The Power of the Purse II: Shifts in Power within Congress

David Super

     Over the decades, the major institutions of our federal government have adapted to their assigned roles.  When those roles undergo a dramatic change, as they are in the second Trump Administration, their internal structures must adapt.  The changes may seem subtle, but new institutional habits can prove far more durable than most specific policy choices.  And in each case, these internal changes are moving us toward a more belligerent and less functional government. 

     My previous post showed how President Trump has wrested increasing parts of the Power of the Purse from Congress.  I promised a follow-up post considering how that transformation is rewiring each of the three branches of the federal government and federal-state interactions.  These are complex issues, and in the interests of readability, I am dividing this discussion into four distinct posts, beginning today with Congress. 

     Congress is the biggest loser in the current realignment.  President Trump’s approach here differs fundamentally from those of his predecessors.  President Ronald Reagan never had formal control over the House of Representatives, but during his first two years in office he leveraged his immense personal popularity with voters to dominate the House and guard against any open defiance in the Republican-led Senate.  He therefore did not so much seize Congress’s prerogatives as he bent Congress to his will while preserving its structure.  He wisely looked the other way when Members of Congress quietly jettisoned his most radical proposals while remaining true to his broad vision.  Republican Senator Bob Dole’s rebellion to save the Food Stamp Program is perhaps the most remarkable example of this.

     Republicans controlled Congress for most of George W. Bush’s presidency, allowing him to achieve his policy goals within the existing structure as well.  Like President Reagan, he set broad policy ends but generally respected Congress’s prerogative to craft the means.  During his first term, President Trump followed this model only for his 2017 tax cut legislation – which also proved to be one of his few legislative accomplishments. 

     Presidents Bill Clinton and Joe Biden tried to micro-manage Congress during their first two years, failed on many of their most important fiscal priorities, and lost control of Congress for the remainder of their presidencies.  President Barack Obama proved far more successful adhering to the Reagan-Bush model of broad goal-setting with deference to Congress on the details. 

     Republican control of Congress, and the relatively pliant Republican leaders of both chambers, likely would have allowed President Trump to achieve sweeping conservative policy successes through conventional means.  And, to be sure, his One Big Beautiful Bill Act made radical changes to a degree that his predecessors of both parties could only dream about. 

     But President Trump has been less interested in persuading Congress to enact his program than he has in stripping Congress of its powers.  This likely reflects in part his dislike for the cajoling and negotiating that prior presidents accepted as a part of the job.  (Perhaps he ought to read The Art of the Deal?)  At least as important, Russell Vought, his Director of the Office Management and Budget (OMB), brought a strong desire to expand executive power and allied with other exponents of executive unilateralism such as Elon Musk.  In less than a year and a half, President Trump and Director Vought have already arrogated much of Congress’s traditional power and driven structural transformations within Congress. 

     The biggest internal change Congress has experienced is the marginalization of the Appropriations Committees.  This change may sound technical, but it is profound.  Historically, the division within Congress between authorizers (those sitting on substantive committees other than Appropriations) and appropriators has been arguably as sharp as that between the two parties or between the House and the Senate. 

     As a lobbyist, I worked comfortably with both Democrats and Republicans, establishing numerous trusting relationships on both sides of the aisle and in both chambers.  But these relationships were all with authorizers, Members and staff from committees such as Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Finance, Agriculture, Education and Labor, and Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.  I went to the Appropriations Committees because my work required it, but I never felt comfortable there.  I never had any confidence that Members or staff of either party were being candid with me.  They had their own retinue of repeat-player lobbyists.  As was I most definitely not among them I was kept at arm’s length by Democrats as much as by Republicans. 

