tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-40937192024-03-18T15:58:26.492-04:00BalkinizationBalkinization
<br>an unanticipated consequence of
<br>Jack M. Balkin
<br>
<br>JBhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02309372047622319060noreply@blogger.comBlogger8597125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-37530194676868038722024-03-18T12:30:00.001-04:002024-03-18T12:32:17.460-04:00Comstockery in the Court and on the Campaign<p style="text-align: left;"></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>Reva
Siegel & Mary Ziegler<br /></span><span><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>We have just posted </span><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4761751"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span>Comstockery</span></i></a> on SSRN<span>,
the first legal history of the Comstock Act since the antiabortion movement
began arguing for reviving enforcement of the law in the wake of </span><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf"><i><span>Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization</span></i></a><span>. The movement
has advanced claims to revive enforcement of this 1873 federal obscenity
law—whose long-unenforced provisions cover abortion-related articles—in courts
and in the presidential campaign. This post provides a brief update.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><br /> <o:p></o:p></span><span>On March 26, <i>Food and Drug Administration v.
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine</i> will return to the Supreme Court.
Representing the Alliance, the </span><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/09/alliance-defending-freedoms-legal-crusade"><span>Alliance
Defending Freedom (ADF), a leader of the Christian legal movement</span></a><span>
that has played key roles in </span><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/09/alliance-defending-freedoms-legal-crusade"><span>15
Supreme Court cases</span></a><span>, including <i>Dobbs </i>and <i>303
Creative v. Elenis</i>, has challenged the FDA’s authority to approve mifepristone,
a drug used in more than half of all abortions, under the relevant laws and regulations.
ADF has further sought to overturn several subsequent FDA decisions, including one
in 2021 permitting the use of telehealth for medication abortion. In the case
now before the Court, ADF argues that the removal of an in-person-visitation requirement
was arbitrary and capricious </span><a href="https://dm1l19z832j5m.cloudfront.net/2024-02/FDA-v-Alliance-for-Hippocratic-Medicine-2024-02-22-SCOTUS-Opening-Brief_0.pdf"><span>under
the APA</span></a><span>. ADF also makes a Comstock claim against the 2021
modification, asserting that the plain meaning of the statute bars the mailing
of </span><a href="https://dm1l19z832j5m.cloudfront.net/2024-02/FDA-v-Alliance-for-Hippocratic-Medicine-2024-02-22-SCOTUS-Opening-Brief_0.pdf"><span>any
abortion-related article</span></a><span>. This argument has received
attention from conservative judges, including Judge James Ho </span><a href="https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-10362-CV1.pdf"><span>of
the Fifth Circuit</span></a><span>; <span style="background: white; color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">in the district court, Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk granted
a motion for preliminary injunction in the spring of 2023 that would have
withdrawn the approval of mifepristone, reasoning that the statute plainly d</span></span><span style="color: black;">eclares
“nonmailable” anything “advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead
another to use it or apply it for </span><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txndce/2:2022cv00223/370067/137/"><span>producing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">abortion.</span></i>”<span><a name='more'></a></span></span></a></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txndce/2:2022cv00223/370067/137/"><span><br /></span></a><span style="color: black;">Whether or not the Court or some Justices reach the Comstock claim, <i>Alliance
for Hippocratic Medicine</i> is a vehicle for spotlighting Comstock claims that
are now asserted in several arenas<i>.</i> Comstock revivalists, including
Jonathan Mitchell—who represented Donald Trump before the Supreme Court in the
ballot-disqualification case and just won the </span><a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/texas-parental-consent-birth-control-fifth-circuit-title-x/"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Deanda</i></a><span style="color: black;">
case in the Fifth Circuit expanding parental rights over minor access to
contraception—argue that the Comstock Act bans the mailing or <i>receiving</i>
of any abortion-related item without exception—and thus, that the Comstock Act
serves as a backdoor ban on all abortions. </span><span style="color: black;">“E<span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">ven though the
Comstock law does not ban abortion literally,” Mitchell has explained, “it bans
the shipment or receipt of any abortion-related </span></span><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/health/womens-health/small-rural-communities-are-becoming-abortion-access-battlegrounds-rcna84921"><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">equipment,”</span></a><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; color: black; padding: 0in;"> and no
abortion takes place in the United States without some item sent in the mail. Mitchell
and his colleague, the preacher Mark Lee Dickson, have written the Comstock Act
into local ordinances they describe as creating </span><a href="https://www.liveaction.org/news/lea-county-new-mexico-sanctuary-county-unborn"><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">“sanctuary cities for the unborn.”<br /></span></a><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; color: black; padding: 0in;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; color: black; padding: 0in;">Comstock has also come to
play a significant role on the campaign trail. Antiabortion figures close to
Donald Trump had made the Comstock Act the centerpiece of a presidential
transition plan, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Mandate for
Leadership</i>, led by the Heritage Foundation and developed by more than 70
conservative groups. Under Trump, explains the </span><a href="https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/project2025/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">Mandate for Leadership</span></i></a><span style="background: white; border: 1pt none windowtext; color: black; padding: 0in;">, the Department of Justice should prosecute drug
manufacturers and providers who supply abortion pills. Mitchell has been clear
that the Comstock Act could be transformed into the abortion ban that the
antiabortion movement could never convince the American people to enact. </span><span style="background: white; color: black;">“We don’t need a federal ban,” Mitchell
recently told the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">New York Times</i>,
“when we have Comstock </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/17/us/politics/trump-allies-abortion-restrictions.html"><span style="background: white;">on
the books</span></a><span style="background: white; color: black;">.”<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p>In
an <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4761751">article
forthcoming in the <i>Yale Law Journal</i></a>, we provide a legal history of
the Comstock Act. We cover the drafting, enactment and evolving enforcement of
the obscenity statute over decades <a href="https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/23-022_5aea8c22-4e30-4135-9d8e-098ab26225a5.pdf">when the postal
service was the nation’s primary network of communication</a>, well before
modern understandings of the First Amendment. We first show how Comstock
censorship of speech and things in the United States mail and other media provoked
conscientious objection and popular resistance, and then demonstrate that the
public’s response to this censorship, called “<a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Comstockery&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3">Comstockery</a>,” played an
important role in germinating our traditions of free speech and of sexual and
reproductive freedom. The article offers critical resources for evaluating claims for
revived enforcement of Comstock now asserted in courts and in politics.<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />We challenge
revivalist claims now advanced in the courts and on the campaign trail on two
grounds—contesting claims about the law’s meaning and its democratic legitimacy.
First, unlike revivalists,
we demonstrate that the meaning of procuring or producing abortion was not
plain or absolute at the time of enactment or today. The statute was an
innovative form of obscenity law whose meaning was underdetermined at enactment
and evolved dramatically over time, diverging widely from the abortion ban
advocates construct today. In a history that ranges over debate about dildos, condoms,
and medical texts on the symptoms of venereal disease, we show that the Comstock provision censoring “any article or thing designed or intended for the
prevention of conception or procuring of abortion [or] any article or thing
intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or nature” was concerned
about suppressing illicit sex, not about obstructing access to needed medical
care—as courts ruled in increasing numbers, culminating in the widely cited and
reported appellate decisions of the 1930s. Our reading of the Comstock law’s
enactment text and history offers another important perspective on the
authority of the 1930s decisions whose congressional ratification the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/application-comstock-act-mailing-prescription-drugs-can-be-used-abortions">Office of Legal Counsel Memo</a> demonstrates.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Second,
we show that there are deep problems of democratic legitimacy in reinventing the
Comstock Act as a twenty-first century abortion ban. <span style="color: black;">The public’s view of the obscenity statute as </span><a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Comstockery&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3">Comstockery</a><span style="color: black;">—as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">illegitimate</i>—led
to the statute’s declining enforcement and evolving interpretation in the
1930s. Arguments for revival, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">especially</i>
textualist claims that disparage the significance of the statute’s historical
context, misread the statute and <i>assume the Comstock statute’s democratic
legitimacy</i>: they reason about the law as if it were duly enacted by a
democratically legitimate body <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">and</i>
that the public had ordinary opportunities for debate over its enactment,
revision, and repeal.<br /> <o:p></o:p></span><span style="color: black;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span><span style="color: black;">Comstock’s
history shows the deepest problems with reviving enforcement of the law is that
the law was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> enacted or enforced
in conformity with any of the presuppositions of contemporary democracy. There
is the fundamental fact that only a minority of adults were entitled to vote on
the statute’s enactment, and that those whose lives would be the most affected
by the law were the least able to shape its terms. But this is hardly the Comstock’s
law’s only democratic legitimacy problem.<br /> </span><span style="color: black;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span><span style="color: black;">Aggravating
women’s exclusion from deliberation over the law’s passage is the government’s
long running effort to prevent women and men from securing the law’s repeal.
Unlike other laws enacted under voting restrictions we would today call
unconstitutional, <i>this statute was insulated from criticism and repeal by generations
of censorship and surveillance whose effect was to deform the democratic
political process for generations after</i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">.</i></span> Federal appellate decisions interpreting the contraceptive
and abortion provisions of the Comstock Act exerted authority both because they
were rooted in a fair reading of the federal obscenity statute <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">and </i>in deep public support forged in
popular conflict over the statute’s enforcement.<br /> <o:p></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Our article uncovers in conflicts over Comstock’s
enforcement popular claims on democracy, liberty, and equality in which we can
recognize roots of modern free speech law and the law of sexual and
reproductive liberty lost to constitutional memory. <span style="color: black;">Understanding Comstock’s history allows us to tell a
different story about the origins of cases like <i>Roth</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Griswold, </i>and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Roe</i>, one that reaches back to the men and women resisting the
state’s efforts, under Comstock, to control political speech and the sexual and
reproductive lives of the American people—a story that gives new meaning to
American traditions of liberty and democracy. If there is any feature of the
Comstock story that warrants reviving, it is the voices of these forgotten
authors of our constitutional present.<br /> <o:p></o:p></span><span style="color: black;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span></span><i>Reva Siegel is Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law at Yale Law School. You can reach her by e-mail at reva.siegel@yale.edu.</i></div><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Mary Ziegler is Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at U.C. Davis School of Law. You can reach her by e-mail at mziegler@ucdavis.edu.</i></div><p style="text-align: left;">
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<br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-13170324199796114782024-03-18T09:30:00.006-04:002024-03-18T09:30:00.137-04:00A Surreal Right to Vote: Responding to the Balkinization Symposium <div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Richard L. Hasen<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>When Jack Balkin graciously put together a symposium
featuring leading election law thinkers to discuss my new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X/?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_w=QVtgM&content-id=amzn1.sym.cf86ec3a-68a6-43e9-8115-04171136930a&pf_rd_p=cf86ec3a-68a6-43e9-8115-04171136930a&pf_rd_r=136-4658653-0162000&pd_rd_wg=3dlec&pd_rd_r=0bdb6c50-190a-4477-8e1c-81dd22220b65&ref_=aufs_ap_sc_dsk"><i>A
Real Right to Vote</i></a>, I did not expect that my proposal to amend the U.S.
Constitution to affirmatively protect the right to vote would garner universal
support. But I also did not expect to be compared to <i>both</i> <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/dare-to-dream.html">Don Quixote</a> <i>and</i>
a milquetoast version of <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/do-we-need-audacity-instead-of-measured.html">Paul
Revere</a> who wants to develop a plan to fight the British in 50 years.
Although all of the eminent commentators—<a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/going-big-on-election-reform-political.html">Bruce
Cain</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/a-more-real-right-to-vote.html">Wilfred
Codrington</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/that-little-omission-in-constitution.html">Alex
Keyssar</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/do-we-need-audacity-instead-of-measured.html">Sandy
Levinson</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/some-skepticism-about-and-some-promise.html">Derek
Muller</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/dare-to-dream.html">Dan
Tokaji</a>, <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/expanding-our-constitutional-imagination.html">Michael
Waldman</a>, and <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/03/give-us-lasting-consensus-on-really.html">Emily
Zhang</a>— have many positive things to say about this book, a constitutional
amendment, and my work more generally (and for that I am grateful), there’s a
definite Goldilocksian problem: I am either too bold in my proposals, or too naïve
about the possibility of change in our hyperpolarized political era, or
insufficiently audacious in not also solving the problem of partisan
gerrymandering or junking the entire Constitution and starting over with a
constitutional convention.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Rather than taking solace for falling somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum among these eminent commentators, it is worth asking
what these set of critiques tell about three key issues I address in <i>A Real
Right to Vote</i>: the nature of the problems with the current state of U.S.
elections and election law; the extreme difficulty of achieving meaningful
constitutional change, especially in the area of voting rights; and the lack of
viable alternatives to pursuing a long term constitutional strategy to expand
voting rights.<span><a name='more'></a></span><br /><o:p><br /></o:p><i>The problems with elections and election law</i>. There
seems to be widespread agreement among the commentators that the
hyperdecentralized, polarized election system in the United States creates
conditions for continued political inequality, a high rate of election
litigation that can undermine confidence in the election system, and a risk of
election subversion. Alex Keyssar, the country’s leading historian on voting
and a vocal advocate for a constitutional amendment in the aftermath of the 2000
election debacle, agrees I have made the case “that statutes alone are
inadequate to do the job and, more disturbingly, that in recent decades the
courts—most importantly, SCOTUS—have become unreliable protectors of democratic
rights.” Emily Zhang similarly gushes over the potential for a “truly secure
right to vote” and what it might mean for American democracy compared to the
situation on the ground today.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>An affirmative right to vote in the Constitution would further
the goals of political equality, especially for minority voters who continue to
end up being the most burdened by restrictive voting laws. As Dan Tokaji notes,
“The problems include state laws that fence out eligible voters, usually people
are less affluent and often people of color.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Hasen rightly focuses attention on difficulties in voting that confront
many Native American voters, especially those living on reservations.”<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>In one universe, courts would fill in the gaps in voter
protection. But we do not live in this universe. Indeed, one of the themes of <i>A
Real Right to Vote</i> is that for most of the Supreme Court’s 235-year
history, it has been a laggard rather than a leader when it has come to voting
rights. The Court has not protected the voting rights of women,
African-Americans or others even when the Constitution fairly read should have been
read to have done so.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>This realization took me a while. As Bruce Cain notes, over
time I have lost faith in courts as impartial agents that could be expected to
fairly protect voting rights. Without a Court-centered approach to voter
protection, change will have to come from elsewhere. Keyssar asks why it is
that we have a Supreme Court that is so hostile to the protection of voting
rights in a country that perceives itself as a leader on democracy. He says it
can’t just be our “elderly” Constitution. That is not a question I try to
answer in <i>A Real Right to Vote</i>.<i> </i>But regardless of the reason, the
trend is clear, and it is not in favor of the voter.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>The difficulty of constitutional change, especially on
voting</i>. If the current Constitution lacks sufficient protection for voting
rights, and courts are not stepping up, then why not simply amend the
Constitution to provide for robust political protection? In short, under
current conditions of political polarization, where Democrats cannot even pass
comprehensive voting rights <i>legislation</i> (as in H.R. 1), how could
Democrats and Republicans come together to meet supermajority requirements in
Congress and a supermajority of state legislatures necessary for <i>a
constitutional amendment</i>? It’s not for nothing that Tokaji compares me to
(the film, not novel version of) Don Quixote. Cain similarly believes the
prospects of my amendment passing are even less than H.R. 1, and of course he’s
right.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>I don’t sugarcoat things in <i>A Real Right to Vote</i> and
I won’t do so here. Passing an amendment won’t be easy and won’t happen soon. First,
the time horizon for an amendment like this passing is decades, much like the
struggles over other voting amendments to the Constitution such as the Fifteenth
and the Nineteenth Amendments. But galvanizing support over the amendment (as
Zhang and Tokaji acknowledge) itself pays dividends along the way, raising
consciousness and creating the conditions for incremental voting improvements
perhaps, as Zhang notes, through state constitutions. At this point in U.S.
history, a majority of Americans were not born when a single voting-related
amendment to the Constitution was passed or ratified. We have to set high goals
even if they are not immediately achievable.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>The lack of a better path for fixing our elections</i>. With
a constitutional amendment being very difficult to achieve, at least in the
short run, we can look for alternatives, and the commentators offer a variety
of alternative paths forward. Together, however, they seem either inadequate or
even less achievable than my proposed amendment.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>1. Big voting statutes and reliance on courts</i>. Some
of the commentators would rely on existing (or enlarged) federal statutes and
judicial protection of voters. Tokaji contends that a right to vote amendment
would be unlikely to reduce polarization or the amount of election litigation,
and that existing enforcement of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could essentially do the same work as my
proposed amendment.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Like Tokaji, Michael Waldman thinks the statutory route
would be a good one: “[I]t is far from clear that constitutional language would
offer stronger protection than well-crafted statutes.” Somewhat in tension with
this point, Waldman adds that: “Perhaps the biggest problem with a
constitutional strategy: it would still rely on judges to enforce it. Indeed,
an amendment would shove the issue of voting rights even more vigorously into
the courtroom. And American history gives little comfort that judges can be
trusted with such a task.”<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The main weakness with the <i>statutes and courts</i>
approach compared to the amendment is that it considers politics and judicial
review in a static way. Imagine how the world would be different if political
momentum increased to pass the right to vote amendment. Doing so would send a
signal to our leaders and the courts to prioritize voting rights. Those who
ignored strong voters’ <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>will would do so
at their peril. So the amendment process <i>itself </i>would help protect
voting rights.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As to judicial review, my amendment provides much more detailed
language (language that Waldman terms “nearly legislative”), directing courts
to protect voting rights in specific ways. To the extent that judges feel any
obligation to follow clear, mandatory language, the new amendment in the
Constitution could serve to rein in judges hostile to voting rights in a way
that earlier vaguely-worded amendments did not.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p><i>2. Make only small change</i>. Some commentators would go
even narrower, resulting in fewer protections for voters. Unique among the
commentators, but likely expressing an opinion consistent with many
conservatives in the United States, Muller expresses opposition to enshrining
the right to vote in the constitution for what he calls “eminently practical
reasons.” He thinks the amendment would tend to either have federal courts
micromanage state and local elections or the amendment would be read to not do
much at all to protect voting rights, leaving us in the same place we were
before.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Muller’s solution is a federal law that would do no more
than create both automatic voter registration and a national id program (one of
the parts of my amendment). He believes such a statute would have bipartisan
appeal (though it could also muster bipartisan opposition).<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Such federal legislation would accomplish much less,
however, than the amendment. It would not deal with other burdens on voters,
nor would it rein in courts, requiring them to resolve disputes over onerous
voting rules in favor of the voter. The way to minimize the resistance of
courts to the protection of voting right is to constitutionalize the rules and
to make them explicit. After a period of litigation in federal courts,
jurisdictions will learn the boundaries of proper behavior and stop trying to
mess with voting rules without very good reason for doing so.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Somewhat in Muller’s spirit, Keyssar would offer what I
would term a “Right to Vote Lite,” stripping out automatic voter registration
and identification, protection for minority voting rights, and my directions to
courts for how to balance voters’ rights against a state’s purported interests.
