E-mail:
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Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
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Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Should religious people who
conscientiously object to facilitating same-sex weddings, and who therefore
decline to provide cakes, photography, or other services, be exempted from
antidiscrimination laws? Last September, in the Annual Law and Religion Lecture at
Brigham Young University School of Law, I analyzed a common response: the claim
that conservative condemnation of gay sex and marriage is as evil as racism,
and those who hold that view should likewise be disqualified from religious
accommodations. My talk, forthcoming in the BYU Law Review and just posted on SSRN,
disambiguates the racism analogy, which is actually several different
analogies. One might be comparing (1) their effects, (2) their moral errors,
(3) the evil intentions of those who hold them, or (4) their status as views
that are appropriately stigmatized. There are important differences. Religious
heterosexism is (5) generally nonviolent. And (6) unlike in 1964, when the
Civil Rights Act was passed, religious claims can be accommodated without
defeating the point of the law.
The law review is also publishing
responses to my talk.One of them, by
Lewis & Clark Law School Prof. James Oleske, is also now on SSRN, here.Prof. Oleske writes that “Koppelman has not correctly identified the
prevailing argument against religious exemptions in the commercial sphere.
Rather, he conflates two very different things: (1) the drawing of *legal*
analogies between the statutory treatment of race discrimination and other
types of discrimination, including religious discrimination, sex
discrimination, marital-status discrimination, and sexual-orientation
discrimination, and (2) an insistence on treating race discrimination and
sexual-orientation discrimination as *morally* and *sociologically* equivalent
in all respects. Number 1 is quite common in the scholarship arguing against
exemptions. Number 2 is not.”
Prof. Oleske, who has written first rate scholarship in this
area, is right that the two issues are distinct. The second is hardly uncommon,
as I show with numerous examples in the book from which the lecture is an
excerpt, Gay Rights
vs. Religious Liberty? The Unnecessary Conflict.(This blog recently ran a symposium on the
book.My response, with links to the critiques,
is here.)He offers two reasons for insisting on the
legal analogies: a slippery-slope argument that the wedding vendors’ claims are
“a key part of a larger strategy to resist the normalization of same-sex
marriage,” and a claim that, while religious nonprofits can be accommodated,
there is something distinctively problematic about allowing any for-profit
businesses to discriminate.
To the extent that the second claim is independent of the first,
it rests on the cultural significance of the businesses’ refusal, “the
importance of preventing the profound indignity of being turned away by
businesses otherwise open to members of the general public.”As I argue in the book, “Any legal resolution
of this contestation about meanings will impose an interpretation on some who
don’t perceive it.Sometimes that is
necessary, but there are costs.Drawing
an exceptionless line at public accommodations means that it is the Christian
wedding vendors who must acquiesce in their humiliation in face-to-face
encounters. . . . This controversy has made clear that some people perceive such
religious significance in their business activity that they are willing to
endure large pecuniary losses rather than do what they think is wrong.That real-world meaning should influence
where we draw the line.” (p. 62)
I appreciate Prof. Oleske’s thoughtful and probing
critique.He also points out that, over
the years, I’ve made some inconsistent proposals for addressing this
issue.It’s true.I’ve changed my mind a few times.These issues are hard, and I’m grateful for
friends like him who keep poking me to do better.