Why the President Would Deny Our Troops the Resources They Need

Marty Lederman

The House and Senate conferees have agreed on a supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 1591, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007. The House voted for it yesterday (largely along partisan lines), and the Senate is expected to do likewise today. [UPDATE: The Senate has also approved the bill by a largely partisan vote.]

The President has already announced that he will veto it.

Why?

Because in addition to providing much more support and funding to the troops than the President himself proposed, the bill would also establish a presumption that redeployment of troops from Iraq is to begin by this July, if the Iraqis are not meeting the President's benchmarks, and if the President is unable to make the case to delay the beginning of redeployment to a later date.

Let's recap: In budget request after budget request over the past few years, the President has failed to ask Congress for resources sufficient to fund the Iraq War. (This has presumably been intentional; it allows the President to avoid publicly acknowledging the true cost of the war.) Therefore, it has been necessary for Congress repeatedly to enact supplemental appropriations bills to fund the war -- seven in total.

Congress is on the verge of passing the latest supplemental appropriations bill, which would provide $124.2 billion, primarily for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for improving the health care for returning soldiers and veterans, for continued Hurricane Katrina recovery for the Gulf Coast, to fill major gaps in homeland security, and to provide emergency drought relief for farmers.

The bill would give the armed forces, and returning veterans, more than what the President requested. Among other things, the bill would include a billion-dollar increase for the National Guard and Reserve equipment and $1.1 billion for military housing; $3 billion ($1.2 billion more than the President’s request) for the purchase of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (which can withstand roadside bombs); more than $5 billion to ensure that returning troops and veterans receive the health care that they have earned with their service; and $6.9 billion for the victims of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.

What's not to like?

Well, the bill would also require the Executive branch to begin (though not to complete) a redeployment of troops from Iraq -- and the President has concluded that such a directive warrants his veto, notwithstanding the bill's generous funding of the troops, veterans and flood victims.

As usual, the nation's media have written countless stories about the public debate on this bill without providing ready access to the actual statutory language at the heart of the dispute. So, for the convenience of the handful of readers who actually care about such things as what a proposed statute would actually do, we provide the relevant statutory language below.

Sections 1901 through 1903 would ensure adequate rest between tours of duty of both active duty and Guard and Reserve forces, while also requiring that their service in Iraq not be extended beyond a year for any tour of duty. But those requirements would be subject to Presidential waiver, and so they are not the source of the President's principal objections.

The crux of the dispute is section 1904, particularly subsections (a)-(e), which would provide as follows:

SEC.1904. (a) The President shall make and transmit to Congress the following determinations, along with reports in classified and unclassified form detailing the basis for each determination, on or before July 1, 2007:

(1) whether the Government of Iraq has given United States Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, and is making substantial progress in delivering necessary Iraqi Security Forces for Baghdad and protecting such Forces from political interference; intensifying efforts to build balanced security forces throughout Iraq that provide even-handed security for all Iraqis; ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces; eliminating militia control of local security; establishing a strong militia disarmament program; ensuring fair and just enforcement of laws; establishing political, media, economic, and service committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and eradicating safe havens;

(2) whether the Government of Iraq is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue reconciliation initiatives, including enactment of a hydro-carbon law; adoption of legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections; reform of current laws governing the de-Baathification process; amendment of the Constitution of Iraq; and allocation of Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects;

(3) whether the Government of Iraq and United States Armed Forces are making substantial progress in reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq; and

(4) whether the Government of Iraq is ensuring the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Parliament are protected.

(b) If the President fails to make any of the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.

(c) If the President makes the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq not later than October 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made
available in this or any other Act are immediately available for obligation and expenditure to plan and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq, as specified in subsections (b) and (c).

(e) After the conclusion of the redeployment specified in subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary of Defense may not deploy or maintain members of the Armed Forces in Iraq for any purpose other than the following:

(1) Protecting American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including members of the U.S. armed forces;

(2) Serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions;

(3) Engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach; and

(4) Training and equipping members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Thus, President Bush would be required to certify whether the Iraqi government is meeting the diplomatic and security benchmarks that he himself has prominently insisted upon. If he certifies that all the benchmarks are being met, the Secretary must begin to redeploy the troops from Iraq no later than October 1st of this year; and if -- as is more likely the case -- the President does not certify that each of the benchmarks is being been met, then the Secretary must begin to redeploy the troops no later than July 1st.

