Balkinization  

Saturday, June 30, 2012

The Health Care Case and the Social Contract

JB

If you haven't already, read Joey Fishkin's post on why "we are headed for a long-term change in the basic social bargain in the United States."

In an essay at the Atlantic, I connect this theme-- the Affordable Care Act as a significant change in the social contract--to the way that federal courts work in American history.

One important function of the federal courts is legitimating and policing government innovations that alter the terms of the social contract. Although they may resist at first, courts eventually ratify the changes and, in the process, set new constitutional ground rules going forward.

We can see this process in the constitutional struggles over the New Deal and the civil rights revolution. The Health Care Case is yet another example. In my essay, I explain why Chief Justice Robert's opinion performs this function: it legitimates and ratifies the new social contract created by universal health care, but with a conservative spin. Mandates on people not otherwise engaged in commerce must use the taxing power, not the commerce power, and conditional federal spending can't leverage withdrawing funding from existing social programs to induce states to accept new social programs.

In this respect, Roberts' opinion is of a piece with the work of the Burger Court: The Burger court ratified the 1960s civil rights revolution and Great Society programs, but with a distinctively conservative gloss that reshaped the meaning of these achievements going forward.

The Health Care Case is, of course, is only one decision. It is the beginning of the story. A great deal will turn on who wins the next several elections, and who gets to staff the federal courts and the Supreme Court. We will only know what changes we have wrought, and what they mean, later on.

Now it can be told: John Roberts was secretly taking orders from Grover Norquist

JB

That's because Norquist's organization, Americans for Tax Reform, argued that the mandate was a tax back in January of 2011:

Comprehensive List of Tax Hikes in Obamacare
Next week, the U.S. House of Representatives will be voting on an historic repeal of the Obamacare law. While there are many reasons to oppose this flawed government health insurance law, it is important to remember that Obamacare is also one of the largest tax increases in American history. Below is a comprehensive list of the two dozen new or higher taxes that pay for Obamcare’s expansion of government spending and interference between doctors and patients.

Individual Mandate Excise Tax(Jan 2014): Starting in 2014, anyone not buying “qualifying” health insurance must pay an income surtax according to the higher of the following

1 Adult

2 Adults

3+ Adults

2014

1% AGI/$95

1% AGI/$190

1% AGI/$285

2015

2% AGI/$325

2% AGI/$650

2% AGI/$975

2016 +

2.5% AGI/$695

2.5% AGI/$1390

2.5% AGI/$2085


Exemptions for religious objectors, undocumented immigrants, prisoners, those earning less than the poverty line, members of Indian tribes, and hardship cases (determined by HHS)
So now we know the truth: John Roberts never switched his vote! Like a good movement conservative, he followed Norquist's line unquestioningly.

The only remaining puzzle is why the four conservative dissenters didn't get the memo. Surely they must have heard that the Maximum Leader had declared the mandate a tax. Does their decision to disregard Norquist's announcement at this crucial moment portend the end of his hold over the conservative movement?




Friday, June 29, 2012

The Missing Constitution

Mark Graber

The opinions in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius serve as a reminder that most justices think they are being paid by the word or have moral obligations to keep their otherwise idle clerks busy. Each opinion is based on a Constitution that can be summarized in several sentences. What is most interesting and disturbing is the absence of one alternative Constitution.

Justice Ginsburg’s Constitution is the Constitution of New Deal Democrats. Article I gives the federal government the power to resolve any national problem, particularly national problems that individual states cannot resolve on their own. The number of persons without health insurance is a national problem that states cannot resolve on their own. Since the individual mandate and extension of Medicaid are not utterly idiotic solutions (the New Deal standard) to that problem, they are constitutional.

Chief Justice Roberts’s Constitution is the Constitution of the Republican Party. National powers are enumerated and limited. Those limits are enforced by the Supreme Court. The New Deal represents the absolute limit of federal power. No New Deal legislation actually required persons to purchase products available on the interstate market. Therefore, the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of the commerce clause. No New Deal measure ever conditioned so much money on compliance with federal conditions for receiving federal funds. Therefore, the extension of Medicaid is unconstitutional. New Deal decisions, however, plainly stated that any exaction that gets some revenue can be a tax. Therefore, the individual mandate is a constitutional tax.

The Constitution of the Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Alito, and (particularly) Thomas, is the Constitution of the Tea Party. New Deal decisions such as Wickard v. Filburn survive, if they survive, only on the principle of stare decisis. Such pre-New Deal decisions as United States v. Butler better reflect fundamental constitutional commitments. The federal government has a very limited role in making social welfare policy, so such agencies as the Department of Education are constitutionally suspect. Both the individual mandate and expansion of Medicaid invade fundamental state prerogatives and so should be declared unconstitutional unless clearly sanctioned by text or precedent. Whether states on their own can solve health care problems is not relevant to the constitutional question.

