Balkinization  

Sunday, December 31, 2017

Who's on Ethical Thin Ice in the Hargan v. Garza Abortion Case?

Marty Lederman

By Marty Lederman and David Luban
This coming Friday, the Supreme Court Justices are scheduled to consider, at conference, the government’s nominal 
“petition for certiorari” in No. 17-654, Hargan v. Garza.  Marty has already written at length on the petition, and we won’t repeat here the many ways in which it is deeply problematic.  Since that first post, there have been further revealing proceedings in the case (see, e.g., this post and this one), and Carter Phillips/Sidley Austin have filed a terrific brief in opposition on behalf of the Respondents, in which they (among other things) carefully explain why the SG’s accusations of ethical breaches by Jane Doe’s attorneys are groundless.  The SG recently filed a reply brief, which doubles down on the allegations of unethical attorney behavior; and David has published a post on why the ethics authorities the SG cites in his reply brief do not support his accusations.

In this post, we address two further items, both related to the attorney ethics aspect of the petition: (i) First, we note the incongruity of the SG using this case to make an unprecedented attack on opposing counsel’s ethics, when the Department of Justice itself has acted in ways that themselves raise ethical questions.  (ii) Second, we address the death penalty analogy that the SG invokes on the final page of his
reply brief--an analogy that appears to have had traction with some readers, if our conversations are any indication.

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Saturday, December 30, 2017

European Commission Savages US

Guest Blogger

James Whitman

Last week there was a landmark moment in comparative law, and in the international crisis of liberal democracy. It should not go unremarked. The European Commission, as the New York Times explained in a condescending editorial, “reminded Poland how a democracy acts,” initiating an Article 7 proceeding because the Law and Justice Party has engineered a “clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law.” The charge, as readers of this blog must all know, is that “Kaczynski and his ilk,” as the Times call them, pushed though judicial “reforms,” with the result, in the words of the Commission, that “the country’s judiciary is now under the rule of the political majority.”

Now, I have no patience for Kaczynski and his ilk, and none of us should. But there is something unbecoming about an American newspaper, and Americans more broadly, sniffing at a country where “the judiciary is now under the rule of the political majority.” If we’re just going to engage in unselfconscious preaching, we will miss an opportunity to think hard about the way things are done here at home.

The Commission’s press release is not a model of clarity on what might count as a “serious breach of the rule of law,” but the fact is that it has enunciated a crucial rule of law principle in this time of transatlantic crisis. Does it really need to be emphasized that the Commission has come down on Poland at the very moment that the last checks on the politicization of the judicial appointments process have fallen by the wayside in the US Senate? The Europeans—or at least the Western Europeans who are still in control in the EU—have just made a formal declaration of a decisive difference between their understanding of liberal democracy and ours. I think the Commission is on the right side of this divide. Others may differ. But it’s a big post-Cold War moment for all of us when the Europeans effectively declare that there is a serious breach of the rule of law in the United States.

And let’s be clear: The politicization of American judiciary may be reaching its climacteric in the Trump era, but it is much older than that. The Commission is not just (sotto voce) condemning Mitch McConnell. It is condemning an American politicization, or if you prefer “democratization,” of the justice system that goes back at least to the rise of the elected judiciary in the Jacksonian era. The fact is that if Trump and McConnell are succeeding in pulling off a Kaczynksi, it is only because American traditions make it easy for them. In the civilized countries of Western Europe, for those who don’t know, judges are recruited into a highly structured career from a young age, and socialized into the values of professional independence that are the sociological foundation of a meaningful rule of law. And that’s to say nothing of professionalized culture of European prosecutors, European prison officials, and more. I’m sure there’s no hope that the American justice will ever look that. But over the last generation it’s come to look less and less like it, and the European Commission has just called us out.


James Q. Whitman is the Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law at Yale Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at james.whitman at yale.edu



Tuesday, December 26, 2017

What Next? The Fiscal Agenda for 2018

David Super


The enactment of the Republican tax legislation is clearly a watershed substantively, politically, fiscally, and procedurally.  It puts an end to the “noxious but ineffective” characterization of the new Administration and Congress, a myth that already had little credibility with anyone who follows health care, the environment, financial regulation, judicial appointments, or other fields.  It also cuts a huge hole in the federal budget at a time in the economic cycle when consolidation and shrinking deficits are more in order.  And it dashes the fairy-tale fantasies of those that imagined that Republican “moderates” would save us from the new regime’s worst excesses.

     With the tax legislation’s enactment coinciding with the end of the calendar year, this seemed like a good time to look forward.  This post addresses the immediate future:  what 2018 is likely to bring us in Congress.  A subsequent post will ponder how the extraordinary enactment of the tax legislation could, and should, change the legislative process.  

     The Republican leadership did an impressive job of postponing potentially distracting issues so that they could move the tax bill.  A great many of those will now reassert themselves with a vengeance, driven either by the exigencies of governance or the demands of one or another part of the Republican coalition.  For example, a range of industries have been quietly advancing extreme anti-environmental legislation that could irreversibly transform this country.

