Balkinization  

Sunday, August 12, 2007

How to Critique Originalism

Stephen Griffin

Like Mark, I recently finished an article, but it won’t be posted on SSRN until it goes through the wash several more times. It is a critique of the “new originalism,” that is, the sort of “public meaning” originalism associated with Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and many other scholars who have some connection with the Federalist Society. In fact, I have the impression that public meaning originalism is now the FS house theory of constitutional interpretation. I’ve never attended a FS meeting, however, so I could easily be wrong (I’m relying on a 2003 article by Kesavan and Paulsen).

Because originalism has been discussed recently here, I should say immediately that I don’t think my critique applies to JB’s version of “text and principle.” It’s hard for me to tell whether JB’s method is really one that originalists would recognize and feel comfortable with. My hunch is that they will never regard JB’s method as a form of originalism. Time will tell, but I need to learn more about JB’s method before I feel comfortable evaluating it. So the article is about new originalism conventionally understood and probably does not apply to text and principle.

Part of the reason I wrote the article is because I was dissatisfied with the conventional list of objections to originalism. I rarely saw the objections I thought important on the list. This is partly because a crucial issue is often neglected. When the case for originalism is pressed, are its advocates claiming its legitimacy as one form of interpretation among others, or that it is the only (or at least primary) legitimate method of interpretation? My critique is directed solely against the latter view, which I call exclusive originalism. Exclusive originalism has real bite as a constitutional theory. It asserts that other methods of interpretation are wrong or illegitimate and thus that some long-standing constitutional doctrines are wrong or illegitimate. Exclusive originalists claim that the Supreme Court should use public meaning originalism as the sole way of interpreting the Constitution. It could be questioned whether there are any real exclusive originalists, but I’m pretty certain at least some scholars qualify (including Barnett and Whittington), although it is questionable whether any judges do.

My first objection involves defining the alternative to originalism, a topic that seems neglected of late. As earlier debates in the late 1980s and 1990s should have made apparent, the alternative to originalism is not “nonoriginalism,” but rather traditional or conventional constitutional interpretation, which features a varieties of forms, modes, or methods. The historical method (what we should call originalism) is a valid way to interpret, but there are others. All of them are connected to the historic tradition of American constitutionalism.

So exclusive originalism is not the status quo. Adopting it would in fact be a radical change. I argue that because originalism is offered as an alternative to the status quo, it must be justified. The justification must match the significance of the change being advocated, which means the justification must be quite substantial indeed. To date, originalist scholars have never offered such a justification. They have depended on an equivocation between advocating greater use of a current method of interpretation and advocating that we adopt only one method.

I also present a second objection to originalism that has been relatively neglected in recent scholarship. Originalism depends on using history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying attention to historical context or the reality of informal constitutional change outside Article V. Understanding American constitutionalism requires an appreciation of changing contexts, something originalism has difficulty acknowledging. The alternative to originalism here is not the now somewhat nebulous idea of the “living Constitution,” but rather what I call “developmental theory,” or historicist theories of constitutional change. Examples include Ackerman’s theory of transformative moments, Balkin and Levinson’s “partisan entrenchment,” and my own institutional approach.

This is just an article summary, of course. I hope to make some additional posts with respect to material I couldn’t include. Even though I critique them in the article, I have a great deal of respect for Whittington and Barnett and their effort to refurbish originalism. And I’m not sure some of their critics really get where they are coming from. I have in mind the recent book by Sotirios Barber and Jim Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions. But that’s for later (or for APSA – there’s a panel on the new originalism).

Comments:

Originalism is a shovel. A shovel is made to dig earth. Sure, you could use a toothpick or a guitar, but in the end, you'd probably be best suited using the tool which was designed to accomplish the task at hand. I reject what I feel is an attempt by critics of originalism to frame it as some theory picked out of a hat. Originalism, neglecting Balkin's dichotomy, is hardly even a theory as much as it is fidelity, as much as mortals are able to apply it.

I think the schism is helped by the fact that many of the more hotly contested Constitutional issues were not brought up before the 20th century. We don't know how a man accused of violating a state speech regulation in 1800 would have his case decided by SCOTUS. Would the Court have been justified in assuming that society had changed during the previous decade?