What might be called the Move-On or Progressive Constitution is missing from this debate entirely. That Constitution, as elaborated in different ways by Jack Balkin, Frank Michelman, Alexander Tsesis, Rebecca Zietlow, Sot Barber and many others (one always loses friends composing these lists) goes something like this. The post-Civil War Amendments, most notably the abolition of slavery and the equal protection clause, were designed to ensure that all persons would have the rights and resources necessary to live lives as democratic citizens (or some other phrase). Persons need rights to health care in order to function as democratic citizens. Therefore, the individual mandate and expansion of health care are legitimate exercises of congressional power to enforce the rights protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This absence may have a subtle effect on constitutional development. Opinions do not simply decide cases. They make different developmental paths somewhat more or less likely. Even though Lawrence v. Texas explicitly denied having any relevance for same-sex marriage, the constitutional case for same-sex marriage was easier to make after that case was handed down. The health care opinions entrench the basic principles of the Republican Constitution a bit more than was previously the case and make championing the Move-On Constitution a bit more difficult.

The Switch of One

Gerard N. Magliocca

"A wise judge chooses, among plausible constitutional philosophies, one that will generally allow him to reach results he can believe in--a judge who does not to some extent tailor his judicial philosophy to his beliefs inevitably becomes badly frustrated and angry. . . A judge who does not decide some cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would wish, because the philosophy he has adopted requires it, is not a judge.  But a judge who refuses ever to stray from his judicial philosophy, and be subject to criticism for doing so, no matter how important the issue involved, is a fool."

Justice Hugo Black

John Roberts as Mona Lisa

Guest Blogger

Rick Pildes

Her enigmatic, knowing smile comes to my mind each time I re-read Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. How much of his opinion reflects his own purely internal legal analysis, how much his concern for perceptions about the institutional authority and legitimacy of the Court? Did he always accept the tax power argument or did his views shift during the course of the opinion-writing process? Did he do any work to persuade Justices Breyer and Kagan to join his opinion on the Medicaid issue, or was that their view from the start? John Roberts is hauntingly, gently smiling out at us from his opinion, and we will be staring back at his opinion for years trying to come to terms with all that his opinion might or might not imply.

crossposted at Election Law Blog

The Secret History of the Chief Justice’s Obamacare Decision

Guest Blogger

John Fabian Witt

A Democratic Party president’s signature legislative victory is imperiled by an aging Supreme Court stocked by Republican appointees. Tricky constitutional law obstacles, including limits on the Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, threaten to undo a vast federal insurance program designed to solve a pressing social crisis. But then one of the justices identifies an alternative way to rescue the constitutional basis for the legislation: Congress’s tax power, he concludes, offers the basis for upholding the legislation.

The scenario sounds like Chief Justice John Roberts and the Affordable Care Act known as Obamacare, which the Supreme Court upheld yesterday on the basis of the Congress’s taxing power. But it also matches perfectly the story of Justice Louis Brandeis, President Franklin Roosevelt, and the Social Security Act of 1935. And amidst all the coverage of yesterday’s decision, the crucial connection between Roberts and Brandeis has gone missing. Right out of law school, in 1979, the Chief Justice clerked for Henry Friendly, long thought of as one of the greatest judges of the twentieth century, perhaps the greatest federal judge (alongside Learned Hand) never to serve on the Supreme Court. Friendly, in turn, clerked for none other than Louis Brandeis. Brandeis’s broad view of the Congress’s taxing authority is readily apparent in Friendly’s widely respected taxation decisions. And now Brandeis’s influence is apparent in the most important opinion of Chief Justice Roberts’ tenure. Read more »

Kennedy loses it

Andrew Koppelman


In yesterday’s column, I discussed Chief Justice Roberts’s decision upholding (almost all of) the Affordable Care Act.  Now I’d like to discuss the world that almost came into existence – the vision of the four dissenters, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, who wanted to throw out the entire statute.  Roberts’s opinion has serious weaknesses, though the result was better than many expected.  The dissenters, on the other hand exhibited the highest virtue of any subordinate: they made the boss look good.  With respect to the mandate, the Medicaid restriction, and the severability question, they devised arguments even weaker than those of the Chief, proposing newly minted Constitutional doctrines that make little internal sense and appear explicable only by a determination to eradicate every bit of a law that they just don’t like.


You can read the rest of this post at Salon.com, here.

A Massive Victory for Liberalism

Joseph Fishkin

Simple question: Who won yesterday?

