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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahman sabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Is Secession a Good Idea in theory but Impossible in Practice?
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Thursday, May 21, 2020
Is Secession a Good Idea in theory but Impossible in Practice?
Sandy Levinson
For the Symposium on Timothy William Waters's Boxing Pandora: Rethinking Borders, States, and Secession in a Democratic World (Yale University Press, 2020) and F. H. Buckley's American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup (Encounter Books, 2020).
Will the United States survive to enjoy its sestercentennial in 2037? Perhaps the only answer is, “Of course.” But substitute instead the United Kingdom or, indeed, the European Union, not to mention a number of other possible candidates for such a question, beginning with Belgium or Spain. Or imagine the (wrong) answers that might have been given forty years ago to such a question about, among others, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. As an historical matter, there is nothing all that unusual about countries breaking up because of secessionist movements. Indeed, perhaps the most notable example, for Americans, is the United States itself, accurately described by Harvard historian David Armitage as a secession from the British Empire; there is no plausible argument that the “American patriots” were themselves the victims of imperialistic British settlement (unlike Native Americans) rather than the agents themselves of the imperialist power. Their complaints about “taxation without representation” masked the fact that above all they wished not to pay any taxes in order to help finance the costs of empire.
I
think one can say with confidence that no thoughtful person automatically
supports or opposes all secessionist
movements on principle. As already
suggested, for an American to do so requires renouncing the legitimacy of our
own national founding. But, apropos of
the examples given above, I strongly suspect that few readers of this posting
will have opposed the breakup of the Soviet Union, Norway’s entirely peaceful
secession from Sweden in 1905, or the equally peaceful secession of Montenegro from
Serbia, even if many of us will have had decided qualms about other
secessionist movements.
The books under review in this symposium,
F. H. Buckley’s American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup and
Timothy William Waters’s Boxing
Pandora: Rehtinking Borders, States, and
Secession in a Democratic World are only two recent books exploring the general
subject. Pua Bossacoma Busquets has
recently published, with Palgrave Macmillan, Morality and Legality of Secession:
A Theory of National Self-Determination, and in July Little Brown
will be publishing Break It Up: Secession, Division, and the Secret History
of America’s Imperfect Union, by Richard Kreitner. No doubt I shall write more about these last
two books on another occasion. It is
significant, though, that all four are undoubtedly serious books that offer
basic support for the idea, both in theory—the central focus of Waters and
Busequets—or practice, with regard to the particular dilemmas facing the
contemporary United States.
When
George Packer, a decidedly non-hysterical and prize-winning analyst of the American
political scene, describes the United States, in The Atlantic, as a “failed state,” attention should be paid. As Lenin so memorably asked more than a century ago, the central
question, even if the U.S. is "merely" a potentially "failing state," is “What is to be done?” And is
it even thinkable that one possible
answer is that we are way too big, way too fragmented, as well as the victims
of a an almost totally dysfunctional 18th century Constitution, to
be governed effectively, whatever the exactly meaning of that term? Is it time to think seriously of divorcing
and letting unhappy states (or groups) go their own way, no longer trapped in
the iron cage of what increasingly seems to be not simply a loveless national
marriage, but one in which the participants increasingly loathe one another and
have fantasies of the political equivalent of domestic violence?
Timothy Waters presents a primarily theoretical argument, drawing on traditional democratic political theorists plus
contemporary international law, particularly that involving decolonization, to
defend the propriety of secession for anyone who professes to take seriously
the basic commitment, set out in the Declaration of Independence, to the
self-determination of a purported “one people.”
He carefully addresses all of the responses to his argument; perhaps his
most important point, in some ways, is pointing out both that there is no
necessary relationship between secession and violence and that violence often
accompanies the attempt of hegemonic groups within particular states to prevent what could otherwise be
peaceful secession. Ostensibly
hard-headed “realists” who disdain the possibility of secession may in fact end
up imposing significantly more costs on everyone involved than might be true of
adherents of what might seem to be more “idealist” and theory-laden support for
self-determination.
Waters has spent much time exploring,
both as an academic and as on-the-ground participant, the complexities of what
we now call “former Yugoslavia,” i.e., the country patched together following
World War I. Yugoslavia was the joint
product of the collapse of the great Empires that had organized the political
topography of Central and Eastern Europe following their defeat by the alliance
that included Woodrow Wilson’s United States, with its insistence on the
priority of “national self-determination.”
Yet, quite obviously, it is quite misleading to speak of a single “Yugoslav
nation,” given the ethnic, religious,
and linguistic splits that were wired into the country from its beginning. As with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Yugoslavia
presented the ominous question of whether such a truly multi-national polity
could be kept together without the presence of a strong dictator like Marshal
Tito, a key leader in the resistance against the Nazis during World War
II. And, of course, not all Nazis were
German; many Croation leaders collaborated with Germany. Tito’s death in 1980 left the country without
the political resources to sustain itself, and on June 26, 1991, both Slovenia
and Croatia declared their independence, without support at that time from
other nations. However, Germany gave both
the Slovenians and the Croats the Christmas present of recognition on December
24, 1991, and a dozen further European countries followed the next month. The United States got around to recognizing
Croatia, Slovenia, as well as Bosnia-Herzogovnia in April. By that time much of
“Yugoslavia” (though, significantly, not Slovenia), was enmeshed in war.