One wonders if such a pared down amendment would be worth the herculean effort
to pass it. It would likely cause courts to see it as accomplishing basically
nothing and give them free rein to continue favoring states over voters.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>3. Go big or go home. </i>Sandy Levinson comes it this
from the opposite direction from Muller, with the most radical set of proposals.
While he’s ready to award me the Presidential Medal of Freedom (thanks Sandy!)
he sees “pathos” in my desire to come up with a proposal that has at least a
small chance of being enacted.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>As anyone familiar with Levinson’s work would expect, he is impatient
with change, ready to throw out the entire Constitution and start over, through
a constitutional convention that, inter alia, would provide for broad voting
rights. Levinson is right that what I propose is not my ideal—for example, as I
wrote in my 2012 book, <i>The Voting Wars</i>, I favor national non-partisan
election administration in the United States, but I do not incorporate that in
my proposed amendment because it is such a nonstarter.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>The key divide between Levinson and me is whether there is a
difference in achievability between what I propose and his proposal to blow
everything up. I believe, like Keyssar, that a carefully crafted proposal would
have a better (dare I say realistic?) chance of adoption in the longer run
compared to a convention and adoption of amendments by the states. As Cain
adds, “There is no reason to believe that a new US convention would be any more
capable of working through these issues than the Congress or state
legislatures.”<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>In a similar, if less radical, spirit, Wilfred Codrington
takes me to task for not including the problem of partisan gerrymandering in my
amendment. As his close reading of my book and my earlier work shows, I find
the gerrymandering problem a much harder one to solve, although I have come to
believe that independent commission model for redistricting, enacted through
voter initiatives when available, provide the best way to deal with the
excesses of extreme partisan gerrymandering. I did not tackle this problem in <i>A
Real Right to Vote</i> because I consider it to be a separate and particularly difficult
problem.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>But Codrington makes a strong case to add redistricting commissions
within the scope of an amendment. He makes an especially good point that
allowing states to continue to engage in some partisan actions like
gerrymandering while barring race-based discrimination in voting will lead
states to defend their potentially raced-based actions on partisan grounds. So
I remain open to including partisan gerrymandering in an amendment, recognizing
that there are tradeoffs.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>Getting from here to there. </i>In the end, a push for a
constitutional amendment needs to dream big but start small. As Cain helpfully
adds: “If we take the laboratories of democracy concept seriously, we should
work out the kinks of the reform agenda at the state level, and then scale up
to the national level.”<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Cain uses this point to argue against constitutionalizing
voting rights (“Imposing national reform on a divided electorate is just a
pathway to more reform controversy and electoral paranoia”), but his approach
would mean we are least likely to get voting reform where we need it the most. But
a push for a national amendment has to start somewhere, and starting in the
states would have the benefit not only of working out the kinks, but also of
showing skeptical voters in other states that democracy-enhancing measures
would not mean the end of efforts at election integrity.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>In the end, the push for a constitutional right to vote
would achieve the promise of equality going back as far as the Declaration of
Independence but far from realized in this country. As Zhang puts it, if such
an amendment passes we should be “more excited for what having such an
amendment would memorialize: that enough people cared about the right to vote
so much as to perform a veritable political feat to protect it.”<o:p> </o:p></span></div><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Richard L. Hasen is Professor of Law and Political Science, and Director, Safeguarding Democracy Project, at UCLA. You can reach him by e-mail at hasen@law.ucla.edu.</i><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-41639501367532223742024-03-13T09:30:00.001-04:002024-03-13T09:30:00.134-04:00Dare to Dream<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2023)</a>.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Dan Tokaji</span></p><p></p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #202124; line-height: 107%;">This is my
quest to follow that star</span><span style="color: #202124; line-height: 107%;"><br />
<span style="background: white;">No matter how hopeless, no matter how far . . .<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><span style="background: white; color: #202124; line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">And the
world will be better for this . . .<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“<a href="https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/andywilliams/theimpossibledreamthequest.html">The
Impossible Dream</a>,” as sung by Don Quixote in <i>Man of La Mancha</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Toward the end of his new book <i>A Real Right to Vote: How
a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy</i>, Rick Hasen
addresses the concern that it might seem “quixotic and naïve” (p. 149) to
pursue an amendment to the U.S. Constitution adding an affirmative right to
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No one can plausibly accuse Hasen
of naivete.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The foremost chronicler American
election law, he is well aware of both the formidable challenges we face and the
herculean difficulties in amending the Constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In one sense, however, <i>A Real Right to
Vote </i>is worthy of Quixote (though more like the musical’s version than the
novel’s).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It embodies a hopeful idealism
about democracy and the possibility for its improvement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The constitutional amendment Hasen imagines
may not be achievable, but the world would be better if we followed his quest. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To his credit, Hasen is clear-eyed and forthright about how
hard this would be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A constitutional
amendment generally requires either a convention or two-thirds affirmative vote
in both chambers of Congress, followed by ratification in three-quarters of states.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In
this era of hyperpolarization, it’s difficult to imagine achieving the consensus
across party lines that would be required to clear this bar.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">That said, Hasen accurately diagnoses the maladies of our
current election system and prescribes effective remedies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problems include state laws that fence
out eligible voters, usually people are less affluent and often people of color.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen rightly focuses attention on difficulties
in voting that confront many Native American voters, especially those living on
reservations (pp. 5, 92-99).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sadly, the
Supreme Court majority elided those difficulties in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf"><i>Brnovich
v. DNC</i></a> (2021).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In that case, the
Court upheld Arizona voting rules with a disparate impact on Native American voters,
in an opinion that has made it more difficult to challenge similar burdens
under the Voting Rights Act.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Arizona isn’t unique.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Over the past two decades, many states have adopted rules that impede
access to voting<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>-- which I’ve termed “<a href="https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3694&context=sclr">the
new vote denial</a>” -- even as other states have liberalized their voting
rules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The polarization of election laws has <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-june-2023">recently
accelerated</a>, following a familiar red-blue divide:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Republican-led states making voting rules
more strict while Democratic-led states have made voting easier. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Hasen’s recommended changes would improve access without
compromising election integrity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One of the items at the top of his wish list
(and rightly so) is automatic voter registration, which would put the onus on states
to register all eligible voters (pp. 60-61, 154).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Other possible
additions are banning felon disenfranchisement (after sentence completion),
enfranchising voters in U.S. territories in presidential elections, eliminating
the Electoral College, and changing the composition of the U.S. Senate (pp. 155-58).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All of these changes would make our democracy
more inclusive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I’m more skeptical of Hasen’s claim that a right-to-vote
amendment would address the more deep-seated challenges that American democracy
faces.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s not clear that a constitutional amendment
would reduce partisan polarization, deescalate the voting wars, or deter
election subversion (pp. 15, 17).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor is
it likely to reduce the volume of election litigation, which has increased
since 2000 (p. 102).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is largely
attributable to the dynamism in election laws and practices in this era, as
well as the hyperpolarized environment in which changes have taken place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A right-to-vote amendment seems more likely
to increase litigation – not necessarily a bad thing so long as states continue
to adopt barriers to full and equal participation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In any event, the real problem isn’t neither the volume of
voting litigation nor the absence of tools to address such barriers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the
right hands, the existing U.S. Constitution and Voting Rights Act would be
powerful tools for protecting the right to vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem, as Hasen aptly puts it, is the
“ultra-conservative Supreme Court supermajority that gives every benefit of the
doubt to states that pass laws intended to make it harder to vote” (p. 9). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And it’s the Supreme Court that would
ultimately interpret any constitutional amendment protecting the right to
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For that reason, the post-Reconstruction history of voting
rights provides a cautionary tale for those seeking to expand voting access by
way of constitutional amendment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite
the Fifteenth Amendment’s express prohibition on denial or abridgement of the
vote on account of race, southern states disenfranchised African Americans <i>en
masse</i> in the last three decades of the Nineteenth Century.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As Hasen recounts (p. 23), the Supreme Court
shamefully refused to intervene in Alabama’s blatantly racist denial of voting
rights in <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/189/475/"><i>Giles
v. Harris</i> (1903)</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
consequence was that most southern Blacks were prevented from voting until the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No matter how
clear its language, the impact of a constitutional amendment will depend largely
on the composition of the courts interpreting it. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To be fair, Hasen understands that most progress in voting
rights has come from political actors rather than judges.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, that point is core to his
argument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His proposed right-to-vote amendment
would, if enacted, shore up the defense against future constitutional challenges
to federal legislation protecting access to the ballot (pp. 65-66).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That would make a difference – but also makes
it more doubtful that bipartisan consensus on a constitutional amendment could
be achieved. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s hard to imagine many
Republicans embracing such an amendment, even in the most modest form the book envisions.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Hasen’s response to these concerns is that we should play
the long game.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His chief model is the Nineteenth Amendment,
with which the book begins (pp. 1-2).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
took over seven decades to enact the federal constitutional amendment
prohibiting sex discrimination in voting. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>During that lengthy period, suffragists built
a movement that enshrined women’s right to vote in many states’
constitutions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">A closer model might be the Equal Rights Amendment, which would
have more broadly prohibited sex discrimination by government.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although the ERA didn’t ultimately become
law, it helped galvanize a movement in support of equal rights for women, which
resulted in major changes in the law and the world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Supreme Court ultimately read the Equal
Protection Clause to protect women from invidious sex discrimination.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Today, half the states have constitutional
provisions explicitly prohibiting sex discrimination.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The struggle for the ERA was part of a
movement that ultimately led to protections against discrimination not only on
the basis of sex, but also gender, gender identity and expression, and sexual
orientation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We could imagine something similar happening with a
right-to-vote amendment. Even if its
prospects for enactment are dim, rallying around such an amendment could help
strengthen the movement to increase access to the ballot and make our democracy
more inclusive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That might take the form
of enhanced state constitutional protection for voting rights. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It could <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>also lead to federal legislation and greater
judicial solicitude for laws protecting access to the ballot. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some might argue that pursuit of a federal constitutional
amendment diverts time and energy from other, more realistic paths to reform.
But I don’t think that’s how movements work. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Uniting around a common goal can create the
energy that spurs political change, even if the ultimate objective proves elusive.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen’s dream may well be impossible, but
he’s not tilting at windmills.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Dan Tokaji is the Fred W. and Vi Miller Dean and
Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at <o:p></o:p></span>tokaji@wisc.edu.</i></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-64717754039014488562024-03-12T09:30:00.003-04:002024-03-12T11:33:28.264-04:00Some skepticism about (and some promise for) a constitutional right to vote<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Derek
T. Muller<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">The
right to vote is a fundamental right, one belonging to the citizens of all free
governments. So who could possibly oppose an amendment to the United States
Constitution enshrining that right?<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">I
suppose I do, but for what I think are some eminently practical reasons.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Professor
Rick Hasen’s <i>A Real Right to Vote</i> opens with some indisputable and
important truths about elections in the United States. We have seen a dramatic
expansion of enfranchisement in the United States. Much of that is thanks to
the political process, from constitutional amendments guaranteeing that the
right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or sex, among
other protected characteristics. Congressional legislation, most notably the
Voting Rights Act, helped give effect to important constitutional guarantees.
And there are perhaps more opportunities and flexibility to vote in the United
States in the twenty-first century than ever before.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
there has not been an affirmative right to vote in the Constitution (at least,
of the kind Professor Hasen desires to see) for quite some time. So, why now?
Three practical reasons stand out.<span></span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">The
first is that some states have been, in Professor Hasen’s view, unduly
restricting voting opportunities in recent years. The second is that the
courts, particularly the federal courts, have been unduly deferential to state
exercises of authority. The third is that the United States Supreme Court has
issued some erroneous decisions on matters of election law may well reverse
some established election law precedents that lack an originalist pedigree.
Even if one might quibble with the first and second concerns, the third is
certainly serious to consider whether affirmative legislation is needed to
protect some precedents and to overturn others.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
I have some doubts about whether the solution, which seems to invite much more
involvement of the federal courts, fits the problem. Indeed, Chapter One is
entitled, “Courts Are Not Enough.” But the proposed constitutional amendment
anticipates significant and robust federal judicial implementation of a series
of fairly open-ended legal standards.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">To
dig into one section of Professor Hasen’s proposed amendment: States must
provide “equal” and “not unduly burdensome opportunities” to vote, “as measured
by ease of voting.” A state must then have “valid and substantial reasons,
backed by real and significant evidence, for imposing restrictions on or
impediments to casting a ballot.” Additionally, “the means must go no further
than reasonably necessary to satisfy those valid and substantial reasons.” Any
restriction, or any impediment, has to clear several hurdles for a state
regulation, novel or long-existing, to pass judicial scrutiny. And Professor
Hasen qualifies that only unequal or “unduly burdensome” restrictions would
face judicial scrutiny.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="">A
law that </span><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1143607381694328793&q=FAIR+ELECTIONS+OHIO,+et+al.,+Plaintiffs,+v.+Jon+HUSTED&hl=en&as_sdt=4,357"><span style="">prevents
voters jailed the weekend before an election</span></a><span style=""> from
requesting an absentee ballot? A law that requires a </span><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5555719867298280573&q=thomas+v+andino&hl=en&as_sdt=4,159"><span style="">witness’s
signature</span></a><span style=""> when someone casts an absentee ballot? A law
that that mandates that </span><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5752906177449995097&q=nelson+v+warner&hl=en&as_sdt=4,376"><span style="">party
whose candidate for president</span></a><span style=""> received most votes
in last election be listed first on the ballot? Trial courts have, at various
times, found each to be more than a minimal burden on the right to vote (although
the decisions did not always survive appeal). And what are the state’s reasons?
Are there many? Or any? Particularly for laws that have long been on the books?
Does it seem like, in any of these scenarios, the state would be able to articulate
a “substantial” reason for the rule? Could it gather “real and significant
evidence” for this rule? And even if it could muster such evidence, would it be
able to demonstrate that these means “go no further than reasonably necessary”?<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Maybe
the answer is, the state should lose in each case—and federal courts should
increasingly patrol the minutiae of state election administration. Indeed, the
test is set up so that states will typically fail to defend their law if a
court finds the law is not an “equal” opportunity or an “unduly burdensome”
opportunity. But this seems to put a terrific amount of pressure on courts to
label what is an “equal” or “not unduly burdensome” opportunity to vote. The
measure of the “ease of voting,” in all three of the circumstances listed above,
could be, “well, it remains quite easy to vote.” This is, in fact, precisely how
Justice Alito’s opinion in <i>Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee</i>
(2021) puts it: “Arizona law generally makes it very easy to vote.” The rest of
that decision flows almost inevitably from that opening finding.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">It
seems to me, then, that the result of a “right to vote” amendment of this type
is to drift toward one of two outcomes. The first is a system where every
mundane, long-established election rule faces this inquiry: the number of
polling locations, their proximity to voters, the number of hours a polling
place is open, how many days ahead of an election an absentee ballot must be
mailed, and so on. Intense litigation follows. Myriad rules are deemed unduly
burdensome on the class of voters challenging the regulation. The state
typically has some inevitable line drawing but, time and time again, fails to
justify its rules, leaving federal courts constant guardians of state
administration of elections—at least, where litigants choose to challenge state
laws.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">The
second is a system where the United States Supreme Court reverts to a
conception of “equal” and “not unduly burdensome” opportunities measure by
“ease of voting” to say that the vast majority of laws need not even face
judicial inquiry. State rules affecting voting here and there at the margins
will be deemed “not unduly burdensome,” and not much will change.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Neither
result strikes me as particularly desirable (although I’m sure reasonable minds
would disagree with me). And it’s possible, of course, that courts instead find
a middle path, one that hews to what Professor Hasen aspires. But I think the
inevitable pressure will be to drift into the second path, with standards such
as these.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Now,
admittedly, I can nitpick Professor Hasen’s proposal because he actually <i>has</i>
a proposal, and for that we can be immensely grateful. Many proposals calling
for a right to vote fail to think through the implications or their scope.
Professor Hasen is forthright and transparent about the scope of his proposal.
He notes some of the cases that would be overturned by his amendment, such as <i>Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin</i> (1972) and its progeny, while reserving other
questions, such as the one left open in <i>Evenwel v. Abbott</i> (2015). It is
helpful to puzzle through the metes and bounds of a constitutional right to
vote amendment.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
the scope of the proposed amendment is much broader still. It empowers all
voters to sue in federal court to enforce this guarantee. That expands Article
III standing quite broadly. Generalized grievances are ordinarily not claims
federal courts can hear. Voters must have a particularized injury. Professor
Hasen’s proposal not only invites more litigation through the implementation of
open-ended standards, but it also invites more litigants to bring more claims
in federal court.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Here,
let me close with a point of emphatic agreement with Professor Hasen, and a
point where I wonder whether a constitutional amendment is needed. Professor
Hasen rightly seeks to “deescalate” the voting wars. While I think open-ended
standards are more likely to exacerbate the voting wars with interminable litigation,
he helpfully offers two specific rules designed to deescalate the voting wars,
universal voter registration and universal voter identification.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Professor
Hasen has long endorsed both of these components in his previous scholarship.
And let me agree that these two areas seem uniquely fruitful areas for federal
legislation. State coordination and cooperation problems are precisely the areas
where federal intervention is most warranted. The inability of states to
effectively coordinate across state lines to handle duplicative voter
registrations, de-registering and re-registering voters, and providing
consistent and streamlined identification procedures are areas ripe for federal
oversight. Federal legislation is less likely to change year by year, in stark
contrast to state legislation. (I should qualify, Professor Hasen’s proposal
requires states to do these things, but it streamlines how the rules work and
gives some power for them to hand over the coordination responsibilities to the
federal government.)<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Existing
federal statutes over the last forty years have worked quite well with respect
to voter registration. “Motor voter” dramatically and conveniently broadened
the universe for how voters interact with government agencies in registering to
vote. Military personnel have increased flexibility to register and maintain
their residence.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
do we need a constitutional amendment for that? The Elections Clause of the
Constitution already gives Congress the power to establish time, place, and
manner rules for congressional elections. While it does not formally extend to
other elections, a uniform federal rule for voter registration and identification
would be extraordinarily convenient for states to use if Congress mandated such
a rule in all congressional elections. That said, the gap in the Constitution’s
power for other elections is enough that perhaps a constitutional amendment
would be in order.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Even
in the absence of a constitutional amendment, which Professor Hasen concedes is
a longshot, Congress should take a hard look at a national voter registration
and identification proposal. Such a proposal adopted in congressional elections
would be a good test case for implementing a larger constitutional amendment.