Let’s begin with a useful distinction of Jack’s and Sandy’s: between the ordinary, low politics of winning and losing elections and enacting laws, and the high politics of constitutional meaning and constitutional change.  In simple low politics terms, Obama won yesterday.  The two-word headline version of the day’s news is: “Obamacare Upheld.”  That is as far into the story as a lot of voters will go.  That’s why many conservative commentators and actors in low politics, such as Michelle Bachmann on the steps of the Supreme Court, immediately attacked the ruling in the harshest terms as a defeat and a betrayal. They think they lost—and in terms of low politics, they did.  This ruling will help bolster the President’s case for re-election by underscoring the legitimacy of his central policy achievement, whereas a ruling the other way would have lent support to many different lines of political attack against him.

On the other hand, a number of elite conservative commentators, who are more engaged with high politics than low, claimed a major victory.  It is easy to see why.  In his Commerce Clause discussion, Chief Justice Roberts has, at a minimum, reaffirmed and reinvigorated the Lopez/Morrison line of Rehnquist Court limitations on the Commerce power whose future after Raich had seemed in doubt.  He has also taken a major whack at the Spending Clause (in a holding that won seven justices!).    “We won,” Randy Barnett crowed, “All the arguments that the law professors said were frivolous were affirmed by a majority of the court today.”  Barnett has a special right to crow.  Due in no small part to his own activism, arguments that seemed “off the wall” only two years ago were adopted by conservative media, then Republican politicians, and finally by half the Supreme Court.   Thus George Will wrote that “the conservative legal insurgency against Obamacare has won a huge victory for the long haul.”  So, in high politics terms, looking beyond the outcome of the case itself, was NFIB v. Sebelius essentially a victory for the Federalist Society and its constitutional project?

No. 

The decision was the most important court victory for liberalism in my lifetime.  For all that Chief Justice Roberts gave conservative movement activists in his compromise ruling yesterday—and he gave them a lot—he gave liberals something even more precious.

Read more »

Thursday, June 28, 2012

It was always about the tax-- and the Medicaid

JB

Over at Slate, I have a longer discussion of the Health Care Case, including my guess about what the Medicaid holding means for the future. Here's a taste:

Read more »

Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power

Neil Siegel

In his decisive opinion today, Chief Justice Roberts embraced a view of the tax power entirely consistent with a theory of the tax power that Robert Cooter and I have developed. A somewhat dated version of the article that articulates the theory, forthcoming in the Virginia Law Review, is available here. Bob and I will post an updated version on SSRN soon. The title is "Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power." Here's the latest abstract:

Unless the U.S. Supreme Court’s tax power jurisprudence reinforces restrictions on the Commerce Clause, Congress can circumvent limits on its commerce power by calling regulations backed by penalties “taxes” and justifying them under the tax power. When the Court restricted federal commerce power in the 1920s and 1930s, it distinguished between taxes, which raise revenues, and penalties, which regulate behavior. This distinction is misguided because many federal exactions do both. The post-1937 Court essentially abandoned judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause, so it had no need to rethink previous distinctions between regulations of interstate commerce and taxes. Since its “new federalism” decisions, the Court has yet to reconsider the scope of the tax power, causing confusion in litigation over the minimum coverage provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).

Legal theory helps to answer constitutional questions when existing doctrine does not. One who must pay a pure penalty is condemned for wrongdoing. Moreover, she must pay more than the usual gain from the forbidden conduct, and she must pay at an increasing rate with intentional or repeated violations. Condemnation coerces expressively and relatively high rates with enhancements coerce materially. A pure penalty prevents behavior, thereby raising little revenue.

Alternatively, a person who must pay a pure tax is permitted to engage in the taxed conduct. Moreover, she must pay less than the usual gain from the taxed conduct, and intentional or repeated conduct does not enhance the rate. Permission does not coerce expressively and relatively low rates without enhancements do not coerce materially. A pure tax dampens conduct but does not prevent it, thereby raising revenues.

Situated between pure taxes and pure penalties are mixed exactions, whose expression sounds like a penalty and whose material characteristics look like a tax. Thus the ACA’s exaction for non-insurance has a penalty’s expression and a tax’s materiality. Should courts interpret a mixed exaction as a tax or a penalty? Our answer depends on the exaction’s effect and follows the Court’s deferential approach to federalism cases. If Congress could reasonably conclude that the exaction will dampen—but not prevent—the general class of conduct subject to it and thereby raise revenue, then courts should interpret it as a tax regardless of what the statute calls it. If Congress could reasonably conclude only that the exaction will prevent the conduct of almost all people subject to it and thereby raise little or no revenue, then courts should interpret it as a penalty. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that ACA’s exaction for non-insurance will dampen uninsured behavior but not prevent it, thereby raising several billion dollars in revenue each year. Accordingly, the exaction is a tax for purposes of the tax power.

The little tax power argument that could

JB

Over at CNN.com I explain why the tax power argument only moved to center stage at the very end of the litigation over the Affordable Care Act.