Especially
interesting in this regard is Kosovo, which declared its independence from
Serbia on February 17, 2008, and was granted recognition the next day by
President George W. Bush, who rather optimistically declared that recognizing Kosovo
as an independent country would
"bring peace to a region scarred by war." Perhaps not surprisingly, neither Russia nor
Spain, among other countries, has recognized Kosovo’s independence. Times change, though, and Russia did cite the
international court decision upholding Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence
in defense of the ostensible propriety of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. Needless to say, this latter secession has been
rejected by the United States and almost all other countries in the
international political system. Perhaps what this demonstrates is that it’s not
always easy to tell the players apart unless they are wearing uniforms and one
is carrying a scorecard.
Still,
Waters’s book challenges the reader to come up with a cogent rationale for
deciding between “acceptable” secessions and those we wish to reject, even regarding
Yugoslavia itself. Is there, for
example, any good reason to reject
the legitimacy of Slovenia’s secession, which was not followed by significant
violence and which has seemingly worked out well? Perhaps that is attributable to the fact that
over 80% of its approximately 2 million population are ethnic Slovenes.
Why shouldn’t they have a state of their own? (As several other reviewers have noted, though, one of the truly important features of Waters's argument is that he in no way relies on ascriptive identities, such as ethnicity, to undergird his argument.)
What is perhaps most truly significant about Waters’s book is that it demonstrates how comparatively weak many of the now-traditional arguments against secession are from a theoretical perspective that takes the notion of “national self-determination” with due seriousness. The strongest arguments against secession are ultimately prudential or otherwise consequentialist. One must drop, perhaps for good reason, all serious commitment to what Ronald Dworkin might have termed “taking rights seriously,” including the right of national self-determination, in favor of preserving stability by endorsing all but the most reprehensible status quos. But even then, Waters points out that what one might term “almost-reprehensible status quos” can still involve lots of oppression and violence, which presumably has to be taken into account in one’s hard-headed calculations.
Thomas
Jefferson and his friends who drafted the Declaration acknowledged the
importance of prudence when they emphasized that only the alleged “long train
of abuses” inflicted by Great Britain really justified their own
secession. That was far more important,
one might suggest, than the reference to “inalienable rights” that Americans
especially tend to fixate on. But had
there been no “long train of abuses,” it presumably would have remained “prudent”
to take one’s lumps and remain within the Empire, as did Quebec, which rejected
American entreaties to join them in secession. Paradoxically or not, it is now
Quebec that especially tests one’s views on secession, not least because
the province generated what is surely the most famous, and important, legal
case dealing with the ostensible duty of a state to pay serious attention to
efforts to secede by a sub-national entity.
Frank
Buckley’s book is, in its own way, far more “practical” than is Waters. It does not range so broadly, being far more
focused on the United States, though Buckley, as a Canadian, also pays
attention to Quebec and its efforts at secession. American Secession is also roughly half
the length of Boxing Pandora. To the extent that it is “theoretical,” the
principal political theorists Buckley is interested in, as was the case of many
in the Framing generation themselves, are David Hume and Montesquieu, the
latter of whom was in fact the most often quoted theorist in The Federalist. But, tellingly, most of the references
were antagonistic, inasmuch as Montesquieu, like Hume, strongly believed that
preservation of what the Constitution was pleased to call, without defining, “a
republican form of government,” required that the states in question be
relatively small and homogeneous (like Slovenia). What generated the move toward confederation
(or, in the American case, federation) was a pragmatic necessity to provide
joint security against predators in the international political order, always
at the potential cost to liberty and “republicanism.”
Madison’s great task—and, for many,
his great achievement—was to argue instead in behalf of the “extended republic”
that, by definition, left the Frenchman’s argument in the dust. But, of course, Madison was writing in 1788
of a country of roughly four million people—less than a quarter of whom could
actually participate in political life given restrictions based on gender,
race, or economic status—that extended from what is now Maine in the north to
the southern border of Georgia and then over to the eastern bank of the
Mississippi River (at least to what is now Memphis but, most certainly, not to
New Orleans, which was then still Spanish). Even if one is persuaded that Madison made
sense in 1787, why would one necessarily find him convincing in 2020, when the
United States has roughly 325,000,000 residents extending still from Maine,
though now unto Hawaii in the mid-Pacific and down through not only to Key
West, but also, depending on one’s perspective of Puerto Rico, into the
mid-Caribbean?
Buckley
clearly believes that “we” would be better off as a group of smaller countries,
each of which would quite likely as well be sufficiently more homogeneous to
temper the mood of loathing-filled fragmentation, that typifies the country
today and helps to account for Packer’s judgment that the national government
is the epitome of a “failed state.” He
offers a variety of empirical measures designed to demonstrate that smaller is
more beautiful, so far as states are concerned.