     Fiscal policy again figures to be important.  Before leaving for Christmas, Congress passed another continuing resolution, extending appropriations for government functions lacking permanent funding forward through January 19, 2018.  The idea is that Congress and the Administration will negotiate full-year funding levels by then, allowing enactment of an omnibus appropriations bill for the fiscal year that started October 1.  In theory, this omnibus appropriations bill could become the vehicle for moving legislation on several other pending issues, including relaxation of the “sequestration” caps on discretionary spending, the reauthorization of the Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and protection of “Dreamers” left exposed to deportation by President Trump’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  In practice, these plans may well fall apart.

     Republican and Democratic negotiators reportedly have reached a tentative agreement on the amount by which they would raise the caps on domestic and defense discretionary funding this year and next.  Since the sequester first struck in 2013 under the Budget Control Act of 2011, a widespread recognition that the caps it imposes are unworkable has driven repeated bipartisan agreements that raised those caps and offset the costs with cuts in mandatory, or entitlement, spending. 

     The problem this year is that negotiators remain far apart on what those mandatory offsets would be.  The relatively painless cuts have long-since been enacted.  With Republicans seeing this as the year to radically reduce entitlement programs and Democrats preparing for a broad campaign to defend those programs, agreement on offsets may prove elusive.  If so, Congress may simply pass a year-long continuing resolution that continues each program’s funding at last year’s levels with a substantial across-the-board reduction to bring the totals under the sequester caps.  Widespread budget cuts coming so shortly after the tax legislation seem unlikely to improve the latter’s popularity even if they are technically unrelated.

     Finding spending offsets also appears likely to be an obstacle to extending CHIP.  Although its cost pales relative to that of the tax law, congressional Republicans have insisted that it cannot be renewed without offsets in other domestic spending. 

     Finally, offsets – in addition to the Administration’s hostility toward immigration – will be a major obstacle to granting legal status to Dreamers.  On December 15, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that providing legislative relief for the Dreamers would cost $26.8 billion over ten years, overwhelmingly in health insurance subsidies and the earned income tax credit (EITC).  The Administration and Republicans in Congress will surely demand offsetting domestic spending cuts for these costs – in addition to whatever policy concessions, such as expanding the border wall, they extract.  Finding domestic spending offsets for both DACA restoration and an expensive border wall will be extremely difficult, all the more so if this is on top of spending cuts to pay for sequester relief and CHIP reauthorization.

     On any or all of these issues, Democrats could try to reject the framework that domestic spending – even continuations of existing programs – requires offsets but that massive upper-income tax cuts do not (and that the Pentagon’s budget is off-limits in any event).  Doing so, however, would likely require a willingness trigger a partial government shut-down and the political skills to persuade the electorate to blame Republicans for that shut-down.  Congressional Republicans have repeatedly burned themselves in similar maneuvers and many Democrats are on record opposing government shut-downs for any reason.

     One add-on that does seem likely to appear in any appropriations legislation for the rest of the year is a cancellation of the mandatory spending sequestration that the tax legislation triggered.  The pay-as-you-go provisions in federal budget process law require automatic cuts in certain entitlement programs if Congress cuts taxes, or raises mandatory spending, beyond levels in current law without adequate offsets.  The tax legislation runs radically afoul of these rules, meaning that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to order automatic cuts.  Although many low-income programs are exempt from this sequestration, Medicare would be cut 4% and some other programs, like administration of Pell Grants, would be zeroed out completely.  (This sequester of mandatory programs for pay-as-you-go violations is distinct from the sequester of discretionary spending that the Budget Control Act imposed in 2013.)  Democrats do not want these cuts on the merits, and Republicans do not want to be blamed for them, so legislation waiving this sequestration should face little difficulty.

     Looking farther ahead, House Republicans have made clear that they now intend to pursue entitlement cuts to offset some of the cost of the tax legislation.  They often frame this as “welfare reform”, which would purge millions from Medicaid, SNAP (food stamps), housing assistance, and other anti-poverty programs in part with phony “work requirements.”  Speaker Paul Ryan would like to move these measures as another reconciliation bill, immune from filibuster and requiring only a bare majority in the Senate.  The tax legislation was enacted as the reconciliation bill for the current fiscal year, 2018.  Congressional Republicans can pass a budget resolution for fiscal year 2019 to provide reconciliation protection for entitlement-cutting legislation.  Remaining to be seen is whether Senate Republicans share their House counterparts’ enthusiasm for attacking Medicaid, SNAP, disability benefits, and even Medicare in the wake of passing unpopular upper-income tax cuts.   

     Although the news media is abuzz about the Trump Administration’s supposed populist turn in proposing infrastructure legislation, this is difficult to take seriously.  Although the President’s proposal apparently depends heavily on funding from state and local governments and the private sector, it would still carry a substantial price-tag.  Congressional Republicans will not move such legislation without offsets for the cost and staunchly oppose revenue measures.  Congressional Democrats seem unlikely to support Medicare or food stamp cuts to pay for an infrastructure proposal that includes selling off public assets to private investors at bargain prices.  And most congressional Republicans appear to prefer to allocate any entitlement savings they can extract to deficit reduction or financing tax cuts (which increasingly appear indistinguishable). 