This is an opportunity to offer a shout out to Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison, Andy Pincus, and the entire amicus team for their outstanding work on the tax power briefs we filed in the lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court. Thanks also to Brian Galle and Edward Kleinbard, who joined forces with us at the Supreme Court level.

We seemed to get nowhere in the courts for a very long time, but slow and steady wins the race!

Silver Linings for Today’s Losers in the PPACA Rulings

Frank Pasquale

There are many excellent commentaries on the Supreme Court’s rulings today. Pam Karlan offers a great summary of the opinions:
There were two issues—two big issues and then two minor issues—before the court . . . . The two big issues were: was the individual mandate constitutional, and was the expansion of Medicaid to cover a great deal many more people who are near the poverty line constitutional?
The two minor issues were: could the court hear the case at all at this point, and if there was any provision of the act that was unconstitutional, what happened to the rest of the act?
The bottom line was that the individual mandate is constitutional and the expansion of Medicaid to cover more people is constitutional, but—and this is an important but—states cannot have their existing Medicaid funds cut off if they decline to participate in the expansion of Medicaid to millions of additional people.
Here are some counterintuitive perspectives on those results, focusing on the “silver linings” for today’s losers:
1) Silver Linings for Mandate Opponents
Reviewing Roberts’ ruling, Gerard Magliocca has said, “The Chief Justice gave a pretty speech about federalism, but ultimately he did nothing about it.” Other commentators worry that the long term implications are more menacing for federal initiatives. Ezra Klein calls Roberts a “political genius:”

Read more »

Early Thoughts on the Health Care Case

Deborah Pearlstein

Initial reports by CNN and Fox News reporting that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) had been struck down notwithstanding, the world now knows the Supreme Court voted to uphold the ACA in nearly every respect. In brief, I think the Court reached the right outcome on the individual mandate, and Chief Justice Roberts did the right thing in voting to uphold it. We learned there is still a difference in this country between politics and law. And the Court, albeit by a bare 5-4, knows it when it sees it.That said, the case produced nearly 200 pages worth of opinions from the justices, and they are chock full of interesting and important things to discuss. In no order of priority and purely in the interest of starting somewhere, a few initial thoughts.

A Little Kremlinology

As a blogger or two have noted, the joint dissenting opinion by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito refers repeatedly to Justice Ginsburg’s opinion (most of which was also joined by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer) as a “dissent.” In the official court syllabus, Ginsburg’s opinion is called an opinion “concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.” Was this an error by the joint dissenters? Evidence that a majority of the Court had been planning to overturn the ACA, that the joint dissent was itself initially a majority opinion, and that Chief Justice Roberts’ vote changed at the last minute, leaving the Court to scramble to revise and correct all of its opinions (corrections it wasn’t fully successful in making)?

Well, maybe. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion goes both ways, so to speak. Still, it is a bit odd that the primary dissent refers to an opinion substantially concurring with the Court’s judgment as a “dissent,” rather than, say, a concurrence, or probably better given Ginsburg’s mixed conclusions, the “opinion by Justice Ginsburg.” Standing alone, I’d say curious, but perhaps not dispositive.
Read more »

Terrible arguments prevail (but it’s not so bad)

Andrew Koppelman

 
This morning, I was prepared to write about a humanitarian catastrophe – 30 million people deprived of their health insurance, chaos as the Supreme Court smashed a statutory scheme that had already become tightly integrated with a fifth of the American economy, all on the basis of terrible legal arguments.  Terrible arguments did carry the day, but the damage is relatively minimal.  So I’m just left to fret, in typical law professor fashion, about a poorly reasoned Supreme Court decision that is going to confuse courts in future cases.  Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a lousy opinion, but on the big issues, he didn’t do much damage.  (How much will depend on how badly Republican governors are willing to hurt the working poor in their own states in order to signal their disdain for Obama.)


You can find the rest of this post at Salon.com, here.

Chief Justice Roberts and the Rule of Law

Gerard N. Magliocca

We have a split personality when it comes to judges. Sometimes we want them to follow the law no matter what the consequences are. Blind justice. Sometimes, however, we want them to make a wise decision no matter what the law is.  Solomon.

Chief Justice Marshall famously found a way out of tough spot in 1803 by reading the Judiciary Act of 1789 in a peculiar way to deny William Marbury a remedy.  Following the law would have brought the Court into a terrible (and destructive) clash with President Jefferson. He lectured the President about not giving Marbury his commission, but did nothing to help.

Chief Justice Hughes less famously found a way out of a tough spot in 1935 by holding that Congress lacked the power to repudiate partially Treasury bonds but that bondholders were not entitled to a remedy.  Following the law would have brought the Court into a terrible (and destructive) clash with President Roosevelt. He lectured Congress about the sanctity of bonds, but did nothing to help.

