Balkinization  

Friday, February 26, 2010

Stuart Taylor responds

David Luban

Stuart Taylor has responded to my post earlier today, and I have added his response as an update to that earlier post (I think it's easier on the reader to see them in one place). I stand by my earlier post. I should add that I neglected to send him my post even though it specifically criticized his article, and I offer my apology for the discourtesy.

UPDATE: My reponse is now up here, directly following Stuart Taylor's letter.

A SECOND UPDATE: Stuart Taylor has asked me to post a sur-response to our exchange, which I will do here. His cover note says "I don't want to prolong this exchange endlessly," and I agree. I don't think readers would be well served by a prolonged response, but I can't forbear making a couple of remarks following Stuart's letter. Here's the letter:

The anti-torture statute makes it a crime for a U.S. agent to act with “specific intent” to inflict “severe physical or mental pain or suffering,” while narrowly sub-defining “severe mental pain or suffering” as requiring proof of (among other things) “prolonged mental harm.”


David Luban now seems to concede that waterboarding and the other CIA interrogation techniques proposed to Bybee and Yoo did not inflict severe physical pain or severe mental pain or suffering as defined by the statute.

He now bases his entire argument on a claim that (contrary to the Bybee-Yoo memos) the statute means something different by physical “suffering” than by physical “pain,” and that waterboarding is illegal torture because it inflicts severe physical suffering.


Though not silly on its face, this argument not persuasive -- and Luban'’s claim that Bybee and Yoo played a “trick” when they interpreted “pain or suffering” as a unitary concept is sadly tendentious -- for the following reasons:

First even OPR – which was nothing if not motivated to fault Bybee and Yoo in every plausible way – implicitly rejected the distinction between “pain” and “suffering” on which Luban rests his entire argument, with such scorn for anyone who might disagree.

OPR implicitly conceded that Yoo and Bybee had been correct in opining that the words “pain and suffering” were a unitary concept and that “suffering” did not broaden the statute’s coverage. The OPR report recites a list of alleged Bybee-Yoo errors and this is not one of them. David Margolis also found no fault with Bybee-Yoo on “suffering.”

Second, nothing in the legislative history and little if anything in dictionary definitions supports this distinction between pain and suffering. The law has generally treated pain and/or suffering as a unitary form of harm.

Third, while it’s fair to note that the disjunctive form of "pain or suffering" suggests two distinct concepts, that view is not supported by the sole definition of “pain or suffering” that Congress supplied in the statute It defined "mental pain or suffering" as "prolonged mental harm" that results from specific enumerated acts. Congress did not treat suffering vs pain as distinctive terms.


Fourth, Luban ignores the fact the CIA told Bybee, and he was entitled to assume, that the core effects of waterboarding were mental and not physical. And the statute is very clear that acts which inflict an imminent fear of death are NOT torture unless they cause prolonged mental harm. Luban is recharacterizing the "fear of death" as a form of physical suffering, when the statute treats it as a form of mental pain or suffering.

Fifth, even assuming arguendo that "physical suffering" is a distinct concept, under the assumed facts the CIA agents did not "specifically intend[] to inflict severe physical . . . suffering.” Specific intent is not a "defense" to torture. It is part of the definition of torture under this statute. Luban says that the intent element is satisfied because the whole point of waterboarding was to make them "suffer." Actually, the point was to make them fear imminent death without hurting them -- a form of "mental" pain/suffering under the statute and not a form of physical suffering. The interrogators (as the process was described to Bybee) had a good faith belief that waterboarding would not inflict any other serious form of harm, pain or suffering.

Margolis also provides strong support for the Bybee interpretation of specific intent. He says that the Pierre decision construed "identical" language in the Convention Against Torture and that the opinion adopted by 10 of the 13 judges represented a "virtual endorsement" of the Bybee interpretation.

I concede Luban'’s point that I was not precisely correct in my offhand description of how we know that the SERE experience did not inflict any form of torture. As he stressed, the CIA relied on the official who presided over the training rather than on a unanimous account by trainees. But this is, as he notes, a “small distinction” -- in my view, so small and with so little relevance to our overall disagreement as to suggest that Luban’'s lengthy discussion of it is designed to divert attention from the weakness of his basic position.

My rejoinder:

1. I don't concede that waterboarding doesn't cause severe physical pain. I don't know whether it does. If Nance is right that waterboarding may bring water into the lungs (see my previous post for the Nance quote), or if OLC is right that victims may swallow large quantities of water (ditto), it may well be that severe physical pain results. For all I know (never having been partially suffocated or drowned myself), the experience actually is severely painful. My point is that even if the answer on pain is no, it's a different question whether it causes severe physical suffering that isn't pain.

2. I do agree that according to the torture statute waterboarding would not be mental torture unless it causes prolonged mental pain or suffering. The Bybee memo discussed reports from SERE officials that SERE veterans did not suffer psychological after-effects. There have been years of back and forth among commentators (including in the OPR report and Margolis's memo) about whether the experience of multiply-repeated waterboardings of detainees is different enough from SERE that this was not adequate evidence; I'm not going to repeat all the arguments yea and nay here. Suffice it to say that I think it's an open question whether repeated waterboardings in a setting where the victim doesn't know how many more weeks or months it will go on might be mental torture even in the narrow sense of the statute. Again, my point was that even if the answer is no, inflicting severe physical suffering with specific intent to cause it is torture.

3. Taylor writes: "the CIA told Bybee, and he was entitled to assume, that the core effects of waterboarding were mental and not physical." That would be page 11 of the classified Bybee memo, here. The exact wording is: "You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical harm." This is not actually the same as saying that it does not inflict severe physical suffering, merely that it does not damage the subject's body. To see the difference, imagine a technique that caused a subject to experience acute itching everywhere on his body. Here too, one might truthfully add "it does not inflict actual physical harm," and we all understand what that means: no damage. It doesn't mean "no pain or suffering." But that is the conclusion that Yoo and Bybee reach: "Thus, although the subject may experience the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drowning, the waterboard does not inflict physical pain." No, no, no. While the fear or panic associated with partial drowning is "mental," the experience is physical. (In any case, it strikes me as basically demented to think that if the CIA told Bybee that a suffocation technique's core effects are mental not physical he should assume it is true. What if the CIA had said, "we will burn him with glowing cigarettes, but we have determined that the core effects of this technique are mental, not physical"? Should a lawyer simply say "yes, boss" and write the opinion based on that assumption?) Again: Waterboarding is not just fear of death. It is the physical experience of suffocation.

4. Taylor's fifth point is about specific intent, and he writes "Actually, the point was to make them fear imminent death without hurting them." Actually, we don't know anything of the sort. Taylor's argument is circular. If you assume, as Taylor does, that repeated partial drowning doesn't cause physical suffering, then the point of inflicting it is to make them fear imminent death without (physically) hurting them. But why make the assumption?

5. Taylor ends by discussing a small embarrassment, namely that his previous letter made an assertion about the unanimous testimony of thousands of U.S. troops that is untrue, as he concedes. But he adds that this is "so small and with so little relevance to our overall disagreement as to suggest that Luban’'s lengthy discussion of it is designed to divert attention from the weakness of his basic position." Um, my lengthy discussion was 194 words, 21 of them quoting Taylor. That's out of a post of (ouch!) 1932 words. (Sorry, readers.) If I was trying to divert attention from the weakness of my basic position, please be assured that I could do better than that.

A colleague commented on this exchange: "God I can't believe we are back to this. Of course we are but it's like a bad record skipping back endlessly in the same loop." I agree. Surely it is time to bury the Bybee Memo's arguments in a deep dark place. We don't have to keep talking about them forever. The Justice Department retracted it and replaced it, Jack Goldsmith warned DoD not to rely on it, OPR thought its arguments bad enough to warrant professional discipline, and Margolis, disagreeing with that recommendation, agreed that its arguments were bad and the judgment it displayed poor. Enough is enough.

