E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahman sabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Anne Twitty Mark Graber’s
stunning new book challenges most of what we thought we knew about the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Congress that drafted it. Punish
Treason, Reward Loyalty calls on us to alter our vision—to forget what we
think we know about Reconstruction and constitutional reform and return anew to
December 1865 as Republicans in Congress sought to put the union back together
again. Once there, Graber challenges us to see the constitutional world that
they envisioned on its own terms, to imagine what they thought effective reform
might entail. The provocative new portrait of the making of the Fourteenth
Amendment that emerges from these efforts will unsettle many. But it also, I
think, promises to help us fashion a more coherent interpretation of
Reconstruction as a whole. In order to
understand the original meaning and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, Graber
argues, we have to expand our frame of reference. Scholars have generally
focused narrowly on the speeches the editor of the Congressional Globe organized
under the heading of “Constitutional Amendment.” But Graber has drawn from the
body’s deliberations on a whole host of related matters as well. The Fourteenth
Amendment, he argues, can only be understood within this rich context since
debates over various aspects of Reconstruction often bled seamlessly into
debates over the provisions that would ultimately become the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Such a broad
survey of the body’s proceedings, in turn, introduces a much larger cast of
characters than scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment have usually examined. Though
Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA) and Representatives Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) and
John Bingham (R-OH) play an important role in Graber’s account, they share the
spotlight with their colleagues. These fellow Republicans, as well as
Democrats, Unionists, Unconditional Unionists, and Independent Republicans, may
never have been household names—indeed, many, even most, of them, had little
individual influence at the time or since. But understanding their motivations
and concerns are key, Graber argues, if one wants to truly understand what the
Fourteenth Amendment was all about. For Graber, all
this thick description reveals a “forgotten Fourteenth Amendment” that has been
lost to us. This forgotten Fourteenth Amendment differs in startling ways from
our contemporary one. To start, Graber argues, the majority in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress viewed the political and financial guarantees of Sections 2-4, not the
civil rights and racial equality guarantees of Section 1, as the central
provisions. This conviction, in turn, was rooted in their assessment of both
the most pressing problems they faced and the best way to address them. Although
the desire to repudiate the Black Codes played a role in the framer’s
deliberations, these were lesser concerns, in no small part because
Congressional Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment and other
constitutional provisions like the Guarantee Clause already imbued them with
the power to protect freedpeople. For Congressional Republicans, Graber
asserts, it was, instead, the threat of resurgent rebel rule and the need to
protect those who had remained true to the Union cause that was paramount. They
needed, as Graber’s title proclaims, to punish treason and reward loyalty.
These goals, they believed, would not be secured by constitutional text that
constrained bad actors, but, rather, through constitutional politics that
empowered their own political coalition. Consequently, Graber argues, the
majority in the Thirty-Ninth Congress crafted an amendment whose key provisions
(Sections 2-4) would configure the government in such a way that secured the
continued supremacy of the Republican Party. Political power, not
constitutional text, was essential to controlling the meaning and
interpretation of not only the Thirteenth Amendment, but the Constitution as a
whole, and, as Graber argues, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed by Congressional
Republicans to make sure they remained on top. Because
Graber’s account contradicts many longstanding assumptions about the original
meaning and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, many will no doubt find it
deeply unnerving. If it isn’t quite the world (of the Thirty-Ninth Congress)
turned upside down, it can feel that way. Graber first
throws us off balance by inverting our understanding of the relative importance
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s various provisions when they were drafted. For us,
Section 1 has been, by far and away, the most important part of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, the interpretation and study of the Fourteenth Amendment in
our world is almost entirely the interpretation and study of Section 1. But the
very section we fetishize, Graber argues, was largely seen as irrelevant by the
Congress who authored it. In their many debates over constitutional reform,
they spent far, far more time discussing the provisions that ultimately became
Sections 2-4. Graber’s
interpretation, however, isn’t merely unsettling because he asserts that
Sections 2-4 were more important than Section 1 at the time they were written. He
is making a more foundational claim, namely that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had a very different conception of how a constitution worked than we