Chief Justice Roberts did something similar today. Following the law and reading the Affordable Care Act in the most natural way (failing to buy health insurance leads to a penalty, not a tax) would have forced him to strike down the individual mandate.  So he didn't do that.  Why? Because a 5-4 straight-line party decision invalidating part or all of the Act would have have brought the Court into a terrible clash with President Obama.  The Chief Justice gave a pretty speech about federalism, but ultimately he did nothing about it.  (Maybe I'm underestimating the importance of the Medicaid issue--I'm not sure.)

Now let's turn to the campaign and see if the voters renew the President's mandate or not.  No preemptive opinion this time (barely).

UPDATE:  If you want to read more about the Chief Justice Hughes example, see my paper that will be coming out in the Florida Law Review.

Congrats to Jack Balkin...

Frank Pasquale

...for authoring "The Health-Care Mandate Is Clearly a Tax—-and Therefore Constitutional," back in May. From his lips to Justice Roberts's ears.

I would also like to congratulate "individuals exposed to asbestos from a mine in Libby, Montana," for keeping the Medicare coverage PPACA granted them. The joint dissent would have stripped that away, along with other parts of the Act they deem "minor provisions," in a blanket repeal of PPACA they would characterize as "caution" and "minimalism." I'm sure the tens of millions of Americans who will now enjoy insurance define "caution" quite differently.

Finally, a tip of the hat to Tim Jost, who has carefully and comprehensively blogged about key steps toward PPACA implementation, even with the "constitution in exile's" Sword of Damocles hanging over it. If you want to learn more about the "Premium Tax Credit Final Rule," essential health benefits, or minimum loss ratios, he's the go-to person.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Charles Lane proves Akhil Amar's point

Stephen Griffin

One of the hardest points to get across to the media about the ACA is why so many legal scholars think it should have easily survived without all the sturm und drang.  The fact that most scholars think the ACA is constitutional has been widely reported.  The why, not so much.  It's proven hard for journalists to cope with the acres of precedent supporting complex regulatory statutes like the ACA.  Apart from the occasional article on grain for home consumption and medical marijuana, the reality of a substantial web of precedent has proven difficult to convey.

Charles Lane's WaPo column of yesterday illustrates this by reducing the dispute over the ACA to a conflict of values.  It's liberty vs. egalitarianism according to Lane (with an apparent assist from Stephen Carter).  This is a good example of how some political theorists read the Constitution, as an abstract "ordering of values."  But not lawyers.  Funny thing is, we think the Constitution is actually a law.  As law, the Constitution could only be effective across a wide range of disputes once it was implemented by the judiciary in a system of common law precedent.  Lane's approach simply junks the common law in favor of going right to the supposedly underlying values.  This has the effect of proving Amar's point that the only way the Court could invalidate the ACA is by ignoring decades of multiple precedents, something that courts do quite rarely.

Lane believes turnabout is fair play, invoking the overturning of, yes, decades of precedents during the New Deal.  The justices that found themselves in the minority were arguably defending an abstract value, federalism, albeit one directly implicated by the constitutional plan.  They thought the system of federalism would collapse unless a hard distinction was maintained between what was national and what was local.  But Lane is missing that there is no real parallel between the pre-New Deal and post-New Deal precedents.  Post-New Deal, the Court realized that it was not in the best position to defend federalism by making what amounted to policy decisions.  The value the Court came to defend was not liberty or equality, but deference to Congress.  Or, if you like, democracy.

The asymmetry between the pre and post-New Deal cases has a deeply practical side.  The conservative jurists who opposed the New Deal predicted, in effect, value chaos.  They were wrong.  Those who support the post-New Deal cases don't predict value chaos if the ACA is overturned.  That's not what happens when you don't defer to Congress.  Some values may be vindicated tomorrow.  But if the ACA is struck down the result could well be policy chaos of a kind we haven't experienced since the New Deal.  That's what happens when the Court substitutes its judgment for Congress in the service of abstract values untamed by precedent.

Supreme Court Strikes Down All Laws Signed By Barack Obama

JB

Associated Press, Wednesday, Jun 27th

WASHINGTON (AP)-- In a suprising announcement, the United States Supreme Court assembled one day earlier than expected and announced their decision in the highly contested health care litigation.