Koppelman vs. George on same-sex marriage

Andrew Koppelman

Prof. Robert George of Princeton, on the Mirror of Justice blog (a first rate blog of Catholic legal theory), responds here to a paper I recently posted on SSRN. Robby (an old friend from my days teaching at Princeton) thinks that my defense of same-sex marriage is incoherent. I think the incoherence lies in his opposition to it.

You’ll have to decide which of us is right.


Here’s the abstract of the paper, Careful With That Gun: Lee, George, Wax, and Geach on Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage:

Many Americans think that homosexual sex is morally wrong and oppose same-sex marriage. Philosophers trying to defend these views have relied on two strategies. One is to claim that such sex is wrong irrespective of consequences: there is something intrinsic to sex that makes it only licit when it takes place within a heterosexual marriage (in which there is no contraception or possibility of divorce). Patrick Lee and Robert P. George have developed and clarified this claim. The second strategy focuses on consequences: the baleful effects on heterosexual families of societal tolerance for homosexuality. Amy Wax (who is not a clear opponent of same-sex marriage, but who is worried by it) has tried to array evidence to support the second. Mary Geach has developed a novel hybrid, relying on the second argument to support the first one. Both strategies fail. The first cannot show that the intrinsic goodness of sex is at once (a) derived from its reproductive character and (b) present in the coitus of married couples who know themselves to be infertile, but not present in any sex act other than heterosexual marital coitus. As for evidence of bad consequences of tolerance of homosexuality, the evidence is all the other way.

I specifically cast doubt on the claim made by Robby and others that the intercourse of infertile heterosexual couples is “oriented to procreation.” I write:

My action can make sense as part of a process, can take its meaning from its role in facilitating that process, only if the process is known to be capable of completion. This is true even if the success of the project is unlikely. But it is not true if success is impossible. A surgeon trying to save the life of a gravely sick patient is engaged in the practice of medicine even if the patient‟s death is almost certain. No guarantee of success is necessary. (Little human endeavor comes with a guarantee of success.) So long as the patient is alive and the surgery even marginally increases the likelihood of the patient's survival, then the surgeon's behavior makes perfect sense. He is engaged in a medical-type act. Whether it is a medical-type act now cannot depend on events that occur only later, such as the patient's recovery. But what would we think if the surgeon performed exactly the same actions, involving the same bodily motions, when the patient is already dead?


Robby now challenges me to explain why my defense of same-sex marriage doesn’t entail endorsement of polygamy: “the redefinition of marriage to remove the element of sexual complementarity perforce eliminates any ground of principle for supposing that marriage is the union of two persons, as opposed to the union of three or more in a polyamorous sexual partnership.” How can my endorsement of same-sex marriage avoid this result?

As it happens, I don’t have strong views on the polygamy question. I don’t think my views on same-sex marriage entail anything about polygamy, either way. I take marriage for granted as a social institution that we’ve inherited, and I try to see whether there is any coherent reason for excluding same-sex couples from that institution. I don’t think that I need to think my way through the polygamy problem in order to address Robby’s challenge.

But let’s stipulate, for the sake of argument, that polygamy is bad and there is a sound argument against it. Call it the Compelling Antipolygamy Argument. Robby’s claim is that (1) his conception of marriage is the Compelling Antipolygamy Argument, (2) his conception can explain why polygamy is wrong, and (3) his conception also condemns same-sex marriage. (Incidentally, I don’t see how, even if one stipulates (1), you can get from there to (2), since a man can have relationships which are oriented to procreation with more than one woman.)

Implicit in his challenge is the claim that there is no sound argument that excludes polygamy without also excluding same-sex marriage. I don’t know if that is true. But I don’t need to know, because it’s enough to show that (1) cannot be the case. This is because (1) posits an entity - the one-flesh union of male and female in an act of procreative kind, which comes into existence even in the union of the infertile heterosexual couple - that is not intelligible. Its unintelligibility casts doubt on its existence. Whether or not there is a Compelling Antipolygamy Argument, this can’t be it.

It is as if someone were to argue that (1) Beethoven’s Second Symphony has polka dots, and then claims (2) that it follows from this that polygamy is wrong. It’s mysterious how (2) follows from (1), but the argument doesn’t even get that far, because (1) doesn’t make a lick of sense. We can stop there.

(I should add, in closing, that having Robby as a colleague was one of the best things about being on the Princeton faculty, and that I’m very pleased to be duking it out with him again.)

The Reconstruction Power

JB

I have placed a draft of my new paper, "The Reconstruction Power," on SSRN. This article, like my previous article, Commerce, applies to method of text and principle to a specific set of constitutional issues, in this case Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. It shows that fidelity to original meaning and underlying principles would produce very different doctrines than courts currently apply. Here is the abstract:

The Reconstruction Power

This essay argues that modern doctrine has not been faithful to the text, history and structure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These amendments were designed to give Congress broad powers to protect civil rights and civil liberties; together they form Congress’s Reconstruction Power.

Congress gave itself broad powers because it believed it could not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen. The Supreme Court soon realized Congress’s fears, not only limiting the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments but also Congress’s powers to enforce them in decisions like United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Due to these early cases, Congress was often forced to use its Commerce Power to protect civil rights. Modern decisions beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) have compounded these errors.

When we strip away these doctrinal glosses and look at the original meaning and structural purposes underlying the Reconstruction amendments, we will discover that the Reconstruction Power gives Congress all the authority it needs to pass modern civil rights laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That was the original point of these amendments, and that should be their proper construction today.

When it enforces the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress is not limited to remedying or preventing state violations of rights. It has long been recognized that Congress may reach private conduct through its Thirteenth Amendment powers to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery. But Congress also has the power to enforce the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause-- a guarantee of equal citizenship that, like the Thirteenth Amendment, contains no state action requirement. The Citizenship Clause, designed to secure equality of citizenship for freedmen, gives Congress the corresponding power to protect the badges and incidents of citizenship. Congress may therefore ban discriminatory private conduct that it reasonably believes will contribute to or produce second-class citizenship.

In addition to its powers to enforce the Citizenship Clause, Congress may also reach private action to prevent interference with federal constitutional rights. In conjunction with its powers to enforce the Guarantee Clause, Congress may therefore reach private violence designed to deter political participation, terrorize political opponents, or undermine representative government.

The failure of state and local governments to guarantee equal protection of the laws was a central concern of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and giving Congress the power to remedy this violence was one of the central purposes of the Fourteenth amendment. Today this same power enables Congress to pass laws banning violence directed at women and other federal hate crimes legislation.

Finally, because of institutional differences between courts and legislatures, Congress may implement the state action requirement more broadly than courts currently do, for example, by imposing antidiscrimination norms on government contractors and operators of public accommodations. For this reason Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in public accommodations, is not only a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; it is a paradigmatic example of that power.

The Supreme Court did not reach these questions in 1964 because it feared that overturning old precedents like the 1883 Civil Rights Cases would encourage Southern resistance to the new Civil Rights Act. But we should have no such compunction today. It is long past time to remedy the Supreme Court’s errors, and reconstruct the great Reconstruction Power of the Constitution.



The Fundamental Trick: Pretending That "Torture" is a Technical Term

David Luban

It had to happen, as night follows day.

After David Margolis concluded that the Bybee Memos showed mere "poor judgment" rather than professional misconduct, it was only a matter of time before someone would spin Margolis into an endorsement of the memos. Stuart Taylor, in the National Journal, has done just that: he writes that Margolis's "analysis more strongly supports the view that the kind of waterboarding that the agency proposed in 2002 was not illegal torture" than the opposite. Goodbye, poor judgment -- hello, legalization.

