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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts The Better-Late-Than-Never Omnibus Appropriations Bill
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Thursday, March 10, 2022
The Better-Late-Than-Never Omnibus Appropriations Bill
David Super
In the wee hours
of March 9, congressional leaders filed the text of a bipartisan, bicameral agreement
on funding for the fiscal year that is now almost half-completed. This legislation contains both provisions of considerable
short-term importance and clues about significant changes in how Congress
operates. I will briefly summarize each. Although the vast
amount of public attention has focused on President Biden’s American Rescue
Plan Act and his pending Build Back Better reconciliation bill, his proposed
increases in domestic discretionary spending would have been almost as
transformational. This oversight results
from the tendency of scholars and advocates (myself included) to shy away from
annual appropriations legislation. The
appropriations process is relatively opaque and sometimes corrupt, it involves
vast numbers of programs that no one person can know at all well, it involves a
lot of crude rent-seeking, it is purportedly non-substantive (rules in both chambers
preclude changing programs’ terms through appropriations bills), and it is
nominally only for one year at a time. Those
of us that engage with fiscal affairs would much rather discuss permanent
changes in tax law or in major entitlement programs such as Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid. Even the Court sometimes
treats
appropriations acts as junior statutes. This neglect of
appropriations is a mistake. Many crucial
government functions cannot be organized into entitlements; many others could
be but are not because of the bad political odor attached to the term “entitlement.” Defense spending, which can easily crowd out
other priorities, comes in annual appropriations; so does most low-income
housing assistance, low-income child care subsidies, low-income energy
assistance, and so forth. The temporal
distinction is blurring, too. More and
more tax changes and direct spending (“entitlement”) program changes are not
permanent. Conversely, because more and
more appropriations come by way of continuing resolutions based on the prior
year’s appropriations level – or through omnibus agreements like this one
negotiated in the shadow of a possible continuing resolution – a single year’s
increase or decrease in spending for a discretionary program can transform that
program for years to come. The Congressional
Budget Act limits reconciliation treatment to revenue and “direct spending”
legislation so the discretionary funding that annual appropriations acts
provide is not eligible. As a result, moving
this package required ten Republican votes in the Senate. In prior years, Democrats might have tried to
work out a deal with a subset of Republicans – moderates or members of the
Appropriations Committee – sufficient to provide the necessary votes. Strong party discipline, and the disappearance
of moderates in the traditional sense, has ruled out that approach. This agreement therefore was made with the
Republican leadership, representing the whole of the Republican Caucus. The Republican Caucus is, to say the least,
unsupportive of President Biden’s agenda.
It extracted a high price for this agreement. President Biden’s
budget proposal would have provided a 15.5%
increase in funding for non-defense programs whose funding annual
appropriations bills controls. Similarly,
the House-passed appropriations bills would have increased those programs by
16%. These increases sought to make
up for some of the deterioration
in spending levels left by the across-the-board sequestration cuts congressional
Republicans forced on President Obama and austere appropriations ever
since. The final agreement apparently increases
these programs by 6.7%. This leaves important needs unaddressed, but
it is far better than the freeze
that would have resulted from a year-long continuing resolution that would have
funded programs in the absence of a deal.
Conversely, Republicans
insisted on substantially more for defense – a 5.6% increase – than the
President or Democrats would have preferred.
They spent the year insisting that defense spending increase in tandem
with non-defense appropriations; depending on how one measures, they either
achieved or fell slightly short of their goal of “parity.” The final agreement can be seen as balancing
Democrats’ desire for more non-defense spending with their aversion to the additional
defense spending that would have been required to secure Republican support for
more on the domestic side. Underscoring the
widespread understanding that appropriations bills have consequences for
spending levels far beyond the year they nominally cover, this package
segregated out two major categories of spending that are believed to be genuinely
short-term: aid to Ukraine and public
health spending to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Historically, supplemental appropriations
bills were passed months after the regular appropriations to address unforeseen
developments in the interim; this omnibus contained two supplemental
appropriations that supplement itself. Republicans
insisted that the supplemental appropriation for the coronavirus be offset with
reductions in other spending.
Congressional rules do not require such offsets – and nobody seriously
suggested that the Ukraine spending be offset despite it being functionally
indistinguishable from the coronavirus supplemental. What appropriations are and are not offset is
largely arbitrary at this point, but Republicans discerned that they had
political leverage to force spending cuts in the amount of the coronavirus
supplemental. When Democrats are in
power, Republicans demand offsets for spending on non-recurring emergencies to keep
overall appropriations levels unchanged.
