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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahman sabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts Does Impeachment Work?
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Monday, January 27, 2020
Does Impeachment Work?
JB Is the American Constitution's system for presidential impeachment good or bad constitutional design? Do the Constitution's provisions actually serve their intended purposes? The Trump impeachment trial adds one more data point to a very small number of cases. If the purpose of impeachment is to remove a president who has abused his power, acted corruptly, or engaged in high crimes and misdemeanors, the Constitution's system for impeachment is a failure. The reason is the emergence of a political party system that the Framers did not expect or intend. The effects of party control and polarization on impeachment If the president's party controls the House of Representatives, impeachment is very unlikely. It is no accident that to date all impeachments (involving Johnson, Clinton, Trump, and Nixon's resignation) have occurred when the President's party did not control the House (Andrew Johnson was a Union Democrat who found himself president after Lincoln's assassination, and faced off against a Republican-controlled Congress). If the President's party does control the House--a very common occurrence in American history--impeachment is essentially off the table, and so it will not perform the function that the framers assigned to it. Even if the House does impeach a president, it still takes a two-thirds vote in the Senate to remove him. If the president has a majority of co-partisans in the Senate--or even close to a majority--and politics is highly polarized, as it now is, the president cannot be removed, no matter how badly he acts. Richard Nixon's case is instructive. His is the one example where the system appeared to work as the framers designed. Nixon clearly deserved impeachment. He was a criminal who abused his power as president. He was forced to resign when members of his own party encouraged him to go. Unlike today, however, 1974 was still a relatively nonpolarized environment. Our current wave of polarization began in the late 1960s following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, but it did not become a significant force in congressional politics until many years later, in the 1990s. Equally important, Republicans controlled only 43 seats in 1974 (42 Republicans plus one Conservative Senator); today they control 53. Even in the relatively nonpolarized environment of 1974, Nixon's party still did not abandon him until the Supreme Court ordered him to hand over the Watergate Tapes, which provided conclusive evidence of his crimes. If the Watergate Scandal had occurred in today's America, Nixon would have had the advantages of a highly polarized (and loyal) Republican Party, a Senate majority afraid to cross him, and a devoted conservative media apparatus. (He would also have had the benefit of a conservative Supreme Court majority ideologically predisposed to protect presidential prerogatives.) In other words, if Nixon had today's Republican Party and Fox News, he probably would have survived. There are multiple reasons to think that the Constitution's system for impeachment will fail in a highly polarized politics. A strongly polarized environment encourages partisan loyalty and epistemic closure. It undermines trust between the two parties, each of whom believes that the other party cannot be trusted with power. Because removal of a president would give the hated opposition a decisive political victory, and undermine the party's electoral chances going forward, senators from the president's party have good reasons to keep the president in power even if they know that he is unfit for office. Losing is not an option, and so one must cling to power at all costs. In addition, in a highly polarized environment, senators from the president's party have good reasons to fear that they will be disciplined electorally by the president's political allies and by the party's base of voters. In the current context, Republican senators know that they will immediately face an onslaught of attacks from conservative media and that many sources of campaign funding will dry up. A primary challenge is highly likely. President Trump has successfully sidelined congressional and Senate Republicans like Jeff Flake who dared to criticize him openly. They were either defeated in primaries or retired. Accordingly, the remainder of his party in Congress has learned that it is prudent to be either silent and obedient or openly sycophantic. In a period of high polarization, voting to remove your own party's president is an act of political suicide. Impeachment does not remove demagogues The Trump Presidency also suggests that the Constitution's system for impeachment and removal will fail us precisely when we need it most. Trump is a demagogue-- the type of leader that the framers feared. However, the kind of political environment that makes it possible for a demagogue to rise to power is also likely to be highly polarized, making impeachment ineffective. Demagogues threaten the survival of democracies because they undermine democratic norms and culture. They are also likely to be deeply corrupt and a corrupting influence on republics. But successful demagogues are also likely to have devoted followings. Therefore they are able to impose discipline over their followers and co-partisans, who will follow the leader even when he is obviously corrupt. We have seen the unfortunate results of this kind of demagogic politics in the Trump impeachment proceedings. In addition, demagogues like Trump thrive on polarization and they do their best to make it even worse. Thus, they are protected by and exacerbate the political conditions in which the impeachment power is least effective. This means that the impeachment process is most likely to fail at its constitutional purposes when American democracy is threatened by a corrupt and demagogic president who can demand complete loyalty from the members of his party. In fact, the more devious, demagogic, and shameless the president, the more insulated he may be from removal. That is because of the way the party system operates in highly polarized times. Another possible function of impeachment I began this post with the assumption that the constitutional purpose of impeachment is to remove a president who abuses his power or engages in high crimes and misdemeanors. For reasons I have described, the system is not well designed for this task, and it is least effective when it is most needed. But impeachment might serve other functions. One function of impeachment might be to undermine the president's party's chances of keeping the White House in the next election. Again, we have only a small number of data points to work with. Nevertheless, the Nixon impeachment likely undermined Gerald Ford's ability to win in 1976 (especially because Ford pardoned Nixon); and the Clinton impeachment probably was a drag on Democratic votes in 2000 because it greatly complicated Al Gore's electoral strategy. He could not easily run as the third term of the Clinton Presidency while still distancing himself from Clinton. According to this view, it is worth it for the Democrats in Congress to offer as strong case for Trump's impeachment as possible. Showing