All things being considered, the best (or at least most practical) method of originalism seems to be Scalia's, whereby entrenched precedent wins out over strict original meaning. (I don't consider Roe v. Wade entrenched in this sense, because although it is very true that women are very assured of their right to an abortion, it's a decision that from the day it was decided has drawn considerable criticism. Raich, on the other hand, shows that the Commerce Clause jurisprudence is much more entrenched.)
 

"Originalism depends on using history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying attention to historical context or the reality of informal constitutional change outside Article V. "

Nonsense on stilts. Originalism comprehends the reality of informal constitutional change perfectly: It understands it to be an abuse. You really want to claim that somebody doesn't "understand" something if they find it objectionable? I guess doctors don't understand cholera, either, then.
 

Professor Griffin:

My first objection involves defining the alternative to originalism, a topic that seems neglected of late. As earlier debates in the late 1980s and 1990s should have made apparent, the alternative to originalism is not “nonoriginalism,” but rather traditional or conventional constitutional interpretation, which features a varieties of forms, modes, or methods. The historical method (what we should call originalism) is a valid way to interpret, but there are others. All of them are connected to the historic tradition of American constitutionalism.

If the alternative means of constitutional interpretation are not bound by the original meaning of the Constitution, they are by definition non-originalist.

The fact that courts have been rewriting the Constitution to suit their own policy preferences by using other modes of interpretation for a long enough time period so that these methods could be fairly called "traditional" hardly makes these methods "originalist" or legitimate.
 

"Understanding American constitutionalism requires an appreciation of changing contexts, something originalism has difficulty acknowledging."

But as Mitchell Berman notes, virtually all actual originalists have acknowledged that changing facts are relevant to constitutional interpretation; that's why they don't take original expected applications as dispositive.

Alas, SSRN seems not to be working right now.
 

I think the schism is helped by the fact that many of the more hotly contested Constitutional issues were not brought up before the 20th century.

I think it's more accurate to say that the hotly contested issues today are different than those of the 19th C. After all, they then had their own hotly contested issues; we just tend to think of those as settled law because of the passage of time.
 

Here are my thoughts about originalism --

(1) A lot of people dive headfirst into applying what they believe to be the beliefs of the Founders without first considering whether we should even be following those beliefs in the first place.

(2) There is no consensus about the beliefs of the Founders, and current views about those beliefs are often severely distorted by bias. For example, the Founders are viewed as everything from a bunch of bible-pounding holy rolling fundies to a bunch of godless blasphemous atheists. In one of the worst examples of originalism, Judge John E. Jones III said in a Dickinson College commencement speech that his decision in the Kitzmiller v. Dover intelligent design case was influenced by his notion that the Founders believed that organized religions are not "true" religions.

(3) The Founders were not monolithic in their beliefs.

(4) After a span of two centuries, it is difficult to discern the beliefs of the Founders, particularly the lesser-known Founders.

(5) The Founders would not have been happy living under all of our principles, so why should we be happy living under all of theirs?

(6) The Founders made mistakes and omissions. For example, the Founders failed to write the Constitution in a way that would have prevented the Civil War. The courts had to add an imaginary "dormant" comment clause -- i.e., a general prohibition on state interference with interstate commerce -- because such a clause was not contained in the Constitution.

(7) Many issues today were not even on the radar screens of the Founders, e.g., environmental problems and freedom of expression on the Internet.

(8) It is argued that originalist interpretations can be overridden by amendment of the Constitution, but amending the Constitution is extremely difficult. There has been no significant amendment of the Constitution since the 1971 amendment which lowered the voting age to 18.

I am certainly interested in knowing the opinions of the Founders, but IMO we should not be bound by those opinions and those opinions should be taken with a grain of salt. It has been said that originalism can be a form of judicial activism, and I agree.
 

Professor Griffin's reference to originalism being the official position of the Federalist Society raises a related question: Does anyone know whether originalism (it probably would have been the subjective intent variety) was endorsed by the Republican Party when it adopted its platform at any of its presidential nominating conventions in 2004, 2000, 1996, 1992, or before?

dah
 

I'm very much looking forward to the paper. Related thoughts on your Point One here.
 

