E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Section 20011 of
the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) declares “there are appropriated to the
Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 2025, out of any money in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to remain available until September 30, 2029, $1,000,000,000
for the deployment of military personnel in support of border operations,
operations and maintenance activities in support of border operations,
counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support,
the operation of national defense areas and construction in national defense
areas, and the temporary detention of migrants on Department of Defense
installations…”.
Article I, section
8, clause 12, of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years”.The four-plus
years that section 20011’s appropriation is available would seem to exceed that
limit rather directly.Section 20011 clearly
is intended to fund the Army and does so.
The Government
Accountability Office’s Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (3d ed 2004),
which the Supreme Court has relied
upon in appropriations cases, says on page 1-13:“The 2-year limit in clause 12 has been
strictly construed as applying essentially to appropriations for personnel and
for operations and maintenance and not to other military appropriations such as
weapon system procurement or military construction. See B-114578, Nov. 9, 1973;
40 Op. Att’y Gen. 555 (1948); 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 105 (1904). In any event,
Congress has traditionally made appropriations for military personnel and
operations and maintenance on a fiscal year basis".Section 20011’s repeated references to “operations”
makes clear that much of what it funds is in the personnel, operations and
maintenance category and hence subject to the two-year limitation.
The One Big
Beautiful Bill Act lacks a severability clause.It has no global statement of purpose nor is one to be found in the
concurrent resolution on the budget that it implements.How lovely it would be if Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch led the Court to declare section 20011 unconstitutional and then to remind
Congress that the Constitution does not
empower the Court to “blue pencil” duly enacted statutes containing
unconstitutional provisions.Congress surely
would repass OBBBA without section 20011, but after the hasty and heedless
process that led to that legislation, Congress should be reminded that the
Constitution still matters and be made to cast those votes again.
The question arises
how this happened.A mechanical answer
is that OBBBA provides the Army with mandatory money (the same kind that funds
Social Security and Medicare) and hence was within the jurisdictions of the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees rather than the Defense Subcommittees of
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.Appropriators are accustomed to working with the two-year limitation;
authorizing committees are not.That is
a lousy justification:all Members take
oaths to the entire Constitution.(I
shudder to think what would happen if Members of Congress were allowed to take
their oaths to the Constitution a la carte.)
A more structural answer
is that neither chamber’s procedural rules place any particular premium on
adherence to the Constitution.It takes
sixty votes in the Senate to violate
your 302(a) allocation but only 51 votes to violate the Constitution.And the House Rules Committee may block any
points of order it sees fit.These facts
ought to embarrass all Members of Congress with any influence over its rules
(with special demerits for those that like to talk about strict adherence to
the Constitution).
The broader answer
seems to be that adherence to the Constitution no longer carries the prestige
it once did and disregard of our fundamental charter is no longer particularly
stigmatized in much of our political community.Section 20011’s authors, and all that waved it through as it navigated the
legislative process, should be deeply ashamed.I very much doubt that they are or will be. This is a fundamental problem for the sustainability
of our political community.