the American people that Trump has abused his power and committed high crimes and misdemeanors will not by itself remove Trump from office, but it will help undermine his chances for reelection. Put another way, every impeachment has two juries-- the first one is the Senate; the second one is the public in the next election. It has long been assumed that impeachment proceedings against Trump made little sense when the election is less than a year away. But based on the history of the Nixon and Clinton impeachments, this might be a good time to pursue an impeachment. Everything turns on whether one can successfully use the impeachment process to influence public opinion, and convince just enough people that the party in power cannot be trusted. Of course, impeachment could have exactly the opposite effect. Trump may use his acquittal-- and his assertion that he has been persecuted by the Democrats and the deep state--as a way to motivate his base. In contrast to Nixon and Clinton, Trump will also be the first president in American history to be impeached and then immediately stand for reelection. So we don't know if impeaching a president weakens his party's chances at staying in power under these circumstances. But if it does, then impeachment might still serve a useful function, just one that the framers did not expect. Posted 8:55 AM by JB [link]
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Books by Balkinization Bloggers ![]() Linda C. McClain and Aziza Ahmed, The Routledge Companion to Gender and COVID-19 (Routledge, 2024) ![]() David Pozen, The Constitution of the War on Drugs (Oxford University Press, 2024) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation (Yale University Press, 2024) ![]() Mark A. Graber, Punish Treason, Reward Loyalty: The Forgotten Goals of Constitutional Reform after the Civil War (University of Kansas Press, 2023) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision - Revised Edition (NYU Press, 2023) ![]() Andrew Koppelman, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed (St. Martin’s Press, 2022) ![]() Gerard N. Magliocca, Washington's Heir: The Life of Justice Bushrod Washington (Oxford University Press, 2022) ![]() Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2022) Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021). ![]() Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak, eds., Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond (University of Massachusetts Press, 2021). ![]() Jack M. Balkin, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Same-Sex Marriage Decision (Yale University Press, 2020) ![]() Frank Pasquale, New Laws of Robotics: Defending Human Expertise in the Age of AI (Belknap Press, 2020) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time (Oxford University Press, 2020) ![]() Mark Tushnet, Taking Back the Constitution: Activist Judges and the Next Age of American Law (Yale University Press 2020). ![]() Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?: The Unnecessary Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2020) ![]() Ezekiel J Emanuel and Abbe R. Gluck, The Trillion Dollar Revolution: How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Politics, Law, and Health Care in America (PublicAffairs, 2020) ![]() Linda C. McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) ![]() Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction (University of Chicago Press, 2019) ![]() Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke University Press 2018) ![]() Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, eds., Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018) ![]() Gerard Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights became the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018) ![]() Cynthia Levinson and Sanford Levinson, Fault Lines in the Constitution: The Framers, Their Fights, and the Flaws that Affect Us Today (Peachtree Publishers, 2017) ![]() Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) ![]() Sanford Levinson, Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought (University Press of Kansas 2016) ![]() Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in the 21st Century (Yale University Press 2015) ![]() Stephen M. Griffin, Broken Trust: Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform (University Press of Kansas, 2015) ![]() Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015) ![]() Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014) Balkinization Symposium on We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution ![]() Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2014) ![]() Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2013) ![]() John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2013) ![]() Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment (New York University Press, 2013) ![]() Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013) Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform (Oxford University Press, 2013) ![]() James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (Harvard University Press, 2013) Balkinization Symposium on Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues ![]() Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University Press, 2013) ![]() Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012) ![]() Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) ![]() Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012) ![]() Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2012) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011) ![]() Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) ![]() Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, First Amendment Stories, (Foundation Press 2011) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011) ![]() Gerard Magliocca, The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash (Yale University Press, 2011) ![]() Bernard Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2010) ![]() Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 2010) Balkinization Symposium on The Decline and Fall of the American Republic ![]() Ian Ayres. 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Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press 2009) ![]() Mary Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (Oxford University Press 2008) ![]() David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) ![]() Ian Ayres, Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-By-Numbers is the New Way to be Smart (Bantam 2007) ![]() Jack M. Balkin, James Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman and Tal Zarsky, eds., Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (N.Y.U. Press 2007) ![]() Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play: Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds (N.Y.U. Press 2006) ![]() Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006) Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge University Press 2006) Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford University Press 2006) Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge University Press 2006) Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (N.Y.U. Press 2005) Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press 2004) Balkin.com homepage Bibliography Conlaw.net Cultural Software Writings Opeds The Information Society Project BrownvBoard.com Useful Links Syllabi and Exams |