Managing religion from Beijing

Lauren Hilgers

After some time of living in China, I have still not made it to Tibet, but I have a clear picture of the place in my mind. Maybe it was the 'Save Tibet' concert I went to college, but the image (one that I think I share with many Americans) intertwine mountains landscapes with elaborate monasteries and serene, saffron-robed monks.

With reform and opening in China, the spread of religion became an accepted reality. China's deep suspicion of religious movements, however, with their ability to mobilize and influence Chinese citizens, remains. China’s solution has been to regulate all religious activity in the country, blending religious teachings with patriotic ones. In addition to local and provincial regulations, two important nationwide documents have been issued, the first, Document 19, outlines the general policy and attitude of the Chinese government toward religion. The concerns and history of that original document are well described in this post at Shanghai Scrap, a blog run by a friend of mine, Adam Minter, who is well-versed in China's religious policy.

The most recent, which went through a six-year drafting process, implemented nationwide regulations governing religion and religious organizations in 2005. These new regulations were heralded by party officials as a comprehensive framework for the practice of religion in China, protecting freedom of religion in the country. Much is left ambiguous in the regulations, however. “Normal” religious activities are permitted, for example, but no parameters are given for what “normal” might be. On the whole, the regulations continue a tradition of heavy government involvement.

Five religions are recognized in China: Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Islam and Protestantism. Under the 2005 regulations, religious organizations and congregations must register with the local Religious Affairs Bureau, and sites for religious activity must be pre-approved. Registered groups can own property, publish literature, collect donations and (with some supervision) train and approve clergy.

Unregistered or unrecognized groups are another matter and are unevenly restricted throughout the country. Some may have contacts in local government and avoid any trouble with the authorities. Others are deemed too disruptive and labeled “evil cults.” These include groups like Falun Gong and a fair number of Christian sects. (Two such groups, Eastern Lightning and Three Grades of Servants, made international news after a violent clash left a number of believers dead a few years ago.) According to China’s Criminal Law "cult" members found guilty of disrupting public order may be sentenced to 3 to 7 years in prison. Leaders and recruiters may be sentenced to 7 years or more.

To ensure clergy are as dedicated to the State as they are to their religion, theological education is also closely controlled. According to the 2005 regulations, anyone wishing to study must do so at a government-recognized training institution for clergy. Potential students must demonstrate "political reliability," and all graduates must pass an examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify for a position in the clergy. In Tibet, such an examination is reported to include a denunciation of the Dalai Lama.

In China's West, primarily Tibet and Xinjiang, the lines between religious fervor and secessionist leanings (or “splittism” as Chinese officials like to call it) can blur. As a result regulations in these regions have been drawn tighter. The Tibet Autonomous Region has its own set of strict implementation rules for the 2005 Religious Affairs Regulations. These implementation rules, valid as of January 2007, significantly tighten restrictions on the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. For example, nuns and monks may not travel across county lines without permission, and Tibetans may not begin religious training before reaching the age of eighteen.

From the rhetoric often heard from Zhang Qingli, the party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the tactic behind these tightened rules pits government directly against religion. "The Central Party Committee is the real Buddha for Tibetans," he said in a 2006 speech. In his earlier writings, Zhang also stated his goal is to ensure that “the constitution and laws enter the temple doors, the management systems and the minds of monks and nuns.” So far, those tactics have fallen flat.