The reason: Margolis speculates "that Congress might have adopted a definition of torture that differed from the colloquial use of the term," in which case it was not wrong that the torture memo failed to mention a federal court decision that repeatedly described waterboarding as torture, or a Supreme Court case that called sleep deprivation torture. Taylor takes this idea and runs with it. He agrees that waterboarding "is torture as colloquially understood by many of us and that it should be banned." But that doesn't make it torture under the "extremely narrow definition" in the torture statutes.

Taylor's argument is built on what I have come to think is the fundamental trick used by the torture lawyers: pretending that the legal definition of 'torture' is something technical rather than "colloquial." Because it's technical, only lawyers can figure out what it means, using The Powerful Methods Of Legal Analysis.

This is nonsense. The core definition of torture in both the U.S. torture statute and the Convention Against Torture is intentional infliction of "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." That's not a narrow or technical definition (although Congress went on to give a narrow definition to the mental pain or suffering part). If we suppose that dictionaries are the best guide to the colloquial meanings of words, then let's see how they define torture:

The 1971 OED: "severe or excruciating pain or suffering (of body or mind)...."

Webster's Third International (1971): "intense pain"

Webster's Second International (1953): "severe pain" and "extreme pain"

American Heritage Dictionary (1976): "severe physical pain".

In other words: the colloquial meaning of 'torture' is virtually the same as the legal definition. The OED definition, by the way, is so similar to the CAT definition that it seems likely that whoever drafted article 1 of CAT may have drawn on the OED.

In short: the fundamental trick really is nothing but a trick. The legal definition IS the colloquial definition.

I've picked dictionaries that pre-date the legal definitions, to avoid the possible objection that today's dictionary definitions (which are more or less the same) look like the law because they borrowed from the law. Also, these dictionaries don't predate the law by much, so there is little chance that the colloquial meaning shifted between the time the dictionaries were published and the time the laws were written.

The most famous use of this fundamental trick is in the Bybee Memo's notorious "organ failure or death" definition of "severe pain." "Severe pain" is of course a vague phrase, because there is no sharp boundary between pain that is severe and pain that is merely bothersome. But there's a difference between vague and obscure. "Severe pain" is not an obscure term, because everyone who has ever given birth to a baby, gotten kicked in the wrong place playing sports, broken a bone, or slipped a disc knows what it is.

What about organ failure or death? Well, um, none of the living can report on the pain of death. And very few among us know what organ failure feels like. By using the fundamental trick, the Bybee Memo was able to ignore the colloquial meaning and make it seem as if "severe pain" is a technical term. Under the guise of providing interrogators with a workable test of the vague term "severe," Yoo and Bybee substituted a "technical" definition that only the dead could use.

I'm not denying that there are technical words in the law that have colloquial meaning. When I first started studying law I was confused by the word "consideration." In legalese it means "the inducement to a contract," and I mistook it for a colloquial word meaning "something to think about." Oops. But there is no comparable specialized definition of "torture." What you see on the surface of the statute is truly all there is. Anyone who tells you otherwise is playing the fundamental trick on you.

The fundamental trick is scandalous because it mystifies the law and pretends that legal language is so complicated, and so different from common sense language, that outsiders shouldn't worry our pretty little heads about it. We should butt out and leave it to the experts. In other words: if you sprain your ankle and someone asks you "Is the pain severe?" your answer would have to be "What are you asking me for? Go ask John Yoo!"

UPDATE: Stuart Taylor sent a reply to my post, which I reproduce here. My response follows.

David Luban's critique of my article grossly misleads your readers, to put it very mildly.
First, he seizes on a one-sentence fragment of my multipoint analysis of the Margolis memo and pretends that it's my whole argument. In fact it's about one-tenth of my argument.

Worse, his own just-check-the-dictionary argument misleads readers by pretending that "severe mental pain" in the torture statute means what dictionaries would suggest. It does not, as he well knows.

The statute specifically sub-defines "severe mental pain" as occurring (for purposes of the statute) only if there is (among other things) "prolonged mental harm."

Even OPR implicitly conceded that "prolonged mental harm" must mean more than a few minutes or hours of severe mental pain when it gave up on challenging the Bybee-Yoo interpretation of that phrase after Attorney General Mukasey's response had shown OPR's draft criticism to be an embarrassment to OPR.

And the statute's specific intent requirement - which Luban conveniently ignores -- makes it utterly clear that an interrogator who in good faith believes that neither prolonged mental harm nor severe physical pain would result from his actions cannot have violated the torture statute.

As Margolis found, 10,000-plus SERE trainees have almost unanimously reported that waterboarding caused no severe physical pain and no prolonged mental harm. This is dispositive as to "physical" and - together with the specific intent requirement - almost dispositive as to "prolonged," given the assumptions that the CIA gave Bybee and Yoo about how waterboarding would be done and would be limited.

As for the cases that Luban cites, both long predated the 1994 torture statute and neither interpreted statutory language remotely like that of the 1994 statute. Indeed, the colloquial "water torture" references in U.S. v. Lee were not part of a judicial holding interpreting any statute. Nor was the footnote about sleep-deprivation in the Supreme Court's 1944 Ashcraft decision. That footnote quoted in passing - without purporting to adopt as law of any kind - a statement in a 1930 report by an American Bar Association committee.

This does Luban descend from weak, to weaker, to weakest, while consistently misleading readers throughout.

Indeed, the more I see highly credentialed experts such as Luban - not to mention five years of thrashing around by hacks at OPR -- twist and turn to avoid the apparent meaning of the statutory language and the most relevant precedents, the more I think that there simply must not be any respectable argument at all for the proposition that waterboarding proposed by the CIA to Bybee and Yoo would be illegal torture as defined by the statute.

If a respectable argument could be made, I think I'd have seen it by now. I'm still waiting.

Sincerely, Stuart Taylor

UPDATE: I stand by my original post. Let me take on Mr. Taylor's objections one by one.

1. I focused only on a fragment of his argument. That's right - I did. It was the fragment that made the argument I am criticizing in this post: the "fundamental trick" of treating the legal definitions of torture as if they change the colloquial meaning of words into technical terms. The rest of Mr. Taylor's article is not about the topic of my post. His article is, as he says, a "multi-point analysis," and I was focusing on just one of those points. Of course, quoting out of context can sometimes distort the meaning of a sentence or an argument when the context is restored. I don't think that happened here, and Mr. Taylor hasn't said that I got the meaning of his argument wrong on the point I was discussing. Readers may judge for themselves whether I misread Stuart Taylor. I don't think so.

2. He accuses me of ignoring the fact that the U.S. torture statute narrows the definition of "severe mental pain or suffering" to something that differs from the colloquial meaning. Wrong. Far from ignoring this point, I said so explicitly. I wrote: "That's not a narrow or technical definition (although Congress went on to give a narrow definition to the mental pain or suffering part)."

I didn't elaborate, because I don't think that mental torture is the issue in waterboarding. The issue is physical torture, and in particular, the infliction of severe physical suffering (one of the express terms of the torture statute). The main trick used in the Bybee-Yoo memos is to treat "pain or suffering" as a single term ("not distinct concepts of 'pain' as distinguished from 'suffering'"), and then focus on pain (see p. 11 here). But the statute uses two words, not one, and that is because there are forms of physical suffering that aren't pain. "Colloquial" common sense knows this: freezing cold, unbearable heat, itchy, nauseous, ache-all-over, unable to breathe -- all are suffering, none are pain. Unable to breathe: waterboarding is controlled suffocation. Even if suffocation isn't pain, it is a form of severe physical suffering. In a moment, I'll explain how OLC mangled the law to avoid this conclusion. But first, let's talk about the physical suffering of waterboarding.