     Fitting in here somewhere will be attention to the statutory debt limit.  CBO estimates that it will need to be raised by late March or early April.  Historically, many Republicans (who happily vote for budget-busting tax legislation) turn deficit-hawk when it comes time to raise the debt limits, forcing Republican leaders to pass measures primarily with Democratic votes.  This fall, Democrats repeatedly warned Republicans not to assume that Democrats would blithely vote for the mammoth debt limit increases to accommodate the tax bill.  If Democrats stand their ground, Republicans may have great trouble rounding up enough votes to pass a debt limit measure on their own; if they can, it would only be through stacking the measure with entitlement cuts (which could cause Senate Democrats to prevent the measure from coming to a vote).  The bruising effort to secure far-right Republican votes for a bill that can pass the Senate could well exhaust the political capital of House Speaker Ryan just as it did that of his predecessor, John Boehner. 

     Optimists can hope that this dilemma will drive our radically non-conformist president to do what President Obama could not bring himself to do:  declare the debt limit unconstitutional and direct the Treasury to ignore it.  As we have just seen, the debt limit provides absolutely no traction against budget-busting legislation, but it does cause a great deal of mischief:  distracting the public from the true sources of fiscal problems, empowering irresponsible lawmakers willing to gamble with the nation’s economic health, and unjustly embarrassing those willing to cast the hard but necessary votes to raise the limit and prevent a crisis. 

The SG’s Empty Ethics Case Against Jane Doe’s Lawyers

David Luban

A few days ago, Solicitor-General Noel Francisco submitted a Reply Brief for Petitioners in Hargan v. Garza, a case in which the government fought against releasing a pregnant teenager (“Jane Doe”) from immigration detention so she could have an abortion. The government lost in an en banc opinion by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and she had the abortion, as was her constitutional right.

The government wants the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and vacate the Court of Appeals decision, on the remarkable ground that Jane Doe’s lawyers, including ACLU counsel, behaved unethically by not telling DOJ when she would have the abortion. As a result, the abortion took place without DOJ filing an emergency motion for a stay. The government also wants the Court to take disciplinary action against Jane Doe’s counsel. My question in this post: how good are the SG’s ethics arguments? And my answer is: not good at all. Giving the government confidential information about the timing of Jane Doe's abortion would have been the real ethics violation.

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Two more remarkable things about the Department of Justice's arguments in the unaccompanied minors' abortion litigation

Marty Lederman

In three recent posts, I've sharply criticized briefs filed by the Department of Justice--and by the Solicitor General, in particular--in the various iterations of the Hargan v. Garza litigation, involving the HHS Office for Refugee Resettlement's new practice of preventing minors in its effective custody from obtaining legal abortions.  (I summarize many of those DOJ failings in a footnote below.*)

Over the weekend, I was listening once again to the oral argument before the D.C. Circuit back on October 20th, and it occurred to me that two further problematic DOJ arguments are also worth flagging.


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Thursday, December 21, 2017

Lawless and Cruel: The HHS Abortion Scandal That's Flying Under the Radar

Marty Lederman

[UPDATED on Dec. 22 to account for filing of Deputy Director memo.]

So many horrifying things are happening every day (see, for example, Jack’s must-read post on the tax bill) that it has become difficult to keep track of, or even to appreciate, every such development.  This is one such case that has escaped much attention--it involves remarkable cruelty and lawlessness, against very vulnerable minors in the custody of the government, committed by a zealous official at the Department of Health and Human Services, and, distressingly, abetted by the Department of Justice, which ought to be putting a stop to the conduct.

As we just learned, the HHS official in question even asserted the authority to decide it is in the best interest of a 17-year-old rape victim to carry her pregnancy to term--and to physically restrain her from exercising her own judgment to the contrary--where that victim was 23 weeks pregnant (in  a state where abortion is only lawful until 24 weeks); where the abortion would be lawful without any parental or judicial involvement; where she had expressed a desire to kill herself rather than to bear the child; and where Congress had, in the Hyde Amendment, actually provided that the federal government could subsidize the abortion because the pregnancy was the result of a rape.  Even in those circumstances, the Director of the agency purported to exercise an authority, not found in any law, to physically restrain the minor from obtaining the abortion, based upon his own assessment that it would be better for the minor to continue the pregnancy because, in his considered view, it is "perhaps likely . . . that this young woman would go on to experience an abortion as an additional trauma on top of the trauma she experiences as a result of her sexual assault," because the abortion would not "undo or erase the memory of the violence committed against her," and because the notion that "it is possible to cure violence with further violence, and that the destruction of an unborn child’s life can in some instances be acceptable as a means to an end," is "dubious," even if the young woman in question does not appreciate it.

(Apologies in advance -- because I wanted to get this out quickly after the memo was released, it's rougher than my usual fare, and perhaps somewhat less dispassionate.  Then again, one doesn't encounter government memos and briefs such as these every day.)
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The Tax Bill and Constitutional Rot

JB

Previously I argued that the Republican attempt to pass a tax cut in the form of a health care bill was evidence of constitutional rot-- the descent of the United States into a system that is less democratic (responsive to popular will), less republican (i.e., one in which representatives act to further the public good) and increasingly oligarchical. that The new tax bill is further evidence.