It would deescalate the voting wars by providing rules that states could not
tinker with, and that would face uniform interpretation and application across
the country.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.25in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="">While
I hold some skepticism of elements of a proposed constitutional amendment, I do
believe there is great promise in more federal legislation to shore up election
administration and voting rights. Professor Hasen’s book is a worthy
contribution to that discourse.</span><i><span style=""><o:p> </o:p></span></i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style=""><span style="font-family: inherit;">Derek T. Muller is a
Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School: dmuller@nd.edu<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-34485061655032891192024-03-11T18:19:00.002-04:002024-03-12T11:34:33.338-04:00Agency Problems’ Impact on Budgetary Outcomes<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Over the past few
years, critics on both the Left and the Right have been intensely critical of
their respective party leaders for supposed timidity in failing to achieve
their fiscal objectives.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These criticisms
are not without foundation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A careful
examination of the past few years, however, suggests that although agency
problems have real adverse effects, within each political coalition grassroots
distrust of leaders has proven much more destructive to the grassroots’
espoused substantive goals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The inescapable
conclusion is that each side needs effective ways of dissuading their leaders
from putting personal considerations ahead of the group’s substantive
objectives, micromanaging negotiations from afar is disastrous.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even when partisans suspect their leaders
have fallen short, failing to support those leaders opens a huge opportunity
for the other side.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This post
illustrates this point with one actual agency failure and one grassroots revolt
from each side of the political chasm.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With an evenly
divided Senate during President Biden’s first two years in office, and with supposedly
moderate Republicans abandoning much pretense of bipartisanship, passing any
legislation required the support of every Senate Democrat.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That included the moderate Joe Manchin and
the <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/12/sinema-purgatorio.html">capricious</a>
Kyrsten Sinema.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As much as progressive
activists might wish otherwise, neither senator shares their values.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although Arizona has recently elected some fairly
liberal candidates, West Virginia is one of the reddest states in the
country:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>if Joe Manchin were not a
moderate, he would not be a senator.<span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With the possible
exception of the Affordable Care Act, the Build Back Better deal that President
Biden negotiated with Senator Manchin would have been by far the most important
social legislation in more than half a century.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It would have assured child care subsidies to low- and moderate-income
working families, revolutionized financial assistance to low-income families
with children through a vastly improved Child Tax Credit, dramatically expanded
the availability of housing assistance to low-income people, transformed our
nation’s response to climate change, and much, much more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many of these provisions were ones Senator
Manchin had opposed but agreed to accept as part of the deal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In exchange for
those concessions, however, President Biden agreed to drop provisions on family
and medical leave and on immigration reform.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Senator Manchin insisted that both were just too hard a sell to his
conservative constituents.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Immigration
reform, too, could not pass because the Senate Parliamentarian had <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/07/the-parliamentarians-curious-definition.html">ruled</a>
it subject to a point of order, requiring at least ten Republican votes (not
one of which was in prospect).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Those
following the negotiations closely were <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/12/build-back-better-or-build-back-best.html">astounded</a>
that President Biden had done so well with Senator Manchin and had understood
that the parliamentary situation put immigration reform out of reach no matter
what they had agreed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Progressive activists,
however, did not trust President Biden’s fidelity as an agent for the
progressive agenda.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They were convinced
that he could have won immigration reform and family leave had he pressed
harder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They launched a furious pressure
campaign, vilifying Senator Manchin and loudly condemning him to his West
Virginia constituents.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Grassroots
pressure campaigns are inherently unpredictable; reportedly lines were crossed
in some very ugly ways involving his family.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And in an appalling display of cowardice, the Biden White House refused
to defend the deal it had reached and seemed to encourage the pressure
campaign.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Predictably, once the President
failed to stand behind his deal, Senator Manchin <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-lost-art-of-negotiation.html">saw</a>
no reason to do so himself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Congress came
very close to passing nothing, and when the Inflation Reduction Act finally
moved the following summer, virtually everything except the climate provisions
had been dropped.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In addition, the
year of demonizing Senator Manchin effectively eliminated any chance he had of
re-election.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although his victories have
depended on gaining crossover votes from independents and Republicans, he also has
depended on a heavy turn-out from West Virginia’s progressives, which he
clearly would not have.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Knocking out
Senator Manchin, who <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/04/hard-votes-and-easy-votes.html">votes</a>
with his party on the vast majority of issues, seems likely to hand control of
the Senate to Republicans in 2025.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That
will doom President Biden’s judicial and other nominees should he win and would
allow former President Trump to further remake the federal judiciary if he
prevails.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It also ends any hope of
passing progressive legislation even if Democrats retake the House.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I believe
President Biden had, indeed, been a faithful agent for progressives.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But even if he was not, progressive’s
rejection of his leadership proved disastrous.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>That is not to say
that President Biden’s fiscal leadership is above progressive reproach.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When Republicans took the House in the 2022
election, Democrats still had time to raise the debt limit before the new
Congress took office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>President Biden
refused to support such an effort, apparently in the belief that doing so would
implicitly question the patriotism of Rep. Kevin McCarthy, the presumptive new
House Speaker.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The President was
convinced that Rep. McCarthy would never allow a default on the national debt
and hence that a bipartisan deal could be struck.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Throughout the following Spring, even after
it had become unmistakably clear that Speaker McCarthy had little real
authority within the Republican Conference and had mortgaged his speakership to
the House Freedom Caucus, the President brushed aside numerous <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2023/04/preparing-to-address-debt-limit-without.html">proposals</a>
for technical fixes to the debt limit problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He elevated his desire to pretend that we still live in the courtly
world of gentlemen’s agreements and patriotism over prudence and fidelity to
the progressive agenda – to say nothing of the nation’s economic well-being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The result was
entering negotiations with Speaker McCarthy in a profoundly weakened position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The predictable result was a deal that badly <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2023/05/losing-big.html">undermined</a> the
progressive agenda by sharply cutting real non-defense discretionary spending
over the next two years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By this point,
Democrats had lost all leverage, and congressional Democrats wisely concluded
they had no viable choice but to vote for the debt limit legislation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Parallel problems,
however, exist on the Republican side.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Speaker McCarthy won the best deal House Republicans could reasonably
expect, given that their donors were quietly warning that a default on the
national debt was absolutely unacceptable and would lead to numerous
well-funded primary challenges.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
House Freedom Caucus nonetheless rebelled, forcing Speaker McCarthy to rely
primarily on Democratic votes to pass the legislation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This set a pattern
that was substantively disastrous for the Republican far right:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>because everyone knew that overwhelming
Democratic support was necessary to move any further fiscal legislation, it
could not include provisions that would cause widespread Democratic
defections.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Democrats had power because
their votes were available for a price; the House Freedom Caucus lacked power
because their votes were surely out-of-reach.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This pattern continued
with the continuing resolutions and then last week’s “minibus” (not to be
confused with an “omnibus”) appropriations legislation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The more far-right Republicans voted “no”,
the more control they handed to Democrats.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Moreover, their raucous internal squabbling, their defenestration of
Speaker McCarthy, and their quickly turning against their own far-right Speaker
Johnson insured that any government shutdown would be <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/12/the-final-throes-of-congresss-ancien.html">blamed</a>
on Republicans.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This effectively robbed
Speaker Johnson of any leverage negotiating with Democrats.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Here again,
although House Republicans’ rejection of their speakers’ leadership quickly
proved self-destructive, genuine agency problems did exist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Speaker McCarthy’s frequent vacillations, and
in particular his abandonment of his deal with President Biden, were not just
unprincipled but also disastrous for the House Republican Conference.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the ultimate repeat player environment,
nobody in Washington can afford to allow their counterparties to renege on a
deal, whatever the price.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Neither
President Biden nor congressional Democrats could ever tolerate any further
cuts below those in the Biden-McCarthy deal or they would never be able to
count on any agreements they made.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Surely an old
Washington hand like Speaker McCarthy knew that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By prioritizing his desire to extend his
speakership a few more months rather than leveling with his conference and
letting the chips fall where they may, he allowed House Republicans to <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2023/09/kevin-mccarthys-speakership-and.html">blunder</a>
along into positions so extreme as to preclude either meaningful negotiations
or effectively blaming Democrats for any government shutdown.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Just as President Biden’s delusions about the
civility of contemporary politics destroyed Democrats’ bargaining position on
the debt limit, Speaker McCarthy’s delusions about his ability to hold onto his
gavel wrecked Republicans’ bargaining position on final appropriations bills. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This entire analysis
could, of course, be misguided if it is mistaken in its assumption that the
activists’ goals are to change policy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Some have suggested that much of the House Freedom Caucus is driven by
the desire to stoke outrage, and hence fundraising, on social media.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If so, they may well be playing this just
right.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would prefer to think that
progressives’ goal is to help people, but <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-perils-of-performative-politics.html">perhaps</a>
I lack perspective.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i>@DavidASuper1</i></p>
David Superhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01105497514487546333noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-91659570664086207682024-03-11T09:30:00.011-04:002024-03-11T09:30:00.246-04:00Do We Need Audacity Instead of Measured Prudence? On the Pathos of Richard Hasen's Call For “A Real Right To Vote”<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Sanford Levinson </span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>There is a deep pathos underlying
Richard Hasen’s call for <i>A </i>Real<i> Right to Vote:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard
American Democracy.</i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen probably
knows more about the workings of the American electoral system than any other contemporary
academic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A founding<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;">co-editor
of the </span><a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/loi/elj" target="_blank" title="Election Law Journal"><em><span style="color: #757575;">Election
Law Journal</span></em></a><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;">, on whose Board he continues to serve, he has
published more than 100 articles on various aspects of election law, not to
mention a number of books on the topic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
is frequently, and for good reason, a “go to” source by journalists looking for
thoughtful—and often critical—responses to judicial decisions touching on
voting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He recently moved to the
U.C.L.A., where he is a professor of law and political science and directs the
Safeguarding Democracy Project there.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
is a truly engaged scholar.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A
frequent theme of his writings, not at all surprisingly, is the inadequacy of
the American system of conducting elections.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He is certainly correct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would
go so far as to say that the United States has the worst electoral system,
overall, of any of the countries that we count as “democratic.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I have chided my friends Pam Karlen, Sam
Issacharoff, and Richard Pildes for titling their widely used casebook on
election law <i>The Law of Democracy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></i>For
me the title is sadly misleading and, therefore, ideological, inculcating in at
least some impressionable students the mistaken view that the United States <i>is
</i>a democracy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(This, of course, is
not a new theme of mine.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One might
argue, of course, that it was never designed to be one; thus the old slogan
that the United States is a republic and not a democracy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In any event, those who shared the views of,
say, Eldridge Gerry that the nascent United States in 1787 was plagued by an
excess of democracy might be pleased with the way things have worked out.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If one compares the United States
Constitution with the fifty state constitutions, let alone most modern foreign
constitutions, it is easily the least democratic constitution in the mix.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>We
are, of course, headlong into a new election season where the upcoming choices,
especially at the presidential level, are accurately described as not only the
“most important election of our lifetime,” but also a potential referendum on
whether the United States will continue to be recognizable as a purported “democracy”
(or “Republican Form of Government”) at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Perhaps it is hyperbolic to compare our situation to Weimar Germany in
1933, but it is surely the case that Donald Trump has become the avatar of a
basically authoritarian, even fascistic, political party whose members brook no
challenges to their exercises of power.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So
Hasen’s latest book is his latest exercise of warning the American public about
the deficiencies of our electoral system and calling on us to engage in reform
before it is indeed too late.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He might
well be analogized to a modern-day Paul Revere.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We must worry that what we think of as our democratic system is under
systematic threat, and we must mobilize to save it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For these warnings Hasen deserves our
repeated gratitude and highest esteem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He is a good citizen in the highest sense of that term.<span></span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c; font-family: inherit;"> But
what if Revere, upon warning the good folk of Concord and Lexington about the
imminent arrival of the hated Redcoats, went on to say (something like),
“There’s really not much you can do to stop them, and even that will probably
take years of organization. But you
really should start now in the hope that we might be able to get rid of British
rule, if we’re lucky, by, say, 1825, which is only fifty years from now”? We might still commend Revere for his
courageous ride and agree with him, as we are often told, that a journey of a
thousand miles must begin with a first step.
Yet, on the other hand, we might think that there is a certain
disconnect between the urgency of his warning—“The British are coming, the
British are coming!”—and his actual advice as to what can be done to forestall
the menace.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c; font-family: inherit;"> </span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I
mean no disrespect to Hasen, whom I indeed admire greatly.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As far as I am concerned, he deserves a
Presidential Medal of Freedom and any other awards that a grateful would-be
republic can assign him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The limited
nature of his actual suggested remedy for the winter (and spring, summer, and
fall) of our discontent is derived not from his own paucity of imagination or
concern, but, rather, from his realization that our political system makes it
basically impossible to engage in any truly audacious politics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if ambitious would-be leaders speak of
the “audacity of hope,” the Obama administration in fact demonstrated how
readily such hopes gave way to the actualities of our political and
constitutional systems; they seem designed to crush all hope on the part of
those who dare enter the political inferno.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So
Hasen’s book, which is well worth reading, as is true of all of his
scholarship, is devoted to arguing in behalf of what he calls a “real” right to
vote, that is, a constitutional amendment that would basically attach a right
to vote to the very idea of American citizenship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would become a true “fundamental right,”
guarded against any easy diminution by government.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There could, to be sure, still be
deprivations of that right, but the state would have to demonstrate a good
reason—a “compelling interest”—to do so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The judiciary would no longer submit to any dubiously “rational”
arguments that a state might make to justify hurdles placed on voting.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
easiest rationale for limiting suffrage, of course, is age.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Children are citizens, with a panoply of
rights, yet no one suggests, say, that a six-year-old should be able to
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But one might believe that there
are relatively few restrictions so defensible as that and, moreover, that the
state should be required to engage in rigorous proof that limitations on what
would now be a genuine constitutional right would be both necessary and
proper.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen takes particular aim at
the still-widespread blanket denial of the franchise to convicted felons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>States are in fact all over the place on
this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vermont, like (I believe) Norway,
allows incarcerated prisoners to vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Others make genuine attempts to reintegrate prisoners who have served
their time back into the polity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
then there are those states, almost invariably controlled by Republicans and
located in the old Confederacy, that are merciless in their denial of the
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even though a hefty majority of
Floridians, including Republicans, voted to relieve the ban, Governor Ron
DeSantis (should one say “of course”) together with Republicans in the Florida
legislature has done everything he could to minimize the actual importance of
the Florida referendum, enabled, as well, by Republican judges on the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and Republican judges friendly to state claims of “rationality.”</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>There
is no doubt that Hasen’s proposed amendment would cure, for once and for all,
the lacunae announced (and embraced) by the Supreme Court in <i>Bush v. Gore </i>that
there is <i>no </i>to vote contained in the Constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At best, one can say that <i>if </i>the state
allows officials to be chosen by voters, then access to the ballot cannot be
deprived on grounds of race, gender, or not being older than 18.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that, obviously, does not prevent a state
from deciding that <i>no one </i>should vote or, more to the point, that <i>everyone
</i>should experience inconvenient hurdles to casting their ballots.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Denial of effective access to all meets the
formal criterion of “equal treatment”!</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It
is difficult to believe that any reader would genuinely disagree with Hasen’s arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One is tempted to assert that they would
almost literally be “un-American” in rejecting Hasen’s reliance on the
Declaration of Independence’s proclamation of equality as the foundation of the
American polity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So Hasen deserves kudos
for setting out so clearly the desirability of such an amendment.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So
why do I describe this book as generating a deep sense of pathos.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The answer is simple:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen is much too knowledgeable and
sophisticated to believe that establishing a <i>real </i>right to vote, through
a constitutional amendment, would truly provide the cure for what ails us as a
polity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He acknowledges, toward the end
of his book, that his approach, which relies, for example, on continued state
operation of elections instead of having a professionalized national agency
conduct more trustworthy elections, is “not my first choice.” “But,” he writes,
“national, nonpartisan election administration is such a political nonstarter
that I have no included it in my proposal for a constitutional amendment” (p.