Here's a famous description of waterboarding by Malcolm Nance, a former master SERE instructor, in a post titled "Waterboarding is Torture...Period." Nance's credentials: "SERE staff were required to undergo the waterboard at its fullest. I was no exception. I have personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of people." Here is his description:

Unless you have been strapped down to the board, have endured the agonizing feeling of the water overpowering your gag reflex, and then feel your throat open and allow pint after pint of water to involuntarily fill your lungs, you will not know the meaning of the word.

Waterboarding is a controlled drowning…. It does not simulate drowning, as the lungs are actually filling with water. There is no way to simulate that. The victim is drowning. … A team doctor watches the quantity of water that is ingested and for the physiological signs which show when the drowning effect goes from painful psychological experience, to horrific suffocating punishment to the final death spiral.

Waterboarding is slow motion suffocation with enough time to contemplate the inevitability of black out and expiration –usually the person goes into hysterics on the board.

Although Nance says that waterboarding begins as a "painful psychological experience," his description also includes "the agonizing feeling of the water overpowering your gag reflex." That's physical. Although the version of waterboarding OLC approved would require that it be stopped before "pint after pint of water" fills the lungs, the OLC itself writes, "the water may enter -- and may accumulate in -- the detainee's mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing. In addition, you have indicated that the detainee as a countermeasure may swallow water, possibly in significant quantities" so that it is necessary to use saline solution to avoid diluting the salt content of the detainee's blood. (Bradbury Memo of May 10, 2005, p. 13). OLC adds: "We understand that the effect of the waterboard is to induce a sensation of drowning. This sensation is based on a deeply rooted physiological response." That's physical too.

How did OLC avoid concluding that waterboarding inflicts severe physical suffering? As I just explained, Yoo and Bybee did it by treating "pain and suffering" as a single term (although Yoo facilitates his argument by misquoting the statute, which says "pain OR suffering" not "pain and suffering"). Yoo does go on to consider "physical suffering" as a separate term, and writes that "the waterboard could not be said to inflict severe suffering. The waterboard is simply a controlled acute episode, lacking the connotation of a protracted period of time generally given to suffering." The Levin Memo - OLC's substitute for the Bybee Memo - borrows this idea and reads into the statute a requirement that isn't there, namely that to be physical suffering an experience must have "some extended duration or persistence." In fact, the statute expressly states that mental suffering must be prolonged to be torture, but it imposes no similar requirement on physical suffering. Levin simply made it up. Nearly four years ago, Marty Lederman spotted this trick and speculated that Levin inserted it because waterboarding is done in short sessions. (The Yoo memo says that "the procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application." When the Bradbury memos were released last year, they proved that Marty was right: Bradbury leaned on the Levin memo to deny that waterboarding imposes physical suffering.

To summarize: Yoo denied that suffocation is physical suffering (merely "a controlled acute episode" - but of what? If not suffering, then what?) because it doesn't last long. Levin builds the duration requirement into the statute even though it is not there. Both of them conjured up law from nowhere - law that not only isn't in the statute or any other legal source, but that the statute rules out. After all, when a statute expressly attaches a duration requirement to one form of torture (mental) but not to the other form (physical), you simply can't read the requirement into the other. Every lawyer learns a rule of statutory construction called "expressio unius," short for a Latin maxim that means "expressing it in one place excludes it from the other." This result mirrors common sense: why would Congress imply a duration requirement into the definition of suffering when everyone knows that severe suffering can happen for very short periods of time? To deny that forty seconds of suffocation is suffering is to deny the obvious.

3. That brings me to Mr. Taylor's criticism that I ignored the evidence of the 10,000 SERE veterans who "have almost unanimously reported that waterboarding caused no severe physical pain and no prolonged mental harm." The first thing to observe is that the source of this information is the classified Yoo memo, which does not say that the SERE veterans "almost unanimously reported" anything at all. It says that an official who trained 10,000 SERE students reported that waterboarding never caused prolonged mental harm, as evidenced by the fact that almost none of them dropped out of the program or required mental health services afterward. A small distinction, perhaps, but there is a difference between one official and the "almost unanimous" testimony of 10,000 military officers. And the Yoo memo, unlike Taylor's article, does not attribute the "no severe pain" conclusion to reports about SERE training. Mr. Taylor's attempt to enlist 10,000 officers claiming that waterboarding wasn't severely painful seems like careless reading and wishful thinking. Perhaps I've overlooked something in the Margolis memo, or perhaps Mr. Taylor has a different version than mine, in which much of the SERE discussion is blacked out.

But more significant is that Mr. Taylor discusses mental pain or suffering and physical pain, but ignores physical suffering -- the category that applies to waterboarding. Margolis makes the same mistake.

4. Mr. Taylor faults me for not talking about the specific intent requirement in the torture definition. Actually, I did mention intent when I described the core definition of torture as the intentional infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering. But I did not discuss specific intent. That matters, Taylor argues, because the specific intent requirement greatly narrows the definition of torture beyond the colloquial meaning.

Or does it? True, if I go through a painful medical procedure, I might say "That was torture," even though the doctors did not intend to torture me. (Probably the specific intent requirement was inserted into the statute to rule out cases like medical treatment that doctors know will cause severe pain.) Perhaps colloquial speech accepts the possibility of someone unintentionally torturing someone else - imagine a farmer who turns on the electric fence without realizing that a passerby is sitting on it. I agree that the definition in the torture statute rules out the possibility of unintentional torture.

But we're talking about waterboarding. Mr. Taylor lays great weight on a 2008 opinion by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180) that gave the same specific intent analysis as the Bybee Memo:

Specific intent requires not just the general intent to accomplish an act with no particular end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited result. Mere knowledge that a result is substantially certain to follow from one's actions is not sufficient to form the specific intent to torture.

Even if we accept this interpretation, waterboarding meets the test. Strapping someone to a tilted board and pouring water over a cloth covering his mouth is not "an act with no particular end in mind." It has a "conscious purpose," and that purpose is to make the victim suffer. (And please, don't retort that the purpose is to get information or to safeguard national security. Those may be the motives, but the specific purpose of the waterboarding is to make the victim suffer.) A CIA interrogator is not The Accidental Waterboarder.

4. As for the fact that the use of the word 'torture' in the Lee case and the Ashcraft footnote were not part of a judicial holding interpreting a federal statute: true, but irrelevant. Both cases pre-date the torture statutes, so of course they were not holding that as a statutory matter waterboarding is torture. The job of the OLC lawyers was to interpret the language of the statute, and Lee, a federal case that labeled waterboarding "torture," is obviously relevant to an opinion on whether waterboarding is torture. At the time of the Bybee Memo no federal case had ever interpreted the torture statute. (There has been only one prosecution ever under the statute, the 2009 conviction of a Liberian torturer.) My whole point in my previous post was that even though the Lee court used the word "colloquially," there is not the slightest reason to suppose that the torture statute had transformed the meaning of the word.

Looking through Balkinization posts of yesteryear, it seems that Mr. Taylor was making similar arguments two years ago. See Marty Lederman's post here (although Marty unfortunately linked to the wrong Taylor article, and I've been unable to find the one he quotes from). Others have made similar arguments: Lederman skewered them here, here, and here. The arguments don't get better with age.

The Constitutional Moment

JB

Back in December, I pointed out that Obama had come to what my colleague Bruce Ackerman calls a constitutional moment. If Obama wants health care reform he would have to use reconciliation or push for a reform of Senate filibuster rules. Senate intransigence would lead him to unconventional adaptation if he wanted to salvage his Presidency.

By the end of the health care summit, it was clear that Obama will choose the less dramatic course of reconciliation. Doing so, presumably, will expand existing precedents and make it easier to use for major substantive legislation in the future. But using reconciliation in this case will not fundamentally change the dynamic in the Senate, and it will probably not significantly alter constitutional understandings. We will still have polarized parliamentary style parties in a constitutional system that is not designed for parliamentary government because of its super-majority rules and many different veto points. In an important sense, this is the larger structural problem. The party system has mutated in ways that are inconsistent with existing constitutional mechanisms.