The basic problem is that the contemporary Republican Party is largely controlled by its wealthiest donors. To stay in power, Congressional Republicans must please these donors, regardless of any promises made to actual constituents. Some of the ways that you please donors involve ideological symbolism and low-profile deregulation, but others are essentially cash transfers.

Using the apparatus of government to pay off the people who keep you in power is pretty much the whole point of oligarchy. This explains why Republicans must say one thing to their constituents but actually do something very different in their legislation, and why they must disregard the judgment of economists and budget analysts about what the tax bill actually does and will do. The public justification of the bill has--and indeed, must have--relatively little connection to the point of the bill, which is to please the relatively small class of powerful and wealthy people who keep the Republican Party in power. These people support Republicans because they want something in return; what they want in return is cash on the barrel head. The public would not support a bill designed on these terms; hence Republicans had to rush the bill through with no hearings, and dissemble publicly about the nature and effects of their legislation.

While it is possible to imagine tax bills that lower tax rates in the service of public-spirited goals, this tax bill is not one of them. The tax bill is not an attempt to close loopholes in exchange for a general lowering of the corporate and individual rates. The tax bill does not simplify the tax code as promised; it does add provisions that will benefit specific donors and pad the wallets of individual Congressmen and Senators (not to mention President Trump himself). This last feature is doubly worrisome; not only are Congressmen and Senators paying off their donors, they are also paying off themselves. The bill is enormously unpopular with the public, and it should be; the process by which the bill was passed is evidence of a guilty conscience.

The tax bill will create deficits, but the total additional deficits are still relatively small in proportion to the total amount the federal government spends. The problem is not the total amount of the deficit but that the bill shows that Congress has largely abandoned the goal of using tax and fiscal policy to further the public interest. That is, the Republican party has now become anti-republican. Instead, Congress seeks to pay off a small number of wealthy individuals and groups and personally enrich sitting Congressmen and Senators. If some of them lose their seats in the next election, they can retire secure in the knowledge that they have taken care of themselves in anticipation of their next careers in business and lobbying.

The point of tax and fiscal policy in a republican form of government is to raise and spend money to create incentives and purchase public goods that will benefit the public interest.  In oligarchical and autocratic governments, government officials constrict spending on public goods and allow government functions and services to atrophy; they distribute income from the broad base of the public to the wealthy, and they divert government revenues to pay off themselves, their family members, and the class of people who keep them in power. This is also a pretty good description of the new tax bill.

It is important not to be alarmist. The United States is still a wealthy country with a tax system that is still broadly progressive, and a government that still spends a considerable amount on public goods. It can absorb a pretty sizeable amount of corruption and self-dealing and still remain a viable democracy. But the current trend is worrisome. Upward redistribution from the poor and middle class to the wealthy since the end of the 1970s is not simply the result of the economic changes that emerged from globalization; it is also the result of the tax and fiscal policies of an increasingly oligarchical system. These policies have shifted risks away from the upper classes and sent them downward to the broad base of the public, even as they have shifted the proceeds from economic growth upward. The Trump era is simply the exaggeration of existing trends.

Yet if the current trajectory continues, we are likely to see an increasing degradation in government functions, a withering of social insurance programs that benefit the poor and middle class, and ever increasing upward redistribution and self-dealing. These are signs of a political economy that cannot support a vibrant democracy; they are evidence of increasing constitutional rot.

I am hopeful that the public will punish the Republican Party for the tax bill in the coming election cycle. Even so, the way our system of government works, it will be very difficult to undo the self-dealing and upward redistributive effects of the bill for some time.

A strongly polarized politics combined with our presidential system of government means that it is easier to use polarization to get in power, redistribute income upwards and get away with it. That is why polarization tends to work hand in hand with increasing income inequality: Inequality leads to popular outrage, which leads to faux populist candidates who stoke anger and distrust of government but actually pay off wealthy donors with legislation that shifts risks onto and income away from constituents. This produces even more unhappiness, distrust and polarization, and the cycle continues. This cycle of polarization and income inequality is also a feature of the constitutional rot of our current system of government.

Matters are far from hopeless. America lived through the First Gilded Age, generating the populist and progressive movements and the New Deal. Something like this might well happen as a result of this, our Second Gilded Age. But if history is any guide, it will be a long, slow, imperfect and fraught process.  My expectation, or rather my hope, is that we are actually fairly far along in this historical transformation, and that the next few election cycles will see a significant change in the terms of our politics-- for the better.



Can a sitting President be sued in a state court?