do. By asserting that their focus was on constitutional politics, not
constitutional text, Graber has presented the framers’ world as fundamentally
at odds with our own. Those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, Graber
argues, thought in terms of political power rather than judicial
interpretation. They understood Constitutions as structures that empowered particular
political coalitions, not words that constrained either faithful or unfaithful governments. This claim should
be especially disconcerting to constitutional originalists, who tend to decipher
the original meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment as if it was
written for them and their textualist, judicial-centric methods. Originalists often
uncritically conceive of constitutions as statute-like texts and presume that such
habits were the natural outgrowth of written constitutionalism. Graber’s
account, however, reveals that such assumptions are ahistorical. The framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not share originalists’ logic, they were engaged
in a different brand of constitutionalism than we are today. Finally,
Graber’s account of the Fourteenth Amendment upsets a more romantic account of
Reconstruction generally. It not only decenters Section 1’s lofty principles of
birthright citizenship, due process, and equal protection and suggests that (what
may seem like crass) political considerations, rather than soaring rhetoric, undergirded
the original Fourteenth Amendment, it also paints Reconstruction in less
exalted terms, at least by our own lights. It suggests that if the architects
of the Fourteenth Amendment were indeed radical, their radicalism was focused
on achieving different goals than the ones that tend to motivate us. They were
“far more concerned,” Graber argues, “with fashioning a loyal South than a
South committed to free labor, racial equality, or some notion of fundamental
human rights” (113). As a result, Graber’s interpretation unsettles the
powerful rise-and-fall story of an era that pits good against evil, ideals
against the forces of reaction. By upending these
prevailing understandings of the making of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
Graber may help us better explain Reconstruction as a whole.
Let me explain:
as a historian, as someone responsible for explaining Reconstruction to
students, I have often found traditional narratives about both the era and its constitutional
reforms wanting. To give you a sense of what I mean, consider just a few of the
quandaries those narratives raise: If the majority in the Thirty-Ninth Congress
thought Section 1 was the most essential provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or operated under the assumption that rights were best protected through text
rather than politics, then why did they spend so little time debating the specific
language of Section 1? If the constitutional reforms Reconstruction-era
Republicans proposed were motivated, first and foremost, by concern for the
formerly enslaved, why did the exact same actors prove to be such unpredictable
friends to the freedpeople? Why, more broadly, did the promise of
Reconstruction, by which we generally mean its potential to remake the South in
a just way and truly dismantle all residue of slavery, so quickly collapse into
the retreat from Reconstruction? Graber’s account of the original meaning and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, I think, enables us to begin formulating
more satisfying answers to these questions that the ones we’ve generally
received.
After all, if we
take Graber’s view seriously—if we see the Thirty-Ninth Congress as focused on
Sections 2-4 rather than Section 1, as committed to constitutional politics
rather than constitutional text, and as primarily driven by the need to punish
treason and reward loyalty rather than a desire to enshrine racial equality in
the Constitution—we get a more persuasive narrative of why Reconstruction
unfolded as it did. To begin with, it becomes clear why there was ultimately so
little debate over the actual substance of Section 1 during the first session
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Federal policymakers’ inconstancy toward formerly
enslaved people, meanwhile, also starts to make a lot more sense, as does Reconstruction-era
Republicans’ willingness to turn a blind eye as would-be western states tried
to restrict the franchise to white men. Finally, Graber’s interpretation also provides
better insight about why Reconstruction didn’t ultimately produce a racially egalitarian
society: because that was never Congressional Republicans’ main goal. It wasn’t
only external forces like the Ku Klux Klan, the Panic of 1873, or a reactionary
Supreme Court that ate away at such efforts. There were internal forces at play
too, namely the fact that the Republicans’ constitutional project was not
designed to achieve this end. Graber’s
account of a Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment is deeply provocative. Indeed, given
how fully it upends contemporary assumptions—assumptions about the original
meaning and purpose of both the Amendment itself and Reconstruction as a whole—it’s
sure to be controversial. But if Graber hasn’t given (many of) us what we want,
he’s perhaps given us what we need: a narrative of the making of the Fourteenth
Amendment that promises a more accurate, more cogent account of the era that
produced it. Anne Twitty is
an Associate Professor (Teaching) of History at Stanford University. You can
reach her by e-mail at atwitty@stanford.edu.