If reconciliation fails, Obama will have to attack the filibuster directly. But even if reconciliation succeeds, the constitutional moment will not have been concluded. The worst, I fear, is yet to come.

The 2010 elections will be a referendum on Obama's handling of health care and his use of or failure at reconciliation. However, even if Obama succeeds, there is almost no chance that Obama and the Democrats will pick up seats in this election. They are defending too many marginal districts. For structural reasons, the Democrats are likely to lose around 25 to 30 seats on the average. The question then is whether they lose only to 20 to 25 or 35 to 40.

This means that it is almost impossible for the public to see the results of this election as a mandate for Obama and the Democrats. The Democrats will lose seats, period, and Republicans will interpret this as a sign that they should continue to obstruct on every possible initiative.

Gridlock will get worse, not better following the 2010 elections.

This will put Obama to the test. The next two year cycle will be much the same as the first, with this difference: Obama will be running for reelection, and the economic news will need to become rosier very quickly if he has a chance at gaining a second term.

Therefore the 2012 election will be the real test of Democratic reforms and Democratic will. Obama will be driven to push for measures that he believes necessary to help the economy and secure reelection. Republicans will resist, insisting on tax cuts but no additional spending or government programs. They will be politically stronger, while the Democrats will have even fewer members in the House and Senate.

If Democrats still retain majorities in the House and the Senate, Obama may be forced to push for reform of the Senate rules in order to survive politically. This may precipitate a new round of unconventional adaptation.

If Democrats lose control of one or both Houses of Congress in 2010, however, Obama's task is far more difficult, and he may not be able to try even this. There is no point in trying to end Senate filibusters if one doesn't control the Senate or the House. Therefore we may find ourselves in a showdown situation like the one between Clinton and Gingrich between 1994 and 1996, but this time Republicans, having seen that movie before, will not be as politically inept as they were then.

If Obama loses control of the House or the Senate in 2010, the chances of a reconstructive presidency are significantly reduced, and the chances of Republican resurgence are high. That might mean a prolonged period of legislative deadlock with neither party able to solve the nation's problems, while those problems mount. The President will turn his attentions to foreign policy, where he can normally proceed without consulting Congress, and he will try to use the federal bureaucracy to do most of the work of domestic reform. This, in turn, will create ever greater incentives for Presidential unilateralism both in foreign and domestic policy, and increasing legislative irrelevance.

This second path has its own dangers. Let me put it bluntly: Either the Senate's rules are reformed soon, or Congress becomes increasingly irrelevant to governance. It must still pass appropriations bills, but it will be increasingly unable to direct domestic policy because neither party will be able to form supermajorities in favor of major policy changes. Earmarks and minor programs remain possible, but not major ones. And if Congress becomes irrelevant, the institution of the presidency is strengthened in the long run, whether or not Barack Obama wins reelection. If the President cannot reform Congress through political exertion, he is likely to strengthen his own ability to decide matters on his own. A strengthened Presidency moves us ever closer to rule by executive decision in American politics.

In other words, the current fight over the Senate, caused by bitter polarization in American politics, threatens the constitutional status of Congress as much as it does Barack Obama.

Earlier I noted that we have developed polarized parliamentary-style parties in a constitutional system not designed for parliamentary government. So if Congress cannot be reformed to become more parliamentary, perhaps the party system will dissolve and become more consistent with the constitutional structures we do have. Perhaps the political parties will become less polarized and less ideologically cohesive. I would not bet on this possibility happening in the short run, however. Our current political polarization is supported by many features of American politics, including the primary system, first-past-the-post rules in elections, and our current system of campaign finance.

If you think American politics was interesting the past year, just wait until you see the next three. Difficult and dangerous times are ahead for the republic.




Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Rule of Law Baselines for Judging

Brian Tamanaha

This paper lays out a project that might be of interest to political scientists who study judicial decision making. I will gladly provide feedback to anyone who takes it up. Here is the abstract for the paper:

Political scientists and law professors have lately taken to asserting that quantitative studies of judging reveal worrisome findings about the rule of law in the U.S. judicial system. The authors of Are Judges Political?, for example, declare: “We show that variations in panel composition lead to dramatically different outcomes, in a way that creates serious problems for the rule of law.”

To evaluate such assertions, one must first know what the rule of law requires of judges; then one must identify or measure how much, or in what ways, judges are falling short of these requirements: there must be rule of law baselines or standards. None exist, however - a gap which allows researchers to draw misleading conclusions from the results of their studies. This essay demonstrates the need for rule of law baselines and offers several proposals for how they might be constructed (with due warnings about their limitations). Furthermore, it argues that the incorporation of such baselines into quantitative research on judging will enhance the value of the information produced in these studies.



Monday, February 22, 2010

Analyzing the Margolis Memo

David Luban

My first-cut analysis of the Margolis Memo - which rejects the OPR recommendations that Jay Bybee and John Yoo should face professional discipline - is available on Slate.com here.

Meanwhile, an unredacted footnote in the OPR Report reveals the identity of the Office of Legal Counsel lawyer who assisted John Yoo in writing the torture memo and apparently drafted the commander-in-chief sections. The story is here.

Yoo, Bybee, and the Hall of Mirrors of Legal Argument

JB

Over at Slate, B'zation blogger and professional responsibility expert David Luban offers his analysis of the DOJ's decision. Luban explains in detail why Associate Deputy Attorney General Margolis had to do a fair amount of, how shall we say, clever lawyering to get to the conclusion that Yoo and Bybee did not violate any rules of professional responsibility. Yet Luban's demonstration of the rhetorical tricks in Margolis' memorandum merely lays bare the hall of mirrors that is legal argument and the limits of what we can expect from law and from rules of professional responsibility.

One of the remarkable features of this controversy over professional responsibility is its self-referential character. The relevant professional responsibility rules in this area depend on criteria of legal objectivity. The rules are violated only when lawyers make arguments that are very bad, so bad that we conclude that the lawyers can't have believed them. However, the question of whether lawyers have made arguments that are so bad that they can't have believed them turns out to be a question on which lawyers themselves disagree. As a result, we end up debating whether Margolis's defense of Yoo and Bybee's arguments as merely weak (and not egregiously bad) is a claim on which reasonable people could disagree or whether Margolis is simply wrong (as Luban claims). But of course, Margolis is a pretty good lawyer; as a result he is able to recharaterize facts and offer various reasons for why reasonable minds could disagree about whether Yoo's arguments were really bad arguments or just pretty weak arguments. The better a lawyer Margolis is, in fact, the easier it is for him to show that Yoo's critics aren't clearly correct that Yoo made objectively bad arguments. And if they aren't clearly correct, then Yoo isn't clearly wrong, and therefore he didn't violate legal ethics rules.

The difficulty is that legal argument about the things we care about most is rarely conclusive, and even when it seems to be, other lawyers soon come along to raise doubts, and turn our firm convictions into mush. The more skilled the lawyers, the easier it is for them to do this, even if the arguments they make to unsettle us aren't really very good (as Luban shows us). Nevertheless, lawyers make these unsettling arguments with firm conviction and all the appearance of objectivity (with the goal of undermining our faith in the objectivity of other arguments). This is in the nature of lawyering. Therefore when you create a standard of professional misconduct that requires that a lawyer's arguments must be so objectively bad as to be in bad faith, it becomes easy for other lawyers to raise doubts about this conclusion, even if the arguments that lawyers make to sow these doubts aren't themselves particularly good arguments.