Originalism depends on using history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying attention to historical context

I don't grok this objection at all. Historical context is the very essence of original meaning originalism. How is anyone supposed to go about understanding the (original) meaning of a Constitutional passage without considering its context? The original-meaning theorists seem to consider "original textual meaning" to mean something like "the meaning that would have been understood by a reasonable reader at the time of adoption of the relevant provision" , which is obviously context-dependent.

Unfortunately, the original-meaning theorists have left "meaning" dramatically undertheorized, so that what exactly they are trying to get at is confused, but I don't see how any concept of "original meaning" can be accused of being context-independent.

without paying attention to . . . the reality of informal constitutional change outside Article V

I'm pretty sure originalists are not failing to "pay attention to" non-Article-V constitutional changes, so much as denying that such changes exist (or denying that they're legitimate, which amounts to more or less the same thing).
 

Platforms are here. Nothing terribly clear on either side that I saw.
 

"I think it's more accurate to say that the hotly contested issues today are different than those of the 19th C. After all, they then had their own hotly contested issues; we just tend to think of those as settled law because of the passage of time."

Well to an extent that's true, as surely the issues of commerce and property are and were hotly contested. Speech, religion, searches, etc., though, are issues that transcend our nation.
 

Elliot said (2:40 PM) --
>>>>>>>"Originalism depends on using history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying attention to historical context"

I don't grok this objection at all. Historical context is the very essence of original meaning originalism. How is anyone supposed to go about understanding the (original) meaning of a Constitutional passage without considering its context? The original-meaning theorists seem to consider "original textual meaning" to mean something like "the meaning that would have been understood by a reasonable reader at the time of adoption of the relevant provision" , which is obviously context-dependent. <<<<<<<

The term "originalism" refers not just to the study of the original meanings or intents of the Constitution but refers to the blind application of such original meanings or intents by the courts without regard to whether such meanings or intents are objectionable or unreasonable according to current standards.
 

Speech, religion, searches, etc., though, are issues that transcend our nation.

A Burkean conservative might take issue with that, but we good Jeffersonians won't. Putting that aside, religion was a very important issue in the 18th C and slavery -- surely a transcendant issue -- was very much so in the 19th. Our political and legal systems eventually reached agreement on them which we continue to (mostly) accept today.
 

"The term "originalism" refers not just to the study of the original meanings or intents of the Constitution but refers to the blind application of such original meanings or intents by the courts without regard to whether such meanings or intents are objectionable or unreasonable according to current standards."

Well, yes, Larry, that's kind of the POINT of having a written Constitution, isn't it? To provide some basics a bit of fixity which only changes in the face of sustained significant consensus, and then in well defined ways, rather than leaving everything to instantly respond to the passions of the moment.

Your problem isn't with originalism, it's with having a constitution.
 

Brett said,
>>>>>> Well, yes, Larry, that's kind of the POINT of having a written Constitution, isn't it? To provide some basics a bit of fixity which only changes in the face of sustained significant consensus, and then in well defined ways, rather than leaving everything to instantly respond to the passions of the moment. <<<<<<

I was not talking about "leaving everything to instantly respond to the passions of the moment" -- I was talking about interpretational "changes in the face of sustained significant consensus." For example, there was no relevant change in the Constitution between the "separate but equal" Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision and the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision, which ruled that separate accommodations are inherently unequal -- the only change was in the interpretation of the Constitution. Though the Brown decision was controversial at the time, today practically no one outside the KKK and Aryan Nations thinks that Brown was wrongly decided. Yet the true originalist position is that Brown was wrongly decided, since the "separate but equal" principle had a lot of support in the Supreme Court not too long after the 14th Amendment was adopted -- the Plessy decision was 8-1.

Also, I want to add to my response to Elliot's comment of 2:40 PM. Elliot said,
>>>>>> I'm pretty sure originalists are not failing to "pay attention to" non-Article-V constitutional changes, so much as denying that such changes exist (or denying that they're legitimate, which amounts to more or less the same thing). <<<<<<<

Originalists don't "[deny] that such changes exist"; they are called "originalists" because -- as you say -- they deny that such changes are "legitimate." And no, it is not "more or less the same thing" -- there is a big difference between denying that changes exist and denying that the changes are legitimate.
 

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