Richard Primus



Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones ruled unanimously that a sitting President may be sued for conduct occurring before he became President.  Jones was a suit in federal court, so the decision in that case does not resolve the question of whether a sitting President may be sued in a state court in otherwise parallel circumstances.  Right now, there is a pending suit in state court in New York raising that next question.
The suit, Zervos v. Trump, involves a defamation claim brought by a former contestant on the television show The Apprentice.  In 2016, when Donald Trump was campaigning for the Presidency, now-plaintiff Summer Zervos was one of several women who accused Trump of having sexually harassed them in the past.  Trump responded in public, saying some things about Zervos that Zervos alleges constituted actionable defamation under New York law.  Trump’s legal team is arguing that the suit cannot proceed because a state court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a sitting President; in their view, Clinton v. Jones should be limited to federal court.  On the other side, Zervos argues that the principle of Clinton v. Jones should govern in state courts and that plaintiffs may indeed sue sitting Presidents there, subject of course to appropriate docket-management in consideration of the unique demands on a President’s time.  (For doctrinal purposes, the demands on a President’s time are, and I think should be, imagined as constant from President to President, regardless of how the particular President who is the defendant in a given case actually spends his or her time.)   
I’m open to the view that Clinton v. Jones was a hard case, even though it was decided unanimously.  But it seems to me that if Jones is the law, which it is, then Presidents should be subject to suit for pre-presidential conduct in state courts as well as federal ones.  There are various reasons why one might think that a line should be drawn between the two kinds of courts, but on closer inspection I don’t think any of them holds up well.  So, as part of a team that included lawyers from the Protect Democracy Project and the law firm of Ropes & Gray, I submitted an amicus brief in the case explaining why.  The brief is submitted on behalf of three law professors who, twenty years ago, filed an amicus brief in support of Paula Jones’s right to sue Bill Clinton.
I won’t here rehearse the substantive arguments that seem to me persuasive.  That’s what the brief is for.  But I’ll mention two quick points.  First, one might worry that if Presidents can be sued in state courts, there will be no end of vexatious, politically motivated lawsuits before state judges whose own distaste for the relevant Presidents will encourage the judges to be complicit as the politically motivated plaintiffs wreak havoc for Presidents.  In principle, I see the worry.  But the strength of this concern needs to be assessed, I think, in light of a striking fact: between Bill Clinton and Donald Trump, our legal system went through four complete presidential terms without any such vexatious litigation, even though Jones stood as an invitation to try and even though there was no shortage of people with pronounced distaste for Barack Obama or George W. Bush.  Indeed, those four terms saw basically no vexatious litigation against Obama or Bush in their individual capacities even in federal court, where Jones was conspicuously holding the door open.  So perhaps we can’t simply assume that rejecting a state-court immunity will bring on a deluge.  Second, if people were to think that the risk of tying up a President with vexatious litigation is still too great to warrant a rule requiring Presidents to answer for their non-Presidential actions in state court, the problem could easily be solved by Congress through the creation of either an applicable tolling statute or a Presidential-removal provision.  In the absence of such a legislative solution, the case for judicially deeming Presidents subject to suit in federal courts but not state courts strikes me as weak.  Readers interested in a more extensive explanation for why are encouraged to read the brief.

Tuesday, December 19, 2017

State "Hostility" to Religion Without Religious Discrimination?: The Unexpected Free Exercise Issue Lurking in Masterpiece Cakeshop

Marty Lederman

At oral argument two weeks ago in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Justices did not appear to be taken with any of the unconvincing distinctions that the bakery’s counsel and the U.S. Solicitor General were offering with respect to which refusals of service would, and which would not, be constitutionally protected under their compelled speech rationales, such as:

-- between pre-made and made-to-order custom cakes;

-- between jewelers on the one hand and, for some reason, make-up artists and hair stylists on the other;

-- between cake-makers and architects[1];

-- between a chef designing a beautiful presentation for a couple’s anniversary celebration and the baker’s work in this case on a cake for a party to celebrate a wedding; and

-- between discrimination against same-sex couples or interreligious couples (constitutionally protected, according to the argument) and discrimination against interracial couples (purportedly not protected).

To be sure, several of the Justices, and Solicitor General Francisco, raised hypothetical cases in which there might be greater sympathy for a businessperson’s right to discriminate.  Most of those hypos, however, described conduct that the Colorado public accommodations law does not prohibit, and others are not likely to result in many, if any, actual cases (such as Justice Alito’s example of a discriminatory refusal by a company that ghost-writes wedding vows).[2]  Still other of the hypotheticals (e.g., married-student housing at a religious college) would better be viewed not as implicating compelled speech, but instead, as David Cole suggested at argument, as raising the question whether the Court would, or might, craft additional exceptions to the general free exercise doctrine of Employment Division v. Smith.  

Most importantly, however, these hypothetical cases, no matter how sympathetic they might be in the eyes of some or all of the Justices, do not offer useful guidance regarding where the Court could draw any principled doctrinal lines on the compelled speech question.  Thus, even among Justices who might be especially sympathetic to Masterpiece and its owner, Jack Phillips, there did not appear to be much enthusiasm for breaking any significant doctrinal ground on compelled speech.

