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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Anti-system Politics and the Thin Constitution
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Thursday, March 10, 2022
Anti-system Politics and the Thin Constitution
Guest Blogger
For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021). Richard Bellamy Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric's new book provides
a welcome comparative perspective on the relations between populism and constitutionalism,
which adds some much needed nuance to the discussion of the links between the
two. I am broadly sympathetic to the direction of travel of their argument –
not surprisingly, as my own thinking on this topic has been to a significant
degree shaped by their work. However, I tend to approach this topic from the
perspective of political theory and comparative political science rather than
constitutional theory and comparative constitutional law, with my
constitutional thinking framed by the UK context rather than the US. These
differences of approach and context lead to certain differences of emphasis in
our views, which I will relate below to a stress on the political dimension of
constitutions and a preference for a political over a legal form of
constitutionalism. While these are small differences, I hope I can avoid being
too narcissistic about them in the manner that occasionally bedevils so much
academic and political debate. There are three main and related points I want
to make in this comment. The first is to emphasise a little more the economic and
political as well as the cultural drivers behind the different varieties of
populism they identify. As Tushnet and Bugaric remark, these drivers can
produce quite different forms of populism with regard to their ideology, policy
objectives and type of organisation. As a result, it is misleading to regard
populism as being by definition illiberal and anti-democratic. I agree. However,
a common feature of these various forms of populism is that they are
anti-system – that is anti the prevailing institutional forms of constitutional
democracy. How far that opposition can be justified depends on whether the
drivers are predominantly socio-cultural and illiberal or economic and social
democratic. This issue relates to the second point, and my most significant
difference with their analysis – their account of constitutionalism. Like
others looking at democratic backsliding, they adopt a minimal ‘thin’ definition
of constitutionalism. They contend this minimum reflects certain basic common
empirical features of a working constitutional democracy. As such, it offers a less
contentious and more neutral benchmark of constitutional propriety than one
informed by a given philosophical ‘regulative ideal’ of constitutionalism. I
doubt the normative and the empirical can be separated so easily. Moreover, the
claim of populists is that the existing mechanisms of constitutional democracy,
including those that form part of the minimum or thin constitution, serve
certain normative purposes and are unresponsive to others. For example, a
common objection among populists of left and right is that they serve a
neo-liberal economic agenda. That criticism requires a normative as well as an
empirical assessment. For example, it could be that a particular reasonable
iteration of the empirical ‘thin’ core nevertheless falls short with regard to realising
certain regulative ideals that could be legitimately associated with
constitutionalism. If so, that minimum may itself be part of the problem. Anti-system
politics may be justified if the system is deficient in its ability to secure
certain core constitutional values. The final point asks how, if the system is
broke, can it be fixed? As the authors note, there is a tradition of populist
democratic constitutionalism in the United States. But perhaps that is a
product of flaws in the US legal constitutional order, and other models – such
as the UK’s political constitution - might offer remedies that might avoid
certain problematic aspects of populism. In what follows, I shall develop each
of these points some more. Populism
as Anti-system Politics With regard to the nature of populism, Tushnet
and Bugaric rightly complain it tends to be portrayed as being ‘by definition
antithetical to constitutionalism’ (Tushnet and Bugaric 2022: 36). A number of
scholars are apt to describe populism in purely
conceptual terms (e.g. Müller 2016), as a defective form of democracy, without
reference to the particular social, economic and institutional drivers that might
promote it or variations in its ideological colouring. It is thereby portrayed
as an ever-present potential risk of mass politics that the constitutional
constraints placed on popular democracy exist to curtail. Yet, once populism
gets related to certain social and economic demands that the prevailing system
has failed to respond to that presentation becomes more problematic. If these
demands can be justified in terms of democratic norms, then the legitimacy of
certain constitutional mechanisms can themselves be called into question. As they report, political scientists are divided
as to whether populism is driven by a socio-cultural backlash (Norris and
Inglehart 2019) or an economic-political backlash (Hopkin 2020). The former certainly
characterises the rhetoric of right-wing populism, which supports a return to
traditional values, favours a patriarchal and even authoritarian social and
political order, and is hostile to immigration, feminism and minority and gay
rights. Populism of this hue is avowedly anti-liberal and anti-pluralist,
adopts an exclusionary, xenophobic, ethno-nationalist view of the genuine
‘people’, and vilifies liberalism as an elite doctrine that favours minority
groups that do not form part of the true ‘people’ of the nation. It appeals to
older, less educated sections of society, especially white males, in rural and
declining industrial areas. Yet, underlying this hostility to liberal cultural
values lies a suspicion of features of the market system that are held to have
promoted their diffusion – with industrial decline associated with a failure to
put national and community interests first, and to favour cheap foreign
manufacturing and immigrant labour over domestic industries and workers. As a
result, it embraces protectionist and mercantilist policies alleged to put the
nation and its people first. This latter economic component, albeit modulated
in somewhat different ways, plays a much more prominent role within the left-wing
populism favoured by younger, well educated, urban groups. They focus on
economic liberalism, the retrenchment of welfare and social spending, the lack
of investment in public services and infrastructure, and growing inequality.