143).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would elicit too much
opposition from “both Republican states and state and local election
administrators of both parties, which have long fought to keep elections in the
United States decentralized,” whatever the practical costs.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Remember the “butterfly ballot,” designed by
a well-meaning but incompetent Democratic official in West Palm Beach, Florida,
that gave us George W. Bush as our 43<sup>rd</sup> President?</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Moreover,
Hasen concedes that his “constitutional right-to-vote amendment, particularly
[what he labels] the basic version, is a much more modest reform” than would be
desirable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“It does not federalize
elections, remake the Electoral College or the Senate, expand voting rights for
those living in U.S. territories (such as Puerto Rico or the District of
Columbia], or mandate the reenfranchisement of former felons.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again basic political realities caution
restraint.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, on top of this, there is
also the practical point that the United States national Constitution is almost
certainly the hardest-to-amend of any not only within the world, but also, and
perhaps even more significantly, within the United States itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Almost all of the fifty state constitutions
in the United States were drafted after 1787 and reflect a far more democratic
sensibility than was present in Philadelphia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Very importantly, a number of states, particularly, though not only, in
the American West, allow their citizenry to play a direct role in reforming
politics through initiatives and referenda.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Thus Nebraska, in 1934, rid itself of a totally unnecessary state senate
and adopted the Unicameral thanks to a state-wide referenda supported by
Progressive Senator George Norris.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
number of states have generated commissions to reapportion legislatures in an
effort to reduce rawly partisan gerrymandering.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This, of course, is impossible at the national level, where James
Madison was unduly proud of the fact that “we the people” are totally excluded
from any direct role in governance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
are at the mercy of our purported “representatives,” who have their own
incentives to maintain the systems that gained them power regardless of the
costs to the American polity as a whole.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Lenin asked the right question—“What is to be done?”—but the answer,
according to Hasen, appears to be “not very much.”</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #003b5c;"> </span></span></p>
<h1 style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="background: white; color: #003b5c; font-weight: normal;">In
spsite of recognizing the multiple deficiencies attached to the American
electoral system, Hasen believes, perhaps correctly, there is nothing he can do
other than start small and hope for the best over, say, the next fifty
years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Like Steven Levitsky and Daniel
Ziblatt, in their own recent book bewailing the current state of democracy in
America, </span><i><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;">Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking
Point</span></i><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;">,
he both offers a depressing picture of our current situation while asking his
readers to take heart from the half-century political process necessary to gain
women a guaranteed right to vote after its denial during the debates of the
Fifteenth Amendment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From the
perspective of eternity, fifty years is not really very much.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But if one shares a sense of urgency about
the situation, then that is, well, an eternity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>(Most of us will probably be dead fifty years from now, even in the best
of circumstances.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></h1>
<h1 style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"> </span></o:p></span></h1>
<h1 style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>As readers of Balkinization know all
too well, perhaps, I persist in advocating for a new constitutional convention
that can, like its 1787 counterpart (or, for that matter, many of the some 235
state conventions that have graced our constitutional republic over the years),
address the equivalent of what Alexander Hamilton labeled the “imbecilities” of
the existing political system and attempt to alleviate them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen expresses no interest at all in any
such audacious proposals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps he
agrees with Balkanization regular David Super, someone else for whom I have the
highest esteem, that a new convention would be a disaster and that progressive
proponents of a convention are serving as useful idiots for the ongoing
right-wing efforts to achieve what they call an “Article V Convention,” named
after the provision in Article V that allows two-thirds of the states to
trigger a new convention upon petitioning to do so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I respectfully disagree.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I continue to regard the “Progressive”
hostility to the very idea of a new convention as myopic, equivalent in its way
to the ostrich who prefers to put his head in the sand rather than to confront
possibly uncomfortable realities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
left seems unwilling or unable to imagine itself engaging in a form of
political ju jitsu by which it would enter a convention with its own audacious
proposals as a way of doing end runs around the sclerosis of the system
established, and not sufficiently amended since then, in 1787.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Establishing a constitutionally
(presumptively) guaranteed right to vote would indeed be beneficial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, with regard to what actually ails us
as a polity right now, it would be little be than an aspirin (which can in fact
be highly effective in curing mild illnesses) that would leave our basic
illness untouched.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></h1>
<h1 style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"> </span></o:p></span></h1>
<h1 style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0f1111; font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So I applaud Hasen for his act of
obvious good citizenship in writing a book that should persuade anyone who
reads it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Adoption of his “basic”
amendment could not possibly do harm, and it would probably do some good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, for better or worse, much more audacity
is needed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We may not have the time
required to realize genuine reform that is channeled within what remains a
truly undemocratic Constitution that, in its own way, is threatening to destroy
our hopes for the future.<o:p></o:p></span></span></h1>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-27451554976464583612024-03-11T07:08:00.008-04:002024-03-11T09:48:40.635-04:00Why We Won Trump v. Anderson<p><span data-offset-key="8b7rv-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Who won Trump v. Anderson is for the future, not the Supreme Court to determine. Or so I maintain in this <a href="https://washingtonmonthly.com/2024/03/11/its-too-soon-to-say-if-the-colorado-ballot-case-was-a-loss-for-anti-trump-forces/">Washington Monthly piece.</a></span></span></p><div data-block="true" data-editor="48sae" data-offset-key="cndhs-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div class="public-DraftStyleDefault-block public-DraftStyleDefault-ltr" data-offset-key="cndhs-0-0" style="direction: ltr; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-top: 2px; position: relative;"><span data-offset-key="cndhs-0-0"><span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></span></div></div><div data-block="true" data-editor="48sae" data-offset-key="acvlr-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div class="public-DraftStyleDefault-block public-DraftStyleDefault-ltr" data-offset-key="acvlr-0-0" style="direction: ltr; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-top: 2px; position: relative;"><br /></div></div>Mark Graberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09691490171082748026noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-76043722928639421722024-03-10T09:30:00.012-04:002024-03-12T12:35:07.562-04:00A [More] Real Right to Vote?<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p><span lang="EN"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Wilfred U. Codrington III</span></span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN">Many congratulations are due to Professor
Richard L. Hasen on the publication of his newest book, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard
American Democracy</i>. In this short book that seeks to address not-so-sweet
problems, Hasen seamlessly weaves anti-canonical election law cases with modern
stories of anti-democracy (some of which have yet to reach their conclusions)
to explain the utility of a Right to Vote (“RTV”) Amendment today. In general,
I am happy to read this work, as it adds a distinguished voice to the growing
chorus that sings the praises of a RTV Amendment. An idea that was once looked
upon as extraneous, unworkable, or even a pipe dream seems to be gaining more
traction in the scholarly community. Even still, my sense is that Hasen’s
proposals—both the basic and extended versions—do not go far enough in an
important respect. Any discussion of an effective right to vote that disregards
the problem of partisan gerrymandering, to me, seems incomplete.<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
And having gone back to review some of Hasen’s older works, I am persuaded
that, even on his terms, there are at least three reasons why the basic
amendment should include a provision to address the concern of partisan
gerrymandering.<span></span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><span lang="EN" style="font-family: inherit;">First is the matter of political equality,
a concept that Hasen rightly notes as critical in matters pertaining to
elections. Indeed, political equality is not just one of the book’s themes, but
the very “basis for an amendment” enshrining the right to vote in the
Constitution.<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span lang="EN">[2]</span></a>
It is this very notion of political equality that offers reason for a more
robust amendment that would address partisan gerrymandering. Whether framed as
an affront to equality because it dilutes the voting strength of a politically
cohesive group or because it amounts to improper retaliation for one’s viewpoint
and political association, partisan gerrymandering undermines the vital
principle.</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN">Of course, there may be reason for pause
about incorporating a provision to address this dimension of political equality.
Importantly, Hasen noted nearly two decades ago that he was skeptical of any
judicial “attempts to promote contested visions of political equality.”<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[3]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Understanding the impetus for this reasonable position, it nevertheless goes
against my own sensibilities as to what might be expected from an ideal
judiciary—one sincerely driven by the goal of maintaining a fair and open
political process and receptive to a solution, even if less than perfect, based
on the thoughtful work and advances in this area over the years. In either
case, however, Hasen’s erstwhile objection is not applicable in this context
for at least two reasons. The first reason is that a RTV Amendment with a
provision addressing partisan gerrymandering would not involve the courts as
the key actors in the pursuit of political equality any more than would the
basic version of the measure. Instead, because of the very nature of
constitutional amendment in the U.S., it would be the political branches taking
the lead and setting out the terms. The second reason is that the equality
principle at issue here is a core one, and not seriously contested. Responding
to an earlier critique, Hasen noted that “it is easy to separate core from
contested political equality rights through the lens of social consensus.”<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[4]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Irrespective of what was the case at that time, that consensus has since
materialized. The large majority of Americans believe that partisan
gerrymandering is deeply problematic and, in fact, even opponents of a judicially
wrought solution acknowledge as much. Not only that, but there has been steady
movement in the states, primarily through direct democracy means, conveying
that sentiment. Nor is partisan gerrymandering concerned with upholding any
prized political values or seeking legitimate public aims; it is, instead,
wholly about self-preservation of the parties and incumbents, raising concerns
of “legislative self-interest and agency problems.”<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[5]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a> In
other words, there is no reason for us to “be confident that the legislature’s
intent is to foster equality rather than engage in self-dealing.”<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[6]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Under these circumstances, then, it seems that a RTV Amendment might properly
be extended to account for the problem of partisan gerrymandering as well.</span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN">Second, Hasen notes aptly that a RTV
Amendment is appropriate because legislation guaranteeing similar protections
might not withstand scrutiny of the current Supreme Court. But in some ways,
that might be more applicable to legislation barring partisan gerrymandering. I
agree, as many scholars would, that Congress has sufficient power to ban
partisan gerrymandering in federal elections, which is supported by its
longstanding practice of requiring contiguous, single-member districts from
which members of the House of Representative are to be elected. I also think
that Congress has similar authority to address the problem in elections for
state office, though I realize that this is a more contested view (including
for reasons set out in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Oregon v. Mitchell</i>).
In either case, however, it is not clear that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i> Supreme Court would countenance congressional legislation
outlawing partisan gerrymandering or statutorily devised process for achieving
that goal in either federal or state elections. Notwithstanding persuasive
arguments against viewing the novelty of acts as probative of their illegality,<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[7]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
such innovation to address partisan gerrymandering might turn out to be
determinative of its constitutionality. That novelty, along with the fact
(which Hasen acknowledges) that the Court has invalidated other provisions of
law previously adjudged to have constitutional basis, suggests that his call
for an amendment rather than legislation would apply to partisan gerrymandering
as well.</span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The final reason for including partisan
gerrymandering in the RTV Amendment is the somewhat inextricable link between
party and race. To his credit, Hasen includes protections against racial vote
dilution in his proposal despite its current protection under statute. And with
good reason: It does not take a tasseographer to read the tea spilled on the
leaves of Justice Kavanaugh’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Allen v.
Milligan</i> concurrence. My fear, however, is that the high correlation
between race and party will nevertheless leave racial minorities exposed under
Hasen’s RTV Amendment proposal because a Court refereeing a claimed
violation—particularly one insistent on a colorblind approach to
adjudication—could simply point to partisanship as driving a regulation. Thus,
a RTV amendment would be prudent to include a measure to address partisan
gerrymandering because, as Hasen previously noted, it “seems a more sensible approach
to police partisanship in redistricting directly than to use racial
gerrymandering for parties to shadowbox over these issues.”<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[8]</span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What a <i>more</i>
real Right to Vote Amendment might look like—one that also grapples with the
intractable problem of partisan gerrymandering—is something that would take
more time to develop. Importantly, though, we can get a glimpse of what a
measure might entail by looking around the country for inspiration. State
constitutions are being amended to bar the consideration of partisanship in
redistricting, and their courts are interpreting new and old provisions of their
charters to invalidate partisan gerrymanders. Likewise, policymakers in the
states are developing structures like commissions to tackle the concern. Critically,
a RTV Amendment that responds to partisan gerrymandering could also comply with
Hasen’s compromise to veer away from nationalizing elections. Given that the
measure would add to the federal Constitution and include congressional enforcement power, the baseline role of the Court and Congress would be a constant. And
because an amendment might delegate to the states the task of setting up any
new body (including with financial and other support from the federal
government), that would require no significant nationalization beyond what
constitutionalizing the right would in the first place. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN">While questions remain about what “a theory
of <i>appropriate</i> political competition” might entail,<a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
lawmakers routinely undermine any reasonable theory, far exceeding the range of
what an acceptable amount of partisanship would permit. The pervasiveness and
potency of partisan gerrymandering in the U.S. is a key contributor to an array
of political problems, from the stalling of basic government operations to the
obstruction of popular measures. In his book, Hasen offers a praiseworthy model
that could begin to make a right to vote real in this nation to cope with these
and other ills. But if it is an effective right to vote that we desire, a
provision that addresses this most urgent concern would make for a good
addition.</span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Wilfred U. Codrington III is a Dean’s Research Scholar & Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and a Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law. Professor Codrington is also the co-author of <i>The People’s Constitution: 200 Years, 27 Amendments, and the Promise of a More Perfect Union</i>. He can be reached at wilfred.codrington@brooklaw.edu.</p>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br clear="all" />
</span><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Notably, I read Hasen’s book
after finishing the draft of a recent article, so you may see some of these
ideas resurface soon.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[2]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Richard L. Hasen, A Real
Right to Vote 11 (2024).<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[3]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Richard L. Hasen, The
Supreme Court and Election Law: A Reply to Three Commentators, 31 J. Legis. 1,
4 (2005).<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[4]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id.</i> at 13.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[5]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id.</i> at 3.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[6]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id.<o:p></o:p></i></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[7]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Leah M. Litman, Debunking
Antinovelty, 66 Duke L. J. 1407 (2017).<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span lang="EN">[8]</span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Richard L. Hasen, Race or
Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to
Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1837, 1879 (2018).</span><span lang="EN"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Dropbox/Attachments/Hasen%20Symposium%20Essays/A%20%5bMore%5d%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote%20-%20Codrington.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></span></a><span lang="EN"> Richard L. Hasen, The “Political
Market” Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 Stan.
L. Rev. 719, 725 (1998).<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
</div><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-25751855224986158332024-03-09T14:50:00.007-05:002024-03-09T18:08:24.929-05:00Rabbi Akiva and the Crowns: A Parable of Constitutional Fidelity<p>I've just uploaded a draft of my latest article, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4753755">Rabbi Akiva and the Crowns: A Parable of Constitutional Fidelity</a>, to SSRN. It is part of a B.U. Law Review Symposium on my new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Memory-Authority-Constitutional-Interpretation-Reference/dp/0300272227">Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation</a> and Jonathan Gienapp's forthcoming book, Against Originalism: A Historical Critique.</p><p>Here is the abstract.</p><p>Historian Jonathan Gienapp argues that the Founding generation held very different views about constitutions, law, rights, and judicial review than lawyers do today. His target is conservative originalism, but his arguments are important for originalists and non-originalists alike. How is faithful interpretation of the Constitution possible if we inhabit a very different world from the generation that produced it?</p><p>This essay answers that question by retelling a famous story in the Gemara about Moses and the Talmudic sage Rabbi Akiva, who lived a thousand years later. The story explains how the rabbis who compiled the Talmud in the sixth century C.E. dealt with the problem of interpreting religious texts that had been written hundreds of years earlier in a very different world. The rabbis argued that faithful interpretation of the law must recognize the distance between past and present and accept the need for creative adaptation in the face of transformations, upheavals, and ruptures. The same lessons hold true for constitutional interpretation today.</p>JBhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02309372047622319060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-78943906763616048262024-03-09T09:30:00.002-05:002024-03-09T09:30:00.131-05:00That Little Omission in the Constitution<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p><span style="text-indent: 48px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Alex Keyssar</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">More than twenty years ago, in the aftermath of the
2000 election and <i>Bush v. Gore</i>, I participated in an effort to place a
“right to vote” amendment in the Constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Working with Jamie Raskin (then a law professor), Rob Richie (of FairVote),
and numerous other activists and intellectuals, we drafted several versions of
such an amendment -- a simple text as well as others dealing with more knotty
matters like ex-felons and Puerto Rico. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Illinois Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr. not
only promoted the idea in Congress but vowed publicly that getting it passed
would be the centerpiece of his work as a political leader. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Our actions, and our thinking, were prompted
by the conflicts, litigation and disenfranchisement that arose during the 2000
election, as well as by Justice Scalia’s pointed assertion, in oral arguments,
that “there is no right of suffrage under Article II” of the Constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We thought that an amendment could plug a big
hole in the fabric of our democracy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
were also optimistic about its prospects (or at least I was):<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the right to vote was an all-American value,
like motherhood and apple pie.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Who could
be against it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thanks primarily to Jackson’s efforts, the amendment fairly
quickly attracted more than forty co-sponsors in the House. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But then the effort gradually stalled.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No Republicans signed on, and no Senate
co-sponsors could be found (not even the junior senator from Illinois). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Democratic Party, at its convention in
2004, declined to insert an amendment proposal into its platform; key leaders
said they feared opening up the Pandora’s box of amendments, lest conservative
ones enter the fray.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Congressman Jackson
understandably put his energy into other battles and later ran into some legal
troubles of his own, depriving the effort of his leadership. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Over the years, we learned that many people –
or at least many members of Congress – were more than ready to oppose a
constitutional amendment protecting the right to vote.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is with this backdrop in mind, as well as my own historical
writing and twenty years of witnessing increasingly strident struggles over
access to the ballot box, that I enthusiastically welcome Rick Hasen’s new book,
<i>The Real Right to Vote. </i>(The book briefly recounts the story above.) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A clarion call to action fused with careful
legal and political analysis, this is an important volume that makes a sober-minded
and compelling case for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the voting
rights of American citizens.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen
argues persuasively that statutes alone are inadequate to do the job and, more
disturbingly, that in recent decades the courts—most importantly, SCOTUS -- have
become unreliable protectors of democratic rights. He maintains that the
presence of an amendment affirmatively guaranteeing the right to vote would
de-escalate the “voting wars” of the last twenty years and greatly reduce the (ridiculous
and wasteful) amount of litigation that accompanies elections in the United
States. Putting a right to vote in the Constitution would tilt the scales in
favor of the prospective voter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I agree and applaud.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">That said, several thoughts (or questions) come to
mind.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first is an historian’s
question, prompted by Hasen’s observation that in recent decades “the Supreme
Court has failed to be a broad protector of voting rights” and by his chapter
detailing the cases and pronouncements that buttress his conclusion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Few constitutional scholars or voting rights
experts (or readers of this blog) will dispute Hasen’s point:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the Warren Court is a fond memory, something
of a benign aberration in our constitutional history, and more recent courts have
repeatedly given sanction to state laws that place obstacles in the path of
prospective voters and limited the ability of the federal government to restrain
such actions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hasen also fears – with
good reason – that the current court, with its deeply conservative majority,
may be willing to overturn other precedents (even “one person, one vote”) and do
further damage to the meaning of “universal” suffrage.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">None of this is news to people who work in the field.