(They paused this demand during the Trump Administration.) A significant quantity of substantively
meaningless “offsets” – money that can be formally rescinded but that would not
have been spent in any event – typically can be found, but this year
Republicans insisted that the offsets be real. Democratic leaders
concluded that rescinding unused state and local aid provided in last year’s
American Rescue Plan Act would be politically painless. They were wrong. Although partisanship has severely weakened
the once-mighty National Governors’ Association, the potential loss of $7
billion across thirty states roused it to action. Democratic leaders should have been able to
afford a fair number of defections from Members responding to their governors’
concerns, but apparently the Republican leadership refused to commit to
providing the votes needed to pass the package they had negotiated. Accordingly, after extensive delays,
Democratic leaders struck
both the coronavirus money and the offsets and passed the remainder of the
package. Part of the
Democratic leadership’s problem was a technical one: they were relying on the rigid measures the
Treasury has for when appropriated funds are legally obligated rather than a
more pragmatic understanding of when money has been committed in practice. The legislatures of several states had
finished enacting their budgets for the upcoming fiscal year in reliance on these
federal funds and would have had to have convened special sessions to slash
those budgets had the rescission been enacted.
Republican negotiators, most of whom had never liked the state and local
aid in the first place, cited Treasury’s listing of large “unobligated balances”
to argue that states are “drowning in money”, and Democratic negotiators failed
to look deeper. The other part of
the Democratic leadership’s problem was political: failing to understand how the Republican
Party has changed. Historically, when
the two parties reach agreement on contested legislation, each commits to
deliver the votes of a majority of its Members.
When Speaker John Boehner was unable to do that, Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi extracted substantial additional policy concessions in exchange for providing
most of the votes for must-pass legislation.
Here, not getting a commitment for Republican votes in the House put the
leadership at the mercy of their defectors.
The leadership could be forgiven for not seeing the need to do so as the
NGA in recent years often has been unwilling to defend states’ fiscal or
autonomy interests when doing so would interfere with national Republican
initiatives. Here, however, Republicans
apparently saw reducing state and local aid funds as a move they forced on
Democrats rather than their own initiative so Republican governors felt free to
green-light NGA’s protest. To accommodate
divisions within both caucuses, leaders brought the omnibus to the floor under
a special rule calling for separate votes on two halves of it – very roughly its
defense and non-defense parts – so that Members opposed to one half could
oppose it without sinking the entire package.
The rule provided that, if both components passed, they would be
combined automatically into a single engrossed bill sent to the Senate. As it happened, both components received overwhelming support once the state
and local funding cut was removed. This splitting
procedure, a variant of which Republicans also employed when they ran the
House, allows Members to obscure what they are doing by voting against provisions
they ensured would pass with a relatively opaque procedural one – to establish
the splitting procedure – that journalists and voters are unlikely to
understand. This is vaguely analogous to
a Supreme Court opinion
that commands different majorities for its various parts – but the justices do
not have to run for re-election. The omnibus legislation
now goes to the Senate, where it easily has the votes to pass. A handful of Republican senators will surely
oppose it for “spending too much” or conceding too much to the Democrats. If they so desire, Senate rules allow them to
slow it down for several days even though the bill has a super-majority sufficient
to end any filibuster. When Senator
McConnell publicly declared that quick passage was vital to helping Ukraine, he
signaled strong disapproval of such tactics (although a few Republican senators
often take pride in undermining him). More likely the
bill will be brought to the floor under a unanimous consent agreement crafted
by Leaders Schumer and McConnell that allows each side to offer a finite number
of amendments, with limited time for debating each. This agreement likely will specify that the
amendments fail unless they receive sixty votes. This procedure allows each side to force
senators of the other party to take politically difficult votes without any
risk that an amendment would be adopted that would destabilize the deal. It also allows up to nine senators to vote
against their party without doing any immediate damage. That is more than enough “free passes” to
cover potentially endangered incumbents in this year’s election. The path forward
for the coronavirus supplemental appropriations that were dropped from the
package is far from clear. Republicans may see little reason to agree to move it separately, even with this or
another offset, now that the omnibus is gone. Democrats could presumably
pass it
through the House without an offset, force Republicans to filibuster it in the Senate,
and hope that the impending exhaustion of important pharmaceuticals will
increase pressure on Republicans to make a new deal. By the time this happens, however, pipeline
issues may prevent prompt replenishment of those supplies. @DavidASuper1
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