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Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
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Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
“Love the sinner, hate the sin.” Some on
the Christian Right might claim to take that injunction to heart when it comes
to us lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (or LGBT) persons. They
love us, but they hate what we may do. They say they won’t shun us simply
for having what some of them trivializingly dub “same-sex attractions,” or for
believing we have a gender identity different from what they take our sex to
be. But heaven forbid we should act on any of that, marrying our partners
or bringing our bodies or identity documents into better conformity with our
identities. We may think they’re thus trying to condemn us to lonely,
inauthentic lives. But they’d tell us that we’re mistaken, that true
nature and God’s plan for us require us to eschew sexual intimacy or daily
living in the forms we find natural, even if some of them may grudgingly concede
that we’re oriented toward those forms. “The lonely homosexual” is the
image that “reparative therapy” or other efforts to “cure” or condition gay
people not to act on our orientations hold out as a deterrent to people
embracing a gay identity and entering same-sex relationships. (See, for
example, David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion andthe Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1297, 1366 (1999), ).
That to some extent is also the message of many
actual or proposed exemptions from obligations of equal treatment expressly on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity or motivated by fear or
loathing of the prospect of law requiring equal treatment of LGBT people.
This may be particularly true where marriage for same-sex couples is at issue,
or even, as Doug NeJaime has persuasively argued in the California Law Review (MarriageInequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions and the Production ofSexual Orientation Discrimination, 100
Cal. L. Rev. 1169 (2012)), any
same-sex relationships. The law has often told lesbigay people that we
ought not couple, as Mary Anne Case showed almost twenty years ago in her
Virginia Law Review symposium article (Couples and Coupling in the PublicSphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights,
79 Va. L. Rev. 1643, 1644 (1993) ). Constitutional law used to see “no
connection” between on one hand the kinds of same-sex sexual activityproscribed
by Georgia
and on the other hand “family,” in the words of Bowers v. Hardwick.
Now, though, law is on many fronts increasingly
recognizing the fundamental equality of LGBT persons, our “common humanity” in
the words of the Vermont Supreme Court decision in Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), that led to adoption of the first “civil unions” law in the U.S. And so
now, people who want to be exempted from legal obligations to treat LGBT people
equally because of their religious beliefs in the immorality of what we do are
the ones telling us to lead lives we might view as lonely and inauthentic, and
they’re asking for legal sanction to do so. They might not have any
illusions that we will simply not celebrate our unions if they refuse to
photograph our ceremonies, but they would prefer that we not couple, and they
will turn away business so as to avoid complicity in what they see as our
sin. They claim a religious right to use their economic positions in our
common markets to discriminate against us. In so doing they would inflict
what the Alaska Supreme Court two decades ago recognized as a serious dignitary
injury. (Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d
274 (Alaska 1994), involved a landlord discriminating against unmarried
cohabitants.)
This is not different in kind from religiously motivated
(or justified) use of market power to reinforce normative views of women’s
roles as wives and mothers. Courts and to a large extent legislatures
rejected this view of the relationship between religious faith and market
participation then, and as a general matter I hope that they will do so
now. If there is a conflict between the full participation of LGBT people
in our society and the full participation of those who regard us and our lives
as sinful and would discriminate against us, the ones who would discriminate
should not as a general matter be privileged to make us bear the costs of their
discriminatory beliefs. When the coherence of sincerely held
religious beliefs is deemed irrelevant as under current free exercise of
religion law, there’s little to distinguish such exemptions predicated on LGBT
relationship activity from ones predicated against anyone who even
publicly embraces an LGBT identity, leaving equality of access only for the
heterosexually identified, for the silent “lonely homosexual,” for persons
willing to hide their gender identity. The religiously objecting
discriminator may be complicit in our supposed sin, or pursue other market
activities, but our law’s commitments to civil equality should not be
undermined with such exemptions.
David B. Cruz is Professor of Law at the University of
Southern CaliforniaGouldSchool
of Law. These are expressions of his views as a legal scholar and not
necessarily those of any organization or institution with which he is
affiliated. You can reach him by e-mail
at dcruz at law.usc.edu