     Appropriators differ from their colleagues in several key ways.  Because they alone have to produce at least twelve pieces of legislation every year, and because the filibuster effectively requires that legislation to be bipartisan, appropriators are Congress’s most instinctive and experienced negotiators.  Extreme Members of each party serve on the Appropriations Committees, but they have to temper their ideologies to get anything done.  In addition, because appropriators are commonly trying to bring projects back to their states, they are quite vulnerable to retaliation.  They thus have strong incentives not to infuriate Members of the opposing party – an impulse that can infuriate Members of their own party.  Thus, in an increasingly ugly political system, appropriators’ institutional roles compel them to preserve civility, cooperation, and a focus on making government work.  Say what you will about “the Swamp”, but swamps are ecosystems.  We can fantasize about how a lovely temperate forest might be, but until that appears appropriators keep the swamp functioning and carry away toxins that could lead the whole system to crash. 

     Appropriators’ jurisdiction has eroded somewhat over the years.  Converting programs from discretionary to entitlement funding transfers most control from appropriators to authorizers.  The Affordable Care Act included large amounts for program administration so that Republicans could not strangle the program in its infancy if they took control of Congress.  Traditionally funding the federal government’s operations is a central function of appropriations. 

     President Trump, however, has shredded appropriators’ powers.  In March 2025 he signed a full-year appropriations bill written by Republican appropriators and then promptly impounded large amounts for programs he disliked. 

     President Trump also rejected the appropriators’ designation of much of that spending as meeting emergencies, which had the effect of erasing that funding.  This was perfectly legal but deeply humiliating for Republican appropriators as it abrogated a bipartisan deal going back several years. 

     A time-honored political script calls for a menacing outsider to threaten a beloved local program only to back down when the state’s valiant appropriator rides to the rescue.  Rural Republican appropriators thought they were being given such an opportunity to prove their worth to hometown voters when President Trump proposed rescinding the appropriations that sustain their local public broadcasters.  Under the illusion that they still mattered, the appropriators denounced the cuts, expecting that the President would play his designated role in the skit.  Instead, the President stood firm and humiliated the appropriators by forcing them to vote for the cuts that they had just said would be ruinous for their states. 

     President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act, enacted through reconciliation procedures that eliminate the need for bipartisanship, included operating funds for federal immigration agencies and aid for state and local governments that cooperate with these agencies – all traditional appropriations functions.  The new reconciliation bill pending in the Senate would further displace the Appropriations Committees’ jurisdiction, cutting them out of funding the operating costs of large, important federal agencies for years to come.  Few obvious limits prevent this mechanism from gobbling up vast swaths of the Appropriations Committees’ jurisdictions.

     Had any Members been foolish enough to attempt something like this under virtually any prior Appropriations Chair, appropriators on a bipartisan, bicameral basis would have devastated funding for activities in the offending Members’ districts.  Were Administration officials implicated, they could expect a $1 appropriation for their salaries the next year. 

     Today, however, Republican appropriators have sat by meekly as the institution they have worked so hard to lead is humbled.  Senate Appropriations Chair Susan Collins is facing a difficult re-election fight in which she dares not offend the President lest she dampen MAGA true believers’ enthusiasm.  No doubt she is concerned.  And Representative Tom Cole became a long-time member of House Republican leadership, and then House Appropriations Chair, by demonstrating loyalty to his party not by defending any committee’s prerogatives.  Democratic appropriators remain more committed to the institution – to the occasional irritation of their party leadership – but one can readily imagine Democrats using budget reconciliation to lock in funding for numerous liberal priorities next time they control the White House and both chambers of Congress. 

     A country whose electorate is split almost precisely down the middle has a dire need for bipartisan negotiation and compromise.  Negotiations are already extremely difficult with ignorant but loud voices in each party’s base screaming “betrayal” at even the most inevitable concessions.  Gutting the Appropriations Committees’ roles will only make that worse.  Reconciliation bills can establish programs with opulent funding when one party holds a federal trifecta (control of the House, the Senate, and the White House) only to be destroyed – before the programs have an opportunity to show their worth – as soon as the other party seizes control.  And all the while, the anger mounts.  Democratic governance will not be sustainable if this persists.

     @DavidASuper1 @DavidASuper.bsky.social