The Perils of Performative Politics

David Super

      We just saw the entirely predictable failure of progressives’ plan to end the filibuster and enact voting rights legislation.  Senators Manchin and Sinema have been saying for years that they opposed eliminating the filibuster and had given quite specific reasons for those views.  When forced to vote their convictions, they did so.  Nothing at all surprising there.

     The question is why we went through this performance.  Why did so many progressives insist on acting this scenario out when the path forward was so completely pre-ordained?

     At times, we have heard that it was necessary for “the Democrats” to “fight” for voting rights and other reforms blocked by the filibuster.  This argument rests on at least two highly dubious assumptions.  “The Democrats” not an ideological monolith.  Former President Trump and other forces have been rapidly pushing the Republican Party into rigid conformity, but a party seeking to unite all those opposed to Trumpism – and which still garnered just 51% of the popular vote for its candidate – will inevitably encompass a wide range of views.  At most, the call to “fight” could be read as a demand directed at the Senate Democratic leadership (and President Biden). 

     The “fight” rationale also assumes that it is only a “fight” when it involves debating and voting on the Senate floor.  Yet that is not how most politics is done; indeed, politicians typically put on a noisy show when they cannot find a path to success.  Real fighting, effectual fighting, is done in quiet conversations, in measured tones, away from the glare of publicity.  No initiative in which I have been involved has ever benefited from a floor debate; on the other hand, several promising initiatives failed when well-meaning supporters could not resist grandstanding on the Senate floor and in so doing mobilized the opposition. 

     An alternative rationale for this public exercise was that somehow it might persuade someone.  It is not entirely clear whom it was that proponents hoped to persuade:  Republican senators, the two Democratic hold-outs, voters, or someone else.  Whomever the intended audience, this was terribly naïve.  Many Members of Congress, to be sure, have quite tepid convictions on many issues.  They have learned, however, to stick to a position once taken rather than risk being portrayed as a “flip-flopper.”  And these issues are much too nuanced to have any prospect of persuading significant numbers of voters:  few voters follow these proceedings closely, fewer still are genuinely open to persuasion, and virtually none will know enough about the issues to see through the plausible-sounding arguments of the legislation’s opponents. 

     And even if none of that were true, proponents made no serious effort to persuade.  For the most part, those demanding abolition of the filibuster refused to take seriously the arguments that Senators Manchin and Sinema made for their position.  Those senators and others opposed to unilateral rules changes because the filibuster preserves major civil rights, environmental, and social legislation during periods of Republican dominance.  Filibuster opponents insisted that Republicans would surely sweep away the legislative filibuster without explaining why they did not do so in 2017-18, when it would have allowed them to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act.  (Although the Republicans failed to get fifty votes for their repeal, without the constraints of the filibuster and reconciliation rules they surely could have included provisions to buy off at least one of their defectors.)  Eliminating the filibuster would have allowed Republicans to omit many deeply unpopular provisions from the 2017 tax law, possibly saving their House majority.  Any serious argument that the legislative filibuster is inevitably doomed needs to explain why Republicans were willing to accept major legislative defeats rather than abolish it.  Yet those blasting Senators Manchin and Sinema merely assumed, without evidence or argument, that the two senators were wrong or even foolish. 

     Proponents of abolishing the filibuster also repeatedly insisted that its primary function has been to squash civil rights legislation.  That is simply wrong.  Yes, many of the performative filibusters over the years have been in opposition to civil rights legislation.  But the filibuster’s availability also is what blocked numerous attempts to gut environmental legislation from even reaching the Senate floor during the Republican monopoly on power of 2017-18.  It is what forced President Trump to meet with Minority Leaders Schumer and Pelosi to make major concessions on appropriations bills.  It is what stopped President Trump from proposing and passing an “infrastructure” bill that would sell off the nation’s assets to his cronies at fire-sale prices.  If proponents were serious about persuasion, they would not have relied on such readily rebutted oversimplifications. 

     Yet another rationale for demanding the public performance of the past week was to force resistant senators to “put themselves on record” against this legislation.  That it did, but to what end?  Senators Manchin and Sinema had already said, with admirable clarity, that they would not support eliminating the filibuster.  They were absolutely on the record, a far cry from some slippery “swing” senators of earlier eras.  Republicans, too, were open and adamant in their opposition to this legislation. 

     One could imagine a quite different outing strategy targeted on purported moderate Republicans:  having moderate Democrats publicly invite them to negotiate bipartisan voting rights legislation and shaming them if they refuse.  This strategy has worked in the past when deftly pursued; whether today’s politics has room for that sort of subtlety is unclear.  In any event, the Republican senator most vulnerable to this approach, Sen. Susan Collins, was just re-elected.

     My suspicion is that the real reason progressive groups’ leaders pressed so hard for a public performance of positions already well-known was that they did not want to be the ones to tell their constituencies that they fervently desired, and amply justified, legislation was not going to pass.  If this is correct, it is unfortunate on many levels. 

      First, it suggests a level of estrangement between progressive leaders and the progressive base that will severely undermine the movements’ prospects of success.  Grassroots progressives are right to be suspicious of politicians’ shifting loyalties, but if they cannot communicate frankly with their own leaders, misdirected efforts and debilitating disappointment become inevitable.

     Second, and related, to maintain popular engagement with these performances, politicians and national policy advocates almost inevitably must mislead grassroots activists.  Nobody floods the Capitol switchboard with calls on an issue they understand to be dead.  Urging activists to respond on legislation that is soon shown to have already been doomed reduces the likelihood of a grassroots response when an issue really is winnable. 

     Third, this sort of public performance imposes a much more absolute finality.  The threat of forcing a public showdown can provide a bit of negotiating leverage even when the outcome of that showdown is pre-ordained.  Now that fifty-two senators have had to publicly declare themselves, they have much less to gain from even talking about any compromise.  Bipartisan voting rights legislation in this environment surely would be thin gruel indeed, but it would be more than we have any chance of getting in the foreseeable future.  Now nothing can happen this Congress, and any appeals to Republican consciences in future Congresses will have to be as different as possible from the just-defeated legislation for Republicans to be confident they will not be accused of flip-flopping. 

     More broadly, all the invective spewed against Senators Manchin and Sinema likely will make them less inclined to compromise on other important progressive priorities, such as the Build Back Better environmental and human services legislation.  It is conceivable that insisting on this week’s futile exercise doomed universal child care and pre-K subsidies, the expanded Child Tax Credit, and the many smart environmental programs that Build Back Better contains.  At a minimum, the ultimate deal on Build Back Better is now likely to be significantly worse even than what would have been available in December.

     Fourth, having gone through this exercise could leave us in the worst of all possible worlds:  it failed to dislodge the filibuster to pass today’s legislative priorities but, by forcing forty-eight Democrats to vote to gut the filibuster, it destroys their credibility in arguing for preserving the filibuster once Republicans take over.  Ironically, if the filibuster survives to give Democrats a seat at the table on appropriations, and to prevent wholesale repeal of progressive legislation, the two people progressives will have to thank are Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema. 

     Finally, performative exercises of this kind make President Biden and the Democratic leadership look weak and ineffectual.  The President’s credibility is a precious asset with immense value to all progressives.  Unfortunately, this is a political Tragedy of the Commons:  many progressive groups want to bludgeon the Democratic leadership to do more on their priorities, but if all groups do so the result is that all progressive priorities starve.  Once lost, a president’s credibility is extremely difficult to rebuild.  And persuading swing voters that they must turn to Republicans for strong leadership has never been more dangerous.  All the more so, of course, now that we have undermined our ability to preserve the filibuster. 

     @DavidASuper1