But in either case, there is no directive about how the troops shall be redployed, the rate at which they shall be redeployed, or by when the troops must be completely redeployed. The statute would only require that the Secretary of Defense have the "goal" of completing redeployment within 180 days after it begins, which is most likely by December 28th. And the bill specifically provides that there is no funding limit at all for the contemplated "safe and orderly" redeployment: "[F]unds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act are immediately available for obligation and expenditure to plan and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq, as specified in subsections (b) and (c)."

If and only when the Secretary actually concludes the redeployment -- which, again, is not statutorily mandated -- the bill would also limit any subsequent use of the Armed Forces in Iraq to four identified functions:

(i) Protecting American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including members of the U.S. armed forces;

(ii) Serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions;

(iii) Engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach; and

(iv) Training and equipping members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Another way of putting it is that the redeployment described in the bill would not in the first instance necessarily include redeployment of troops performing these four functions.

The President has identified three reasons for vetoing the bill. At least one of them is a makeweight: that the bill "includes huge amounts of domestic spending that has no place in an emergency war funding bill," and "[w]e should debate those provisions on their own merits, during the normal process." Presumably -- one hopes -- the President would not deny the troops the necessary funding simply because the bill includes some domesitc funding as well. (Note that even on the President's view, the bill "does remove some of the most egregious pork barrel projects that Democratic leaders had inserted in earlier bills.")

The President also complains that:

[T]he Democratic leadership's proposal is aimed at restricting the ability of our generals to direct the fight in Iraq. They've imposed legislative mandates, they passed legislative mandates telling them which enemies they can engage and which they cannot. That means our commanders in the middle of a combat zone would have to take fighting directions from legislators 6,000 miles away on Capitol Hill. The result would be a marked advantage for our enemies and a greater danger for our troops.

Presumably here the President is referring to subsection 1904(e), which would limit the functions of U.S. forces in Iraq to the four specified functions if and when the Secretary actually completes the redeployment. And one of those permitted residual functions would be to "engag[e] in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach" -- hardly an unreasonable limitation after redeployment has been completed, and a far cry from "tak[ing] fighting directions from legislators 6,000 miles away on Capitol Hill."

Thus, it's hard to take this objection seriously, either.

Which leaves the principal objection, the one that is presumably the real source of the veto:

[The bill] would mandate the withdrawal of American troops beginning as early as July 1st of this year, and no later than October 1st of this year, despite the fact that General Petraeus has not yet received all the reinforcements he needs. It makes no sense to tell the enemy when you start to plan withdrawing. If we were to do so, the enemy would simply mark their calendars and begin plotting how to take over a country when we leave. . . . Precipitous withdrawal from Iraq is not a plan to bring peace to the region or to make our people safer at home. Instead, it would embolden our enemies and confirm their belief that America is weak. It could unleash chaos in Iraq that could spread across the entire region. It would be an invitation to the enemy to attack America and our friends around the world. And, ultimately, a precipitous withdrawal would increase the probability that American troops would one day have to return to Iraq and confront an enemy that's even more dangerous.

Note again that the President raises these objections even though the bill would not direct how or at what rate the troops would be redployed, nor the final date by which they must be completely redeployed. Moreover, the deadline for commencing redeployment is not, of course, carved in stone: If July 1st is fast approaching and the President can convince the American public that there is a serious national security need to postpone the beginning of the redeployment, Congress could enact a further statute delaying the modest mandate.

In other words, and just so we're clear: The President will veto this bill -- which provides the troops, and returning veterans, with much greater funding and support than the President himself proposed -- simply because the bill would also, quite modestly, establish a presumption that redeployment is to begin by this July, if the Iraqis are not meeting the President's benchmarks, and if the President is unable to make the case to delay the beginning of redeployment to a later date.

And yet the President accuses the Democratic leaders of "[choosing] to further delay funding our troops." Nothing could be further from the truth.

* * * *

The Key Compromise Language in H.R. 1591:

SEC. 1901. (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that units should not be deployed for combat unless they are rated "fully mission capable".

(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be used to deploy any unit of the Armed Forces to Iraq unless the chief of the military department concerned has certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services at least 15 days in advance of the deployment that the unit is fully mission capable.

(c) For purposes of subsection (b), the term "fully mission capable" means capable of performing assigned mission essential tasks to prescribed standards under the conditions expected in the theater of operations, consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Defense readiness reporting system.

