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Can we really avoid conflict by avoiding
courts? In June 2010, as the Proposition 8 trial was wrapping up in a San
Francisco courtroom, the Federal District Judge, Vaughn Walker, put this
question to Ted Olson, who was about to make his closing argument on behalf of
the two same-sex couples seeking the right to marry:
“Isn’t
the danger . . . to the position that you are taking . . . not that you’re
going to lose this case, either here or at the Court of Appeals or at the
Supreme Court, but that you might win it? And, as in other areas where the
Supreme Court has ultimately constitutionalized something that touches upon
highly-sensitive social issues, and taken that issue out of the political realm,
that all that has happened is that the forces, the political forces that
otherwise have been frustrated, have been generated and built up this pressure,
and have, as in a subject matter that I’m sure you’re familiar with, plagued
our politics for 30 years – isn’t the same danger here with this issue?”
Ted
Olson replied: “I think the case that you’re referring to has to do with
abortion.”
“It
does, indeed, said the judge.
Running
through commentary on the cert grants in Perry
and Windsor are continual
references to Roe v. Wade. “Watch
out! Don’t go there! Look what happened 40 years ago when the Supreme Court
granted women the right to abortion.” The Roe-centered
backlash narrative, it seems,is the trump
card in many discussions of the marriage cases. But what do we mean by
“backlash” in the context of a Supreme Court decision? What might an accurate account of what occurred before and after Roe v. Wade actually have to impart? And
why should we care, on Roe’s 40th
anniversary, Lawrence’s 10th, and on the eve
of Perry and Windsor, about getting this story right? “Backlash,”
of course, is not limited to courts. A
December 26 front-page New York Times article
on the weakening Tea Party movement, for example, cites a former Republican
Party chairman in New Hampshire for the view that “a backlash against ‘tinfoil
hat’ issues pushed by the Tea Party-dominated legislature” there had led to the
loss of the Republican majority in one house and its near loss in the other.
This is conventional talk in politics.
But
the premise of the Roe backlash
narrative is that there is something distinctive about backlash when it comes
to courts, something about the judicial declaration of minority rights that
produces an especially virulent and polarizing reaction among losers who would
not respond in similar fashion to legislative defeat. On this view, court decisions that vindicate minority rights
or that pick winners of vigorously contested claims have the harmful effect of
shutting down ordinary politics and giving birth to a new, deformed politics: “Roe Rage,” as one of us has labeled it.
Winning, in other words, can be even worse than losing. The message is: minority
claimants should stay away from courts.
But
is that the right message?
With
specific respect to the role that Roe v.
Wade has come to play in the backlash narrative, we refer readers to the Yale Law Journalarticle we published in
2011, “Before (and After) Roe v. Wade:
New Questions About Backlash.” We have added the article as a new Afterword to
the second edition of our 2010 book, Before
Roe v. Wade: Voices That Shaped the
Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court’s Ruling.
In
this work, we ask what conflict over
abortion before Roe might teach about
the logic of conflict after Roe. Examining
the period before the Court ruled allows us to perform something of a “natural
science experiment”—to investigate what forces were capable of generating political
conflict over abortion, in the absence of judicial review. We found facts absent in most discussions of
“Roe” and “backlash.”
(1)
Before Roe, there was escalating conflict over
abortion, driven by social movements, religious institutions—and by political
parties.
(2)
Before Roe,
there was broad popular support for liberalization of abortion law. Polling on
the eve of the decision showed that substantial majorities of Americans favored decriminalizing abortion: more
Republicans than Democrats -- more than
two-thirds of self-identified Republicans and 56 percent of Catholics told Gallup
that “The decision to have an abortion should be made solely by a woman and her
physician.” (Three major surveys
conducted in the immediate aftermath of Roe
– Harris, Field, and NORC – all
showed that the decision did not reduce but rather consolidated these broad
levels of popular support.)
(3)
Before Roe,
despite broad popular support, liberalization of abortion law had all but come
to a halt in the face of concerted opposition by a Catholic-led minority. It
was, in other words, decidedly not the case that abortion reform was on an
inevitable march forward if only the Supreme Court had stayed its hand.
(4)
Before Roe, Catholic opposition to abortion
was amplified by the Republican Party as the Republicans began to employ
attacks on abortion to recruit Catholic voters who historically had voted with
the Democratic Party. Our article draws on evidence from the 1972 presidential
election to show how the Republican party used the abortion issue in the
service of party realignment in the period before Roe, and shows the expansion of this strategy during the 1980
election, in the creation of the coalition of conservative Catholics and
evangelical Protestants who helped vote Ronald Reagan into office.
(5)
After Roe: The entanglement of abortion in
party realignment explains how, over time, Republicans and Democrats came to
switch position on the abortion issue, leaders before base, and assume their
current polarized positions on abortion, an evolution that took nearly twenty
years after the Court handed down Roe.
Our paper argues that when you line up the evidence, political realignment
better explains the timing and shape of political polarization around abortion
than does a court-centered story of backlash.
Of course, judicial decisions, like Roe and Brown, provoke conflict. The
question is whether judicial decisions are likely to provoke more virulent
forms of political reaction than legislation that vindicates rights. There
was, is, and will be conflict over abortion, same-sex marriage, and indeed, the
very meaning of equality. When
minorities seek to unsettle the status quo and vindicate rights, whether in
legislatures, at the polls, or in the courts, there is likely to be conflict
and, if the claimants prevail, possibly backlash too. To the question of
whether one can avoid conflict over such issues by avoiding courts, the answer from
an accurate pre-history of Roe v. Wade
is no. The abortion conflict escalated before the Supreme Court ruled.
To the
question of whether one should avoid asserting
claims of right for fear of igniting conflict, the answer must be: it depends.
Bringing about change is hard work, including the hard work of deciding when,
costs and benefits considered (including norm and meaning creation), litigation
and/or legislation are worth pursuing in the first place. Even litigation losses
have produced gains for marriage equality, as Doug NeJaime and others have
shown us. In every case, a contextual judgment should drive the decision
whether to make rights claims—not the assumption that progressives will surely
get punished if they go to court seeking rights out of turn.
Linda Greenhouse is a Senior Research Scholar in Law, the Knight Distinguished Journalist in Residence and Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. You can reach her by e-mail at linda.greenhouse at yale.edu Reva B. Siegel is the Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law at Yale University. You can reach her by e-mail at reva.siegel at yale.edu