But can we also broaden the lens and ask why this has been happening?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is it not a bit odd, even baffling, that the
Supreme Court of a country that proclaims itself to be the world’s foremost
democracy does not actively defend the democratic rights of its citizens?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The explanation does not (or cannot be
presumed to) reside in the limitations of our elderly Constitution:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>after all, it was the achievement (and
method) of the Warren Court to recognize democracy as a core American value and
to find in portions of the Constitution the rationales for making that value
operational.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So why do recent courts think
differently?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Are there core tenets of
modern conservatism (or conservative jurisprudence) that necessarily override
the value of democracy – and if so, what are they and how/why did they become
ascendant?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(They are hard to find in
decisions like <i>Crawford v. Marion County</i> or <i>Shelby County v. Holder</i>.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or is the posture of the court simply a
reversion to an older form of conservatism, one that was distrustful of
democracy, especially if the wrong people were voting?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An older form of conservatism that no longer speaks
its quiet parts out loud – at least not in court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I raise this issue not to criticize Hasen’s
appropriately focused and sober-minded book but to encourage all of us to seek
deeper, broader explanations for the anti-democratic drift that now seems so
evident in our country, to re-examine the links between developments in the law
and what is happening in politics and society. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The somber backdrop of our history, which is
filled with episodes when suffrage rights contracted as well as expanded, suggests
that we should be alarmed, even outraged, by the willingness, if not eagerness,
of judges to limit or constrain the exercise of the franchise. All the moreso
because we are again living in an era of declining faith in democracy, as was
true in the late nineteenth century when actions were taken that undermined democratic
rights for many decades, in the North as well as the South.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is precisely in such conservative, or
reactionary, eras that we most need our courts to uphold democratic values;
making that happen may require more than fixes to the Constitution, necessary
as those surely are.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I would also like to offer a few comments about the
text, or texts, of the amendment that Hasen offers to his readers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rick provides both a “basic version” and four
possible additions to that basic text:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>the inclusion of a ban on felon disenfranchisement:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>enfranchising residents of territories to
cast ballots for president; the elimination of the Electoral College; and a
restructuring of the Senate to make representation proportional to
population.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I support each of these
measures (Electoral College reform is particularly dear to my heart), but I
agree with Rick that they should be addressed separately, outside the context
of this amendment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The inclusion of any
one of them – all will have strident opponents -- could sink the whole
enterprise.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Indeed, I would go further and strip several items out
of his “basic text.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That text now
includes several provisions that go beyond the assertion of a right to vote for
all citizens :<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the creation of an
automatic registration system that would give every eligible voter a “unique
voter identification number”; a requirement that states provide “equal and not
unduly burdensome voting opportunities” to all voters;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and the protection of minority voters by
guaranteeing to them a “fair opportunity . . .<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>to election representatives of their choice regardless of race,
ethnicity, or membership in a language minority group.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, I regard each of these proposals to be
desirable;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>they are standard items in
the wish list of democratic<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>reformers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But they are not as
fundamental as the right to vote itself, and they will surely give opponents of
this endeavor something to complain about.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In addition, these operationalizing features could logically flow—at a
later time – from the adoption of a simple amendment such as the first
paragraph of Rick’s formulation: it guarantees to “all citizen, adult,
resident, nonfelons of the United States. . .the right to vote in all elections
for federal, state, and local offices within their residential areas.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In brief, I vote for keeping it simple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To be sure, Hasen is well aware of the trade-offs
between going simple (or minimal) and going big, and he closes his book with a
judicious discussion of those trade-offs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He also acknowledges that a “real right to vote” will be a hard sell to
Republicans – although he puts forward several arguments that just might lead
conservatives to endorse the idea.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
think it unlikely that those arguments (or any arguments) will carry the day in
the acrid, polarized world that we now inhabit, but that’s not really the point
of this determined and forward-looking book.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Hasen is looking at the long haul (or, at best, the medium haul), urging
his readers to embrace a project that is important and necessary but may take
decades to be realized. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He knows well
that similar efforts have failed in the past, but, hopeful democrat that he is
(and wisely invoking the elongated path of past amendments), he encourages us
to think that propitious circumstances could present themselves, sooner or
later – and we should be prepared for that moment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally, a few words – a bit fanciful – about
strategy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The obvious and
straightforward way to start advancing this project will be to settle on a text
(or several variations thereof), find a few congressional sponsors, and begin
the incremental process of moving it forward in Washington. But I would suggest
that such an approach needs to be augmented by a major publicity and public
relations campaign, addressed to the American people rather than to
congressional leaders. The effort to amend the Constitution should be a popular
movement, not just a series of sit-downs with politicians.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Being
old-fashioned, I picture billboards (but I’m sure there are more high-tech
equivalents).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Just imagine driving down
a highway and seeing a billboard that said:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>DO YOU WANT THE CONSTITUTION TO GUARANTEE YOUR RIGHT TO VOTE? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>SUPPORT AMENDMENT 28. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And ten miles later:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>DID YOU KNOW THAT YOUR RIGHT TO VOTE IS NOT
PROTECTED IN THE CONSTITUTION?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>DO
SOMETHING ABOUT IT:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>SUPPORT AMENDMENT 28.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Just a thought.<span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Alex Keyssar is the Matthew W. Stirling, Jr.,
Professor of History and Social Policy at the Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><a href="mailto:alex_keyssar@hks.harvard.edu">alex_keyssar@hks.harvard.edu</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-62122154027188496132024-03-08T10:30:00.002-05:002024-03-08T12:06:23.049-05:00Academic Freedom of the Press: Is it Too Late for the New Fourth Estate?<p style="text-align: left;"></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Lea Bishop</span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: black;"><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></span><span style="color: #212121;"><div style="text-align: left;">Denial of tenure for suspected political views. At-will
termination. Ideological reviews. Classroom surveillance. Bans on expression of
“political or ideological views and opinions.” Students trained to report
violations to state officials.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span></span><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://tinyurl.com/IndianaSB202">This is the bill</a><span style="color: #212121;"> on the
desk of Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb. Indiana’s pending “tenure reform”
legislation is a First Amendment parade of horribles. Political orthodoxy. Viewpoint
discrimination. Arbitrary dismissal. Vague standards. Chilling effects. Public
discourse. Pure speech.</span></span></div><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div> <o:p><div style="text-align: left;">So why is no one talking about the Constitution?</div></o:p></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">First Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that
constitutional protection of counter-majoritarian viewpoints is the most
essential bulwark of democracy. Ironically, tenure is precisely what that empowers
judges to do so.</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">To realize this potential, however, legal scholars must offer
the courts a <i>justiciable</i> theory of academic freedom. My proposed
solution is to reframe university independence, academic research, and
pedagogical autonomy as part and parcel of freedom of the press.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">* * *<span><a name='more'></a></span></div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Law professors easily spot the interplay between academic
freedom and the First Amendment, yet courts have avoided reading the former
into the latter.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Specialists meticulously distinguish the two concepts. The
leading scholar, Bob Post, persuasively cautions that on current doctrine, the
two norms conflict—though reconciliation is possible. The nuance is likely to
elude judicial arbiters.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Public discourse defines “academic freedom” as a set of special
privileges accorded to professors. This framing presents an inviting target to
conservative criticism of “special rights,” and alienates libertarians who
would otherwise be allies of free speech. A</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">All of this bodes poorly for the possibilities of judicial
review to protect First Amendment interests in university autonomy. Unfortunately,
constitutional review is urgently needed.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">* * *</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">I propose doing so through via the doctrinal framework of press
freedom.</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">The fit is surprisingly easy. Investigation and publication are
the central job description of tenure-track faculty.<span style="color: black;"> </span>Professors
research and report on matters of public concern, educate the public, sponsor debate,
air dissent, and expose corruption.</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div> <o:p><div style="text-align: left;">Journalists seek out our commentary on every social and policy
issue. We can do so with unique independence from corporate and political
influence, because of university autonomy and tenure.</div></o:p></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">The professional norms of scholarly journalism continue to
prioritize truth-seeking, empirical evidence, analysis, critical thinking and
expertise.<span style="color: #212121;"> </span>With the long erosion of traditional journalism, and declining
confidence in mass media, the free-press university has never been more vital.</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">* * *</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">The core mission of the modern research university has always
been investigation and publication. <span style="color: black;">This insight should
transform how we talk about academic freedom.</span></div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">No one suggests that press freedom is about job security for
journalists. We do not defend its utility as a means to recruit and retain reporting
talent, or to promote the outlet’s national reputation.</div> </span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Instead, two centuries of political thought emphasize the value of
a free and independent press to a free and democratic society. Defenders of
academic freedom must do the same, emphasizing voters’ interest in access to reliable
information, the watchdog role of politically independent scrutiny, and defense
of liberty.</div> </span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">In doing so, faculty the accusation of financial self-interest and
regain the moral high ground.</div> </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">* * *</div></span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">My proposal goes beyond rhetorical analogy.</div> </span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Judicial review of state intrusions on university autonomy and
academic speech is urgently needed. F<span style="color: #212121;">reedom of the press moors</span> the
misunderstood and endangered social value of academic freedom to an enduring
constitutional anchor.</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div> <o:p><div style="text-align: left;">The central conceptual necessity is to emphasize the value of
university independence to insulate academic reporters from state efforts to
censor and punish political criticism. Framing academic autonomy as freedom of
the press can accomplish this.</div></o:p></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Helpfully, it highlights the need for strict scrutiny of means of
controlling politically controversial scholarship, even when the legislation is
viewpoint neutral on face.Press freedom doctrine has long rejected government
demands for ideological “balance” or “equal time.” The government may not “put
its thumb on the scale.”</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Conceptually, this reframing can accommodate the collective nature
of the right to university autonomy that Post emphasizes. At the same time, it centers
the interests of the ordinary individual citizen in freedom of access to uncensored
political information.</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Most importantly, the free press framing preempts the deadly argument
that faculty speech at public universities should be treated as “government
speech,” entitling the state to regulate its content. When journalism is
subsidized by state funding—as it is in many constitutional
democracies—editorial independence is obviously essential. </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">* * *</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">It is not necessary this year to resolve (or ignore) the ongoing
debate about the best approach to academic freedom within the university. This
year’s urgency is to cut short the mounting effort to silence political
criticism through prescription, prohibition, punishment, and political capture.</div></span><o:p style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></o:p><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">Courts must call an end to the dangerous trend of political interference
and censorship in universities. They can easily do so, simply by appreciating
that eternal research, publication, and education missions of universities go hand-in-hand
with free and independent journalism.</div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;">I explore these issues further at in <a name="OLE_LINK3"></a><a name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a name="OLE_LINK1"></a><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/zd6w4ff6x92wijlyy7q6c/h?rlkey=wkvadwg8hxfh6qt9v31lroe6h&dl=0">Academic Freedom of the Press</a>.</div></span><o:p style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></o:p><o:p><div style="text-align: left;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Lea Bishop is Professor of Law at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. You can reach her by e-mail at </span>lea.bishop@gmail.com<span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></i></div></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-15921007054479270312024-03-08T09:30:00.002-05:002024-03-08T09:30:00.248-05:00Going Big on Election Reform: A Political Scientist’s Take on Rick Hasen’s Proposed Constitutional Amendment<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">Bruce E. Cain</span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">Through various editions of his textbook, voluminous blogs
and extensive scholarship, Professor Rick Hasen has tirelessly promoted and
energized the field of Election Law for several decades.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, there are times in my life when I received
more daily communications from Rick and electionlaw@lists than my close friends
and family combined. Not complaining, mind you, but just saying.</span><span style="color: #212121; text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Due to his high
public profile and many connections with the reform community, Rick often both
reflects and shapes the modern US political reform agenda. Accordingly, his
latest book offers insight into contemporary reform thinking in the context of recent
conservative judicial decisions and the country’s considerable political
uncertainties.</span><span style="color: #212121; text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">On the strategy spectrum of going big with reform versus
going small with incremental measures, the trend lately is more towards the
former than the latter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We got a glimpse
of this when the Democrats offered up HR1 in the early days of the Biden
administration. Professor Hasen ups the ante on big and proposes what many
consider the most politically difficult pathway: i.e. amending the US
constitution.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">Over the decades, Rick has been a consistent advocate for
extending political participation, depoliticizing election administration, and
promoting equality of voice. What has changed is not Rick’s goals and values,
but his perspective on how to achieve them. Like many other legal scholars of
his generation, Rick initially had considerable faith in the Courts as
“impartial’ agents of political reform.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But as judicial appointments have become more politicized and
conservative justices have trimmed the sails of ambitious political reform,
faith in the legal system as an agent of political reform has waned
considerably.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">HR1was the comprehensive election reform bill the Democrats
unveiled when they achieved trifecta control in 2020. It failed due to the
narrowness of the Democratic majority in the US Senate and the filibuster rule
barrier. HR1 aimed to plug the reform holes with a comprehensive array of
policies such as adopting automatic and same-day registration, expanding access
though vote-by-mail and early voting opportunities, limiting on removals from
voter rolls, requiring states independent redistricting commissions to carry
out congressional redistricting, etc.). Beyond HR1, many contemporary reformers
urge even deeper structural reforms such as eliminating the Electoral College, phasing
out partisan election officials, and changing the size and limiting the terms
of the Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While going big
might be the best answer to all that ails American politics, every extra degree
of reform bigness entails additional political risk.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Which
brings us to Rick’s new book</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span><i><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can
Safeguard American Democracy</span></i><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">. Rick shares the view that the liberal reform agenda has
stalled out at this moment in history and proposes a reform pathway that has
hitherto been dismissed as politically impractical due to its several steps and
supermajority requirements: namely, a constitutional amendment affirmatively
safeguarding the right to vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such an
amendment, he argues, would limit a conservative Court’s capacity to weaken
egalitarian political reforms. He then offers several versions of this proposed
amendment. The “basic” version combines a general commitment to a
“substantially equally weighted vote” for all federal, state, and local races
except for President and Vice President along with a few specific provisions
such as automatic voter registration for eligible citizens along with assigning
them unique voter identification number.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>One reason
he is optimistic that this amendment might succeed is that it contains a trade that
is bipartisan in spirit: it pairs something the reform community has
historically wanted (automatic registration by the government as in other
democracies) with a reform Republicans might favor (compulsory voter id). Ignoring
for the moment that anything proposed by a Democrat is indelibly tainted in the
eyes of House Republicans, it is fair to say that this exchange might be in the
ballpark of a bipartisan bargain.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">But then Rick packs some additional liberal reforms into
the basic amendment. For instance, he proposes requiring more proof of the
purported state need for restrictive voting laws. The amendment also gives
Congress “broader power to protect voting rights” and more deference from the
courts when enacting measures that favor “enfranchisement and the equality of
voters.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Apparently worried that his
amendment might not be big enough for the progressive left, he provides some alternative
add-on features such as limiting felon voting rights restrictions, eliminating
the Electoral College, changing the US Senate composition, and expanding the
franchise to vote for the President is residents of US territories. These
add-ons do not make a bipartisan sale more likely, to say the least.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While I
personally like many of his proposals, I am even less convinced about the
political prospects of his proposed constitutional amendment path than I was about
HR1. Rick offers various reasons why he thinks an amendment could win over
public opinion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One is that Republican
opposition to the liberal reform agenda is not factually supported by academic
research. In my experience, that logic has not convinced many Republicans.
Another argument Rick makes is even if this amendment cannot pass presently, it
could spur a movement that could eventually succeed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Maybe, but I would feel more optimistic about
this if the Equal Rights Amendment had eventually passed.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>But
political feasibility is only part of the problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I also question whether broadly worded
standards can really prevent a partisan court from finding a way to limit and
shape the amendment’s application.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given
that the Supreme Court has successfully narrowed the interpretation of both the
14<sup>th</sup> amendment and the Voting Rights Act, I see no reason why it could
not limit the commitment to a “substantially equally weighted vote.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The specific institutional provisions in both
the basic amendment (e.g. automatic voter registration and unique voter id
number) and its optional features (e.g. abolishing the Electoral College) would
have more impact but also more Republican opposition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This suggest a strategic dilemma: formulate a
broad standard and risk losing by court interpretation or limit interpretation
by specificity and risk losing at the ballot box.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">Not only is the pathway to constitutional amendment
formally arduous, it is also politically harder as well.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>State constitutional revision experience
teaches us that by the 19<sup>th</sup> century, state constitutional
conventions were not the reasoned 18<sup>th</sup> century forum reflected in
the Federalist papers. Rather they were raucous, interest group infested, and
highly politicized political battles fought under the glare of a highly
partisan press. More recently, Californians backed off a proposed
constitutional convention when they recognized who would likely attend its
proposed convention and what they would likely be asking for.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no reason to believe that a new US
convention would be any more capable of working through these issues than the
Congress or state legislatures.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>State
constitutions contain all kinds of specific provisions, and consequently, are
lengthy documents full of provisions that give statutory-like measures constitutional
weight.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The easiest paths for reforms
that are too specific for the US Constitution are found in the state
constitutions. State constitutions are typically amended hundreds of times
because the amendment processes involve fewer steps and lower approval
thresholds. If we take the laboratories of democracy concept seriously, we
should work out the kinks of the reform agenda at the state level, and then
scale up to the national level.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes,
that would mean more diverse outcomes with states possibly moving in different
directions, but I favor incremental progress over going big and coming back
empty.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #212121; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The reform
agenda will scale easiest when the political consensus is broadest. We have
already seen that Republicans back off Trump-ist opposition to convenience
voting. In the end, I think voter convenience will prevail over voter paranoia.
I have confidence in the inherent laziness of human beings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Imposing national reform on a divided
electorate is just a pathway to more reform controversy and electoral paranoia.
Rick is right about constitutional solutions but wrong about where to look for
them.</span><span style="color: #212121;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #212121; font-family: inherit; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; mso-ligatures: none;">Bruce E. Cain is Charles
Louis Ducommun Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University. You
can reach him by e-mail at bcain@stanford.edu.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-10266459914182093112024-03-07T09:30:00.003-05:002024-03-07T09:30:00.131-05:00Give us (a lasting consensus on really protecting) the Right to Vote!<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Emily Rong Zhang </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I am reminded of the following
aphorism as I read Rick’s new book: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we can emerge from the Trump era of
American politics with the kind of robust protections for the right to vote
that Rick writes about and argues convincingly for, perhaps we will have gained
something lasting and worthwhile from it all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If a truly secure right to vote can be the lasting legacy of the Trump
era, it might (almost) make all the agita we collectively suffered less painful
in retrospect.<span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As a former/retired voting rights
advocate, I am, of course, excited for what Rick advocates in the book, a
federal constitutional amendment that affirmatively enshrines the right to
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I am even more excited for
what having such an amendment would memorialize: that enough people cared about
the right to vote so much as to perform a veritable political feat to protect
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rick writes persuasively about what
should galvanize folks to want to undertake this political feat; our troubled
history with the right to vote, especially as it concerns the Courts, was what
upset me enough as a law student to want to do something about its modern
vestiges.<span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Clearly, the courts cannot be
trusted to do the right thing on their own.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Rick suggests that with our help, they might.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A constitutional amendment might be a good starting
point, but it shouldn’t be thought of as a destination.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After all, while Rick reminds us that there
is no right to vote in the federal constitution, we have no shortage of rights
to vote in this country.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As <a href="https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol67/iss1/1/#:~:text=State%20constitutions%20explicitly%20confer%20voting,generally%20provided%20within%20state%20constitutions.">Joshua
Douglas documented</a>, each of our fifty states has the right to vote
explicitly enshrined in its state constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Their existence during our recent <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300198249/the-voting-wars/">Voting
Wars</a> makes painfully clear the inadequacy of legal protections that are not
backed by a current and diligently-maintained consensus about the importance of
those protections.<span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>What might
such a consensus contain?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rick makes a
compelling proposal for one in his book.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>To be sure, not every element is uncontroversial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some, as Rick acknowledges, for instance
those related to felon disenfranchisement or implementing national voter
identification, are likely to be contested.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But that should serve as an invitation for us to engage, not as an
excuse to disengage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Afterall, some of
us are better at reacting to what someone else has written than at filling an
empty page.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We are lucky to have as good
a drafter as Rick. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Emily Rong Zhang is an assistant professor of law at UC
Berkeley School of Law. You can reach her by e-mail at <a href="mailto:zhanger@berkeley.edu">zhanger@berkeley.edu</a></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-20287694764765008842024-03-06T09:30:00.001-05:002024-03-06T11:26:46.587-05:00Expanding Our Constitutional Imagination<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the Balkinization symposium on Richard L. Hasen, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.</span></p><p><span style="text-indent: 48px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Michael Waldman</span></span></p><p>
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The
most significant thing about this terrific book may be the simple fact of the
topic and author. It matters that Rick Hasen, a mandarin of election law and a prominent
public intellectual voice, has embraced an amendment to guarantee voting rights.
It is a welcome sign of the expansion of our <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/symposium-constitutional-amendments">constitutional
imagination</a>.
As Rick notes, the fight for American democracy over the centuries has included
fierce drives to amend the Constitution. These battles were won not in court but
in the court of public opinion. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Yet
for decades, those who care about voting rights – and progressives more broadly
– have been remarkably skittish about the notion of amending the Constitution. Some
argue there already is a right to vote in the Constitution. True, the original document,
the one written by the powdered-wig boys, makes no mention. (Most Founders did
not support a dramatic widening of the franchise, though some did.) But five later
amendments refer to the “right to vote.” Acknowledging that protection is weak
or missing seemed a misguided concession. For many years, this was my own view.
