Why a President Might Decline to Appeal

Andrew Coan

Historically, the federal government has enjoyed extraordinary success when it appeals adverse district court decisions, with a win rate often exceeding seventy percent. Yet for a President pursuing an aggressive and legally contested policy agenda, refusing to appeal while resisting compliance—what I have called “the appellate void” strategy—can offer distinct strategic benefits. Recent calls by influential MAGA personalities to ignore federal court orders have given this possibility renewed salience.

The most significant benefit of the strategy is political rather than legal. By refusing to appeal, the executive branch would strand a dispute in district court, denying higher courts any practical vehicle to intervene. Confronting a single, unknown district judge, rather than the Supreme Court, fundamentally changes the optics of interbranch conflict. The American public knows the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. When a President defies the Supreme Court, he challenges the public embodiment of constitutional law itself. To a large and bipartisan majority of the public, such confrontation is likely to be profoundly unsettling.

Beyond political optics, the appellate void strategy avoids the risk of creating adverse nationwide precedent. A single district court decision binds no other court. By contrast, a district court decision affirmed by the Supreme Court becomes the supreme law of the land. For an administration advancing legally dubious policies, the risk of transforming one district judge's opinion into nationwide precedent may exceed the benefit of possible reversal on appeal.

Ultimately, the strategy serves a broader purpose: normalizing executive refusal to accept judicially enforced legal constraints. Each instance of successful defiance or circumvention of a district court order is likely to make the next act of defiance easier, especially if the administration pays little or no political price.

For a fuller explanation, you can read my new paper on the appellate void here.