Balkinization: Is the "Weak" American State a Myth?

Is the "Weak" American State a Myth?

Stephen Griffin

Mary Dudziak has called attention to William Novak’s essay, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” in the June 2008 issue of the American Historical Review. This essay continues Novak’s project of criticizing the standard story that is told about the historical lack of a strong state (or even of the idea of the state) in the United States. Novak’s project is a good one and he cites an impressive body of research that backs his claim that the “weak” American state is a myth.

Good ideas can be pressed too far, however, and as someone who has defended a version of the weak state thesis, I wonder if that’s happened to Novak. For the most part, Novak uses the “American state” as an omnibus term, sweeping in all levels, branches, and agencies of government that have existed in U.S. history. If we focus on this entity, arguably fictitious because of the constitutional separations of government, we might agree that the idea of the weak state has been overplayed. If I recall correctly, in his book Novak enumerates an enormous collection of state and local regulations of business and economic activity that date to the early nineteenth century, if not earlier. This sort of active regulation by government from an early stage in American history belies notions of a weak or “night watchman” libertarian state.

The scholarship and the evidence can be divided in a different way, to focus on the development of the “national state,” what Americans normally call, somewhat inaccurately, the “federal government.” Here it is much harder to dispute evidence of weakness, much of it supported by the literature Novak cites to support his assertions that the weak state is a myth. Novak cites the work of Stephen Skowronek, but it is Skowronek’s work that established the early national state as one of “courts and parties.” I should note at this point that the inquiry into the nature of the national state as strong or weak is not one-dimensional, despite the popularity of these terms. There are various dimensions along which the national state can be compared with the organization of government in the American states and other countries – compliance, competence, and the capacity to reorganize civil society (sometimes called “infrastructural”) are a few. In the early republic, particularly in the early nineteenth century, we can test dimensions like compliance by states with federal decisions and competence in areas like military organization without coming up with very much evidence of a strong, self-confident national state.

The ambiguities introduced by not separating the omnibus state from the national state can be illustrated by looking at racial segregation, an example cited by Novak. Perhaps he is saying the pervasiveness and persistence of the system of regulation that was segregation cannot be explained by reference to a weak state tradition. Some form of state power was making sure that segregation lasted. But when we turn our attention to the national state, we have to confront the legacy of southern opposition to centralized government in service of protecting the system of segregation. Certainly during my lifetime the values of federalism have been used over and over again to resist granting more authority and power to the national state.

I agree with Novak that it is incongruous to maintain that the traditionally weak national state remains in place in the twentieth century, a time that sees, as Novak puts it, “the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers.” Yet to also posit, as Novak seems to, an essential continuity with a “strong” national state that somehow existed in the nineteenth century would be equally unhelpful in understanding state development. As at least a minor survivor of Hurricane Katrina, I can only regard in wonderment Novak’s claim that the national state somehow achieved enough power, authority and competence to handle natural disasters. As late as 2004, the federal government was still adhering to the idea that state and local governments must take the lead in responding to disasters, no matter how serious. An unexceptionable example of our commitment to federalism, one might think, but one also that belies Novak’s claim that the national state is “strong” across the board. Far from it!

Strong or weak, what is the significance of the argument about the “myth” of the weak state? What is at stake? First, our understanding of the relationship between the national state and the Constitution. If you believe, as I do, that it took relatively cataclysmic events such as the First and Second World Wars, along with the Great Depression to galvanize the development of what had previously been a relatively weak national state, then this raises important issues of constitutional change, given there were no authorizing amendments. Second, positing a slow start from a weak national state helps explain the organizational and policy fragmentation described by so many scholars. It accounts for many anomalies otherwise hard to understand – true, as Novak emphasizes, a strong military (with good health coverage!), but a welfare “safety net” full of holes. A tendency to build state capacity in times of crisis, but then allow full or partial dissipations of hard-won expertise when the crisis ebbs. The “giveaway state” – good at distributing benefits to all congressional districts, poor at coordinating national objectives. The tendency not only of the state to organize civil society, but the opportunities afforded for civil society (in the form of interest groups) to colonize the state and run it for their benefit. And finally, yes, “antistatist” ideology, the conservative critique of the “Leviathan” state that comes to fruition with the election of Ronald Reagan. If such conservative critiques had any impact on public policy, then Novak has a difficult problem of explanation. Could such critiques be securely grounded purely on a “myth?” Or is the structure and development of the American state more complex than Novak allows?

