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Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
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Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
This essay uses the theories developed in my my 2020 book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, to explain the current moment in American democracy (the fall of 2026).
The United States is living through a constitutional interregnum: the Reagan regime has exhausted itself, but no successor has yet emerged. The country is experiencing “regime suspension,” in which the two major parties possess different but incomplete resources for political reconstruction. Republicans have a powerful movement infrastructure but no demonstrated durable national majority. Democrats remain electorally competitive but are still primarily a coalition of interest groups and lack a comparably coherent social movement capable of organizing a new constitutional regime.
The situation is made worse by severe polarization and constitutional rot—the process by which a republic becomes less democratic, less responsive to popular will, and less oriented toward the public good. Donald Trump has attempted to compensate for the political resources he lacks through a strategy of “reconstruction through corruption”: expanding presidential power, installing loyalists and sycophants, weakening institutions, selectively enforcing the law, intimidating opponents, rewarding cronies, and converting public authority into an instrument of personal and oligarchical power.
The Roberts Court has repeatedly facilitated Trump’s efforts. That is not because the Court actively supports Trump, but because the Court’s conservative majority is realizing long-standing conservative legal commitments to increasing presidential power, deregulating campaign finance, weakening voting-rights protections, narrowing anti-corruption laws, and defanging the administrative state. These ideological projects, combined with the Court’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Trump, have created an opportunity structure for executive aggrandizement.
Constitutional rot creates a widening gap between constitutional institutions and the constitutional values these institutions were designed to serve. The essay explains how polarization makes rot difficult to remedy, and why advanced rot makes constitutional crises more thinkable and more likely.
The essay identifies several possible directions the constitutional system could take: a new Republican or Democratic led regime, a prolonged period of preemptive politics, competitive authoritarianism, constitutional breakdown, or the development of anti-corruption reform movements in both parties, as occurred during the Progressive Era. The most plausible democratic path resembles the Progressive Era: state and local experimentation, cross-party reform coalitions, institutional rebuilding, and a shift from culture-war issues toward questions of affordability, wealth inequality, concentrated economic power, industrial policy, and class. Renewal remains possible, but it is neither guaranteed nor imminent; it requires sustained mobilization, constitutional and institutional reform, protection of vulnerable groups, and a long time horizon. It took many decades for constitutional rot to develop in the United States. Freeing ourselves from it may take many more.