Their residents are, generally, happier, freer, and more prosperous, in
part, perhaps, because they are less likely to be members of gigantic countries
with vast militaries and imperialistic ambitions.
I very
happily blurbed both books. Waters’s
book was published by a leading academic press, the Yale University Press;
Buckley, on the other hand published his book with Encounter Books, generally
identified as a publisher of right-wing books.
My fellow pro-Buckley blurbers are all from the right. Michael Anton writes, for example, that “We
can’t go on like this forever. If the Left
continues to amp up its mouth-frothing rage at half the country, eventually
that half will react. Something’s got to
give. Frank Buckley explores one
possibility for what that ‘something’ might be….” And Michael Barone frankly (and admiringly)
identifies Buckley as a “Trump supporter.”
He is certainly correct. But, as
I indicate in my own admiring blurb, it is also essential to realize that
Buckley is an unusually interesting immigrant—from Canada—who is willing to ask
genuinely radical questions about the American experiment. An earlier book, for example, lamented the
fact that the Framers in 1787, perhaps because they were thinking only of George
Washington, rejected parliamentarianism in favor of what we should now
recognize is a potentially dangerous presidential system. (He may be a “Trump supporter,” but he is
scarcely a devotee of the monarchical and quasi-dictatorial views of the presidency
adopted by Trump.)
Political
scientists are justifiably fond of the notion of “path dependence,” i.e., the
homely truth that decisions made at time A, whatever their merits or demerits,
become so embedded that it becomes at best extremely costly, at worst almost
literally unthinkable, to suggest in effect starting over in the hope of “getting
it right” this time around. Cynthia Nicoetti's review is a superb meditation on the importance of this point. So it is, I
believe unfortunately, with our radically defective Constitution. So it may be with what Buckley describes as an
increasingly ungovernable United States more generally.
As with
Waters, it is not that Buckley’s argument are easily refutable from a “theoretical”
perspective. If one could engage in a
Rawlsian fantasy of redesigning an international political order from behind a
veil of ignorance, it is almost impossible to imagine that one would include
the United States with its present borders. Indeed, Prof. Busquets own theory
of secession within the framework of “national self-determination” is
predicated on a Rawls-like thought experiment devoted to the design of national
borders. But, far from endorsing the retention of Westphalian (or Wilsonian) “national self-determination,’ it is thinkable
today, given the challenges, say, of global warming and the need for
international response to pandemics, that one would say that it is time to get
rid of our commitment to an international system of so-called "sovereign" states. Perhaps we can no longer afford the luxury of
a plethora of states—193 [!] of which are in the contemporary United Nations--
each proclaiming its “sovereignty” (whatever exactly that means) and should use
Madison-like arguments to endorse an effective form of world government, tempered
by a great deal of decentralization and what European thinkers call “subsidiarity.” The point is that almost no sane person would design
the contemporary borders that we live with and that constitute our present
political order, either domestically or internationally.
We are,
alas, not living behind a veil of ignorance and, most definitely, not being invited
to redesign the world we live in to make it more likely than it is at present
that our children and grandchildren will flourish. Most readers of these two books—and I would
hope there are many—will, at best, probably pronounce them as “interesting” but
merely “academic” in the pejorative sense of that term. The United States is not going to break up, if only because our divisions, for all of
the facile division into “red states” and “blue states,” are far less
sectional, as they were in 1860, than based on whether one lives in cities more
rural—or at least less densely urban—areas; whether one is an Evangelical
Protestant or someone far more secular, perhaps even an atheist; whether one is
white or identifies in some way with the non-whites who are becoming, quite
steadily, a majority of the country (to the consternation of Trump’s vaunted “base”).
Texas, for example, is a distinctly blue state, consisting of four of the
country’s eleven largest cities, embedded in an even larger red state. There are relatively few “purple” Texans, and
this is the case by now in most American states. These facts, far more than any of the “mystic
chords of memory” evoked by Abraham Lincoln, are what makes hopes (or fears) of
national breakup likely to be fruitless.
But, of course, this is not to say that Buckley’s diagnosis of our
national ills, or Waters’s reminders that secession has often been accomplished
quite peacefully, can be dismissed.
Instead, though they write from quite different backgrounds and
perspectives, they may ultimately provide good explanations as to why we are
basically doomed if we can’t break free of our commitment to a present
territorial status quo that generates at least as much frustration and fury as
contentment.
Posted 9:30 AM by Sandy Levinson [link]
Comments:
"Indeed, perhaps the most notable example, for Americans, is the United States itself, accurately described by Harvard historian David Armitage as a secession from the British Empire"
That description is highly INaccurate, or at best misleading. When the slaveholders seceded, they claimed it as a *Constitutional right*. Jefferson claimed not secession but revolution (a natural right, but not a Constitutional one). It's perfectly ok, these days, if someone wants to re-define "secession" to mean "any separation between parts of a previously unified country". But use of that definition anachronistically misleads everyone about what happened in 1776 v. 1860-1.