Indeed, the best way to raise doubt is to pound the table and insist that the folks on the other side are fools or knaves or both. (If you read the memos of Yoo's and Bybee's lawyers, you will see that they pound the table a lot.) You rebut claims that your client is acting in bad faith by asserting that the other side is acting in bad faith. Margolis, too, tries to show us that the folks at OPR (his own colleagues at Justice!) are themselves overzealous, perhaps a bit too eager to reach a predetermined conclusion, and therefore not to be trusted. (That is, he tries to insinuate that they are just like Yoo!) If I were at OPR right now, and read Margolis' characterization of my work, I would be pretty pissed. But that is what Margolis needs to do to reach the conclusion that Yoo's faults are merely "a close case," and he does it with lawyerly aplomb. Legal argument, like politics itself, ain't bean bag.

The debate over the plausibility of Yoo's and Bybee's legal performance is thus replicated at a different level in the debate over the legal performances of lawyers evaluating Yoo and Bybee's legal performance. And so on and so on and so on.

The moral of the story is not that legal argument is hopeless. It is rather that you should be careful that you do not demand the wrong things of it. Law works best when it relies on plausibility and reasonableness; when it requires certainty it often badly misfires, because lawyers are trained to upset certainty where ever they find it. That is what they do for a living. If Yoo and Bybee are guilty of something it is not they made objectively bad legal arguments. It is that they were toadies to power and facilitated torture. Professional responsibility rules are not well designed to deal with this kind of evil.





Sunday, February 21, 2010

The stench of fascism

Sandy Levinson

[The New York Times reports that Glenn Beck, in his closing speech to the Conservative Political Action Conference described "progressivism" as a cancer, "the disease in America." Let there be no doubt that this is nothing more than the stench of fascism, which relies on treating one's political opponents as what Carl Schmitt, the great (I use that word advisedly) Weimar political theorist (who ended up supporting Hitler's takeover in 1933), termed "enemies" who were viewed ultimately as subhuman (as "cancers" are), ulutimately fit to be eradicated "by any means necessary. Forget Newt Gingrich, who also spoke, and who, by contemporary standards, is almost a reasonable elder statesman of the GOP, actually willing to work, on occasion, with Hillary Clinton. The voice of way too much of contemporary "conservatism" (the scare quotes are also deliberate, because it is an insult to "conservatives" to say that they are necessarily fascists, is fascistic.

Beck and his ilk feel free to call on Democrats to denounce anyone who strays from a quite narrow "political correctness." Jessie Jackson is still being criticized, after his many apologies, for his "hymietown" remark of 1984. God help us if Barack Obama were ever discovered to have written a term paper at Occidental in which he argued that there might be something to be said for "socialism." But Republicans say nothing. They are truly "useful idiots," who are counting on their ability to rein in Glenn Beck (and Sarah Palin) before they destroy the country. It is past time for Republicans to be called on whether or not they tolerate millions of their fellow citizens being called "cancers" and "diseases." We are indeed in a true moment of cultural and political warfare, in which Glenn Beck has made very clear that he has no regard whatsoever for the most basic notions of civility (which begin by granting the possibility that one's opponents simply disagree rather than are "cancers" to be ripped out of the body politic).

What "Beckism" presages is more terrorist violence like that conducted in Austin, Texas, where a demented citizen flew into an IRS building and killed a true American "hero" a/k/a known as a public servant who had dedicated his life to tax collection. One might remember that Justice Holmes called taxes "the price we pay for civilization." Part of our move toward fascism is to view as "heroes" only those who carry guns and are prepared to risk their lives while preparing to inflict fatal violence on others. We must recognize that all public servants are, in their own ways, "heroes." The Republican Party for the past generation has systematically viewed all public servants, save for the military, as chumps, who if they had any real talent, would be working in the private sector (perhaps in Goldman Sachs, etc.). I truly fear for our country.




Saturday, February 20, 2010

Ted Kennedy's (and William Rehnquist's) disservice

Sandy Levinson

Given my comments in my last posting on the narcissism of elderly and ill senators who will simply not retire gracefully, I must regretfully add to the list the late Sen. Edward Kennedy, who I believe to be the greatest single senator of the past century (at least). In many ways, he provided all of us with a model of how to face death with true grace, as did, arguably, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, but in both cases, alas, one must also recognize that they should have resigned once it became clear that their illnesses were indeed terminal and that they would be subject to treatment regimens that could not fail to affect their abilities to do the jobs to which they had been elected or appointed.

We actually have a constitutional amendment, the 25th, to take account of presidential disability. But the problem is that it seems to believe, implicitly, that there are no problems posed by similar disabilities on the part of other public officials (including, for that matter, the vice president). This is obviously questionable, even if one can easily agree that presidential disability, especially in a system that includes elements of constitutional dictatorship, poses special problems. As it happens, Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton have taken the lead in drafting a proposal that I was glad to sign that addresses the problems of potential disabilities of members of the Supreme Court.

This is obviously a difficult subject to address. Most of us, happily, do not yet know what it means to face the reality of one's imminent death, and the imagine of "dying with one's boots on" is, I suspect, attractive for most of us. The proposal suggests a legal response to this human, all-too-human situation, but, ultimately, what is required is a sense of personal responsibility (and, perhaps, a family that is willing, at some point, to cease enabling the desire to hang on to the bitter end).

There is, incidentally, one vital difference between the situation facing Sen. Kennedy and the one possibly facing Sen. Lautenberg. Sen. Kennedy would not have worried that a resignation would have inevitably handed his seat to the Republican Party, whereas Sen. Lautenberg is correct to be concerned that this would not be the case in New Jersey. This is a good reason to modify the 17th Amendment to require governors to appoint successors from the political party of the former senator, as is indeed required in several states, including Wyoming. (Obviously, there would be problems in Connecticut and Vermont, where the senators are formally "independent.") As I have argued previously, it is a terrible idea to strip governors of their power to make such appointments at all, given the high desirabililty of replacing senators as soon as possible in case of an attack that would kill or disable a significant number of senators.

Perhaps the contemporary revolt against incumbents will sweep away so many of the "old timers" that the problem will basically vanish (save in the Supreme Court), but, if not, we can look forward to ever more examples of senators whose health necessarily will be of concern to all of us.

Why Yoo's Sincere Extremist Excuse Doesn't Work

Brian Tamanaha

The decision by Deputy A.G. David Margolis to not refer John Yoo to the bar for disciplinary proceedings can in no way be read as a vindication of his conduct. The key issue is whether "Yoo intentionally or recklessly provided misleading advice to his client." "It is a close question," wrote Margolis, adding:
I would be remiss in not observing, however, that these memoranda represent an unfortunate chapter in the history of the Office of Legal Counsel. While I have declined to adopt OPR's findings of misconduct, I fear that John Yoo's loyalty to his own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his client and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit sincerely held, views of executive power while speaking for an institutional client. These memoranda suggest that he failed to appreciate the enormous responsibility that comes with the authority to issue institutional decisions that carried the authoritative weight of the Department of Justice.
Margolis goes on, in conclusion, to explicitly condemn Yoo for acting inappropriately.

Why, then, no referral to the bar for disciplinary proceedings? Margolis agrees (along with just about every lawyer who has read the legal memos) that Yoo's (and Bybee's) legal analysis is seriously flawed and distorts the law. He doesn't think, however, that the preponderance of the evidence shows that Yoo distorted the legal analysis "intentionally or recklessly;" rather, his ideological extremism clouded his legal judgment.

It's difficult to know what Yoo was thinking, of course--any such showing will have to be inferred from his conduct. This is how subjective intent requirements are satisfied. The Office of Professional Responsibility Report, which recommended that he be referred to the bar for disciplinary proceedings, found that Yoo's intent to distort could be inferred from his consistent pattern of twisting every possible angle to reach the legal conclusion he desired (CIA interrogators can torture with impunity), combined with his failure to acknowledge weaknesses in his analysis.

