Are the Moral Beliefs of Religious Believers Sturdier Than The Moral Beliefs of Atheists? (A Response to Michael Perry On Religion and Human Rights)

Brian Tamanaha

A recent Time magazine poll asked likely voters whether the religious beliefs of candidates would negatively influence their support. Only atheists were singled out for disfavor by more than a majority of those polled, with 59% responding that it would negatively affect their support if a candidate was an atheist. Muslims (49%), Mormons (30%), and Fundamentalist Christians (29%) had the next highest negative ratings.

Atheists have been distrusted for centuries. Locke’s classic liberal essay advocating the separation between church and state and the toleration of different religions, A Letter Concerning Toleration, emphasized one exception:

Lastly, those are not to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all...

Are atheists less moral than religious believers? Is their morality suspect in some way that does not apply to religious believers? If almost two-thirds of the voters would not vote for (or would be less supportive of) a candidate simply because that candidate is an atheist, that is a significant factor in our polity.

Recently, the rap on the morality of atheists has been extended to the human rights context. Although he is careful to acknowledge that many atheists live moral lives and many religious believers behave immorally, legal philosopher Michael Perry—who I have the utmost respect for—has argued at length that human rights can only be grounded in religious beliefs, and he suggests that human rights might not survive “the death (or deconstruction) of God.” [the quotes herein come from Perry, 54 Emory L.J. 97].

Perry is not persuaded by the fact that the citizens of Western Europe, who are far less religious than Americans, are not evidently less moral than Americans and appear to be more committed to the protection of human rights (even aside from our recent infatuation with torture). Perry is not impressed by the increasing body of evidence that, owing to evolutionary factors, humans have a genetically ingrained moral sense, which presumably means that adherence to moral norms would not disappear if everyone stopped believing in God. He acknowledges that morality of some kind will exist, but not belief in the inherent dignity of humans.

Perry’s argument traces out in a few basic steps: Human rights require belief in the inherent dignity of humans. The only stable foundation for this belief, he argues, is religion: Belief in God specifies the “source of normativity—the source of the should in the claim that no one should violate any human being.” “Every human being is sacred…because every human being is a beloved child of God and sister or brother to every other human being.”

Perry argues at length that there is (and can be) no non-religious foundation for belief in the inherent dignity of humans, and thus there can be no non-religious foundation for human rights. The non-religious (atheist) world view is a chilling vision of a metaphysically empty, meaningless existence with no inherent good or right built into the nature of the universe. He quotes approvingly R.H. Tawney (and others to the same effect): “The essence of [our] morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite importance, and therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God.”

Perry uses a Nazi interlocutor to test, and dismiss, attempts at providing a non-religious foundation for inherent human dignity (in this example Dworkin’s):

Imagine someone saying to a Nazi: “This Jew, too, no less than you, is a creative masterpiece, and we attach great value to her. No one, therefore, should violate her.” The Nazi can reply: “Who is this ‘we’? You attach great value to the Jew. We, however, do not: we attach no value to her. Even if we assume, for the sake of discussion, that the Jew, too, is a creative masterpiece—a creative masterpiece in the sense and for the reason you have mentioned—we would still attach no value to her. Indeed, given what else we believe about Jews, we would still disvalue her.” The obvious problem with Dworkin’s specification of the source of normativity—and, therefore, with his nonreligious ground—is that Dworkin assumes a consensus among human agents that has never existed: Many people do not attach much or even any value to every human being.

Let’s assume Perry is correct that there can be no non-religious grounding for human rights. Some argue, as Richard Rorty does (also taken up by Perry), that human rights can continue without such a grounding. Liberal societies include support for human rights as an important cultural belief, and this is sufficient to keep them robust.

My response to Perry’s argument is different. Taken on its own terms, it seems evident that, in the end, his religious believer is in the same position as a non-believer. Consider again the Nazi interlocutor. Perry’s Christian will resist the Nazi by asserting that the Jew is equally one of God’s children and possesses inherent human dignity. The Nazi can respond: “Your religion is a false religion. My religion, the true religion, disvalues Jews." Or the completely skeptical Nazi can say: “God is a fiction, so your religious beliefs are empty.”

At this juncture, Perry’s religious believer in human rights is indistinguishable from a non-religious person committed to human rights: both are confronted by someone who rejects entirely their particular (religious or non-religious) belief system. Perry admits this openly: the “religious position” “is vulnerable to disbelief by the Nazi….What position isn’t?”

But if that’s the case, then why do religious beliefs provide a superior foundation for human rights?

The obvious answer is that religion provides the better foundation because God in fact exists, and, therefore, humans possess inherent dignity regardless of whether the Nazi agrees. If God exists, and if inherent human dignity comports with God’s will, then the foundation for human rights lies entirely in the fact of God’s existence, not in religion or beliefs of any kind.

Despite the power of this argument, it is not the answer given by Perry. Perry does not pin his claim of the superior religious foundation for human rights on the existence of God. He argues that religion provides a superior foundation even if the believer “is deluded about all this.” The believer’s view is superior because the “religious position is embedded in—and it has whatever plausibility or implausibility it has because of its embeddedness in—a broader family of religious claims, especially the claims that (a) every human being is a beloved child of God and a sister or brother to one’s self and (b) human beings are created by God to love one another.”