Sandy: I think one can say with confidence that no thoughtful person automatically supports or opposes all secessionist movements on principle.
Any thinking person should automatically question every secession movement for multiple reasons: (1) The fragments of a state are less economically efficient and, thus, poorer than the previous whole. This would especially be the case if Blue megalopolis city states left the rest of the nation. The seceded city states could not survive on their own and the rest of the nation would be substantially poorer. (2) Similarly, fragments of a state are militarily weaker and less secure than the previous whole, for many of the same reasons noted above. (3) Secession movements often lead to civil war during the break up or war between the resulting states afterward. What happens if CA secedes based on the vote of it's Blue megalopolises and the rest of the state refuses to leave like West Virginia during the Civil War? Does Sacramento use force to keep the Central Valley and its food with the Blue cities? Does the US send in the military to protect the rest of the state from the Blue cities? What happens if CA secedes and the US refuses to lose its Pacific ports and military bases? See Russia, Ukraine and Crimea. When George Packer, a decidedly non-hysterical and prize-winning analyst of the American political scene, describes the United States, in The Atlantic, as a “failed state,” attention should be paid. Reading the linked article, Packer is not really complaining the US is a "failed state" in the normal meaning of that word describing a state without a functioning economy or government. Rather, like others on the left, Parker is complaining the government is not dictatorial enough in dealing with the COVID illness. And is it even thinkable that one possible answer is that we are way too big, way too fragmented, as well as the victims of a an almost totally dysfunctional 18th century Constitution, to be governed effectively, whatever the exactly meaning of that term? Sandy's complaint falls into the same category. What is left of the checks and balances of our 18th century Constitution is keeping our government from directing as much of our lives as Sandy would prefer. Still, Waters’s book challenges the reader to come up with a cogent rationale for deciding between “acceptable” secessions and those we wish to reject, even regarding Yugoslavia itself. Is there, for example, any good reason to reject the legitimacy of Slovenia’s secession, which was not followed by significant violence and which has seemingly worked out well? Perhaps that is attributable to the fact that over 80% of its approximately 2 million population are ethnic Slovenes. Why shouldn’t they have a state of their own? As constitutionally designed, the USA dealt with the factionalism which plagued Europe by creating a relatively decentralized federal government, allowing states and localities most power to govern themselves, while otherwise guaranteeing individual freedom, including the ability to vote with your feet and move freely to a state or locality which better suits your preferences. The ability to run LA or CA is not enough for today's American secessionists, however. Rather, they want to entirely escape our relatively free constitutional order to impose European-style central control and limited freedoms over all of a new blue nation state. Ironically, this sort of centralization is what contributed to the European factionalism.
"Secession is nothing but revolution."
https://loa-shared.s3.amazonaws.com/static/pdf/Lee_Evils_of_Anarchy.pdf (Sounding a bit Lincolnian there) These facts, far more than any of the “mystic chords of memory” evoked by Abraham Lincoln, are what makes hopes (or fears) of national breakup likely to be fruitless. Lincoln (shades of Franklin in "1776" talking about how Americans were a new people now, separate from Britain) was poetically saying something that overlaps with the more pedestrian reality that there are a range of connections in place. Anyway, secession can be defended in certain contexts [if I was around in 1776, I very well have gone all John Dickinson, especially if I got to later be part of the Constitutional Convention] if the necessities merit it. It is best if we have some sort of mechanism, such as a sort of regional international dispute body, to handle this without bloodshed if possible. The artificial nature of many countries and territories made them more open to divisions. We also have certain in between mechanisms that allows succession to be avoided in various cases. Secession in theory can be part of the constitutional system. A constitution can set up a mechanism for consensual secession comparable to the independence granted to various regions including by the U.S. in regard to the Philippines. The Confederate constitutional argument is a lot harder though I'm somewhat open to it if the grounds are there. They weren't in 1860 but one can imagine some Nazi regime taking over and a secession movement being deemed a 10A power. Again, it's a longshot argument. As noted, we are a far way from secession even if the likes of Alaska etc. have groups that are secession-curious. It after all took years after the end of the Seven Years War for it to happen here & that was helped by the isolated nature across the ocean that simply is not present now. Anyway, world-wide experience shows the perils of secession movements though worked.
I'm pretty skeptical about any form of separation, particularly in the US. I'd consider it on pragmatic grounds, but Prof. Balkin's practical objections seem pretty hard to overcome. Setting up guidelines and protections would be hard to do.