In a 5-4 decision, the Justices struck down not only the entire Affordable Care Act, but all legislation signed by Barack Obama since he became president.
Having held that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, we next consider whether the mandate is severable or is inextricably related to the rest of the Affordable Care Act. Upon further reflection, it appears to us that all of President Obama's efforts since his election have been part of an elaborate scheme to foist European-style socialism on an unsuspecting public. See generally, Fox and Friends (collecting examples of Obama's socialist agenda); The Rush Limbaugh Show (same). Like the ACA itself, none of these acts contains an explicit severability clause stating that if one law is held unconstitutional the others should remain standing. We therefore conclude that all laws signed by President Obama during his term in office are void.
Departing from Supreme Court tradition, Justice Antonin Scalia published his concurring opinion on his new blog, It's Nino's Law: Get Used to It. In his opening post, Justice Scalia explained:
Since my recent opinion in Arizona v. United States I've finally realized that what I've really always wanted to be is a conservative pundit. Therefore from now on all my opinions will appear as blog posts. Oh, and by the way, why does Barack Obama hate America?
Not to be outdone, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg published her dissenting opinion on Twitter:
Ruth Bader Ginsburg @ruthiebg
OMG! WTF!

Tough Luck Libertarianism and Health Care

Andrew Koppelman


I argued a few days ago that the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s insurance mandate reflects the anarchist-libertarian proclivities of its principal theorist, Randy Barnett.  But this invites an obvious objection.  The challenge to the mandate is a freestanding argument.  It does not expressly rely on its author’s other views.  Why think that there is any relation between the two?

One important bit of evidence comes from the questions that three Justices saw fit to ask at the oral argument in March.  Those questions each presumed that something like Barnett’s philosophical views can be read into the Constitution – and that there is a serious danger that they will decide this case by relying on those views.  That is very bad news for anyone who is neither healthy nor rich.

You can read the rest of this post on Salon.com, here.

Incidentally, I'd like to acknowledge here the assistance of my friend and colleague Steve Lubet, who, in conversation, coined the term "tough luck libertarianism."  It is, I think, an important contribution to the taxonomy of political theory.  Not all libertarianism is tough luck libertarianism.  Hayek and Friedman, for example, had no problem with redistribution.  Neither would be welcome in today's Republican Party.

On Griffin, Wartime, and the Wars that Matter

Mary L. Dudziak

Thank you to Stephen Griffin for his interesting post about my book War Time. One thing Stephen and I agree on, and that informs his current work, is that seriously taking up diplomatic history is essential to understanding the way war powers and the national security state develop in the 20th Century.

As it happens, I am rushing off to the diplomatic historians' annual meeting, so I have time only for a short note. At the opening state-of-the-field plenary panel on Thursday evening, I plan to discuss the ways that foreign affairs history and legal studies need each other. In developing my remarks, I have had the contributions in Griffin's work in mind.

While there is much we agree on, let me highlight an important point of disagreement. Griffin argues that:
Dudziak determinedly ignores the issue of the relative significance of America’s various and very different twentieth century military conflicts to our post-9/11 reality. One plausible way to distinguish among America’s wars, for example, is to take into consideration the importance of the foreign policy objectives pursued, the costs incurred, both quantitative and qualitative, and, of course, casualties.
This point matters to Griffin because distinguishing between big military conflicts and smaller ones is an essential element of his work. It is these larger wars, he argues, that are the ones constitutional scholars should be concerned about, and where democratic constraint is most important.  I don't dispute the importance of democratic constraint in the decision to engage in a large-scale war.  In my Balkinization post Another way to think about War Powers: Why the Small Wars Matter I responded to Griffin this way:
historian Marilyn Young argues that the small wars have played an important role in this normalization of the use of force, and especially the insulation of the American people from American war politics.  In the many American military interventions of the Cold War, she argues, post–World War II administrations “had to create a public tolerance for war as normal rather than aberrational, so normal that after a while only those who were actively engaged in fighting it—and their families—noticed it was being fought at all.” 

This consciously facilitated insulation of the American people from American wars, I argue, has helped to atrophy political restraints on the war powers.  And so the "real" wars that have impacted the workings of our constitutional order include the small wars and the "forgotten wars" that lead us to Bacevich's critique, that "war has become a normal condition, something that the great majority of Americans accept without complaint."
For more on American power in the context of on-going warfare, this review by war correspondent Peter Maass is especially illuminating.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Considering War Time

Stephen Griffin

I’m happy I had the chance to make a post about war powers before the ACA din descends.  My comments here are taken from a short review of fellow Balkinization blogger Mary Dudziak’s book War Time that I just posted to SSRN.  Her book is well worth reading and is expressive of a widespread unease with the way America went to war after 9/11.

The most helpful feature of the book is that it both encourages and enables us to place the Cold War and the “war on terror” in meaningful contact.  In focusing on the Cold War, Dudziak makes the important point that the metaphor of “war” can be so mesmerizing that it can cause analysis to go astray.  The Cold War is more fruitfully understood as a period of state-building.  Setting to one side major wars such as Korea and Vietnam, the key developments revolved around the creation and maintenance of the national security state.  This is quite helpful in directing our attention to issues of state resources and the relative capacity of state officials, particularly those in the executive branch, to make effective policy decisions.  The Cold War constitutional order appeared to underwrite granting the president the authority to order the nation to war.  President Truman’s 1950 decision to intervene in Korea without asking for congressional authorization is well known.  In an especially insightful discussion, Dudziak correctly emphasizes the enormous authority that flowed, seemingly automatically, to President Bush as commander in chief after 9/11.

