Is the "Weak" American State a Myth?

Stephen Griffin

Mary Dudziak has called attention to William Novak’s essay, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” in the June 2008 issue of the American Historical Review. This essay continues Novak’s project of criticizing the standard story that is told about the historical lack of a strong state (or even of the idea of the state) in the United States. Novak’s project is a good one and he cites an impressive body of research that backs his claim that the “weak” American state is a myth.

Good ideas can be pressed too far, however, and as someone who has defended a version of the weak state thesis, I wonder if that’s happened to Novak. For the most part, Novak uses the “American state” as an omnibus term, sweeping in all levels, branches, and agencies of government that have existed in U.S. history. If we focus on this entity, arguably fictitious because of the constitutional separations of government, we might agree that the idea of the weak state has been overplayed. If I recall correctly, in his book Novak enumerates an enormous collection of state and local regulations of business and economic activity that date to the early nineteenth century, if not earlier. This sort of active regulation by government from an early stage in American history belies notions of a weak or “night watchman” libertarian state.

The scholarship and the evidence can be divided in a different way, to focus on the development of the “national state,” what Americans normally call, somewhat inaccurately, the “federal government.” Here it is much harder to dispute evidence of weakness, much of it supported by the literature Novak cites to support his assertions that the weak state is a myth. Novak cites the work of Stephen Skowronek, but it is Skowronek’s work that established the early national state as one of “courts and parties.” I should note at this point that the inquiry into the nature of the national state as strong or weak is not one-dimensional, despite the popularity of these terms. There are various dimensions along which the national state can be compared with the organization of government in the American states and other countries – compliance, competence, and the capacity to reorganize civil society (sometimes called “infrastructural”) are a few. In the early republic, particularly in the early nineteenth century, we can test dimensions like compliance by states with federal decisions and competence in areas like military organization without coming up with very much evidence of a strong, self-confident national state.

The ambiguities introduced by not separating the omnibus state from the national state can be illustrated by looking at racial segregation, an example cited by Novak. Perhaps he is saying the pervasiveness and persistence of the system of regulation that was segregation cannot be explained by reference to a weak state tradition. Some form of state power was making sure that segregation lasted. But when we turn our attention to the national state, we have to confront the legacy of southern opposition to centralized government in service of protecting the system of segregation. Certainly during my lifetime the values of federalism have been used over and over again to resist granting more authority and power to the national state.

I agree with Novak that it is incongruous to maintain that the traditionally weak national state remains in place in the twentieth century, a time that sees, as Novak puts it, “the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers.” Yet to also posit, as Novak seems to, an essential continuity with a “strong” national state that somehow existed in the nineteenth century would be equally unhelpful in understanding state development. As at least a minor survivor of Hurricane Katrina, I can only regard in wonderment Novak’s claim that the national state somehow achieved enough power, authority and competence to handle natural disasters. As late as 2004, the federal government was still adhering to the idea that state and local governments must take the lead in responding to disasters, no matter how serious. An unexceptionable example of our commitment to federalism, one might think, but one also that belies Novak’s claim that the national state is “strong” across the board. Far from it!

Strong or weak, what is the significance of the argument about the “myth” of the weak state? What is at stake? First, our understanding of the relationship between the national state and the Constitution. If you believe, as I do, that it took relatively cataclysmic events such as the First and Second World Wars, along with the Great Depression to galvanize the development of what had previously been a relatively weak national state, then this raises important issues of constitutional change, given there were no authorizing amendments. Second, positing a slow start from a weak national state helps explain the organizational and policy fragmentation described by so many scholars. It accounts for many anomalies otherwise hard to understand – true, as Novak emphasizes, a strong military (with good health coverage!), but a welfare “safety net” full of holes. A tendency to build state capacity in times of crisis, but then allow full or partial dissipations of hard-won expertise when the crisis ebbs. The “giveaway state” – good at distributing benefits to all congressional districts, poor at coordinating national objectives. The tendency not only of the state to organize civil society, but the opportunities afforded for civil society (in the form of interest groups) to colonize the state and run it for their benefit. And finally, yes, “antistatist” ideology, the conservative critique of the “Leviathan” state that comes to fruition with the election of Ronald Reagan. If such conservative critiques had any impact on public policy, then Novak has a difficult problem of explanation. Could such critiques be securely grounded purely on a “myth?” Or is the structure and development of the American state more complex than Novak allows?


Posted 11:20 PM by Stephen Griffin [link]