In response, I will argue (again) that believers and non-believers are ultimately in the same position. By contrast to Perry, I must emphasize, my argument is not that an atheist's position is superior, but that both positions are equally tenuous.

It bears pointing out at the outset that, although Perry is correct that the religious position in support of inherent human dignity is embedded in a broader family of religious claims, it seems evident that non-religious believers committed to human rights also make their commitment within a broader complex of beliefs (all beliefs, for that matter, are similarly embedded). The fact of embeddedness alone, therefore, does not carry the day, as Perry knows. His point is rather that the belief in inherent human dignity is more internally coherent within this complex of religious beliefs than without it.

To identify the flaw in Perry’s argument for superiority, one must ask this crucial question of the religious believer (which Perry does not pose): “Does your moral belief system still make sense if it turns out that God does not in fact exist?” Perry the philosopher appears to presume that the religious moral system remains internally coherent even if belief in God is a delusion, so, "yes," it would still “make sense.”

That is not, I assert, the answer a religious person would give when asked this question (which is another way of saying that Perry’s argument about coherence subtly shifts the focus away from what really matters). The religious person would understand the inquiry as a question about something foundational to the belief system. That foundation, of course, is the existence of God. God’s existence—not mere belief in God’s existence—is a critical aspect of the internal coherence of the religion-based moral system. So if God does not exist, then, “no”, the religious moral system does not “make sense,” because the religious moral system is fundamentally (at every point) and inseparably premised upon the existence of God. Happily for the religious believer, God exists, so the religious moral system is sound. Note, however, that the believer thinks the moral system is sound not owing to her mere belief in God’s existence, but owing to the fact of God’s existence. Take away God, and the coherence of the religious moral system collapses.

Perry insists that non-religious beliefs in human rights are fatally flawed because they cannot be grounded. Religious believers do not suffer from this flaw, and therefore possess a superior foundation for human rights, he argues, because belief in God supplies the necessary foundation. But if my argument is correct, the foundation for the religious moral system is not belief in God, but the actual fact of God’s existence. Since the fact of God’s existence has never been established—and remains the impenetrable uncertainty of our existence—religious moral systems likewise operate without a grounding, for they cannot establish their foundational assumption.

This brings me to my assertion that religious believers and non-believers are, with respect to morality, ultimately in the same position. Setting aside the argument that the overwhelming bulk of our moral beliefs—for religious and non-religious people alike—are held owing to the nature/nurture combination of genetic predisposition and socialization (culture and family upbringing), in those rare moments when we consciously question the ground or integrity of our moral belief system, religious folks and non-religious folks come, in the end, to the same moment, upon which all else depends: they make a commitment. Religious folks commit to their belief in God (and their religious moral system follows); non-religious folks embrace (commit to) their moral beliefs because they think they are right.

Aha, a religious person might say, that is precisely why atheists cannot be trusted on morality. Atheists can change their moral views at any moment, so there is no built in stability to those views. But a religious person can likewise at any moment reconsider her belief in God, and decide it’s all a fiction. No difference there.

Nonetheless, religious believers seem unable to shake their suspicion that atheists have a dubious morality. Perhaps a simple thought experiment can help. Imagine that your longstanding belief in God is destroyed owing to some precipitating event (say, an inexplicable, arbitrary, unjust, tragedy happens to a family member). In the dark of the night, you come to the conclusion that you no longer believe in God. The next day, when you venture into the world, will you suddenly feel tempted to freeload off your friends, cheat strangers, stop taking care of your children, or steal from, rob, rape, or kill someone? Of course not. You considered all of these things immoral the day before, and you will still see them as such. You may well experience the throes of an existential crisis (asking yourself what matters in life), but that will not of itself penetrate or dissolve your routine moral beliefs.

These comments take us far afield of Perry’s argument to confront more general suspicions religious believers have about the morality of atheists. Perry did not explicitly raise these suspicions, although his argument can easily be extended in that direction. To avoid misunderstanding, I must emphasize that nothing I have written in this post challenges the integrity of the moral beliefs of religious believers. I am not echoing the recent, unfortunate spate of polemical books by atheists attacking religion.

Rather, I am merely defending the integrity of the moral views of atheists from attacks by religious folks. With respect to Perry in particular, I cannot understand why he would press his argument that only religion provides a stable foundation for human rights. Lots of non-religious people are strong supporters of human rights (again see Western Europe), as he knows, so what is the point of making the argument?

Perry can say that he is merely making an important philosophical point. But if that is his justification, one must wonder about the morality of the argument itself. After all, if Perry persuades readers of the soundness of his argument, has he increased the likelihood that they will give up their support for human rights? Fortunately, his argument won’t likely diminish the commitment to human rights by non-believers, in my view, because their commitment runs deeper than the logic of Perry’s argument. Like belief in God, to embrace human rights is not a matter of logic, but of faith and commitment.

Religious and non-religious supporters of human rights are allies in the global struggle against injustice. Nothing can be gained in this struggle by attacking the coherence of the beliefs of non-religious people committed to human rights. Both paths to human rights have their own strengths (and weaknesses). The best approach in this context, and in connection with moral views more generally, is to accord more respect and toleration for the integrity of one another’s moral views—Locke redux, but this time extending the toleration to atheists.

All well-minded people trying to do right by morality, believers and non-believers, are swimming in the same existential sea, fighting the same struggles.
Posted 3:37 PM by Brian Tamanaha [link]