Dudziak seemingly wants to see not only the Cold War and post-9/11 as “wartimes,” but nearly the entire twentieth century.  To be sure, Dudziak is on solid ground when, like many historians, she emphasizes the neglected importance of the many “small wars” in which the U.S. was involved in the twentieth century, particularly in Latin America.  But Dudziak determinedly ignores the issue of the relative significance of America’s various and very different twentieth century military conflicts to our post-9/11 reality.  One plausible way to distinguish among America’s wars, for example, is to take into consideration the importance of the foreign policy objectives pursued, the costs incurred, both quantitative and qualitative, and, of course, casualties.  Dudziak stays well away from these markers.
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What will we call the Health Care Cases?

JB

Students of constitutional law know that many famous Supreme Court decisions that resolve several different lawsuits at once have been called not by the names of the parties in the lead case, but by a nickname that describes their content. The most famous examples are The Slaughterhouse Cases, The Civil Rights Cases, and the Trademark Cases. In addition, groups of opinions decided roughly contemporaneously have later been grouped together in hindsight, although they are not always cited that way in legal opinions. Examples are The Insular Cases and The Legal Tender Cases.

Many people remember that the various cases from Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina, Delaware, and the District of Columbia that are now called Brown v. Board of Education (I and II) and Bolling v. Sharpe were once called The Desegregation Cases. Most people now refer to them as Brown. United States v. Virginia is sometimes called The VMI Case.

Which brings me to HHS v. Florida, Florida v. HHS, and National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. What will these cases be called? I vote for The Health Care Cases. The press has generally called them "the health care case," but since there are several of them, the plural seems more appropriate.


Monday, June 25, 2012

Who will write the final opinions of the Term (and what will they say?)

JB

There are three opinions left for this Supreme Court Term:

First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, an Article III standing case;

United States v. Alvarez, the "stolen valor" case, about whether a federal statute making it a crime to lie about receiving military medals or honors violates the First Amendment; and

The Health Care Cases, raising challenges to the individual mandate and the Medicaid extension.

My understanding (from Linda Greenhouse) is that all of the Justices have written opinions in the sitting at which First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards was argued with the exception of Justice Thomas. My guess is that he will write that opinion, and the Court will find no Article III standing.

Similarly, in the sitting in which United States v. Alvarez was argued, all of the Justices have written opinions except for Justices Kennedy and Kagan. If either of them writes the opinion, my prediction is that the Court will hold the statute unconstitutional, either completely or in some respect.

That leaves The Health Care Cases. It is everybody's guess that Chief Justice Roberts will write the opinion in the mandate case. The Court could combine all of the Health Care Cases together, in which case Chief Justice Roberts would write all of them in one opinion. What he will say nobody knows.

But there is another scenario. The challenge to the Medicaid extension was generally thought to be weak even after the oral arguments. Kennedy or Kagan (whichever one doesn't write Alvarez) could be assigned to write that opinion, which would probably be 8-1 or 7-2 (upholding the Medicaid extension), and Chief Justice Roberts would write the mandate opinion, which could go either way. This scenario would throw the liberals a bone: Medicaid would be expanded to 133 percent of the poverty line, which would significantly increase the number of Americans with health insurance.

However, if that happened, it would follow that the Court would not strike down all of the Affordable Care Act in the mandate opinion, because it would have just held that the Medicaid extension is constitutional. The Court would then either uphold the ACA, strike down just the mandate, or strike down the mandate and the consumer protection--guaranteed issue and community ratings--provisions.

My track record on predicting these things is pretty lousy. In fact, it's downright terrible. So take these predictions with a grain (actually a mountain) of salt.

Automated Arrangement of Information: Speech, Conduct, and Power

Frank Pasquale



Tim Wu's opinion piece on speech and computers has attracted a lot of attention. Wu's position is a useful counterpoint to Eugene Volokh's sweeping claims about 1st Amendment protection for automated arrangements of information. However, neither Wu nor Volokh can cut the Gordian knot of digital freedom of expression with maxims like "search is speech" or "computers can't have free speech rights." Any court that respects extant doctrine, and the normative complexity of the new speech environment, will need to take nuanced positions on a case-by-case basis.

Digital Opinions

Wu states that "The argument that machines speak was first made in the context of Internet search," pointing to cases like Langdon v. Google, Kinderstart, and SearchKing. In each scenario, Google successfully argued to a federal district court that it could not be liable in tort for faulty or misleading results 1) because it "spoke" the offending arrangement of information and 2) the arrangement was Google's "opinion," and could not be proven factually wrong (a sine qua non for liability).
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Citizens United Redux: or What "Democracy" Means for our Five Republican-Appointed Justices

Marvin Ammori

People are discussing the Arizona immigration ruling and, once again, Citizens United and its effect on our democracy.

