E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Senator Manchin, Justice Breyer, and the Madisonian Delusion
Sandy Levinson
Both Senator Joseph Manchin of West Virginia and Justice Stephen Breyer can, I believe, be viewed in terms of the Madisonian hope--or delusion--of staving off factional partisanship by relying instead on the virtuous impulses of what we today might describe as "bi-partisan" and public-spirited leaders. One should not disdain this desire. Madison was clearly on to something when, in Federalist 10, he bewailed "factions" as collectivities committed not to the public good, but, instead, to their own selfish interests. That, of course, is what political parties can be viewed as, and there is widespread agreement that the Madison of 1787, like Washington and most other luminaries, were trying to stave off the development of political parties.
One can easily say that Madison and Washington were delusional in their hope, not to mention illustrating the propensity of all of us to define our own particular desires with "the public good." In any event, the only interesting controversy among historians is dating exactly when the Madisonian fantasy collapsed. Some would say as early as the first couple of Congresses and the debate, in particular, over the chartering of the first Bank of the United States, where Madison led the attack on Hamilton's brainchild. Others might say the election of 1796; everyone would agree that by 1800 it was in complete shambles and, like Humpty Dumpty, would never be put back together.
But it is still possible to say that "partisanship," though completely explicable and even productive, has its downsides as well. There is no evidence that either Senator Manchin or Justice Breyer is an ignorant fool in emphasizing the importance of moving away from our present polarization. That being said, however, one can say that even if not foolish, they are still nonetheless subject to justified criticism in refusing to recognize what is obviously true, for better and, certainly, for worse about our contemporary polity. They are making the best--i.e., a Madisonian (or "Publian") society of leaders selflessly committed above all to the "common good"--the enemy of the good. So what is "the good" in this context: The answer is a political system that, at least over the next few years, is basically controlled by the Democratic Party, given that the GOP has become largely a fascistic cult of personality around the truly malevolent figure of Donald J. Trump and the necessity to support his Goebellian big lie concerning the integrity of the election.
I suspect that Manchin, as an experienced practicing politician realizes this. His resistance to "partisanship" can in part be explained by his tenuous position in West Virginia itself, the most Trumpista state in the Union, apparently. Breyer's position must find a different explanation, and I think the basic answer lies in his being a very bright technocrat--he has taught at the Kennedy School as well as the Harvard Law School--who really buys fully into the Hegelian/Frankfurterian ideal of a class of civil servants, including judges, who transcend "the political thicket" and can make judgments faithful to the public interest and/or "the rule of law."
In some ways, Breyer is more interesting than Ginsburg, who I think had become simply a form of megalomaniac at the end, encouraged to accept the view of her acolytes that she was truly indispensable and irreplaceable. Breyer, on the other hand, is more the instantiation of a particular ideological vision. Whether this makes him more admirable, or even more dangerous, than Ginsburg is truly debatable.