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Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
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Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
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Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
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David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
In
Brewster’s Millions, a thoroughly forgettable 1980s comedy based on a
1902 novel by George Barr McCutcheon, a man comes suddenly and surprisingly
into world-altering wealth via an inheritance and must quickly decide how to
spend it. The conceit of the film is that if Brewster spends the money in full,
he gets ten times as much, and if he doesn’t, he gets nothing. Hilarity ensues.
Or at least, it was meant to. The biggest problem with Brewster’s Millions
is that, despite having Richard Pryor and John Candy as its comedic leads, it isn’t
very funny.
Spending
vast sums of money turns out to be rather serious business, as John Fabian
Witt’s splendid book, The Radical Fund, makes pellucid. Witt’s subject
is Charles Garland, who receives a roughly $1 million inheritance—the same
amount as McCutcheon’s Brewster—that he initially refuses in indignant protest
of unearned wealth in a world of vast inequity. He is eventually persuaded, by
Upton Sinclair no less, that he should accept the money but give it away. His
charitable efforts turn into the American Fund for Public Service, which spends
down the money and its investment earnings in the roughly two-decade period
between the World Wars.
The
trick for the Fund was to spend the money not just fully, but wisely. Garland
was a lefty—the old kind—as was ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin, whom Garland
tapped to direct the fund. In telling the story of the applicants vying for American
Fund largesse, rivalries within the Fund’s board of directors, and competing
philanthropic philosophies, Witt takes readers on a lush journey through the strategic
challenges around confronting labor exploitation and racial discrimination, two
of the most trenchant social problems of twentieth-century United States, with
a million dollars and a dream.
Though
Witt doesn’t quite put it this way, The Radical Fund at times reads as a
book about how to pursue social change within a failing state—or, more
optimistically, one that has not yet been fully realized. The challenge of
building out industrial democracy in the first half of the twentieth century was
that workers had lost control of their lives and livelihoods through factory
work and, eventually, failing farm prices, and had no effective political
recourse. The government was structured to protect narrowly conceived property
and contractual rights, and courts understood those rights to be
constitutionally entrenched (by a constitution written in an era in which
non-property owners were largely excluded from electoral politics).The even more daunting challenge of
combatting Jim Crow was that white supremacist planters controlled the
Democratic Party and traded political favors for non-interference with a system
of race-based feudalism and caste-like social privilege.
Economic
power through unelected plutocrats competes quite openly with political power
in this anemic environment, which partly explains Garland’s personal discomfort
with his role. The recurring question for reformers is whether to pursue social
change through corrupted existing institutions or whether to try, at great
risk, to build new ones. In Witt’s telling, many of the much larger charitable
funds, such as Rockefeller’s and Carnegie’s, opted for the former strategy, as
their benefactors benefited from those existing structures. The American Fund’s
directors were attracted to the latter, more disruptive strategy, but found
that the choice is not quite as binary as it may seem to some.
This dilemma plays
out in TheRadical Fund in the sequelae of the classic debate
between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois over how much to compromise
with segregation in order to achieve black emancipation. James Weldon Johnson,
the Board’s lone black director, toggled between these camps over the course of
his own life. It plays out in the labor strategies of institutionalists like
Sidney Hillman versus radical socialists such as Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. It
plays out in the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s strategies for improving black
education, whether it’s via cases seeking to improve the resources given to
black schools and teachers or attacking segregation itself more directly. Refusing
to attend to the economic circumstances of, say, teachers who will lose their
jobs in a unitary school system, in order to achieve loftier, longer-term,
speculative goals is hard—and not necessarily right—when there are real people standing
before you holding out their hats. But can you reform an utterly compromised
politics by relying on its own rotten infrastructure?
It is impossible
to read Witt’s book without asking the same question about today’s U.S. politics.
(Witt doesn’t shy away from infusing those notes throughout the text.) It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Trump Administration is attempting
to induce a militarized but ultimately failed federal state, one able to
inflict violence sufficient to keep the governing regime in power but lacking
the capacity to address genuine social problems. It has shuttered federal agencies
addressing public health and education, has defunded scientific and medical
research, has sought to coerce academic institutions into banal conformity with
its ideology, and has pursued massive tax cuts for the wealthy at the expense
of the social needs of the most vulnerable Americans. In deciding whether and
how to participate in funding the government under these circumstances,
Democrats in Congress face their own version of the American Fund’s dilemma.
A predictable
consequence of the Administration’s agenda is to create opportunities for other
sources of economic power. (This is, no doubt, part of the Administration’s
goal, so long as it controls or is in league with those sources.) How should
that power be exercised? The Fund had its successes and failures, but a theme
of its most successful projects is that, rather than focusing on individual
needs or vanity projects, they catalyzed organizational capacity, such as by
educating union organizers at places like Brookwood Labor College or supporting
higher quality education for minority students, which could then create a black
professional class to pay the movement forward. The Fund’s most innovative
recipients were also conscious of the need to seek control of the information
environment — that is, to engage in propaganda — every bit as much as their
opponents do. As the labor lawyer Walter Nelles put it, the question isn’t
whether to use political and legal institutions coercively but rather “which
coercive power (not of course right in any strict sense) will result in more peace,
freedom and happiness.” [Witt, 477]
This is dark
stuff, but perhaps necessary if we are to turn tragedy into comedy. As the
American people seek the light at the end of our own tunnel, we would do well
to learn what we can from a history that, thanks to Witt, will in time make
Garland’s Millions far more memorable than Brewster’s.
Jamal Greene is Dwight
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.