Such difficulties were hardly unforeseeable or unanticipated.  The oral argument thus renewed the mystery of why the Court granted certiorari in the first place--especially after it had denied the petition in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock four Terms ago, when Justice Scalia was still on the Supreme Court.  Elane Photography raised virtually the same compelled-speech claim as the one at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop.  Indeed, if anything, the free-speech claim in Elane ought to have been the stronger one of the two cases, because it involved artisans—photographers Elaine and Jonathan Huguenin—who were required to perform their services at a same-sex wedding itself, and whose job presumably included using their creativity to put the same-sex couple in the best possible light.  (I don’t mean to suggest that I think the Free Speech Clause requires an exemption in either case—I don’t.  I mean only to point out that in Masterpiece there’s even less possibility that anyone would misattribute any views to the business, and that Masterpiece’s services do not require the baker to feign acceptance/celebration of the couple, something might at least arguably be true in a case such as Elane.)

It therefore came as something of a surprise, three years later, when the Court requested the record in Masterpiece from the state court, put off decision for more than a dozen further conferences after receiving the record, and eventually granted cert.  Was there perhaps something in the record of the Masterpiece case that distinguished it from Elane in a way that troubled one or more Justices—something that might have been the subject of discussions among the Justices in the five months of conferences they had on the case after they received the record from the Colorado state court? 

I speculated that the sticking point might have been the nature of the disclaimers that state law allowed the businesses to display in the two cases—some ambiguity about whether Colorado would allow Masterpiece to post, in its shop or on its website, the sort of signage that the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Elane Photography, held that the vendor there could display without violating state law:  “a disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising that they oppose same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable antidiscrimination laws.”  (As I explain in a footnote, however, the two States probably do not vary from one another in this respect.[3])

The recent oral argument in Masterpiece, however, revealed that there was something very different in the record that was sticking in the craw of at least some Justices—namely, the possibility that one or more of the seven Commissioners on the Colorado Civil Rights Commission might have been biased against religious objectors to Colorado's public accommodations law.  As Justice Kennedy remarked (at pages 51-52 of the transcript), although all the counsel and most of the Justices were focused on the compelled speech question, he was concerned about a possible violation of the Free Exercise Clause, because of the possibility that “at least one member of the [Colorado Civil Rights] Commission” based his or her decision “in significant part . . . on the grounds . . . of hostility to religion.”  In particular, Justice Kennedy and Justice Gorsuch identified two quotations from Commission proceedings that, they suggested, might reflect such hostility.

Below the "fold," I examine more closely the evidence of possible “religious hostility” that Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch raised.  For reasons I'll explain, the two examples of possible animus they identified do not demonstrate a Free Exercise violation by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  Nor, contrary to Justice Alito's suggestion, was the Commission's treatment of other claims against bakeries evidence of impermissible religious or viewpoint discrimination by the agency.

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[UPDATED to account for developments through Tuesday morning, 12/19] HHS's shocking new justification for preventing 17-year-old girls in its custody from obtaining abortions: It knows more than they do about whether the abortions would be in their best interests

Marty Lederman

[UPDATE as of early Tuesday morning, 12/19:  The developments are coming fast and furious and are a bit confusing--bear with me here.  (If you haven't yet done so, you should probably read the main post, below, for context.):

1. On Monday evening, Judge Chutkan issued the TRO, which applies to both girls.  It requires the defendant ORR officials to "allow J.R. and J.P. to be transported--promptly and without delay, . . . to an abortion provider, in order to obtain any pregnancy or abortion-related medical care and to obtain the abortion procedure itself, in accordance with the abortion providers’ availability and any medical requirements," and restrains those defendants "from interfering with or obstructing J.R.’s and J.P.’s access to abortion counseling or an abortion."  Judge Chutkan stayed the order for 24 hours--until 6:05 p.m. today, Tuesday the 19th--to allow the government to seek emergency relief in the D.C. Circuit.  The government then noticed an appeal.  

2. The government moved for stays of the TRO only as applied to Jane Roe in both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.  The government, however, represented that it will not seek a stay as to Jane Poe (the minor who is 22 weeks pregnant).

3.  The D.C. Court of Appeals (Judges Rogers, Tatel and Millett) promptly granted a 24-hour stay of the TRO, until 6:05 p.m. on Wednesday, December 20, 2017, to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the government's emergency motion, but only "to the extent that the order requires appellants to transport Jane Roe or allow Jane Roe to be transported to obtain an abortion procedure."  

At 10:09 this morning, Judge Chutkan lifted the stay as applied to Jane Poe (who is 22 weeks pregnant).  Presumably, then, Jane Poe will obtain her abortion today (Tuesday), and the case now is confined, on appeal, to Jane Roe, who is approximately 10 weeks pregnant.  

4.  The D.C. Circuit motions panel further ordered the appellee (i.e., Roe's lawyers) to file a response to the government's emergency motion for stay by 10:00 a.m. this morning, with the government's reply brief due at 3:00 p.m.  The plaintiffs filed their brief moments ago.  