Today, without oral argument or briefing, the Supreme Court handed down American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, a one-page decision  reversing the Montana Supreme Court and striking down a 100 year old law limiting corporate spending in Montana elections. The Court--or rather the same five Justices appointed by Republicans who brought us Citizens United--held that Citizens United squarely forbids states from banning corporate spending on elections--whatever the facts in that state. The dissenters--or the four Justices appointed by Democrats--would have heard the case to reconsider Citizens United, noting that expenditures can be as corrupting as direct contributions, and noting the huge flood of corrupting corporate money in the 2012 elections.

This decision may show that the Supreme Court will not defer to the fact-finding of legislatures. The Court is instead determining its own facts. Those facts: no, no, expenditures do not give rise to corruption or its appearance. The first fact is about how elected officials react to expenditures. The second fact is about how Americans view the millions spent by SuperPACs and huge corporations. The Supreme Court's view on both of these facts is probably totally detached from the experience of elected officials and average Americans, many of whom think their government is corrupt.

But that can't be right. The Montana decision goes into great detail about how out of state corporations and "copper kings" would buy and sell the government through expenditures. Those facts were swept aside in a page. (You should read for the riveting, corrupt soap-opera-like drama alone (e.g., pages 14-25).)

Instead, what's going on is something different.

Either (1) the five Republican-appointed Justices are completely unprincipled and simply will do whatever it takes to help Republicans gain power and enact a pro-corporate agenda. In a widely read Atlantic piece, James Fallows just accused the five Justices--Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito--of being part of a judicial "coup" running back to Bush v. Gore, which included three of these justices and two replaced by Roberts and Alito.

Or, to be more charitable, the Supreme Court might actually have a principle.  The Supreme Court (2) might not care about the facts (as it doesn't) because it simply believes that corporations should be part of our democracy. They should be able, as a matter of right, to buy and sell candidates who agree and disagree with them, just as individuals should be allowed to vote for or against candidates. They don't think there's anything wrong with corporate involvement in campaigns. Justices on the infamous Lochner court probably didn't second-guess the health conclusions of the laws; they believed the laws conflicted with liberty.

From both Citizens United and this decision, it seems our Republican-appointed five man majority defines liberty and democracy to require unlimited corporate spending on elections--whatever the facts, whatever the outcomes (though knowing those outcomes favor Republicans and favor donors who fly Justices to nice events and fund their wives' organizations). (For more on this point, see Joshua Cohen's 2011 Dewey Lecture.)

This decision raises one other point: many hopeful activists have proposed ways around Citizens United they think would be upheld. That is probably nuts. The five-member majority will not let that happen. If a state Supreme Court, upholding its own legislature, on a hundred year law, on a colorful and deep record, to keep out the corruption of out-of-state corporations, is struck down without ceremony, I can't see many laws getting through these guys.
The Court has even undermined public financing and public matching funds more than most people will admit. If a state makes public financing available for one side, the state could not increase the amount provided or the matching funds formula based on the money spent by the other side or the supporters of the other side. These limits constrain the effectiveness of public funding; indeed, they effectively make it impossible to match the resources of those backed by billionaires willing to write huge checks.

I have written elsewhere that I think Obama should make the Supreme Court--and particularly Citizens United--a key plank in his campaign. If the public knew more about the five Republican appointees to the Supreme Court--e.g., that their current Chief isn't Thurgood Marshall and Harry Reid--maybe they would be more excited about voting for Obama and for Senate Democratic candidates, and against their opponents.

Friday, June 22, 2012

Grab a Diet Coke

Ken Kersch


I got a text a few days back from a non-plussed former student, now in law school, doing his first stint as a summer associate in a large prestigious law firm in a big glass box. It reminded me of my two-years as a K Street lawyer. I offer a series of office haiku I wrote back then (the Clinton administration)(I'm currently an “inactive” member of the DC Bar).

The hum of the air
Slumped in my chair nodding off
Suddenly, a knock.

Window reflecting
Sealed like a submarine porthole
The law – a depth charge.

Photos on the desk
In clear plastic, places I’ve been
Not ceilings, but sky….

High back swivel chair
Rolls inches and tilts back, forth
Why reach for the phone?

White outlet, beige wall
Two faces in terror bored
Waiting for the prongs.

Press down the button.
In liquid suspended the time
Later than I thought.

Drop ceiling above
If the world weren’t upside down
White enough to ski.

Degrees on the wall.
Is this what the smart people do?
Grab a Diet Coke?

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