The Brennan Center shied away from such an amendment because we did not think
it necessary. (In contrast, we have long backed an amendment to overturn <i>Buckley
v. Valeo</i> to allow reasonable regulation of money in politics.)<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This
hesitancy was not limited to voting issues. Liberals more generally grew queasy
about constitutional change. The right seemed to burn with inexhaustible
passion, demanding amendments to balance the budget, ban flag burning, prevent
same sex marriage, and on and on. Calls for a constitutional convention raised
fears that demagogues would dominate and shred the Bill of Rights. When it came
to constitutional change, liberals became conservative.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
that misreads history. Those who want to advance democracy should not, as Rep.
Jamie Raksin put it at a Brennan Center conference, be “fraidy cats.” A push
for an amendment need not give courts, for example, an excuse to deny those
rights in the meantime. Reva Siegel has <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963782">recounted</a> the push for
the Equal Rights Amendment. Even as backers argued the ERA was needed, judges
did not use that as an excuse to rule against claims of equality. Instead,
popular momentum encouraged judges to go further. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So,
the A word is not transgressive. But as a genuine strategy – rather than a
thought experiment – we would need to assess opportunity costs, including time
and money spent, and the effectiveness of an amendment versus a strong statute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Opportunity
costs are high, of course. Enacting legislation is hard, but enacting an
amendment is much harder. The Senate could change its rules to pass a voting
rights bill with a majority, for example, and if the Democrats win a trifecta it
likely will do just that. But it cannot change the constitutional provision
requiring a two-thirds vote of both houses as well as three quarters of the
states to ratify an amendment. Amendments take time: <a href="https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=8026&context=journal_articles">the NAACP
opposed</a>
the provision barring a poll tax in 1962 because “It is a travesty to call a
constitutional amendment a civil rights measure when Congress has the
constitutional power to abolish the poll tax by legislation.” Franklin
Roosevelt pointed out as he decided not to seek an amendment during his feud
with the “nine old men” of the Court in 1937 that all that needed to happen was
one legislative house do <i>nothing</i> in thirteen states and an amendment is
doomed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">And
it is far from clear that constitutional language would offer stronger
protection than well-crafted statutes. Hasen notes that legislation to restore
the strength of the Voting Rights Act, ban partisan gerrymandering, establish
automatic voter registration, and other steps passed the House and had majority
Senate support in 2022, though it fell to a threatened filibuster. Hasen does
not dismiss legislative action, but argues that “such reform would not be
nearly as good as a constitutional amendment.” Judges, after all, might strike
down statutory provisions. (John Roberts, in <i>Rucho</i>, actually had pointed
to H.R. 1 as an example of constitutionally sound response to gerrymandering,
though he probably assumed it would not pass!)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But
as a matter of historical record, legislation, police power, and even military
power have produced deeper voting rights gains than court rulings. Union Army bayonets
protected voting rights in the 1860s and 1870s. Preclearance by the Justice
Department under the Voting Rights Act’s Section 5 had the biggest impact until
it was demolished by the Supreme Court in <i>Shelby County</i>. Affirmative
reforms such as <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/voting-reform/automatic-voter-registration">automatic voter
registration</a>,
now implemented in nearly half the states, effectively enfranchise millions
without a rights-based litigation strategy. Until very recently, it was nonpartisan
redistricting commissions that had been most effective in forestalling
gerrymandering. Only after <i>Rucho </i>did state supreme courts step up, and
in some places such as Ohio, legislators simply ignored adverse rulings. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Hasen’s
proposed amendment intriguingly includes not just sweeping language (“right to
vote” akin to “equal protection” or “due process”) but also specific, nearly
legislative language. States would be required to implement automatic voter
registration. A national voter ID system would be established. And more. Why
not just pass these as laws? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">(A
quibble: Rick writes that “Democrats and those on the left have reflexively
opposed all voter identification provisions.” That is no longer true. The
Brennan Center supports “pro-voter” election integrity rules, and published a <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-integrity-pro-voter-agenda">report on this</a> in 2016 authored
by Myrna Pérez, now a federal judge. It praised biometric ID and requirements
such as those enacted in Rhode Island and Michigan. Stacey Abrams <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/21/democrats-voter-id/">endorsed
national ID</a>
rules as part of the Freedom to Vote Act. I have long supported voter ID. What
we oppose is requiring forms of ID that lots of people don’t have.) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Perhaps
the biggest problem with a constitutional strategy: it would still rely on
judges to enforce it. Indeed, an amendment would shove the issue of voting
rights even more vigorously into the courtroom. And American history gives
little comfort that judges can be trusted with such a task. The proposed
amendment declares that courts should not narrowly construe Congress’s
authority to implement it. But we know that courts are fully capable of gutting
or ignoring even robust constitutional provisions, often soon after enactment. The
Fifteenth Amendment was too narrow (as Rick explains), but even so, courts refused
to make real the promise of even the weaker law. The Fourteenth Amendment
contains much language that could have been used by judges to craft a regime of
strong equal democracy, but over most of a century and a half, they refused to
do so. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Above
all, this book takes seriously the crisis faced by our democracy. It does not
flinch, and as a reader and a citizen, for that I’m especially grateful. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Michael
Waldman is President and CEO of the <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/">Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law</a>. He is the
author of <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Supermajority/Michael-Waldman/9781668006061"><i>The
Supermajority: How the Supreme Court Divided America</i></a><i> </i>and <i>The </i><a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Fight-to-Vote/Michael-Waldman/9781982198930"><i>Fight to Vote</i></a>, among other
books. He can be reached at michael.waldman@nyu.edu.<o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Guest Bloggerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15634986143935453376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-27657125617837643952024-03-06T09:20:00.002-05:002024-03-06T11:17:49.082-05:00The Myth of the Irresolvable Conflict<p> <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Monday’s <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/23">decision</a> in <i>Trump
v. Anderson </i>amplifies a growing if selective theme in our public life:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the assumption that no controversy may ever
be resolved because neither side will accept its loss.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From this, the reasoning seems to go, we
should wall off the processes through which a conflict might arise and, if one
does anyway, regard it as permanently irresolvable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This pattern of thinking is irreconcilable
with both democracy and the rule of law, yet it seems to be gaining
ground.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On Monday, the per
curiam declared that “state-by-state resolution of the question whether Section
3 bars a particular candidate for President from serving would be quite
unlikely to yield a uniform answer consistent with the basic principle that the
President represents all the voters in the Nation. … The patchwork that would
likely result from state enforcement would sever the direct link that the
Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the
United States as a whole.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Citations
and internal quotations omitted.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Justice
Barrett joined this part of the Court’s opinion, and the disaffected liberal
justices wrote that allowing states to enforce Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment “<span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;">would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at
odds with our Nation’s federalism principles.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>To
read this, one might think that the justices have never heard of a certain
institution empowered to resolve such disagreements among states’ adjudications
of federal questions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, that institution,
at the very moment the justices were writing, was busy resolving a patchwork of
inconsistent state decisions about a candidate’s eligibility for federal office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If
we cannot bear the thought of states reaching inconsistent applications of
federal law, perhaps the Court should overturn <i><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/330/386/">Testa v. Katt</a></i>
and get the states out of the business of applying federal law at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That would, of course, lead to a serious
under-enforcement of crucial tenets of federal law, but that is no more than what
happened in <i>Trump v. Anderson</i>.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>As
awkward as the Court’s phobia about controversies may be, it has become
increasingly common.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Traditionally,
parties wishing to win a point seek to persuade others that they are
correct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, however, they may deem
their task merely to be declaring the existence of a controversy, no matter how
flimsy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>President Trump’s strategy for
overturning the results of the 2020 election did not depend in any meaningful
way on submitting proof of fraud; he and his accomplices believed they only had
to assert their subjective opposition to the result.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under their plan, Vice President Pence would
declare that two conflicting sets of electoral votes had been submitted and therefore,
merely because a controversy existed, neither should be counted.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This assumes that no evidence is required to
raise a controversy and no amount of evidence is sufficient to resolve
one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A large majority of House
Republicans <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/07/us/elections/electoral-college-biden-objectors.html">agreed</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In
his concurrence with the Court’s granting a stay in <i>Bush v. Gore</i>,
Justice Scalia declared that “counting of votes that are of questionable
legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and to
the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his
election.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here again, we are told that
the mere presence of a controversy is so harmful that it must be prevented,
even at the cost of gaining evidence that could lead to a more accurate
resolution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Supreme Court could and did
resolve that controversy; its resolution was not to everyone’s liking.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Justice Scalia’s view, like those of the
election deniers twenty years later, implies that the mere presence of a
disagreement is debilitating in and of itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>We
see this same assumption in crucial public policy discussions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Most
of the Republican Party opposes acting against climate change because, it <a href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/26072016/democrat-republican-party-platforms-energy-climate-change-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/">says</a>,
the existence of human-caused climate change remains controversial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That this supposed controversy almost
entirely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/18/the-forgotten-oil-ads-that-told-us-climate-change-was-nothing">reflects</a>
the subjective, self-interested preferences of extractive industries, with many
of the supposed evidence <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/09/big-oil-delay-tactics-new-climate-science-denial">contradicted</a>
even by their own internal research, is deemed immaterial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The mere fact that the oil and gas industry will
continue to protest is seen as rendering the controversy irresolvable and hence
policy action inappropriate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
same could be said about any proposals to treat LGBTQ youth more humanely:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>although no meaningful evidence suggests that
brutalizing them and pressing them to deny their identities achieves anything
good, because some loud, angry voices demand that we do, the question is
treated as an irresolvable controversy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I
am finishing up an article arguing that this sort of “adjudication failure” has
reached the point of becoming self-reinforcing downward spiral that threatens
our capacity for self-government.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Curiously,
when regulating civil litigation, the Court has moved in the opposite
direction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/">Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly</a> </i>and <i><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/662/">Ashcroft v. Iqbal</a></i>,
it substantially increased the quantum of facts plaintiffs must present to have
the federal courts recognize their cases and controversies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court had never suggested that disputed
questions could not be resolved, or that the losing parties’ objections would
somehow stay action indefinitely, but it had previously been more willing to <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/355/41/">allow</a> an
exploration of the facts through discovery. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under either view, however, the mere fact that
a dissatisfied party might object would not be grounds for despairing of
reaching a resolution, as <i>Trump v. Anderson </i>seems to suggest.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Century Schoolbook"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i>@DavidASuper1</i></span></p>
David Superhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01105497514487546333noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-14475854221540940872024-03-06T09:00:00.002-05:002024-03-06T11:26:32.139-05:00Balkinization Symposium on Richard L. Hasen, A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="445" data-original-width="288" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOR8LPRH_KPMB2sS7X-SQg-OqHFaC3L5a-adriaMxguR4hN4MceiP4FcOxZeNP5K9F3tpjZMcsPGAaYXQJSuBne1e6ds5FjsDN8H8gamQZMUCiAH_0Qmh44gCh7wjNIW2n5w2-BePteNJj_gyxjMP-IwEJLh8JhKMXZIoPBkNxLxztaOz5vY9p/w259-h400/Richard%20L.%20Hasen,%20A%20Real%20Right%20to%20Vote.jpg" width="259" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p>This week at Balkinization we are hosting a symposium on Rick Hasen's new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Real-Right-Vote-Constitutional-Amendment/dp/069125771X">A Real Right to Vote: How a Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2024)</a>.<br />
<br />
Bruce Cain (Stanford), Wilfred Codrington III (Brooklyn), Alex Keyssar (Harvard), Sandy Levinson (Texas), Derek Muller (Notre Dame), Daniel Tokaji (Wisconsin), Michael Waldman (NYU - Brennan Center), and Emily Rong Zhang (Berkeley)</p><p>At the conclusion, Rick will respond to the commentators.<br />
<br /></p>
JBhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02309372047622319060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-26911827424597047682024-03-05T13:43:00.011-05:002024-03-05T22:56:48.644-05:00Trump and the American Problem of the Commons.<p><span data-offset-key="ev9nf-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span data-text="true"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Waiting for others to act and insisting on our preferred solution is likely to guarantee the continued menace of Donald Trump. See <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/trump-and-the-american-problem-of-the-commons/">Verfassungsblog</a></span></span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Been a busy day. See also, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/trump-supreme-court-insurrection-ruling-election">The Guardian</a></span></p>Mark Graberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09691490171082748026noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-84087650926880489332024-03-05T11:13:00.010-05:002024-03-07T09:47:37.471-05:00What's dividing the Justices (and other initial reactions to the Court's decision in Trump v. Anderson) <div style="text-align: left;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Here are a few preliminary thoughts about the Court’s </span><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-719_19m2.pdf" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">decision yesterday in <i>Trump v. Anderson</i></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">. The only one that's likely to be of any lasting significance is the final item, concerning what divided the five Justices in the majority from the four who wrote separately. So assuming that’s what most interests you, you can skip ahead to reaction number 7, below.</span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div><span><span><a name='more'></a></span></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1. As I </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/01/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson-post.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">explained on January 28</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, from all that appears in the record, it seemed as if the controversy had become moot, given that Colorado already included Donald Trump’s name on its primary ballot, which has been sent or handed out to many voters and (presumably) returned by many of those voters to state officials. I was hoping that one or more of the parties would explain to the Court why the case </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">wasn’t </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">moot but, alas, none of them said a word about it in their briefs or at oral argument. In theory, the Court “has an obligation to satisfy itself … of its own jurisdiction," </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 523 U.S. at 95, whether or not the parties raise or contest the issue. Perhaps the Justices coalesced around an understanding about why the case wasn’t moot but, if so, they didn’t whisper a word about it in their opinions. (Just to be clear: I’m not surprised.) Thus it becomes an interesting little mystery for future cases, Fed Courts courses, and Hart & Wechsler. (I also raised the question whether and on what grounds the Court had statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)—another jurisdictional prerequisite that the parties and the Court (not surprisingly) did not address.) </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">2. For what it's worth, I think the Court probably reached the right result with </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">respect</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> to reversing the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, albeit not quite for the right reasons. The Court’s opinion would have been more persuasive had it relied upon the argument, based on </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Anderson v. Celebrezze </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">and related precedents, that Colorado lacked a sufficient basis for limiting the constitutional right of Trump supporters to cast their ballots for him—though even that would have raised tricky questions, as I noted </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/02/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson-part_8.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">here</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Instead, as I (and many others) predicted after the oral argument, the Court used the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Anderson </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">line of cases as only one part of a newfangled federalism-based constraint on the ability of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">states </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">to “enforce” Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">federal </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">offices. The most remarkable thing about the Court’s federalism-based resolution, which </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">all nine Justices </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">approved in large measure, is that it was not among the ten or more arguments that the parties and the numerous amici presented to the Court, nor is it anything discussed in the many law review articles about Section 3.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I find the Court’s rationale to be unconvincing in two principal respects: First, as I discuss in Points 5 and 6 below, I think some of the Court’s premises—about what Colorado was doing here, and about states’ authority to decide how to select presidential electors—are erroneous. Second, I agree with the concurring Justices that to the extent the analysis in Section II-A of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment itself provides some basis for concluding that states have to treat </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">this </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">ground of ineligibility for holding federal office differently than they can treat </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">other </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">federal grounds of disqualification, that’s not right.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nevertheless, the Court’s resolution was ingenious, in that it reached the right result while not adopting any of the lousy arguments Trump himself had offered; allowed the Court to avoid opining on questions related to Trump’s constitutional eligibility to serve again as President (or in any other covered office); and </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">(as I explained </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/02/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson_15.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">here</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">) </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">at the same time </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">preserved </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">the power of states to do two other things that presumably don’t trouble the Justices nearly as much as the prospect of a state ballot exclusion on Section 3 grounds in November—namely, (i) to exclude persons from </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">state </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">office on Section 3 grounds and, probably, (ii) to exclude candidates for federal office from their ballots on federal constitutional grounds </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">other than </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Section 3 (e.g., being 27 years old or being born outside the United States), as then-Judge Gorsuch held in the 2012 Tenth Circuit decision in </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Hassan v. Colorado</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Because the Court expressly preserves the states’ power to enforce Section 3 as to state offices, I think we can expect the Court to deny certiorari in the </span><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-279.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">pending Couy Griffin case</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (or, at most, to GVR it). (Contrary to the view of </span><a href="https://reason.com/volokh/2024/03/04/the-modern-supreme-court-agrees-with-chief-justice-chase-trump-cannot-be-removed-from-the-presidential-ballot/" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">some observers</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, the Court most certainly did </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">not </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">hold that Chief Justice Chase was right in (the earlier, 1869) </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Griffin’s Case</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. The opinion cites <i>Griffin's Case </i>only for very limited and uncontroverted proposition, which "</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized," that it's necessary for </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">someone</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> to “‘ascertain[] what particular individuals are embraced’” by Section 3 before they can be excluded from office. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Indeed, </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Griffin’s Case </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">was about a </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">state </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">office, and the Court in </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Trump v. Anderson</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> expressly holds that no congressional legislation is necessary in </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">order</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> for a state to enforce Section 3 as applied to state offices. If anything, then, the Court undermined the holding of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Griffin’s Case</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">.)</span><i style="font-family: inherit;"> </i></div></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As for the latter state power—i.e., to deny ballot access to candidates who are ineligible on other federal grounds—it is certainly now subject to more substantial litigation risk than it was yesterday. But I expect the Court would distinguish </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Trump v. Anderson </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">if such a case ever reaches the Court. However the courts ultimately resolve that question, it’s not of great practical importance: States have often included on their ballots candidates who are clearly ineligible to hold the federal office for which they are running, including the presidency. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">3. To state the obvious: This outcome was foreordained. Indeed, most close observers of the Court predicted that the decision would be unanimous or close to it. The assumption underlying the challengers’ strategy—that the Supreme Court itself might actually opine on the substance of the Section 3 question and declare that Donald Trump is ineligible to serve as President—was deeply misguided from the start and has, not surprisingly, turned out to be counterproductive. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">4. Thankfully, no Justice wrote to give any credence to the absurd arguments that the President isn’t an “officer of the United States” or that the presidency isn’t an office “under the United States.” Perhaps, then, those arguments will be re-consigned to the obscure corners of implausible scholarship from whence they came.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">5. The central, necessary predicate of the majority’s rationale is (p.6) that “[t]his case raises the question whether the States, in addition to Congress, may also </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">enforce</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Section 3 … with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency.” Not that it much matters now, but in fact that’s </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">not </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">a question the case raised. As </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/02/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">I’ve explained</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, Colorado did not purport to be “enforcing” Section 3 by “disqualify[ing] persons holding or attempting to hold” office or in any other way; nor did the State purport to be asserting a “power over governance” that “extend[s] to federal officeholders and candidates,” </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">id.