Posted 11:20 PM by Stephen Griffin [link]

Comments:

Stephen,

The crucial question, as you put it, is "what is at stake?" Bill's argument is a historical one aimed at dispelling a resilient (romanticized) story that the 19th century was a laissez faire paradise of individualist-oriented liberty. That is the myth he worked hard to dispel in his book, followed up in this essay.

It does not detract from his argument to point out, as you correctly do, that the national government was underdeveloped at the time--and was vastly underdeveloped compared to today--because the image of laissez faire does not care which branch or unit of government engages in intrusive or expansive regulations or activities.

Your argument is more focused on present concerns, which takes you in a different direction. Bill can speak for himself, of course, but I don't think he would disagree very much with your position, while still maintaining that his argument stands.

Brian

# posted by

Brian Tamanaha : 1:54 AM

Hi Brian,
I agree with you about Bill's book, but not about the essay. In the essay, he pretty clearly is taking on the national state as well and rolling into his earlier story. He's making some very broad assertions about the state as a whole without differentiating between the American state and the national state. That's the point I'm raising.

# posted by

Stephen Griffin : 10:07 AM

But when we turn our attention to the national state, we have to confront the legacy of southern opposition to centralized government in service of protecting the system of segregation.

I'm uneasy with the notion of the "national state"--it still seems to follow the conflation of categories found in "nation-state," and I'm not sure what is gained by continuing along that path.

If effective southern opposition stands as a sign of weakness, does southern collaboration serve as a sign of strength? For example, would the Indian Removal Act of 1830 be an indication of a strong centralized government or a weak federal government succumbing to southern demands? Should the background of the executive come into play in assessing the relative weakness/strength of the government's ability to make states comply with federal regulations?

# posted by

PMS_CC : 11:27 AM

Stephen,

Your point is well taken (you are right that my main focus was on his book). Let's set Bill's argument aside (he can jump in), and instead take up the interesting (and hard) questions your raise in the final paragraph of your post.

I wonder if it would help by shifting the focus a bit. Your questions look at national government activities--services it provides, functions it fills. Here we can see growth tied to the wars and depressions, with subsequent cut-backs, as you indicate.

But what if we instead examine the growth in the size of the institutional apparatus of the national government: numbers of employees, buildings, departments, size of budget. (Morton Keller's work is excellent on this). I think you will see a steady and uninterrupted (except for minor blips) rise in all of these measures that begins in the late nineteenth century, a rise matched by other states in the West (and elsewhere). This growth was part of the emergence of mass bureaucratic society and organization.

These increases are of course tied to the activities and functions of government (managing war and the economy, providing services), but focusing exclusively on raw institutional measures might show that the emergence of "anti-statist" reactions (Reagan) don't really change the fundamentals on the ground.

The (national and state) government apparatus is big, must be big because mass society cannot function without organization and coordination (which cannot be managed entirely by the market or other forms of spontaneous organization), is getting bigger (though perhaps at a slower rate), and will be big no matter what we do or say (absent a doomsday scenario). What the Constitution says, or does not say, about this reality doesn't really matter much.

If this is correct (and I'm not sure it is), your questions touch the rippling surface of what has been a nigh inexorable development which belies the notion of a weak state. Our state (counting all branches and units) may be inefficient and flawed, and sometimes completely breaks down (Katrina), but these are exceptional events compared to its daily (unseen but many-fingered), massive institution presence.

Brian

# posted by

Brian Tamanaha : 11:53 AM

Brian, good questions! Just briefly: in understanding the national state, it's just as important to pay attention to internal structure and evolution over time as to the fact of bigness. And bigness conceals many issues of detail. The national state needs to be studied at retail, not just wholesale.