What's odd about Margolis's conclusion is that it implicitly relies upon a necessary assumption that he elsewhere explicitly contradicts. Early in the memo he notes that Yoo is a distinguished lawyer with sterling credentials (SCOTUS law clerk, Berkeley professor). But Margolis's conclusion makes sense only if we assume that Yoo is an incompetent lawyer.

Here is why: Yoo's extreme ideological views undoubtedly colored his reading of the law, but that does not end the inquiry of whether he intentionally or recklessly distorted the law. After all, his extremism provides an affirmative reason to suspect that he distorted the law intentionally in pursuit of his ideological aims. More to the point, even an extreme ideologue can recognize when his preferred (idiosyncratic) reading of the law departs from conventional legal analysis. All competent lawyers know the difference between how they would like the law to be interpreted and how the law will likely be interpreted by a court. (The ability of lawyers to predict outcomes, an essential part of the job, depends upon the capacity to mark this distinction.)

So yes, Yoo undoubtedly holds extreme views about executive power. But if we assume that Yoo is a competent lawyer--as there is every reason to believe--then he must have recognized at some level that his analysis distorted the law. This recognition, and the determination to issue the memos anyway, provides a basis to find that he recklessly (knowingly) distorted the law.

Given the patent weakness of his legal analysis, there are two possible alternatives: Yoo is an incompetent lawyer or he intentionally or recklessly distorted the law. Margolis makes two pivotal assertions--that Yoo is a highly qualified lawyer and that Yoo is an ideologue with extreme views. When these assertions are read together, a strong inference can be drawn that Yoo knew his analysis distorted the law but his ideological extremism led him to decide that the ends (enable harsh interrogation) justified the means (distort the law).


Robert Justin Lipkin, 1943-2010

JB

Widener Law School reports that Professor Robert Lipkin passed away on February 18th.
Robert 'Bobby’ J. Lipkin, a Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law on Widener Law’s Delaware Campus, passed away on Thursday, February 18th. The Widener Law community’s thoughts and prayers are with Professor Lipkin’s loved ones. We are shocked and saddened by his passing and share their grief. Bobby Lipkin was an exceptional individual, a good friend, and a respected professor. His passing is a substantial loss for the entire law school community. He will be missed by all of us privileged to have known and worked with him.

Bobby was a lovely man and will be deeply missed.



Friday, February 19, 2010

Justice Department Will Not Punish Yoo and Bybee Because Most Lawyers Are Scum Anyway

JB

At long last we have the Department of Justice report on the professional conduct of John Yoo and Judge Jay Bybee in writing the infamous torture memos, along with previous versions of the Office of Professional Responsibility report and responses by Yoo and Bybee. Upon reviewing the OPR's report and recommendations, Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis concluded in a 69 page memo that the DOJ should release the Office of Professional Responsibility report for public review but that the Justice Department would not refer a finding of misconduct to state and local bar committees where Yoo and Bybee are members.

In deciding not to refer charges to state bar committees, Margolis does not tell us that Yoo and Bybee behaved admirably or according to the high standards that we should expect from Justice Department lawyers. Indeed, he says the opposite. Yoo and Bybee exercised poor judgment and let the Justice Department down. But Margolis argues that the Office of Professional Responsibility chose too high a standard to judge the professional responsibility of Yoo and Bybee. The OPR argued that Yoo and Bybee had "a duty to exercise independent legal judgment and to render thorough, objective, and candid legal advice." This standard, Margolis explained, is much too high a requirement and not one that Yoo and Bybee were previously warned was the standard to which they would be held.

I know what you are probably saying: shouldn't every government lawyer have to live up to this standard? Of course, they should, but the point is that this is a disciplinary proceeding. It's not about what people should do, but about how badly they have to screw things up before they are subject to professional sanctions.

Instead, Margolis argues that, judging by (among other things) a review of D.C. bar rules, the standard for attorney misconduct is set pretty damn low, and is only violated by lawyers who (here I put it colloquially) are the scum of the earth. Lawyers barely above the scum of the earth are therefore excused.

Margolis concludes that Yoo and Bybee exercised poor judgment and made bad legal arguments. But lawyers often make arguments that are bad or even laughably bad, and this by itself does not violate the very low standard set by rules of professional responsibility. These rules are set up by jurisdictions to weed out the worst offenders, leaving the rest of the legal profession to make entirely stupid, disingenuous and asinine arguments that normal people with functioning moral consciences would not make. That is to say, rules of professional misconduct are aimed at weeding out sociopaths and people driven to theft and egregious incompetence by serious drug and alcohol abuse problems; they do not guarantee that lawyers will do right by their clients, or, in this case, by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America. In effect, by setting the standard of conduct so low, rules of professional conduct effectively work to protect all those lawyers out there whose moral standing is just a hair's breadth above your average mass murderer. This is how the American legal profession simultaneously polices and takes care of its own.

To show misconduct, according to the standard that Margolis finds most relevant, one would have to show that Yoo or Bybee intentionally made arguments that they knew were wrong and false or did so not caring whether they were wrong or false. That standard could not be met for Jay Bybee, because Bybee was, to put it bluntly, an empty suit who relied on the advice of others and didn't analyze the memos all that closely. He just signed the papers. This makes him pathetic, but not, in Margolis's view, someone who unambiguously violated existing rules of professional responsibility.

As for John Yoo, Margolis explains (although he puts it far more diplomatically) that Yoo was an ideologue who entered government service with a warped vision of the world in which he sincerely believed. Yoo had crazy ideas even before he entered government; which strongly suggests that he probably shouldn't have been hired in the first place. Therefore it is hard to conclude that Yoo deliberately gave advice that he knew was wrong to the CIA. Yoo isn't putting people on when he says the absurd things he says in these memos and elsewhere. He actually believes that the President is a dictator and that the President doesn't have to obey statutes that make torture a crime. He actually believes that you should read the torture statute so narrowly that it lets the CIA torture people. John Yoo used every trick in the book to twist the law because he actually believes in a law that is twisted. And Margolis points out that other department lawyers, who, presumably, did have properly functioning consciences and were not seriously incompetent, looked at the torture memos and told Bybee that, on the whole, in the context of the limited audience for the memos, and putting aside their most ridiculous claims, the torture memos made defensible legal arguments of the kind that lawyers sometimes make on behalf of their clients. It is important to understand that Margolis reached this conclusion not because Yoo's arguments were just or sensible, or even plausible, but because lawyers can make really really crazy arguments and still avoid professional sanction. This is less a defense of Yoo than an indictment of the doctrines of professional responsibility.

Margolis concludes (p. 67), perhaps more in sorrow than in anger, that Yoo did not intentionally give incorrect legal advice, although, Margolis admits that "[i]t is a close question." He notes that "OPR's findings and my decision are less important than the public's ability to make its own judgments about these documents and learn lessons for the future."

Margolis' last point is especially important, since the former Vice-President of the United States is now going around the country telling people that he supports waterboarding and actively sought to use it when he was in office. Put differently, there is at least one member of the previous Administration walking around that is an admitted war criminal, although, to be sure, confessing to the elements of a war crime on television apparently does not, at least in this country, lead to any serious danger that one will actually be prosecuted for such crimes.

Whether or not the DOJ refers Yoo and Bybee for professional discipline, no one should think that either man behaved according to the high standards we should expect of government attorneys. They, and the government officials who worked with them, shamed this nation. They dragged America's reputation in the dirt. They severely damaged our good name in the eyes of the world. They undermined the values this country stands for and that the legal profession should stand for. Nothing the DOJ does now--or fails to do--will change that.


