In March, I'll give a lecture at Villanova on "The Real Unitary Executive Problem." My argument will be that the Framers erred by creating a president who is both the head of state and head of government. America managed this problem fairly well through a series of norms and fictions that lasted until the end of the Cold War. Today, though, the original misunderstanding about executive power is doing significant harm.                                                                                     Most constitutional democracies reject the Framers' model. They instead have a ceremonial head of state (a monarch or a president) and a functional head of government (a prime minister). There are many advantages to this executive organization, but for now I want to concentrate on why the Framers failed to grasp this point.                                                                                             Federalist #70 contains Hamilton's argument for a single executive. He contrasted that model with two alternatives drawn from classical history and state practice. One involved "two or more executives of equal dignity." The other involving requiring a council (say, a formal Cabinet) to sign off on the decisions of a single leader. Neither of these frameworks, of course, describes the modern practice of having two unequal executives (one ceremonial and one functional).                    Hamilton acknowledged that Britain's executive authority was a third alternative. He argued, though, that the division between the Crown and the Cabinet was necessary because "it is a maxim, which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his actions, and his person is sacred." "But in a republic," he wrote, "where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British constitution dictates the the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but against the institution."                 Hamilton was simply wrong here. Executive bicameralism divided along a formal/ functional line can be justified without reference to accountability. It is true that there was no theory on that point until Walter Bagehot wrote The English Constitution in the 1860s. But the Framers did have the example of George Washington, who very much played a ceremonial role at the Constitutional Convention as the presiding officer.                                                                                                         Part of the reason the Framers failed to understand the importance of separating (in Churchill's phrase) "pomp from power" is that they did not anticipate parties. Once parties emerged, though, there were practical efforts to do just that. They worked for a while but no longer do. I'll discuss that in a subsequent post.