1) "The fragments of a state are less economically efficient and, thus, poorer than the previous whole. "
That's not clearly true. It's quite possible that there's a point of diminishing returns in making a state larger, and even, somewhere beyond that, a point of negative returns, where the larger state just becomes too unwieldy to be efficient. This is particularly likely where the state in question is heterogeneous, as is likely in any really large state. Centralized authority will tend to drive uniform policies in a country that isn't really uniform. It might, for instance, mandate water saving appliances be used even in areas where there is no prospect at all of a water shortage. To give a hypothetical example of a policy no smaller government would be tempted to. 2) "Similarly, fragments of a state are militarily weaker and less secure than the previous whole, for many of the same reasons noted above." Weaker, trivially so. Less secure? Only if the weaker military isn't equal to the threat facing it, and the stronger military isn't tempted to engage in unnecessary military adventures. A stronger military than you actually need is a waste, not a benefit. 3) No argument here. Indeed, I think secession in the context of America is unlikely to be peaceful, for exactly the reason you identify. The basic problem in America is that the dividing line isn't East-West, or North-South, or anything that easy to manage. It's basically down to population density. I don't see any feasible way for urban centers to secede from the rest of the country. But that's what you'd really be looking at.
Take the USSR.
Was it bad that broke up? You also have countries that were creations of artificial colonial mash-ups. Secession there very well might make sense. We can imagine weak coalitions with a lot of local self-government like the British Commonwealth. Yes, as a norm, secession would be an extreme approach. This bias against "urban centers" which are a noticeable range nation-wide is a bit amusing on some level. Usually, you have regional areas that involve not just cities but surrounding areas that as a unit is a mixture of cities and more thinly populated areas. This is the true "urban center." Even beyond that, "urban centers" tend not to be simply isolated from other areas. So, yes not very feasible. (And, even there the assumption is off. The 2018 elections underline that there is also a suburban openness to Democratic government and even many rural areas have a mix of interests that overlap with urban in various instances.) This arose during desegregation battles including Milliken v Bradley.
Brett:
(1) A truly free market which allows free trade without state misdirection or barriers is the greatest engine of prosperity invented by humanity. The bigger the better. Expanded free markets mean access to more intellectual capital, larger supply and distribution chains, and greater competition. The Constitution created the largest free trade zone in the world, which was integral in turning the US from a nearly failed confederacy of feuding states to the most prosperous and efficient economy in human history in less than a century. Of course, government misdirection of the economy regardless of size will make it less efficient and reduce prosperity, but breaking up a nation state into smaller pieces only makes a bad situation worse, placing more of your supply and distribution chains into other uncooperative and potentially hostile nations. (2) Breaking up a large nation into smaller nations will by definition reduce military power and security. Not only will the smaller, poorer states each have less military power to defend against current enemies, they are now facing one another as potential enemies. History is littered with bad breakups of empires and nation states.
Joe: "Take the USSR. Was it bad that broke up?"
Yes, for all the reasons i noted above. The resulting states are poorer than they otherwise would have been after liberalizing the communist state. For example, instead of receiving all the products of the former Russia, the Russian rump state is now holding seceding nations like Ukraine hostage to energy embargoes. Ethic Russians left in the seceding nations will be a constant source of friction and war. See Russia, Ukraine and Crimea. The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China.
The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China.
Well, we might ask the residents of some of the new states their opinion. And let's not overlook the USSR's former subject states, like Poland, the former East Germany, etc.
Yes, byomtov -- it's like when a person divorces.
They very well might in some ways be worse off, but net, they often will tell you that it's better than being married. The ideal situation there is a somewhat friendly relationship, especially if children are involved. Often this occurs (the UK and U.S. remained close) and in the case of nations we can have economic and other arrangements in place. Not always. But, sometimes, it still is a good idea to separate. Experts can debate the details though there will be some idiosyncratic local choices made including because living together turned out just to be too difficult. "Subject states" also overlaps with my discussion of shades of sovereignty.
The former subject states seem to be doing reasonably well, which I'd expect, though Poland and Hungary aren't looking good now. It doesn't look to me as if any of the former "republics" could be described as a success, but it's plausible that they're better off than they were under Brezhnev.
Adding: I'm not sure how we count the former Yugoslavia in the breakup, but it's hard to describe that as an unqualified success.
byomtov: Well, we might ask the residents of some of the new states their opinion.
Joe: Yes, byomtov -- it's like when a person divorces. They very well might in some ways be worse off, but net, they often will tell you that it's better than being married. Excellent comparison! Marriage provides a wide range of economic, health and social benefits to the husband, wife and kids. (Yes, I did not include SSM because these unions do not create children and there is no evidence of similar benefits to the couple) While one or both of the spouses may believe divorce will be better in the long run, the broken families lose all the benefits of marriage and end up substantially worse off. Short of bailing out of an abusive relationship, divorce is generally a bad idea.
"Adding: I'm not sure how we count the former Yugoslavia in the breakup, but it's hard to describe that as an unqualified success."