The panel further directed the parties to address: (1) whether Jane Roe’s independent request for and decision to undergo an abortion fully complies with the relevant state law governing abortions by minors [I believe the answer to this is "yes"]; (2) whether the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) has yet made an individualized decision regarding its view concerning why termination of the pregnancy would not, in its judgment, be in Jane Roe’s best interests [based upon yesterday's oral argument, I believe the answer to this is "no"--and Roe's counsel agrees]; and (3) if no such individualized decision has been made, for ORR to identify "on what basis ORR has concluded that an abortion would not be in Jane Roe’s best interests."  As for this final item, my understanding is that although ORR had concluded that an abortion would not be in Jane Poe's best interests (a determination that will apparently be rendered moot if Poe obtains an abortion later today), ORR has not made a similar determination with respect to Jane Roe.  It is, instead, trying to prevent Jane Roe from having an abortion even if it is in her best interests, at least until such time as she is transferred to the custody of a "sponsor"--allegedly so as to prevent the ORR from being compelled to "affirmatively facilitate" the abortion (but see my discussion below, questioning the "facilitation" rationale).  We shall see shortly whether that understanding is correct.

5.  In the meantime, back in the Jane Poe case, yesterday afternoon the government filed, under seal, the ORR Director's "Decision . . . for Jane Poe," which is, presumably, ORR's explanation for why, in its view, an abortion is not in Poe's interests, thereby overriding her decision to the contrary.  (See my discussion below.)  The ACLU lawyers representing Roe and Poe then filed, with Judge Chutkan, a motion for a public filing of a redacted version of that ORR Decision (and an attached note).  Although Poe's own case might be moot as soon as she obtains her abortion (presumably today), the lawyers represent that the ORR Decision, and the attached note, "provide highly relevant information about Defendants’ challenged policy that ought promptly to be made public, as well as important additional facts about Plaintiff Roe’s situation"--information that the plaintiffs hoped to refer to today in their responses to the government’s emergency motions for stays pending appeal.  Judge Chutkan presumably will rule on that motion early this morning, at which time we might learn relevant new information that bears on Roe's case going forward.  In the meantime, in their filing this morning, Roe's counsel write:
A document filed by Defendants under seal with the district court yesterday regarding the reasons for denying another Plaintiff, Jane Poe’s, request for an abortion makes abundantly clear that Defendants’ refusal to allow young women to access abortions has nothing to do with their best interests and everything to do with Defendant ORR Director Scott Lloyd’s personal opposition to abortion.
END UPDATE (for now)]

Last month I published a post here about the Solicitor General’s nominal “Petition for Certiorari” in No. 17-654, Hargan v. Garza, the case involving HHS’s efforts to deny a 17-year-old girl in its custody, “Jane Doe,” the right to obtain an abortion to which she was entitled under the Constitution and Texas law.

Now, in that same litigation, the Department of Health and Human Services is once again trying to prevent two other unaccompanied, immigrant 17-year-old girls in its custody from obtaining abortions.  HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which has statutory responsibility for such unaccompanied minors, has instructed the private shelters housing the girls (both of which are contract agents of ORR) not to permit the girls to obtain the abortions they are seeking—i.e., to forcibly restrain them from leaving the shelters for the procedures. 

I just returned from a hearing before Judge Chutkan on a motion by “Jane Roe” and “Jane Poe” for a temporary restraining order that would enjoin HHS from requiring the shelters to stand in the way of their abortions.  What makes these second and third cases so remarkable is that they starkly demonstrate the most striking thing about the government's argument:  the fact that HHS simply has no legal, cognizable interest in preventing the abortions.  For that reason alone, Judge Chutkan should grant the TRO.  [UPDATE Monday evening:  Judge Chutkan has issued the TRO, which, inter alia, requires the defendant ORR officials to "allow J.R. and J.P. to be transported—promptly and without delay, . . . to an abortion provider, in order to obtain any pregnancy or abortion-related medical care and to obtain the abortion procedure itself, in accordance with the abortion providers’ availability and any medical requirements," and restrains those defendants "from interfering with or obstructing J.R.’s and J.P.’s access to abortion counseling or an abortion."  Judge Chutkan stayed the order for 24 hours to allow the government to seek emergency relief in the D.C. Circuit.  The government has noticed an appeal.  The government has also moved for stays of the TRO as applied to Jane Roe in both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.  It appears, however, that the government will not seek a stay as to Jane Poe (the minor who is 22 weeks pregnant), who therefore will be able to obtain an abortion tomorrow evening, unless something more happens.]

Jane Roe learned that she is pregnant about four weeks ago.  She is now ten weeks pregnant.  Jane Poe, by contrast, is 22 weeks pregnant—something she recently learned.  (She had previously been told that she was not nearly as far along in the pregnancy.)  Unlike Jane Doe, the plaintiff in the earlier proceeding who was in custody in Texas, neither Roe nor Poe is being held in a state that requires any parental consent or judicial bypass before a minor may exercise her right to an abortion:  That is to say, as far as state law is concerned, there is no obstacle to either young woman exercising her constitutional right to an abortion, as long as the health care professional in question determines that she is capable of providing informed consent to the procedure.  Poe, however, is quickly approaching the point in her pregnancy (fetal viability) where state law might permanently prevent her from exercising her right.  And ORR is preventing both girls from exercising their rights now.

Why?  What reason does ORR give for standing in the way?  The principal state interest that it invokes, just as it did in the Doe case, is that the Constitution does not require the government to “facilitate” an abortion; that ORR does not wish to facilitate abortions; and that the requested injunction would direct ORR to “affirmatively facilitate” the abortions.  I’ve explained previously why there’s nothing to this argument that the injunction would force ORR to “affirmatively facilitate” any abortion—an explanation I’ll repeat below. 