</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">; nor did the Colorado Supreme Court assert (p.8) that states’ constitutional powers “to conduct and regulate congressional and Presidential elections, respectively [see Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2] … implicitly authorize the States to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.” (Indeed, and as I further explained in that </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/02/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">earlier post</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, Colorado wasn’t even exercising its federal constitutional authority over presidential elections at all here—it was merely acting pursuant to </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">state </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">law to regulate the manner in which it uses its </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">primary </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">elections to recommend delegates to the Republican Party convention.) </span><i style="font-family: inherit;"> </i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i style="font-family: inherit;"><span> </span></i></div><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To be sure, as the </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> opinion notes (p.7), the private </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">respondents </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">“maintain that States may enforce Section 3 against candidates for federal office.” But Colorado itself didn't maintain anything of the sort. That’s why the Court </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">should have </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">predicated its decision on Colorado’s violation of Trump supporters’ right to vote, rather than on a rationale that states can’t “enforce” a constitutional provision that Colorado didn’t purport to be “enforcing” here. </span></div></o:p></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">No matter: The upshot is the same, under either rationale--namely, that states can’t exclude a federal candidate from their ballots, in the primary or general election, based upon a determination that Section 3 disqualifies the person from holding the federal office in question.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">6. A significant portion of the Court’s reasoning is peculiar to </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">presidential </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">elections—see pages 11-12, beginning with “state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the Presidency would raise heightened concerns.” The Court describes the possibility that “a single candidate would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others, based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same factual record).” The resulting “patchwork” of state presidential ballots (presumably at the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">general </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">election stage) would, according to the Court, “‘sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States’ as a whole” (quoting </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">). Moreover, this “patchwork” of state treatment of a presidential candidate “could dramatically change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the country, in different ways and at different times.” “Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such chaos—arriving at any time or different times, up to and perhaps beyond the Inauguration.” </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Moreover, there’s little doubt that the four “concurring” Justices were </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">most </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">influenced by these considerations about presidential elections. See pages 2-3 of the Sotomayor/Kagan/Jackson concurrence. The Court’s rationale concerning the presidency, they conclude, “provides a secure and </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">sufficient</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> basis to resolve this case. To allow Colorado to take a </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">presidential</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> candidate off the ballot under Section 3 would imperil the Framers’ vision of ‘a Federal Government directly responsible to the people’” (quoting </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Term Limits</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">; emphasis added). “The Court,” they write, “should have started and ended its opinion with this conclusion.” Justice Barrett similarly writes that “I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">against Presidential candidates</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that.” (Emphasis added.) </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are at least [UDATE: three] important things to note about these presidency-focused passages.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">First, as the Anderson respondents' counsel noted at oral argument, it was </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">not </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">their objective to have Trump on some ballots but not others, in a "patchwork" fashion; the whole point of their suit in Colorado was to tee up the question of Trump's eligibility for a </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">singular </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">authority to resolve--namely, the U.S. Supreme Court itself--in hopes that the Court's resolution would settle the matter on a national basis. I </span><a href="https://reason.com/volokh/2024/03/05/if-trump-prevails-how-will-section-3-be-litigated-on-or-after-january-20-2025/" style="font-family: inherit;">explained earlier</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> that I'm not sure a pronouncement by the Court that Trump is disqualified to serve as President </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">would </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">have settled the matter nationwide. But more importantly, the respondents simply miscalculated in assuming that the Court would ever be inclined to adjudicate the merits of the Section 3 question itself.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Second, the Court's passages about states' authority to control presidential ballots are deeply ahistorical (and nonoriginalist). The Constitution affords the states extraordinary discretion about how to choose their presidential electors, which might well result in a “patchwork” of methods—and even a patchwork of means of assessing possible Section 3 ineligibility. States may, for example, authorize their </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">legislatures </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">to appoint electors, which was a common practice early in our constitutional history. The Florida legislature, for example, chose that state’s electors in 1868, shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to ensure that its electoral votes would be cast for Ulysses S. Grant. And just after its admission to the Union, Colorado itself provided for its legislature to choose the state’s three electors in the election of 1876, perhaps </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">so as to foreclose the possibility that the people of Colorado might opt for Samuel Tilden over Rutherford B. Hayes—which would have changed the results of the national election. Where a state legislature chooses its electors, the legislators (and the electors) surely can make their decisions based upon whether they believe certain candidates are ineligible to hold federal office under Section 3 (or for many other reasons). </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Moreover, as my colleague Josh Chafetz noted </span><a href="https://twitter.com/joshchafetz/status/1764676553886273624" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">on X yesterday</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, state presidential ballots often differ in terms of which candidates' names appear: “Just a reminder that states have different people on the presidential ballots all the time. Cornel West will likely be on some ballots but not others. Ditto for RFK, Jr.” </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It's highly unlikely the </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Supreme</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Court would hold that all state presidential ballots must be uniform—or that a state could not once again enact legislation to remove the voters’ power to choose presidential electors. Such practices, however, are in considerable tension with the implications in yesterday’s opinion that the Constitution might require </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">some deg</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">ree of national uniformity when it comes to the states’ treatment of the vote for presidential electors. (And it’s especially hard to reconcile those paragraphs of the <i>per curiam</i> opinion with Justice Thomas’s separate opinions in </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Term Limits </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">and </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Chiafalo</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, where he insists upon the authority of states to control the content of their presidential ballots.)</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Third, there's some tension in the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;"><span>per </span>curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion about whether its analysis of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">presidency</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> is necessary to its ultimate holding. On the one hand, at the end of the opinion the majority--apparently channeling former Justice Breyer, </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">see, e.g.</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">U.S. v. Comstock</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 560 U.S. at 133, 149--insists (p.13) that "it is the combination of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">all</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> the reasons set forth in this opinion ... that resolves this case" and that, "[i]n our view, </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">each</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> of these reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for the judgment the Court unanimously reaches" (emphasis added). If that were true, then the Court's holding would not extend to other federal offices, because </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">one </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">of the reasons it offered is specific to the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">presidency</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. On page 6 of the opinion, however, the majority writes </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">that “[w]e conclude that … States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>with respect to federal offices</i></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">, especially the Presidency.” (The significance of "especially" is something of a mystery.) And at the bottom of page 12 the Court similarly writes that the “responsibility for enforcing Section 3 </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>against federal officeholders and candidates</i></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> rests with Congress and not the States.” (Emphasis added in both places.) The </span><i style="font-family: inherit;"><span>per </span>curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion doesn't make any effort to reconcile these inconsistent statements. Even so, I think it's fair to assume that the Justices in the majority surely believe they've issued a holding that applies to all federal offices, not only to the presidency.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There’s a suggestion at the top of page 13 that “[a]ll nine Members of the Court agree” with the broader, "all federal </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">officeholders</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">" statement on page 12, but that's clearly mistaken. The joint concurrence's rationale is expressly limited to the presidency. And although Justice Barrett purports to join Part II-B of the Court’s opinion, which includes the statement on page 12, she specifically writes that she agrees with the other concurring Justices on the “principle” that “States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presidential candidates,” which is “is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that.”</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So that’s one difference among the Justices: Four of them would have reserved the question about whether a state could, for instance, refuse to include on its ballot a candidate for Senate or the House who the state has deemed to be ineligible for federal office under Section 3. But five other Justices did not do so, notwithstanding their extensive comments about the need for uniformity when it comes to </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">presidential </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">ballot practices. The Court’s holding, therefore, appears to be that states may not “enforce” Section 3 as to any and all federal officers and candidates for federal office.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">7. And that brings us, finally, to the major difference among the Justices—the one that prompted four of them to concur separately and that prompted Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson to note their strong objections.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some observers have read the Court’s opinion to preclude </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Congress itself</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> from taking steps to prevent individuals from taking or holding federal office on Section 3 grounds unless and until Congress enacts further “enforcement” legislation—and, in particular, to forbid the two houses of Congress from refusing to count electoral votes for Trump on Section 3 grounds when they convene in “Joint Session” to count electoral votes on January 6, 2025. I don’t think that’s right.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In fairness, that broad reading finds support in some statements in the joint concurrence’s characterization of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, particularly this passage on page 2: “The majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection can occur </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">only</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">the majority shuts the door on other potential means of federal enforcement</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">." (Emphasis added.) </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The majority opinion, however, <i>doesn't</i> contain any such categorical “announce[ment].” Nor does the <i>per curiam </i>opinion specifically “opine[] on how federal enforcement of Section 3 <i>must </i>proceed.” </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Id. </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">at 4 (emphasis added). The joint concurrence also (pp. 3-4) cites page 5 of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion for this proposition: “Congress, the majority says, must enact legislation under Section 5 prescribing the procedures to ‘“‘ascertain[] what particular individuals’”’ should be disqualified” (internal quotation from </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Griffin’s Case</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">). The cited passage on page 5 of the majority opinion, however—the one quoting </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Griffin’s Case</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">—doesn’t mention Congress, or section 5, or enforcement legislation, at all; it merely states that because Section 3 “works by imposing on certain individuals a preventive and severe penalty,” “[i]t is therefore necessary … to ascertain[] what particular individuals are embraced by the provision” (internal quotation marks removed). The joint concurrence likewise (on page 5) states that the majority has articulated a “requirement that a Section 3 disqualification can occur </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">only</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> pursuant to legislation enacted for that purpose” (emphasis added). Again, however, the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion contains no such statement. </span><u style="font-family: inherit;">(</u><span style="font-family: inherit;">To be sure, as the concurrence notes (p.5), page 5 of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">does</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> say that “Congress’s Section 5 power is critical when it comes to Section 3.” As the concurrence notes, however, it isn’t clear what the word “critical” “means in this context.”) </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">All of this leaves the reader (this reader, anyway) with the distinct impression that the concurrence might have been drafted in response to an earlier, more categorical and more restrictive version of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, in which case the concurring Justices’ criticisms might have had the salutary effect of causing the majority to </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">cut back </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">on what its opinion had to say about federal enforcement. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nevertheless</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (if this speculation is correct), the criticisms remained in the joint concurrence, even after the majority opinion was tweaked to be more equivocal (i.e., less express) about the range of possible means of federal enforcement of Section 3 as applied to </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">federal</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> offices. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But that's merely speculation on my part--a bunch of </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">different</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> scenarios are also possible. And </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">the important point is that all four dissenters concluded that the final version of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion bodes ill for at least some forms of federal enforcement of Section 3, even though that </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion doesn’t ever state in so many words that enforcement legislation is necessary<i> </i>before <i>anyone other than states </i>can enforce Section 3 as applied to federal offices. </span></div></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So which forms of federal enforcement are the source of the concerns?</span></div></span><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I strongly doubt that </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">the disagreement </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">centers</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> on possible enforcement by the Congress itself, </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">pursuant</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> its existing constitutional </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">authorities</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">. The </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> opinion acknowledges (p.10) that the House and the Senate can, for example, exclude or expel members from their bodies for Section 3 violations—something they did in the years immediately following ratification of Section 3. And there isn't anything else in the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion suggesting that, for example, the Senate could not convict and disqualify someone for a Section 3 violation—something that 57 Senators voted for in the second Trump impeachment trial—absent enforcement legislation. The majority opinion also does not mention, let alone call into question, the possible power of the Joint Session of Congress, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment and/or the Electoral Count Reform Act, to refuse to count electoral votes of a person who is disqualified under Section 3—or possible action by Congress, even absent enforcement legislation, to enforce the prescription of section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment that “if the President elect shall have failed to qualify [by Inauguration Day], then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.” There are, of course, open questions about whether Congress has the power to take such actions under the Twelfth Amendment (and the ECRA) and the Twentieth Amendment. But I think it’s fair to assume the Court would answer those questions by looking to those amendments (and the ECRA) themselves, and would not impose a Section-3-specific constraint on a congressional power that the Constitution and statutes otherwise authorize. Nothing in the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, in any event, suggests otherwise. (The majority opinion does </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">quote Senator Trumbull's statement in 1869 that because the Constitution provided "no means for enforcing" Section 3, Congress should enact implementing legislation. That statement, however, was addressed to the problem Trumbull was discussing (quoted in the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">), namely, the "hundreds of men" holding </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">state </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">office in violation of Section 3. Enforcement legislation was, indeed, needed as a practical matter if the federal government was to be able to enforce Section 3 as to those state officials. Trumbull did not say anything, however, to suggest that the federal government could not enforce Section 3 as applied to federal offices absent implementing legislation--indeed, Congress had already been enforcing it by excluding rebels from the House and the Senate, as the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">decision itself acknowledges.)</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">More to the point, I’d be very surprised if the four concurring Justices' criticisms were motivated by a desire to preserve such </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">congressional</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> actions to disqualify Donald Trump from office—hypothetical legislative actions that the concurrence </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">never mentions</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. The concurring Justices likely realize (as I wrote </span><a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2024/01/a-users-guide-to-trump-v-anderson-part.html" style="color: #954f72; font-family: inherit;"><span color="windowtext">here</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">) that if Trump receives more than 269 electoral votes, there’s virtually no chance that majorities of both houses of Congress would refuse to count those Trump electoral votes or try to enforce section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment by taking some (unknown) steps to prevent his inauguration. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nevertheless, the concurring Justices obviously </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">are </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">concerned about a different way in which the Section 3 question might be raised and decided by federal actors—namely, by future </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">judicial</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> adjudication of Section 3 questions if they arise in cases </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">after</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> January 20th, if and when executive actions by Trump or by alleged insurrectionists he appoints are challenged "defensively." The </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">joint</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">concurrence</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> specifically offers two such examples (p.5):</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p></span></div><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">[T]he majority … forecloses judicial enforcement of that provision, such as might occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrectionist and raises a defense on that score. The majority further holds that any legislation to enforce this provision must prescribe certain procedures “‘tailor[ed]’” to Section 3, ante, at 10, ruling out enforcement under general federal statutes requiring the government to comply with the law.</span></div></span></span></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The second of these two sentences is, I think, a not-so-veiled reference to a challenge to agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, or pursuant to an </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Ex Parte Young</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">-like prospective enforcement action. Assume, for example, that shortly after taking office President Trump issues an order freezing certain individual and corporate assets pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and an affected party sues the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to enjoin its enforcement of the President’s order on grounds that the order was </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">ultra vires</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> because Trump is ineligible to hold office under Section 3. </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">See </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (providing that “[t]he reviewing court shall— … hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— … not in accordance with law”); </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">see also Franklin v. Massachusetts</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (explaining that although the APA doesn’t authorize suits directly against the President, “the President's actions may still be reviewed for constitutionality” in a suit against an agency implementing a presidential directive (citing </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Youngstown</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> and </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Panama Refining</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">)); </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">id. </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">at 828 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin officers who attempt to enforce the President's directive.”); </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 575 U.S. at 327 (federal courts may enjoin “violations of federal law by federal officials”); </span><i style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="border: 1pt windowtext; padding: 0in;">Chamber of Commerce v. Reich</span></i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996)</span><i style="font-family: inherit;"> </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(“courts have power to compel subordinate executive officials to disobey illegal Presidential commands”).</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Trump v. Anderson </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">concurring opinion is correct about the effect of yesterday’s </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, presumably the courts would hold that such an APA or </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Ex Parte Young</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">-like</span><i style="font-family: inherit;"> </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">suit can’t go forward because it would (arguably) be seeking “enforcement" of Section 3 outside the context of a Section 3-specific statute. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The concurrence’s other hypothetical is even more interesting and more arresting. Assume, for example, that Trump appoints Jeffrey Clark to be Acting Attorney General, and a federal defendant challenges her federal indictment—authorized or signed by Clark—on grounds that Clark is ineligible to hold office under Section 3. Or let’s say that Trump appointed an </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">acknowledged </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">participant in the January 6, 2021 attack at the Capitol to be U.S. Attorney, and a defendant challenges an indictment signed by that U.S. Attorney. </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">If </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">the concurring Justices are correct about the meaning of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, it might mean that courts would be precluded from adjudicating whether Clark or that U.S. Attorney is eligible to serve in office in such a case, even though such ineligibility presumably would render the action </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">ultra vires </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">and thus ordinarily be grounds for quashing the indictment. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In contrast to the fanciful “Joint Session of Congress might not count Trump electoral votes” hypothetical, it is virtually </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">certain </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">that some litigants—perhaps many hundreds of them—</span><i style="font-family: inherit;">would </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">raise such Section 3 defenses to governmental enforcement actions and prosecutions if Trump is elected and takes office. It appears that the four concurring Justices preferred to leave open the prospect that federal courts could, in such cases, adjudicate whether the officeholder in question is ineligible to hold office and, on that basis, enjoin prospective application of their actions to aggrieved individuals. As the Sotomayor/Kagan/Jackson opinion understands the majority opinion, however, the Court has precluded those "defensive" suits (or defenses to prosecution). </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The odd thing about this dispute is that the majority opinion doesn't expressly reference such hypothetical “defense to enforcement” cases. Had the concurring opinion not referred to them, I think it'd be an open, contested question whether the majority’s rationale would preclude a federal court’s adjudication of a Section 3 eligibility question in such cases. After all, in those cases courts would not be “enforcing” Section 3 in the way the majority opinion describes—they would not be “imposing on certain individuals [the] preventive and severe penalty [of] disqualification from holding a wide array of offices” (pp. 4-5). The upshot of a judicial finding that Trump or an appointee is ineligible to hold office under Section 3 in such a case would </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">not </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">be a removal of that person from office but instead “only” an injunction against his or her enforcement of federal law. (Then again, that’s true of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">Trump v. Anderson</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">, too: enforcement of the Colorado Supreme Court opinion would only have meant (at most) removal of Trump’s name from a primary ballot, not “enforcement” of his ineligibility to hold federal office.) </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, if the Supreme Court were to affirm such a holding in any given case, that would put considerable pressure on other actors (i.e., the appointing/removing authority, or Congress) to remove the official in question so that his or her actions wouldn’t all become subject to judicial injunction. Therefore, the eventual practical </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">effect </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">of such a holding might turn out to be a </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">de facto </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">“disqualification” of the official from holding all covered federal and state offices. Whether that means that the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion would preclude such a challenge in the absence of a further enforcement statute is not evident from the text of the opinion itself. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">That said, the concurrence now has specifically written that that’ll be the effect of the </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">per curiam </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">opinion, and the Justices in the majority didn’t add anything to their opinion to call that reading into question. Therefore it’s probably fair to assume—although perhaps not certain—that the majority </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">did </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">intend to put the kibosh on such “defensive” Section 3 challenges here and now, so that they don’t consume the federal judiciary come January 21 if Trump is elected.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I assume the Justices in the majority believe that if such actions </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">were </i><span style="font-family: inherit;">adjudicated, the Supreme Court would eventually reject the challenges on some non-merits-based ground. Therefore, they want to cut off the litigation now. The concurring Justices, however, apparently think that the Court should confront that question when it arises in “defensive” actions, just as it would any other claim that a federal official’s actions are invalid because the official lacked the legal authority to act. </span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p><span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">That, anyway, is how I’m reading the tea leaves in the opinions. It's altogether possible, of course, that I'm misreading them and that something different, or in addition, explains the Justices' disagreement. With any luck, we'll never have occasion to find out exactly what sorts of federal </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">enforcement</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> of Section 3 the majority opinion purports to </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">foreclose.</span></div></span><o:p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div></o:p></span></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>Marty Ledermanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13387756184234029027noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-60983162913258650312024-03-05T06:58:00.003-05:002024-03-05T22:56:31.285-05:00Is Trump's Innocence Irrelevant?<p><span data-offset-key="a6pvm-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Or how conservatives stopped worrying and learned to love procedural technicalities that prevent criminals, in this case a traitor, from receiving their deserved sanctions.</span></span></p><div data-block="true" data-editor="81cif" data-offset-key="7eai6-0-0" style="background-color: white; color: #0f1419; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div class="public-DraftStyleDefault-block public-DraftStyleDefault-ltr" data-offset-key="7eai6-0-0" style="direction: ltr; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-top: 2px; position: relative;"><span style="color: #1d9bf0;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/trump-supreme-court-insurrection-ruling-election</span></span></div></div>Mark Graberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09691490171082748026noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-21504515994692466222024-03-04T12:44:00.005-05:002024-03-04T14:42:35.570-05:00Two Other Quick Takes on the Opinion<p>First, the majority says that each House of Congress could (and did) exclude members-elect on Section 3 grounds during Reconstruction. Thus, the opinion (I think) cannot be read to say that exclusion can occur only through an Act of Congress when a national official is involved. No Act of Congress was involved in those exclusions by the House and Senate.</p><p>Second, Congress gave amnesty in 1868 to Roderick Butler, a member-elect to the House from Tennessee, so that he could be seated. No Act of Congress was in place at that time to enforce Section 3. Under the majority's theory, that amnesty was completely unnecessary.</p><p>I may be back with more later . . .</p><p>UPDATE: And here I am. The Court at one point describes Section Three as a "penalty," which is incorrect but conveys its negative attitude toward the provision.</p>Gerard N. Maglioccahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00473343947353087860noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-69408208316982433342024-03-04T11:36:00.003-05:002024-03-04T12:31:05.770-05:00The Court Wasn't Clear Enough<p>If the majority in <i>Trump v. Anderson </i>wanted to foreclose the possibility of a post-election Section Three challenge to Donald Trump's eligibility, then they did a poor job. The majority did not address the Electoral Count Reform Act or the Joint Session pathways at all. Thus, if Trump wins in November those pathways will remain open (or at least a lot of people will think that they are open).</p><p>It's the worst of both worlds. The majority used dicta that drove away four Justices and denied fans of unanimity the satisfaction of a single opinion. But the dicta doesn't accomplish anything because it's too vague. Perhaps they should have taken a few more weeks to iron that out.</p><p><br /></p>Gerard N. Maglioccahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00473343947353087860noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-34380019939681090972024-03-01T20:16:00.000-05:002024-03-01T20:16:05.540-05:00Ida B. Wells: A Plea for Law and Society Canonization <div>The Law and Society movement, as one of its major figures has put it, is “the scholarly enterprise that explains or describes legal phenomena in social terms.” Intellectual histories of the movement, which formed in the 1960s, typically begin with the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s, and their argument that the content of the law was less determinate than had been assumed by legal formalists. The realists in turn reached back to Oliver Wendell Holmes and his pragmatist critique of formalism. If law was nothing more than a prediction of what the courts would do, as Holmes famously put it, and if those courts were influenced by extra-legal factors, then it became important to understand how societal factors impacted law in a systematic way. (The deeper intellectual origins of this approach go back to Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law of 1861, and Montesquieu before him.) </div><div><br /></div><div>Though famous for his call for empiricism, Holmes was not an empirical scholar himself, and so when we look for early studies that deploy the empirical approach, we see very few. It is only with the consolidation of social science disciplines in the first decades of the 20th century that we really see systematic exploration begin. The famous Brandeis brief appears around that time, in such cases as <i>Muller v. Oregon</i> (1908). </div><div><br /></div><div> I want to make the case for Ida B. Wells, who died in Chicago 93 years ago this month, as a founding intellectual mother of this approach. Wells, famous as journalist and activist who battled sexism and racism, did more than any other individual to expose and investigate the practice of lynching in the United States. This work began with her newspaper, <i>The Free Speech</i>, which was destroyed by a mob in 1892 and led her to flee to Chicago. Here she continued her work and career, becoming a national figure and participating in the formation of the National Afro-American Council in 1898. The Anti-Lynching Bureau of this body, which she chaired for a time, undertook the systematic documentation of lynching. </div><div><br /></div><div>The key essay for my purpose is her 1900 speech, <a href="https://www.americanyawp.com/reader/18-industrial-america/ida-b-wells-barnett-lynch-law-in-america-1900/" target="_blank">Lynch Law in America</a>, which embodies many of the qualities that are later consolidated in the Law and Society approach. Wells begins by identifying mob justice as an “unwritten law” that bypasses the formal legal system. She traces the history of the practice as originating on the frontier, and refers to Judge Lynch, who is thought by some to have given the practice its name in summary trials of loyalists in the Revolutionary War. She then goes on to explain how the practice consolidated in the Jim Crow South. Wells’ short essay includes statistics, documenting the continuity of the practice over time, and taking 1892 as the year for focus. She identifies the number of lynchings by state, documenting the spread of the practice outside the South. She documents the accusation that prompted the lynching, with allegations of sexual assault and murder being the most common categories. There are some statistics by race—roughly 2/3 were Black. </div><div><br /></div><div>Wells' <i>Lynch Law</i> is an early example of a “gap study,” the systematic exploration of the deep division between the law on the books and the law in action. Critically, Wells does not stop with a demonstration of evidence. She goes on to make a normative argument for the application of the law: all that Black people want, she says “is justice–a fair and impartial trial in the courts of the country.” In the normative part of her argument, she documents the reparations paid to foreign governments for the victims of lynchings, which was required under international law. Appealing to self-interest and national pride, hers is a systematic call for reform. </div><div><br /></div><div>In this short work, we see all the hallmarks of later Law and Society scholarship. First, it is focused quite directly on the law in action, suggesting that the true functional law is Lynch’s rather than that of the United States. As Susan Silbey put it, “law and society scholars often locate themselves at the margins of traditional legal scholarship, looking at what law does rather than what law ought to do.”
Second, it embodies Philip Selznick’s ideal of utilizing the tools of social science for normative ends. Selznick’s commitments were to a bounded positivism, in which social science was not value free. Values and ideals were both subject to inquiry but also informed by natural law ideas. Wells was not motivated to her inquiry for the sake of pure knowledge. Instead, positive social scientific data was used to make an argument in service of justice. </div><div><br /></div><div>In their teaching work, <i>The Canon of American Legal Thought</i>, David Kennedy and William Fisher provide a history of American legal reasoning, beginning, appropriately, with Holmes’ 1897 essay “The Path of the Law.” The contributions of the Law and Society movement begin with Stewart Macaulay’s 1963 essay “On-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study and move on to Marc Galanter’s 1974 “Why the 'haves' come out ahead : speculations on the limits of legal change.” The first essay points out that the law does not much matter to Wisconsin businessmen; the second provides a schematic account of why law so often fails in its aspiration and serves the interests of the powerful. (The only women in the collection are Catherine MacKinnon and Kimberle Crenshaw.) </div><div><br /></div><div>Surely when it comes to marshalling data about gaps between law in action and law on the books, gathering evidence in the service of justice, we ought to start our teaching with Wells as the forerunner of the Law and Society movement.
</div><div><br /></div><div>@TomGinsburg</div>Tom Ginsburghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03896135211673097786noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-63007287031532112192024-03-01T17:31:00.001-05:002024-03-01T17:31:18.260-05:00Anticipating a New Senate Republican Leadership<p><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>For anyone who
follows Congress, the departure of the longest-serving Senate party leader is a
momentous occasion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It merits comment
both on the significance of his leadership and what is likely to come after
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Senator McConnell’s
career has been marked by taking advantage of virtually every opportunity within
his reach.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As an obscure state judge, he
won the Republican nomination to run against seemingly popular Senator Walter
Huddleston because nobody else wanted it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>McConnell noticed, however, that Huddleston had been neglecting
constituent services and had stopped traveling outside of the urban parts of the
state.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>McConnell’s win was a shocking upset
in a state that was, at the time, solidly Democratic (and whose Republican Party
had been quite moderate).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since then, Senator
McConnell has shown remarkable skills in spotting and exploiting political
opportunities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Representing an
impoverished state on the Senate Agriculture Committee, engaging with the Food
Stamp Program would have been a logical move:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>many extremely conservative senators from such states have made an
exception for food stamps (now SNAP).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
he did not care for the Food Stamp Program and did not think supporting it
would help the hard-line conservative brand he was trying to build.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He therefore found an alternative in making a
name for himself as a supporter of school meal programs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This avoided the ire directed at senators who
ignore their constituents’ hunger while not forcing him to tangle with other
conservatives.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>He outmaneuvered
self-congratulatory Democrats on numerous occasions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He deftly used threats to eliminate the
filibuster for judicial nominees to push through a collection of extreme George
W. Bush picks without actually having to terminate the filibuster.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That left him free to tie up numerous Barack
Obama nominees, which would not have been possible had Democrats called his
bluff a few years earlier.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>And he
outmaneuvered his own less-diligent Republican colleagues.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Few have commented on how he centralized the
vetting of Republican nominees in his office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>When Democratic presidents selected nominees for Republican seats on multi-headed
agencies, they soon learned that negotiating names with anyone but Senator
McConnell all but ensured that the nominee – and any Democratic choices for the
same panel – would never come up for a vote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>No longer could Democrats find a moderate Republican donor from the home
state of the top Republican on the relevant committee.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, the nominees would be intensely
partisan and reliably conservative, highly resistant to cooptation by the
career staff or other board members of the agency.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Senator McConnell
also had the judgment that so many of his colleagues lacked about when a
seeming short-term opportunity was worth seizing and when it would be a
long-term liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He recognized that federal
government shutdowns depend heavily on careful messaging.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Having seen his party repeatedly pummeled in
shutdowns under Bill Clinton due to undisciplined messaging by Speaker Newt
Gingrich and other House Republicans, he became a determined foe of
shutdowns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>He also concluded
that blocking broad relief during the coronavirus pandemic would unsustainable
for Republicans in an election year and sought to negotiate the best deal he
could.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Trading the Republicans’ dream
corporate welfare package for the Democrats’ dream temporary unemployment
compensation expansion surely won him enormous credit with GOP donors; had he
tried to hold out, his party would have suffered serious damage and, in the
end, he would have had to have negotiate a package from weakness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>More generally, he
stayed sufficiently focused on the big picture to reject short-term expedients with
big long-term costs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He would freely,
even enthusiastically, tell Democratic senators “no”, but he would not tell
them lies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(He also was zealous in his
punishment of those that lied or broke promises to him.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On the other hand,
he correctly determined that neither he nor his party would endure serious
long-term damage for blockading Merrick Garland’s nomination to the seat
vacated by Justice Scalia’s death.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
also concluded that the only people paying enough attention to notice Republicans’
hypocrisy in filling Justice Ginsburg’s seat on the eve of an election were self-identified
moderates whose feigned commitment to process values paled next to their
determination to “both sides” every issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He similarly perceived that Republicans cared much more about judicial
nominations than Democrats so that he could force through record numbers of
Trump nominees to lower courts without provoking Democrats to bring the Senate
to a grinding halt – and then make exactly that kind of threat to slow
confirmation of Biden nominees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>For most of his
political career, his motto might have been “nothing personal”:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>he maneuvered as necessary to maximize the
power of the Senate Republican Conference without becoming personally invested
in this or that particular issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the
past few years, however, his detachment began to crack.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He took the January 6 assault on the Capitol
very personally.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Senator McConnell is
not nearly as athletic as some of his Republican <a href="https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?&q=senator+hawley+running+video&qpvt=senator+hawley+running+video&mid=E34A89CE2166A507F700E34A89CE2166A507F700&&FORM=VRDGAR">colleagues</a>
and would have been in grave peril had the mob gotten close to him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His subsequent speech criticizing former
President Trump and failure to repair that relationship greatly weakened him within
his caucus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And after leading a Senate
Republican delegation to Kyiv, he became smitten by the Ukrainian people
fighting Putin’s efforts to re-establish the Soviet empire.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As Russian disinformation took hold in the
Republican base, this commitment weakened him further.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Like the Lady of Shallot, he grew half tired
of the shadows that are today’s Republican Party, lost his magic, and paid the
political price.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Senator McConnell
never allowed anyone to get to his right on substance, although he maintained
more tactical flexibility in negotiating deals than many other congressional
Republicans.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Assertions that the next
Senate Republican Leader will be more conservative are therefore absurd.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The next Senate Republican Leader likely will
be much weaker than Senator McConnell, far less able to make commitments on
behalf of their party and hence far less able to secure concessions from
Democrats.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The MAGA element of the
Conference seldom meets a deal it likes or a fight it dislikes, no matter how
bad the long-term consequences might be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thus, the new
leader will fight more and, lacking Senator McConnell’s political and
procedural skills, lose more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When they commit
their conference to positions out of step with the electorate, their subsequent
collapses will give Democrats more room to dictate terms on key
legislation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The new leader also
will have more difficulty getting rid of disastrous nominees for winnable seats
and will be less adept at protecting Republicans in swing states from political
embarrassment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This could cost Republicans
control of the Senate some years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On substance,
therefore, Democrats will likely gain from Senator McConnell’s departure from the
leadership.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The increasing contentious,
combative tone that will result, on the other hand, will alienate more voters
from politics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Reduced voter turn-out
likely helps Republicans, particularly MAGA Republicans.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And the further degradation of our public
life will contribute to the normalization of ruthless, anti-republican behavior
like that of former President Trump.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is not good for our future at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i>@DavidASuper1</i></p>
<p> </p>David Superhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01105497514487546333noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-24896133198707625102024-02-29T13:32:00.001-05:002024-02-29T13:32:33.375-05:00The Electoral College in 1868/1869<p>Building on yesterday's post about the new article on Reconstruction and the Electoral College, here is the background. In 1868, the Florida Legislature awarded the state's electoral votes to Grant. The Alabama Legislature passed a law to do the same thing, but the law was vetoed by the Governor. Then the Union Army pledged to protect Black voters at the polls in exchange for the abandonment of direct appointment by the state legislature. (Grant carried the state narrowly).</p><p>In response, a constitutional amendment was immediately proposed in Congress to establish uniformity and federal authority over the Electoral College. Here was the proposal, with the changes in italics:</p><div class="page" title="Page 13"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span style="font-family: MillerText;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: MillerText;">Each State shall appoint, </span><span style="font-family: MillerText; font-style: italic;">by a vote of the people thereof qualified to vote for Representatives in Congress</span><span style="font-family: MillerText;">, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust and profit under the United States, shall be </span><span style="font-family: MillerText;">appointed an elector; </span><span style="font-family: MillerText; font-style: italic;">and the Congress shall have power to prescribe the manner in which such electors shall be chosen by the people</span><span style="font-family: MillerText;">.</span></blockquote><p>This proposal received the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate but did not pass the House. </p><p>What's the upshot for Section Three and <i>Trump v. Anderson</i>? The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware that states could use inconsistent standards in choosing presidential electors. Voices were raised to give the Congress a leading role in that process through another amendment. The proposal failed. This reinforces the understanding at the time that the Electors Clause conferred broad authority on states and that inconsistent applications were not unconstitutional.</p><span style="font-family: MillerText;"></span><p></p></div></div></div>Gerard N. Maglioccahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00473343947353087860noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4093719.post-86532577119423657102024-02-29T10:00:00.008-05:002024-02-29T10:00:00.134-05:00Sour Grapes, The Supreme Court, and Ideological Drift<p>In recent years, critics have frequently condemned the Supreme Court for changing too much, too quickly. The constitutional law professors quoted in Jesse Wegman’s recent NYT <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/26/opinion/constitutional-law-crisis-supreme-court.html">column</a> are good examples. </p><p>A common retort is that this critique is simply sour grapes or hypocrisy. Liberals and progressives would love to enact sweeping constitutional change leftward and would not hesitate to do so if they controlled a majority of the Supreme Court. But denied the sweet fruit of judicial power, they hypocritically condemn its exercise for conservative ends as radical, high-handed, and illegitimate—just like Aesop’s disgruntled and envious fox. Many responses to Wegman’s column have expressed variations on this view.</p><p>This is an uncomfortable charge for liberals and progressives, but it demands to be taken seriously. On the other hand, the Court’s liberal and progressive critics have a number of plausible and weighty responses at their disposal. </p><p>First, liberals and progressives are not a monolithic group, and the membership of the group has changed over time for many reasons. The most significant for present purposes is cohort replacement. Some of today’s leading proponents of the “too much, too quickly” critique have been around long enough to have made significant public commitments that now seem inconsistent—or at least in serious tension—with the critique. But many belong to a younger generation that is developing its jurisprudential commitments in the crucible of the present moment.</p><p>Second, the charge of sour grapes, hypocrisy, or opportunism implies conscious bad faith, which the critics have not proven and is probably unprovable. Unproven does not mean wrong, of course. But a more charitable, and more realistic, explanation might point to the alchemy of motivated reasoning or, what amounts to the same thing, the suppression of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, there are even more charitable, and arguably more plausible, explanations. Jack Balkin’s 1993 <a href="https://jackbalkin.yale.edu/ideological-drift-and-struggle-over-meaning">paper</a> on “ideological drift” helpfully explains: </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0 0 0 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">The sincere individual who lives, as we all do, in the currents of ideological drift, does not perceive her beliefs in this way. … This individual has many possible responses to the tension produced by ideological drift: she may believe that she has changed her mind, that she gradually has come to understand more clearly what she always has believed, or that her principles and commitments have remained constant, however much they may have been misunderstood by others in changing contexts. But in no case is she an opportunist. In each case she believes in her reasons, because she reasons through her beliefs. </p></blockquote><p>These thought processes should be familiar to conservatives from the <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822517">well-documented</a> transformation of originalism over the past few decades. What began as a theory of judicial restraint, formulated in response to the liberal judicial activism of the Warren Court, has evolved into a theory of “judicial engagement,” formulated as a justification for the conservative judicial activism of today. On top of this, we can add selection effects in the reception and recirculation of scholarly ideas, which are probably more common pathways for politics and ideology to influence the evolution of constitutional arguments than conscious bad faith, subterfuge, or opportunism. </p><p>All of this provides good reason to hesitate before embracing sour grapes as the best understanding of the “too much, too quickly” critique. That understanding should be taken seriously, and it is probably justified in some cases. But there are other more charitable and psychologically plausible explanations. At a minimum, sour grapes, hypocrisy, and opportunism are not the only plausible explanations for the critique, and it is worth asking whether there are other ways to make sense of it. </p><p>At the same time, the sour grapes charge raises an important and pointed question that liberal and progressive critics of the current Supreme Court who do not favor gradualism as a general matter should feel obliged to answer: Namely, why do these critics oppose sweeping constitutional change in some circumstances, while favoring it in others?</p><p>I explore these issues further in this new <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=4714188">paper</a>.</p><div><br /></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com