They accuse the political elites of corruption and of being too closely tied to
global financial markets and multinational corporations. However, they combine this
critique of neo liberal economics with a social liberal attitude that is accepting
and even promotive of minority rights and favours redistribution, greater
inclusivity with regard to diversity, and a lessening of all forms of inequality. The
Thin Constitution as a Regulative Ideal What unites these two versions of populism is their
anti-system politics. In part, that involves a critique of the functioning of
the four components of ‘thin constitutionalism’ identified by Tushnet and
Bugaric: majority rule, entrenchment, judicial independence, and politicians
and political parties. All four elements can be regarded as operating in ways
that have given rise to populism. On the one hand, anti-system politics reflects
how the policy space between politicians and political parties of the centre
right and left have converged on a broader role for competitive markets,
including in what had hitherto been regarded as non-market institutions – such
as the police, prisons, public health services and education systems, and a
consequent narrowing of electoral choice.
These policies have also brought with them a disinclination to increase
progressive taxation to fund welfare measures, and growing income inequality. A
system of majority – or, in the UK and USA, plurality – rule may operate in
formal terms, but increasingly voters have become so disillusioned with
democratic politics that barely a majority of eligible voters tend to participate
in many elections (sometimes not even that). As a result, government policies
rarely command the support of a majority of the population. On the other hand,
these economic policies often get entrenched and further depoliticised by being
in part operated by non-majoritarian regulative bodies, such as Central Banks
and Courts. In the wake of the 2008
Eurocrisis, for example, there have even been moves to constitutionally
entrench commitments to keep national budgets balanced or in surplus (Bellamy
and Weale 2015). To the extent thin constitutionalism gets mobilised in ways
that might justify certain populist critiques of how the prevailing legal and
political system promotes a given economic agenda, then it forms part of the
problem rather than the solution. As a result, it becomes necessary to look at
how far it is inspired by a given ‘regulative ideal’. As Jeremy Waldron has
noted, constitutionalism is often deployed as the ideology of limited, as in
less or minimal, government (Waldron 2009). Even a thin constitutionalism can serve that goal.