Before I do so, however, it’s important to stress that at the hearing this morning, ORR offered another, quite shocking rationale as applied to the case of Jane Poe, who is 22 weeks pregnant:  ORR has determined, according to its DOJ lawyer, that it is not in Poe’s own interest to have the abortion, even though she has decided otherwise.  In support of this argument, ORR cites 6 U.S.C. 279(b)(1)(B), which provides that the ORR Director is “responsible” for “ensuring that the interests of the child are considered in decisions and actions relating to the care and custody of an unaccompanied alien child.”  ORR reads this legislative conferral of “responsibility” upon the Director to include the authority to override the minor’s own decision about whether an abortion is in her own interest.  (The government did not explain at the hearing why or how the Director had made the decision that an abortion was not in Poe’s interest—and, in particular, whether that determination was based upon anything more than the Director’s own belief that abortion is immoral.  Judge Chutkan directed counsel to file an explanation by 3 p.m. today.)

Think about that argument for a second.  And recall that in the Jane Doe case, in the D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Kavanaugh understood the government to have “expressly assumed, . . . presumably based on its reading of Supreme Court precedent, that the Government lacks authority to block Jane Doe from obtaining an abortion.”  We now know that that is not the government’s position, if it ever was:  ORR now boldly claims that it has the authority to block Jane Poe’s abortion—permanently—because its Director knows better than she does what her best interests are.
  
I have not had time to do any research on section 279(b)(1)(B), but—simply as a matter of statutory interpretation—I would be shocked if Congress intended to confer such “override” authority on the Director with respect to such a significant, constitutionally protected choice of the minor.

Not surprisingly, it appeared that Judge Chutkan was shocked, too, when DOJ tendered this argument at the hearing.  After all, she noted, a state could not constitutionally afford even the minor’s parent such an unqualified power to override a daughter’s determination of whether an abortion is in her best interests.  The notion, therefore, that Congress has—and constitutionally could—confer such authority upon the ORR Director is, to say the least, very dubious.

As I noted above, ORR’s other stated interest—besides the audacious notion that it must be permitted to act in accord with its own determination of what is in Jane Poe’s best interest—is in not being compelled to “affirmatively facilitate” abortions.  As Judge Millett wrote in the Doe case, however, this is “verbal alchemy.”  The TRO would not require the defendant government officials to “facilitate” an abortion or, for that matter, to do anything.  The injunction would be prohibitory.  As Judge Millett elaborated:

The government need not pay for [the minor’s] abortion; she has that covered (with the assistance of her guardian ad litem).  The government need not transport her at any stage of the process; [she] and her guardian ad litem have arranged for that.  Government officials themselves do not even have to do any paperwork or undertake any other administrative measures.  The contractor detaining [the minor] has advised that it is willing to handle any necessary logistics, just as it would for medical appointments if [she] were to continue her pregnancy.  The government also admitted at oral argument that, in light of the district court’s order, the Department of Health and Human Services does not even need to complete its own self-created internal “best interests” form.  See Oral Arg. 31:40-33:15.

In sum, then, the TRO would merely forbid ORR officials from barring the contracting shelters from allowing Poe and Roe to receive medical care.  Standing aside, and declining for a few hours to hold a human in custody, is not a form of "affirmative facilitation," if those words have any meaning.

Indeed, if ORR’s simple failure to prohibit a minor’s agents from transporting her to the clinic actually entailed ORR's “facilitation" of the ensuing abortion, it would follow that the Department of Homeland Security and federal Bureau of Prisons regularly “facilitate” abortions when they transport their custodial detainees to clinics so that those women may obtain such procedures.  Surely that cannot be the view of the United States--yet it is the logical implication of the government’s absurd “affirmative facilitation” argument. 

Moreover, ORR’s own argument in Roe’s case undermines its “facilitation” claim.  As in the Jane Doe case, ORR is willing to permit Roe to obtain an abortion so long as ORR first transfers her to the custody of a “sponsor.”  If ORR’s failure to stand in the way of the private efforts to take Roe from the shelter to the clinic would result in ORR’s “affirmative facilitation” of Doe’s abortion, however, as DOJ argues, then it stands to reason that ORR’s transfer of Roe to a sponsor’s custody—and its subsequent failure to do anything to prevent that sponsor from taking Roe to the clinic for the abortion—would likewise result in ORR being responsible for “affirmatively facilitating” the abortion.  (Indeed, as Judge Millett explained in the Doe case, transferring the minor to a sponsor would, if anything, require far more use of governmental resources than the simple transfer of the minor the contractor shelter to the custody of private parties who would assist her in obtaining her abortion.)  The remedy ORR is seeking in Roe’s case, then, belies the “affirmative facilitation” claim upon which its argument depends.

In sum, ORR simply has no good reason—surely none that Congress has recognized or authorized the agency to act upon—to continue to require the shelters to physically restrain Roe and Poe from exercising their constitutional rights.  That, in and of itself, is enough to resolve these cases.

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