E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
We live in a political moment in which the world is deeply
divided between those people who believe that members of some groups, including
racial minorities, immigrants, and the LGBT community need increasing legal
entitlements and those who see those very legal entitlements as a threat to
their own futures. This is not new, of
course. As many scholars have shown, these moral and political
fights began before the
country was founded.
Linda McClain’s brilliant book, Who’s the Bigot?
Learning from Conflicts Over Marriage and Civil Rights Law, brings new
perspective to how these fights play out in law and society by excavating the
power of calling someone a bigot. By
tracing this word over several decades and as it appears in legal doctrine,
activist organizing (from the right and left), and as a term used in political
debate, McClain powerfully demonstrates how an accusation of bigotry carries
with it the power to fuel a movement and even alter the legal environment. In turn, McClains careful excavation shows
how individuals and organizations orient themselves to avoid the accusation of
bigotry, and, in turn, how the word carries with it a deep ability to bring
about societal shift and spark political debate. While the book traverses a range of topics, she
focuses on several key shifts in American legal and political consensus
including those that have occurred around interfaith, interracial, and gay
marriage; and transgender rights.
As McClain demonstrates in her book, a key defense to an
accusation of bigotry has long been that the discrimination experienced by
others is simply the purported bigot’s sincerely and deeply held belief. Most often this is justified by
religion. Yet, even religious leaders frequently
interweave their faith-based perspective with reference to expert discourse
including the work of scientists and social scientists. By making the move to expertise, religious
groups seek to ground their desire to discriminate in other sources of
authority that carry a broader legitimacy than religion might and carries with
it the valence of political neutrality.
The claim to social science – or to “fact” – purportedly protects
against the idea that there is bigotry.
This is also true of progressives, who draw from scientific development
and social science to forward their own project. As McClain describes, this back and forth was
clearly on display in Loving v. Virginia, where lawyers for the Loving’s,
who argue that interracial marriage should be legally permitted, utilize a
UNESCO report which disclaims the idea of a scientific basis for racial
difference. The UNESCO report was
produced following World War II which helped discredit racial science (though
not eliminate it) given its
role in the holocaust. While not science per say, as McClain describes, in defense
of anti-miscegenation laws the state of Virginia draws on social science
expertise in their reliance on the work of sociologist Rabbi Gordon who argues
that intermarriage, both of faith and race, is a threat to “personal and group
happiness.”
In more recent years, claims to biological fact have
played a role in arguments against ending discrimination against members of the
trans community, particularly in public accommodations law, where we again see
claims of religious and biological authority invoked to defend against the
accusation of bigotry. As described by
McClain in the case of protecting trans individuals in the context of public
accommodations, Christian evangelicals called for upholding the scientific
definition of sex offered by the Trump administration on the grounds that it
was based in biology and could not be argued against. By staying focused on biology, there would be
no need to protect people from using the bathroom of their choice as they
should use the bathroom of their biological origin. The conservative argument is flawed for many
reasons, even on the fixity of biology itself as Anne
Fausto Sterling demonstrated
long
ago, yet the appeal to
biology offers a rationale beyond those perceived as purely religious or
moral. Its power lies in its ability to
make a claim to a discourse that appears to be politically neutral: science.
Much of the ideological contestation we have experienced
– from interracial to interfaith marriage to public accommodations – is the
product of shifting social and cultural beliefs. Once these shifts have occurred, once they
are institutionalized in law and in the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary to
effectuate the law. Once a
political transition is made, say, for example that interracial marriage is
seen as widely acceptable, according to McClain we begin to see the past
belief, that interracial marriage is unacceptable, as bigoted. In turn, as McClain argues “claims
about bigotry are simultaneously backward- and forward-
looking. Defining a belief or practice as bigotry may be possible only after
society has repudiated it as wrong and unjust. Once there is general agreement
that such past beliefs and practices were bigoted, it becomes hard for people
to understand that anyone ever seriously defended them.”
Each decade, or perhaps even every few years, we seem to
arrive at a new, albeit often tenuous consensus about the social, cultural, and
political issues of our time. The
consequences of these decisions are often profound: who will get the legal and
financial entitlements that come with marriage? Who will be safe in public
spaces? Who will be accepted in society?
These transformations are powerful not only because they
change legal entitlements but they have the capacity to help legitimate or
undermine the political neutrality of the expertise that they are based
on. They call into question the very
facts relied upon by those who argued for the now regressive position. And, these transformations open the door to
new forms of knowledge production about people’s relationships to one
another. Often, these new
expert-generated forms of knowledge about
marriage, race, gender, and sexuality still take on the valance of
neutrality. But as McClain’s incisive
genealogy of the word bigotry demonstrates, we understand the legitimacy of
these facts through our new and ever shifting legal, social, and political
moment.
Aziza Ahmed is Professor of Law at Northeastern University School of Law. You can reach her by e-mail at Az.Ahmed at northeastern.edu