E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
The subtitles are a bit misleading. I’d forgone reading
Sabin’s book when it was first published because reviews led me to think that
he argued that public interest liberals made important contributions to the
general discrediting of “government” that’s happened in the United States over
the past fifty years. His argument and Berman’s are substantially more nuanced
than that. Both do argue, though, that some liberals – Naderites and critics of
bureaucratic capture by regulated industries for Sabin, centrist liberal
economists for Berman – put forth ideas about “government” and its regular ways
of functioning that contributed to some degree to the growth of skepticism
about the ability of “government” to do good things, a skepticism that ran much
deeper among conservatives and was exploited for political gain by Republicans
and big business interests.
In my view (no surprise here), I think their arguments could
have been strengthened by incorporating some insights from critical legal
studies. I had some strange feelings when reading Sabin. Yale Law School in the
late 1960s-early 1970s plays an important role in his story, and it’s
disconcerting to read about people I knew then as figures in a historical
narrative (though I suppose I’m used to it when reading intellectual histories
of legal thought during that period, where I am one of the historical actors).
I sort of expected to read a couple of pages about the contemporaneous
development of CLS at Yale, then came to understand that including CLS in the
narrative wasn’t appropriate for the story Sabin was telling. But, again, some
CLS insights – and in particular seeing why CLS-influenced folks put themselves
at some (sympathetic) distance from some aspects of public interest law – might
have enhanced Sabin’s story. As I’ll note, something similar is true about
Berman – though again I want to emphasize that I’m talking about deepening
narratives that aren’t seriously flawed in themselves.
For me at least, the CLS take on public interest law was “Go
for it, but don’t expect too much – and too many of you see public interest law
as a new technocratic solution to the ills of the contemporary political
economy.” At least part of the "go for it" came from the fact that I knew and sort of liked a fair number of the people who were working their way into the new field of public interest law (though I did find some others too careerist for my taste). Sabin does a very nice job of showing the deep technocratic
aspirations of the most fervent proponents of environmental and public-health
related public interest law. (Sabin notes the tension between movement
activists and the social-welfare dimensions of public interestlaw – here I’d observe that future federal
judge and CLS fellow-traveler Nancy Gertner’s student law journal note was on
challenges from the public interest legal community to the enforcement of
limits on social welfare benefits.). He might have referred to the criticism
from the left of the “new professional class” or the “professional-managerial
class,” which was part of the Marxist-influenced literature rattling around CLS
circles. Technocratic public interest law was, from that perspective, one route
into the existing corridors of power – an important aspiration for the
soon-to-be lawyers at Harvard and Yale.
(By the way, that aspiration, I think, is one reason for the
hostility, particularly at Yale, to CLS – we had no interest in becoming
“movers and shakers” while Yale Law’s professors thought that they and their
students should do exactly that. The story at Harvard’s more complicated and,
for me, intellectually more interesting, because, as Kennedy and Unger have
powerfully argued, CLS threatened not the careerist dimensions of law school
education but intellectual foundations that were more important to Harvard
Law’s identity than to Yale’s. One reason for the absence of a CLS perspective
in Sabin may be that, as his acknowledgements list shows, only one of the Yale
Law professors with whom he talked – Bob Gordon – had CLS ties, and I suspect Gordon
talked with Sabin primarily about the state of the profession in the relevant
period than about CLS ideas.)
So, with respect to Sabin, CLS-influenced ideas about class
and political power might have introduced even more nuance. For Berman, a
similar role might have been played by the critique of rights. She emphasizes
the disappearance, or at least eclipse, of rights-based claims about the
environment and workplace safety in liberal advocacy and their replacement by
efficiency-based arguments for policies in those areas. She doesn’t treat
rights- or equality-based argument as a panacea, and emphasizes that such
arguments tend to be more successful when associated with social and political
movements (and that the weakening of unions and the rise of checkbook environmental
groups meant that the rights-related arguments didn’t have such movement
associated with them).
The critique of rights saw, as Berman does, successful
rights-based challenges associated with social and political movements. It might
have contributed to Berman’s story a deeper skepticism about the ability of
rights-based arguments to form a stable basis for enduring victories (again,
unless supported by social and political movements). The transformation
(“weaponization”) of the First Amendment is well-known. Had public interest law
managed to constitutionalize economic rights, which was one component of the
overall agenda (mentioned by Sabin but not a focal point of his analysis – he
is after all mostly an environmental historian), we might have seen a similar
transformation (“markets are the best way to ensure the economic prosperity
that enables everyone, qua market participant, to secure the basic necessities
of life”).
Sam’s right that these two books really do help us
understand how we got to where we are. Having recently read and reflected upon
Joseph Fishkin and Willi Forbath’s book, I think that the “new political
economy” folks have a solid intellectual foundation for moving forward.
If only they were connected to some real social/political movement (and were more open about the contributions CLS made to their project)….