Narcissists in the Senate

Sandy Levinson

I note that 86-year-old Sen. Frank Lautenberg has just been diagnosed with stomach cancer. I wish him a rapid recovery, not least, I confess,
because the Governor of New Jersey is now a Republican who would, I assume, not hesitate a second before appointing a Republican to fill his seat should the worst happen. (He ran for re-election in 2008 and received 56 of the vote from New Jerseyites grateful for his long and honorable service.) There is also a report that the geniuses in the White House, led, no doubt, by Rahm Emanuel, offered Rep. Joe Sestak a job to induce him to drop his challenge in Pennsylvania to now- Democrat Arlen Specter, who turned 80 on February 12 and who has had a variety of serious diseases in his 70s. And, of course, there is also Sen. Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who is 92 and frail. He was re-elected with almost 2/3 of the vote in 2006. Senator Byrd is the President pro Tem of the Senate, which means, under our lunatic Succession in Office Act, that he is third in line to succeed to the Presidency behind Vice President Biden and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. No serious country would take such a risk, but, then, it's been long established that we're simply not a serious country when it comes to some very basic issues of governmental design.

But enough of attacking the Constitution and statutes like the Succession in Office Act. I want to attack narcissitic senators (assuming that's not simply a redundant phrase) who are unable to hang it up. Whether or not the Constitution should establish age limits on holding public office--we could also discuss Justice John Paul Stevens, obviously--is something reasonable people can certainly disagree about. But, equally obviously, we do depend on what Madison and his 18th century friends called "virtue," i.e., an internal compass and sense of self-restraint to know when the public good requires stepping down and letting other (and younger) citizens take over. Must we really pretend that age is irrelevant and that 80 is the new 50? No doubt there are inspiring exceptions, such as the late Sam Beer, who at 90 had a mind I would trade for straight up. But, of course, he really was exceptional, and that is the point.

I know very little about New Jersey politics, though I lived in Princeton for four years, but I find it hard to believe that the Garden State lacked any attractive Democrat who might have proved a capable successor to the then 84-year-old Sen. Lautenberg in 2008. With regard to Specter, I think it is over-determined that it's time for him to go. Why the White House is so determined to pander to this backboneless narcissist (who voted for the MCA while stating that it was unconstitutional because the then-Republican Sen. Specter wanted to keep his Committee Chairmanship) is beyond me. Sestak strikes me as an able public servant who would bring some new perspectives to the Senate--he is, among other things, a former admiral, I believe, and, with Sen. Webb, could take on the hysterical and fear-mongering. (If this post were only on the White House enablement of narcissistic senators, without attention to age, one might ask why President Obama is so insistent that Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand have no opposition in the Democratic primary in New York.)

Perhaps in another post I'll confront the issue of university professors, the only other people in our society, save for self-employed persons and owners of family businesses, who have "full-life" tenure. But, surely, no law professor, however narcissistic, is capable of doing anywhere near the harm to the Republic as narcissistic senators.



Thursday, February 18, 2010

The Global Impact of Brown v. Board of Education

Mary L. Dudziak

Cross-posted from SCOTUS Blog, where this essay is part of its special Black History Month coverage:

In May 1954, Brown v. Board of Education made headlines, not only in American newspapers, but also around the world. “At Last! Whites and Blacks in the United States on the same school benches,” was the headline in Afrique Nouvelle, a newspaper in French West Africa (now Senegal). In India, the Hindustan Times noted that “American democracy stands to gain in strength and prestige from the unanimous ruling” since school segregation “has been a long-standing blot on American life and civilization.” For the Sydney Morning Herald in Australia, Brown would “go a long way toward dissipating the validity of the Communist contention that Western concepts of democracy are hypocritical.”

The global reaction to Brown was also noted in American news coverage. The decision would “stun and silence America’s Communist traducers behind the Iron Curtain,” argued the Pittsburgh Courier, an African American newspaper, for it would “effectively impress upon millions of colored people in Asia and Africa the fact that idealism and social morality can and do prevail in the Unites States, regardless of race, creed or color.”

Justice Stephen Breyer referred to the global attention given to Brown in his dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 in 2007. He emphasized the historic importance of Brown, noting that the case “deeply affected not only Americans, but the world.” But the global significance of the case goes beyond Justice Breyer’s point that Brown enabled others to find a positive model in American racial justice. Brown is one example of the way American law plays a role in U.S. public diplomacy. When major Supreme Court cases are covered in the world press, they inform the understanding of peoples of other nations about the nature of American democracy.

Continued below the fold.

While Brown was held up as an achievement, it came at a troublesome time for the American image abroad. American civil rights failings had long been a staple in the international press. Editorials around the world lambasted racial segregation in public schools and elsewhere, and instances of racial violence, including lynching, caused international outrage. All nations had their own injustices, so why was it that peoples around the world focused their ire on American racism?

It was the Cold War, which American leaders described as a battle between a nation that upheld rights, and the Soviet Union which repressed them. With nations in Africa and Asia poised to gain independence, the United States hoped the new countries would follow its lead. The Cold War balance of power itself seemed to turn on the faith of other nations in the benefits of democracy. Yet in the world’s leading democracy, citizens were segregated by race, and African Americans were sometimes brutalized for attempting to exercise basic rights.

The Soviet Union took advantage of this American weakness. American racism was a principal Soviet propaganda theme by the late 1940s. This propaganda was overblown, yet it had an impact because the long history of oppression of African Americans was well known around the world. Many believed that American world leadership, and world peace itself hinged on the nation solving its racial problems. As Gunnar Myrdal put it in 1944, “America, for its international prestige, power, and future security, needs to demonstrate to the world that American Negroes can be satisfactorily integrated into its democracy.”

Supreme Court Justices encountered international concern about American race discrimination in their overseas travels. When Justice William O. Douglas traveled to India in 1950, the first question he was asked was, “Why does America tolerate the lynching of Negroes?” Douglas later wrote that he had learned from his travels that “the attitude of the United States toward its colored minorities is a powerful factor in our relations with India.” Chief Justice Earl Warren echoed Douglas’s concerns in a 1954 speech to the American Bar Association. “Our American system like all others is on trial both at home and abroad,” he said. “The way it works, the manner in which it solves the problems of our day; the extent to which we maintain the spirit of our constitution with its Bill of Rights, will in the long run do more to make it both secure and the object of adulation than the number of hydrogen bombs we stockpile.”

When Brown v. Board of Education was argued, the Justice Department made sure the Court was aware that the case before it had important national security consequences. In an Amicus Curiae brief, the Justice Department argued that segregation had “an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.” The brief quoted extensively from Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who argued that the damage to U.S. foreign relations from race discrimination was growing. School segregation had been “singled out for hostile foreign comment.” The impact of such practices on American international prestige “jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world.”

When Brown was decided, the ruling gave American diplomats ammunition they had been seeking. The U.S. government quickly helped get the word out about Brown. The case was the top story on the Voice of America, where it was accompanied by a commentary explaining that the decision came about "by law under democratic processes rather than by mob rule or dictatorial fiat." The State Department informed American Embassy staffs around the world about how to manage the news. “You may imagine what good use we are making of the decision here in India,” wrote U.S. ambassador to India George V. Allen. The United States Information Service circulated a press release in that country calling Brown “another milestone in the American Negro’s steady progress toward full equality as a citizen.” The international impact of Brown was followed closely by civil rights organizations. If civil rights advances aided U.S. foreign relations, then the NAACP could argue that its effort to change the nation’s racial practices were not un-American, but instead strengthened the country.

When American judges and legal scholars discuss the impact of American law around the world, they tend to focus on the question of whether other nations draw from the American model. In the story of Brown’s global impact, we can see another role of American law in the world. Rather than exporting American ideas to other nations for their benefit, the United States sought to spread the story of Brown to repair the American image, and to safeguard U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War. We may think that sending our legal ideas overseas helps others, but in this example American justice aided American diplomacy.

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Sources for quotes in this essay and more of this history can be found in Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), and Mary L. Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War Case,” 91 Journal of American History 32 (2004).

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