So let's not overlook deregulation and privatization in the Carter-Reagain years, it's all grist for the mill. Also the growing reliance on private contractors to provide for the troops because of the reluctance to permanently expand the size of the federal bureaucracy. Also the traditional reliance on state and local governments to run otherwise "national" programs because of the same reluctance.

But more to the point -- what's the real answer to the question that while Reaganites fulminate, the national state still exists and grows? I'm afraid I don't have any doubt that antistatist ideology still makes an enormous difference in the way policies are formulated and carried out. It affects policy evolution and that's important to know. And disaster relief is indeed a perfect example.

# posted by

Stephen Griffin : 2:40 PM

If one includes all levels of government, there is a theoretical basis for Novak's thesis. The Constitution did not place any practical limits on the size of state and local governments, only that of the national government.

However, as a practical matter, economic and social competition between the states placed an effective check on the growth of government. A free people are permitted to vote with their feet to leave oppressive taxation and regulation, as they continue to do today from the Blue States to Red States.

It was not until the New Deal Court eviscerated the Article I limits on Congress to enumerated powers that the federal government began its seemingly inexorable growth. It is far harder to vote with one's feet to flee from your entire nation to escape an expansive government, especially when nearly every other similar nation has an even more extensive government.

However, even national government growth apparently has limits with the American citizenry. The Reagan Revolution effectively limited the size of the federal government to roughly 20% of GDP. The absolute growth of the federal government between Reagan and George II, while impressive, was a function of a rapidly growing economy.

We are entering an interesting period now. The GOP under George II flirted with the ideological contradiction known as "big government conservatism" and increased the national government as a percentage of GDP for the first time in a generation. However, the ideological compact established during the 80s and 90s to maintain the size of the federal government does not appear to have changed. Voters punished the congressional GOP by voting for center-right Big Dog Dems running on fiscal responsibility platforms. So far, the change in partisan control in Congress to the traditional party of government has not resulted in an increase in the size of government as the Blur Dogs appear to be honoring their pledges to voters in what are normally Red districts. As the Dem congressional expansion most likely continues this cycle, it will be interesting to see if the Blue Dog resolve continues.

# posted by

Bart DePalma : 6:05 PM

Bart DePalma said...

**If one includes all levels of government, there is a theoretical basis for Novak's thesis. The Constitution did not place any practical limits on the size of state and local governments, only that of the national government.**

I am shocked - shocked that I actually agree with Bart on something. Given the original constitutional theme of limiting the new central government, much of the early development of the American state necessarily took place at the state and local level. Looking closely at the basic institutions necessary for a strong active American "state" (institutions such as administrative bodies and revenue collection), the state-building action in the early years took place at the subnational level rather than on the Potomac.

# posted by

rln : 12:42 PM

There are really four relevant time periods in the strength of the federal government.

First, 1776-1789 (Articles of Confederation -- very weak).

Second, 1789-1861 (current constitution, weak federal government, small bureacracy, non-professionalized congress, fairly unimportant federal courts). This is really the last time that the federal government was weak.

Third, 1861-1932 (current constitution, expanded bureacracy, professionalized congess, small peacetime armies, stronger federal courts developed).

Fourth, 1932-Present (addition of welfare state and increasing general regulation particularly in the areas of commerce and civil rights).

State and local government followed a somewhat similar pattern. Municipal police didn't exist until the third period, which also gave rise to modern civil service systems and much increased regulation of commerce. Widespread use of zoning didn't occur until the fourth.

# posted by

Andrew Oh-Willeke : 8:00 PM

It's somewhat off topic here, but I have to comment on this sentence: The “giveaway state” – good at distributing benefits to all congressional districts, poor at coordinating national objectives.

I rarely see this so cogently stated. It's the direct result of winner-take-all elections in single-member districts. The antidote is proportional representation.

# posted by

Bob Richard : 9:12 PM