I didn't think that was the test. To me, it is if it is better than the alternative. Realistically. Not ideally if some other situation was present. So, is it better if Poland was "under" Putin now etc. would factor in. The sensible move to me there is some loose coalition of European states. Excellent post. But, dividing, to red v. blue states, is not sufficient of course. Too vague for being a reason for potential breaking up. In fact, When having closer look, the potential is far greater weak: For there is no substantive issue that can cause such scale or magnitude of occurrence of breaking up. Debates are held for sub vectors, not main vectors, like: Overthrowing oppressing dictators. Oppressed ethnic groups (easily and clearly identifiable as such). No possibility to exercise religion of some sort whatever. Clearly identifiable discrimination in allocation or distribution of state resources. Everything is rather if already, tactic, repairable, about to pass, depends upon current administration, that by democratic and peaceful means, can be replaced. The frequency so far, suggests, that there is no consisting governance during long or too long period. Finally, republican shall replace democratic one, and vice versa. There are harsh debates. Yet, have to do with sub vectors, like: Second amendment. Abortions. Free speech ( in extreme cases). Gender issues (very particulars) but, not for big reasons typically causing such breaking up. Also, worth to note, that such federal system, aggregates finally huge power on the International arena. Many Americans, have become so used and spoiled in this regard ( like having veto power in the Security Council, or, imposing sanctions on firms and entities all over the world ) that finally, facing diminishing power and influence in global terms, they may regret, any stupid idea of such. Just amazing and yet, negligible illustration, titled: "BNP Paribas to pay $9bn to settle sanctions violations. France's largest bank, BNP Paribas, has agreed to a record $9bn (£5.1bn) settlement with US prosecutors over allegations of sanctions violations." You get it ? A French bank has pissed them off, and, a " fine" of 9bn dollars imposed on them. Simple as that. Would you give up such "French luxury". Well, not so fast !! Here: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28099694 For the rest, we won't stay young no more here.... Thanks
"I didn't think that was the test. To me, it is if it is better than the alternative. Realistically. Not ideally if some other situation was present."
I agree in concept, though counterfactuals are pretty disputable. Still, in the case of Yugoslavia there was a major civil war with ethnic cleansing. That's pretty awful.
"While one or both of the spouses may believe divorce will be better in the long run, the broken families lose all the benefits of marriage and end up substantially worse off. Short of bailing out of an abusive relationship, divorce is generally a bad idea."
Lol this is like saying you shouldn't retire because you won't make as much money if you do. Also, boy Bircher Bart's wife is one unlucky gal.
"The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China."
Remember this the next time our Bircher starts talking about how the slightest infringement on liberty is not to be beared and how steps toward socialism or totalitarianism are TEH WORST. It''s dishonesty and incoherence all the way down.
Yeah, I found that statement a bit surprising myself. What Bart doesn't seem to grasp is that a lot of the parts of the USSR, which fled it as soon as they had a choice in the matter, count themselves among Russia's enemies.
The USSR wasn't a federation of equals. It was a Russian empire, with most of the rest of the USSR consisting of subject states.
It was also one of the closest modern regimes to constitute actual totalitarianism. Escaping that was the best thing that could happen to the other states, allowing them to develop into more free societies. Reagan was correct to call it the Evil Empire.
Mr. W/Brett:
The disintegration of Russia/USSR was not the American colonies separated by an ocean declaring independence from a foreign country to establish a free nation. The departing states were part of Russia for centuries and left to form their own ethnic enclaves. Once again, what did they gain from the departure? Russia is still bullying and now is often warring on them. Their new governments are just as corrupt and unfree as before. Indeed, in many cases the new bosses are the same as the old bosses. Their economies are worse off.
It doesn't look to me as if any of the former "republics" could be described as a success, but it's plausible that they're better off than they were under Brezhnev.
Nor does he grasp that whether they are better off or not is for the inhabitants to say, not us. This is also true of divorced people.
Mr. W:
The seceding states did not abandon communism for freedom. The whole of Russia more or less abandoned the Soviet communism at the same time. The question was to do this together or apart.
Abandoning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a necessary first step away from communism and towards having the most important thing a person or people can have: autonomy. And it's simply not true that the nations are worse off as a general matter (see Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are all classified as 'Free' by Freedom House while Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are 'Partly Free).
Mr. W:
FWIW, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania were independent countries until WWII and I place them in the same category as the occupied Warsaw Pact nations. I am discussing secession of long time parts of Russia like Ukraine and White Russia. Ukraine is partly free in comparison to where they were under the totalitarian Soviet communists. The government is BAD.
So, you mean the departing states were part of Russia for centuries, except for the ones that weren't?
Brett:
We are discussing the breakup of nations through secession, not occupied foreign countries regaining their independence.
A partly free but corrupt government > a totalitarian one.
Also, Estonia was an independent country for only about two decades before Soviet rule.
Mr. W: Abandoning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a necessary first step away from communism and towards having the most important thing a person or people can have: autonomy.
Let's explore that. Individual autonomy is freedom to live as you please so long as you do not harm others. I agree this is an unalloyed good. You never have. But group autonomy? Do you actually consider racial or ethnic group political autonomy a good? (For example, only Ukrainians can pass laws for Ukrainians) Why? How do you determine who belongs in a group? What happens to the minority groups you will have in every geographic subdivision absent racial or ethnic cleansing? Does every minority racial or ethic group have a right to secede from a nation state? Ukrainians from Russia, then Russians from Ukraine, then Asian Russians from White Russians, and so on and so forth.