Yet, in doing so it supports a core driver of populism: namely, a political
system in which governments of whatever party act, as Peter Mair (2013) put it,
responsibly with regard to the views and interests of the main financial and
economic institutions, rather than responsively to the interests and opinions
of the public. As such, it serves to undermine the accountability of
politicians to those they are supposed to serve. However, an alternative regulative ideal of
constitutionalism might be a view of non-arbitrary government. Here the goal is
not less government, understood in libertarian terms as involving less
interference with individual liberty, especially in the market, but rather of a
non-dominating government, that is one that treats citizens as deserving equal
concern and respect as autonomous agents (Pettit 2013). This goal need not
entail less government – it may well require more. The key will be whether this
more government can be justified to, and be influenced and controlled by,
citizens as serving their collective purposes. In this case, the assessment of
a given thin constitution will be how far it helps promote that process of
mutual justification and public equality. Varieties of
Populism and Constitutionalism As with definitions of populism, so with definitions of constitutionalism
the normative presuppositions underlying the advocacy of any given
constitutional arrangement - no matter how thin - need to be made clear. Would
the view of a constitution as providing for non-arbitrary rule be compatible
with either right-wing or left-wing populism? If the prevailing constitutional
institutions – be they thick or thin - serve to establish an arbitrary form of
limited government then, on this account, that would at least make populism an
understandable reaction, and point to the need for reform. Nevertheless, understanding
all, as the phrase goes, need not mean condoning all or even any of these
reactions. As democratic backsliding regimes from Trump to Orban reveal, right
wing populism can be exploited by leaders to establish arbitrary rule. As such,
populism of this kind would be anti-constitutional on this account, even if –
as the authors note – a feature of populism is that it often manages regime
change through processes consistent with a thin constitution. After all, they
win elections, pass constitutional amendments, appoint judges often all within
the strict terms of the prevailing constitution. Yet, the purpose of these
changes is to affect a shift from democratic to authoritarian rule. What about left-wing populism? Tushnet
and Bugaric have a certain sympathy for the US Populist Party of the nineteenth
century and the popular mobilisation orchestrated by F. D. Roosevelt to secure
the New Deal. The US also has a populist tradition of seeing ‘we the people’ as
exercising constitutive power (Kramer 2005). Moreover, Tushnet has elsewhere
advocated that progressives should be prepared to play constitutional hardball
to take back the constitution from an increasingly right-wing populist
Republican Party (Tushnet 2020). Consequently, the authors are well aware that
the legal constitution can be weaponised and used to secure the hegemony of a
party, even – or perhaps not least – when they are in danger of losing in
politics. However, it is precisely that possibility that
leads me to focus on the political constitution (Bellamy 2007). I have
suggested that it has been the breakdown of responsiveness in the political
system, often aided and abetted by a constitutional culture and arrangements
designed to limit government, that accounts for the recent rise of populism.
Where the action lies, therefore, is in unblocking the political channels to a
wider range of voices rather than capturing them anew for any one particular
group. For on the arbitrary government account, it is only by allowing
deliberation and contestation that arbitrariness can be overcome and equality
secured. As such, attention needs to be paid to such issues as electoral rules,
the devolving of power to different regions and municipalities, and the
institutionalising of political balancing mechanisms. Indeed, it is these
elements rather than courts, which are more easily captured, that have often
proved the basis of successful resistance to democratic backsliding regimes. Conclusion In sum, I have suggested where the tensions
between populism and constitutionalism lie is in the extent to which the former
has produced the latter by institutionalising a certain form of arbitrary rule
by what populists call elites – that of limited government. The solution,
though, cannot be to similarly arbitrarily institutionalise a regime devoted to
unlimited or extensive government through some form of progressive populism.
Rather, the reforms need to be guided by the appropriate regulative ideal and achieved
in a manner in conformity with it. Bellamy, R. (2007) Political Constitutionalism: A Republican
Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press Bellamy R and Weale A
(2015) ‘Political Legitimacy and European Monetary union: Contracts,
Constitutionalism and the Normative Logic of Two-level Games’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(2):
257–274. Hopkin, J. (2020) Anti-system Politics: The Crisis of Market
Liberalism in Rich Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press Kramer, L. (2005) The People Themselves: Judicial review and
Popular Constitutionalism, Oxford: Oxford
University Press Norris, P, and
Inglehart, R. (2019) Cultural Backlash:
Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press Mair, P. (2013) Ruling the Void, London: Verso Press Müller, Jan Werner
(2016) What is Populism?,
Philadephia: University of Philadelphia Press Pettit, P. (2013) On the People’s Terms: Republican Theory and
Model of Democracy,
Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press Tushnet, M. (2020)
Taking Back the Constitution, New
Haven: Yale University Press Tushnet, M.
and Bugaric, B. (2021) Power to the People, Oxford: Oxford
University Press Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’ in T. Christiano and J. Christman (eds), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley, 2009, ch. 15
Richard Bellamy is
Professor of Political Science and University College, London (UCL). You can
contact him at r.bellamy@ucl.ac.uk.
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