(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services that the deployment to Iraq of a unit that is not assessed fully mission capable is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the particular reason or reasons why the unit’s deployment is necessary despite the chief of the military department’s assessment that the unit is not fully mission capable, may waive the limitation prescribed in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.


SEC. 1902. (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard units should not be deployed for combat beyond 365 days or that Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve units should not be deployed for combat beyond 210 days.

(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to initiate the development of, continue the development of, or execute any order that has the effect of extending the deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom of—

(1) any unit of the Army, Army Reserve or Army National Guard beyond 365 days; or

(2) any unit of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve beyond 210 days.

(c) The limitation prescribed in subsection (b) shall not be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total United States force levels in Iraq prior to January 10, 2007.

(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services that the extension of a unit’s deployment in Iraq beyond the periods specified in subsection (b) is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the particular reason or reasons why the unit’s extended deployment is necessary, may waive the limitations prescribed in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.


SEC. 1903. (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard units should not be redeployed for combat if the unit has been deployed within the previous 365 consecutive days or that Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve units should not be redeployed for combat if the unit has been deployed within the previous 210 days.

(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to initiate the development of, continue the development of, or execute any order that has the effect of deploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom of—

(1) any unit of the Army, Army Reserve or Army National Guard if such unit has been deployed within the previous 365 consecutive days; or

(2) any unit of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve if such unit has been deployed within the previous 210 consecutive days.

(c) The limitation prescribed in subsection (b) shall not be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total United States force levels in Iraq prior to January 10, 2007.

(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services that the redeployment of a unit to Iraq in advance of the periods specified in subsection (b) is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the particular reason or reasons why the unit’s redeployment is necessary, may waive the limitations prescribed in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.

SEC.1904. (a) The President shall make and transmit to Congress the following determinations, along with reports in classified and unclassified form detailing the basis for each determination, on or before July 1, 2007:

(1) whether the Government of Iraq has given United States Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, and is making substantial progress in delivering necessary Iraqi Security Forces for Baghdad and protecting such Forces from political interference; intensifying efforts to build balanced security forces throughout Iraq that provide even-handed security for all Iraqis; ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces; eliminating militia control of local security; establishing a strong militia disarmament program; ensuring fair and just enforcement of laws; establishing political, media, economic, and service committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and eradicating safe havens;

(2) whether the Government of Iraq is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue reconciliation initiatives, including enactment of a hydro-carbon law; adoption of legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections; reform of current laws governing the de-Baathification process; amendment of the Constitution of Iraq; and allocation of Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects;

(3) whether the Government of Iraq and United States Armed Forces are making substantial progress in reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq; and

(4) whether the Government of Iraq is ensuring the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Parliament are protected.

(b) If the President fails to make any of the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.

(c) If the President makes the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq not later than October 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made
available in this or any other Act are immediately available for obligation and expenditure to plan and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq, as specified in subsections (b) and (c).

(e) After the conclusion of the redeployment specified in subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary of Defense may not deploy or maintain members of the Armed Forces in Iraq for any purpose other than the following:

(1) Protecting American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including members of the U.S. armed forces;

(2) Serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions;

(3) Engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach; and

(4) Training and equipping members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 50 percent of the funds appropriated by title I of this Act for assistance to Iraq under each of the headings "Economic Support Fund" and "International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement" shall be withheld from obligation until the President has made a certification to Congress that the Government of Iraq has enacted a broadly accepted hydro-carbon law that equitably shares oil revenues among all Iraqis; adopted legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections, taken steps to implement such legislation, and set a schedule to conduct provincial and local elections; reformed current laws governing the de-Baathification process to allow for more equitable treatment of individuals affected by such laws; amended the Constitution of Iraq consistent with the principles contained in Article 137 of such constitution; and allocated and begun expenditure of $10,000,000,000 in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

(g) The requirement to withhold funds from obligation pursuant to subsection (f) shall not apply with respect to funds made available under the heading "Economic Support Fund" for continued support for the Community Action Program and Community Stabilization Program in Iraq administered by the United States Agency for International Development or for programs and activities to promote democracy in Iraq.

(h) Beginning on September 1, 2007, and every 60 days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National Forces—Iraq and the United States Ambassador to Iraq shall jointly submit to Congress a report describing and assessing in detail the current progress being made by the Government of Iraq regarding the criteria set forth in subsection
(a).

Posted 4:20 AM by Marty Lederman [link]