I noted that I was looking for a good book on the Articles of Confederation (did not get the book that deals with it some that Mark suggested though it is a library ... when they open again) and one reason is that it has some interesting stuff.
Note this part: And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state. The Preamble of the Constitution speaks of a "more perfect union" so I take it reasonable to consider this to be basically still binding. Such is the reasoning of Texas v. White after the Civil War. Lee to his son noted: It was intended for “perpetual union,” so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. I think he might have altered his view in time. After all, our constitution is one in constant development, minus the very fixed clauses. I'm not really a believer in "perpetual" commands of this sort except that it would require a revolution or a new constitution (thus our Constitution didn't need the ratification of each state as spelled out in the Articles). At some point, if some extreme thing happened, one can imagine Alaska or Hawaii not being part of the union any more. Let's say some global disaster which made it best for Russia [in this scenario, a better Russia] to take care of Alaska or something. So, an amendment might do the trick in such a scenario.
Note also this late in the AOC:
And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said articles of confederation and perpetual union The only place the Lord is referenced in our Constitution is the date & that probably can just be seen as a sort of "date stamp." The Confederation Constitution is notable for "invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God" and repeatedly people wished to amend our "godless" Constitution to do something similar.
It's a meaningless abstraction to talk about the distinction between individual autonomy and group autonomy in this way because individuals define and achieve/exercise 'individual' autonomy living in groups. And for individuals in many groups, they will have their autonomy thwarted if they live in polities run by other groups, hence their group/individual autonomy depends on autonomy from the latter groups.
"I agree this is an unalloyed good. You never have." Lol, says the authoritarian who just lamented the passing of the USSR. You can't make this up at home folks.
joe, that's interesting. What surprises me is how many conservative Christians would get so much satisfaction from such an anodyne, lifeless statement. I doubt seriously they'd lead off any personal prayer with 'oh, Great Governor of the World.' That was plainly Deist fare, thin gruel I should think for them.
It reminds me of what one might imagine Bircher Bart's love poetry to his wife might consist of given his comments about marriage and divorce: "oh darling, every day I am thankful that we entered into this mutually advantageous compact making us eligible for so many economic benefits, subsidies and health benefits like decreased cholesterol levels, perhaps, which would be lost if we dared end the compact. I hope these mutually advantageous benefits last forever (or until they become marginal benefits or worse)." ;)
"Yes, I did not include SSM because these unions do not create children"
This almost slipped by. Iirc the late Shag used to needle Bircher Bart because he could not produce children. Perhaps that was some fact that came out before I started to read this blog. To the extent it's true this has got to rate as one of our Birchers' greatest 'every accusation is a confession' moments (right up there with Bircher Brett's anti-immigration obsession for a guy who married foreign born woman, I wonder how he'd feel about someone telling their son to 'go back to Manila!').
Mr. W: It's a meaningless abstraction to talk about the distinction between individual autonomy and group autonomy in this way because individuals define and achieve/exercise 'individual' autonomy living in groups...
This is the foundational belief of every flavor of totalitarianism ever proposed. ...and for individuals in many groups, they will have their autonomy thwarted if they live in polities run by other groups, hence their group/individual autonomy depends on autonomy from the latter groups. This is why classical liberal nations enforce equal protection of the law and bar discrimination based on race and ethnicity. BD: I agree [individual autonomy/liberty] is an unalloyed good. You never have. Mr. W: Lol, says the authoritarian who just lamented the passing of the USSR. You can't make this up at home folks. You just did. What I actually posted: The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China. I happily include myself as a US citizen thrilled with the fragmentation of the Soviet Empire. At the time, I was serving as an infantry officer tasked with defending Germany from the "red horde." However, this does not prevent me from observing, by all objective measures, the breakup of Russia did not go so well for the people of the seceding provinces.
"This is the foundational belief of every flavor of totalitarianism ever proposed."
This is the foundational belief of reality. "This is why classical liberal nations enforce equal protection of the law and bar discrimination based on race and ethnicity." No nation that is classically liberal in Bircher Bart's metric has done so. His Golden Ages of pre-1900 USA and classical Britain certainly did not. Of course, it was only when governments Bircher Bart classifies as 'progressive/socialist/totalitarian' came to pass that equal protection barring discrimination on race and ethnicity was taken seriously. Another own goal for Bircher Bart. "The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China." As you can see, Bircher Bart thinks people under Soviet rule were better off under Soviet rule. He's an authoritarian. "by all objective measures, the breakup of Russia did not go so well for the people of the seceding provinces." See, our Bircher doesn't think freedom, liberty and autonomy are objective measures and/or of any moral weight. He literally doesn't care a whit for individual liberty or autonomy and has said so here.
There does seem to be some appeal to references of God in some fashion as seen in many state constitutions, using different phrasings. The usage in the AOC suggests an attempt to bring in as many people as possible, thus acceptable to deists. It's an example of being reasonable even if one doesn't go all the way (here a strict separation of church and state).
Mr. W: It's a meaningless abstraction to talk about the distinction between individual autonomy and group autonomy in this way because individuals define and achieve/exercise 'individual' autonomy living in groups...
