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The organizers of our
conference panel on “Freedom
of Speech and the Crisis of the Political Marketplace” posed a difficult question:
“How should courts and others conceptualize the relationship between speech and
money?” Since I am neither a First Amendment scholar nor an election law
expert, I will sidestep that challenging question to address a related one—that
is, how lawyers and other actors shaped the treatment of the relationship
between speech and money in First Amendment doctrine.
This column briefly
sketches the story-line of my recent book on this topic, Big
Money Unleashed, about a campaign over decades to deregulate election
spending. It draws from interviews with
fifty-two lawyers who participated in the major cases, as well as public
records and archival materials, to explore the process by which money became
speech and most regulation of campaign finance became censorship in First
Amendment law.
Supreme Court justices obviously were central
players in that process. But so were the attorneys who devised the theories,
the legal advocacy groups that advanced those theories and brought cases, the
patrons who promoted and financed these efforts, and the networks through which
these actors coordinated strategy.
The story begins in the early 1970s, when a few entrepreneurial lawyers demonstrated
how a policy dispute that was then playing out in Congress could be transformed
into a constitutional battle waged through the courts. Ralph Winter, then a
Yale Law School professor, and John Bolton, one of Winter’s students, wrote
influential pamphlets published by the American Enterprise Institute showing how
First Amendment arguments that had been developed to protect political
dissenters could be refashioned to give wealthy individuals and corporations
constitutional rights to use their money in elections. A law review article by
Martin Redish around the same time championed an understanding of the First
Amendment according to which “the ideological marketplace of the political
campaign must remain uninhibited.”[1] The arguments advanced in these
publications laid the foundation for the litigation campaign, and they have
served ever since as key points stressed by opponents of campaign finance
regulation.
The
effort gathered momentum in the 1990s and early 2000s, as opponents of
regulation invested in expertise, strategic case selection, and evocative
rhetoric. They pursued an incremental litigation strategy modeled on the
NAACP’s effort to dismantle racial segregation. Specialized advocacy
organizations led the way in advancing the themes of the campaign and chipping
away at restrictions on money in politics. Lawyers developed legal theories,
found sympathetic plaintiffs, brought test cases, and organized amicus
participation and media strategies, framing the effort as a fight for the
little guy’s right to engage in free speech. They deployed potent rhetoric about
the need to prevent government from “banning, chilling, suppressing, silencing,
and censoring” political expression. They made common cause with advocates for
interest groups that saw how free speech claims could be useful in other policy
battles—e.g., over economic regulation, union activities, consumer protection,
abortion, and the reach of antidiscrimination laws. An emerging conservative
media ecosystem helped to disseminate these themes. The ACLU and some labor
groups offered partial support. The Federalist Society’s Free Speech and
Election Law Practice Group served as a site for cultivating arguments and
coordinating strategy. Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell also played a central
role—leading Republican opposition to campaign finance legislation, assembling
teams of lawyers to challenge laws, recruiting FEC commissioners who shared his
perspective, and overseeing the appointment of federal judges who would be
receptive to this deregulatory agenda.
The
Supreme Court’s first major ruling on the constitutionality of campaign finance
regulation, Buckley v.
Valeo, gave opponents of regulation some of what they wanted. It upheld
contribution limits and disclosure requirements, but it struck down caps on
independent expenditures and limitations on candidates’ use of their own money
in their campaigns. It found that the only permissible justification for campaign
finance restrictions was to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption,
and it flatly rejected the notion that government could limit money in politics
to promote political equality.
For
years after Buckley, the Court upheld some laws that could be construed
as deterring corruption. But since 2006, when justices appointed by Republican
presidents and vetted through the conservative legal movement’s network gained
a majority, the Court has invalidated or severely limited nearly every campaign
finance regulation it has considered.[2]Citizens United’s broad holding—that
independent expenditures by corporations and unions cannot be limited—led
almost immediately to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in SpeechNow.org
v. FEC that contributions to super PACs cannot be limited. What little
remains of federal campaign finance law appears vulnerable to attack under the
logic of the current doctrine, which imagines freedom of speech as a restraint
on almost any government action that restricts the ability of individuals and
institutions to use money to influence elections so long as it does not
constitute quid pro quo corruption.
The
campaign that advanced these claims about the relationship between speech and
money—a constitutional construction now firmly embedded in First Amendment law—has
unleashed big money in American elections. In the years since Citizens United
and SpeechNow, expenditures by super PACs and
other outside groups have exploded,
often exceeding
the amounts spent by the candidates’ own campaigns. The rulings have emboldened megadonors
to put enormous amounts behind candidates through outside groups while easily hiding
their identities from the public if they care to do so. Super PACs sometimes
operate as shadow campaigns, thanks, in part, to FEC disfunction and advisory
opinions that weakened rules against coordination between candidates and
nominally independent outside groups. Meanwhile, states that want to implement voluntary
public finance systems must work around one of the Robert Court’s less noticed
campaign finance rulings—a 2011 decision
striking down Arizona’s “matching funds” system on the ground that it violated
the First Amendment rights of privately-financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups.
The First Amendment law that
treats most campaign finance regulation as impermissible censorship is the
product of investments made over many decades.Networks of powerful
actors used the courts—and deployed a resonant speech frame—to accomplish this
task. The constitutional law generated through this campaign has given the wealthy
freer rein to use their economic power to influence elections and elected
officials, and it has left ordinary people, the purported beneficiaries of the
campaign, with less of a voice in our political process. Most
Americans, across party lines, believe that reducing the influence of money
in politics should be a top policy priority. They may not know how courts and
others should conceptualize the relationship between money and speech, but they
understand that there is something wrong with a campaign finance system that gives
private money such a dominant role American politics.
Ann Southworth is Professor of Law & Founding Faculty Member, University of California, Irvine. You can reach her by email at asouthworth@law.uci.edu.
[1] Martin H. Redish,
Campaign Spending Laws and the First
Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 900, 910 (1971).