BD: This is the foundational belief of every flavor of totalitarianism ever proposed. Mr. W: This is the foundational belief of reality. Every totalitarian believes so. Mr. W: ...and for individuals in many groups, they will have their autonomy thwarted if they live in polities run by other groups, hence their group/individual autonomy depends on autonomy from the latter groups. BD: This is why classical liberal nations enforce equal protection of the law and bar discrimination based on race and ethnicity." Mr. W: No nation that is classically liberal in Bircher Bart's metric has done so. Your contention is the US (or anyone else) has never enforced equal protection of the law; thus, by your reasoning, it is necessary for racial and ethnic minorities to secede from the US. My Lord, you are on a roll! BD: "The only people better off with the breakup of the Russia/USSR are its rivals/enemies like the US, EU and China." Mr. W: As you can see, Bircher Bart thinks people under Soviet rule were better off under Soviet rule. He's an authoritarian. Yet another strawman from a liar in order to engage in a libel. Secession from Russia was not necessary to abandon Soviet communism because all of Russia did so. The Ukrainians left to form a majority Ukrainian state.
"Every totalitarian believes so."
And they're correct about this. Think of it: Bircher Bart could not even make this silly claim about individuality without the fact that he was part of groups, without language (which is a social construct). "thus, by your reasoning, it is necessary for racial and ethnic minorities to secede from the US." That's of course not my reasoning, but a classic logic fail of our Bircher's. My point was clear to the non-addled: no 'classical liberal' polity he recognizes has taken equal protection to bar discrimination based on race or ethnicity seriously. That's a fact. "Secession from Russia" There was no 'secession from Russia,' there was secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the closest *actual* modern totalitarian empire. And now Ukraine is more free than Russia (not to mention the many other constituent parts of the USSR that are much more free than when they were linked to Russia under communism), but of course Bircher Bart doesn't value freedom so that doesn't matter to him.
joe, I'd like to think that the logic for the Constitution was that there was a fear of a stronger federal government messing with, or rather just supplying, some religious pronouncements or establishments that might be seen as at odds with a state establishment* or hard fought neutrality, and so they wanted to keep 'God' out of the federal document so that each state could do what it wanted without feeling it was aligning with a contrary 'establishment.'
Were that more conservative Christians saw this logic in *every facet of their government* (in other words, they thought about their intended government expressions in the terms of 'what if some other religion were in power and did the same, would I like that?'). But taking the view of others is very difficult for many conservatives it seems these days.
"Rather, like others on the left, Parker is complaining the government is not dictatorial enough in dealing with the COVID illness."
This reminds me of the snowflake conservative who, having been asked to wear a mask to shop in a store, cry about the tyranny of it all. Let's note that our Bircher Bart, post 9/11, was only too happy to see the President at the time engage in much closer to actually dictatorial ways, he put on his skirt and grabbed his pom poms and cheered as people were widely surveilled, renditioned, indefinitely detained, tortured, cheering the whole time for these awesome powers to be used without any meaningful check. But someone telling him he should only make trips like to the grocery store or Lowes? DICTATORIAL HOUSE ARREST! This is privilege expressed in infantile ways.
Mr. W:
I mean this most sincerely - F___ off! I am doing fine because our state dictator has decreed the practice of law to be necessary. I have two clients who will lose their businesses and life’s work because our dictator has decreed their businesses to be non-essential. They are joining two other main street businesses which have failed. There are a couple other restaurants who are not longer answering their phones for takeout. The restaurants still doing takeout are earning maybe a 1/5 of their normal income and have laid off nearly all of their employees. My doctor sister is out of work because of decrees stating that her type of non-emergency medicine was unnecessary. She is going through her retirement to pay the mortgage and feed the kids. I suspect the rural hospital it took years to bring up here will go under for the same reasons. My wife and I have given thousands to the local food bank and it is not remotely enough. Unemployment here is reaching great depression levels. This is not a frigging game. Tens of millions like my family and neighbors are being plunged into poverty because of cluelss asses in government and other clueless asses like you who support them. If our dictator in Denver does not grant our county the requested waiver from his decrees, we need to tell him to f__ off as well. You can talk when you voluntarily give up all your income and savings in solidarity with the neighbors you support impoverishing.
Mr. W:
blah...blah...blah... # posted by Blogger Bart DePalma : 9:37 PM You really should be pissed off at the orange clown who parroted Chinese government propaganda and did nothing to stop the spread of Corona here in the US. That's why we're screwed. Hopefully the Corona kills both of you and makes our country a much better place.
Bircher Bart finally finds compassion for those impacted by dictatorial government. When our government was renditioning people, he was not only silent, but waving his pom pom's approvingly. When our government was engaged in widespread surveillance, he did the same (until they focused on the Russia riddled GOP presidential campaign, hey, that's for little people!). When they rounded up families and put them in cages he rushed to be the top of the pyramid.
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When they restricted restaurants to take out though, he went full William Wallace. This is not a serious man.
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