Now I'd very much like to see a study and report about the pervasive ignorance of STEM among the justices. Many attorneys, especially those who deal with Intellectual Property or Tax Laws, have a solid background in STEM or Economics, but no Justice in my memory, with the possible exception of Steven Breyer, has shown much erudition in math, natural science or economics, and it always shows.

In Amerika, it's hard to be judged by your peers if you are skilled in anything but the humanities. Thomas and Stephens (RIP) were English majors, for Chrissake!
 

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I am far less inclined to cut Justice Gorsuch any slack. A truly educated, open minded person can both critically analyze secondary sources, and stay relatively free of confirmation bias.

But only if he or she wishes to.
 

Gorsuch in particular strikes me as unjustifiably confident of his expertise in many matters. Amity Shlaes? Really? I seem to recall that during the argument on the census question he was dismissive of the views of the Census Bureau statisticians on the grounds that, more or less, "Experts are sometimes wrong, so my own conjectures are a good as theirs."

Roberts, of course, famously dismissed arithmetic as "sociological gobbledygook."

The fundamental ignorance of these matters is astonishing. Why are statistics and probability not an integral part of the law school curriculum? Is it inaccurate to say that a big part of law is evaluating evidence? If not, then why is a common and powerful type of evidence ignored?
 

Constitutional Commentary had a bi-centennial Marbury v. Madison issue with several fine articles on that early major SCOTUS decision. One of those articles was written by Sandy and Jack Balkin focusing on the "facts" in the case. Their article looked at many facts about the case that were not revealed in the decision. These facts were quite significant, including the role of CJ Marshall in the Adams administration that might have constituted a conflict of interest for CJ Marshall. This article raised the question in my mind of the accuracy of the "facts" of a case referenced in a SCOTUS opinion. I was reminded of this by Mark Tushnet's post on Justice Gorsuch's "facts" on Schecter.

Richard Primus' post addressed a weakness of originalism, using Gorsuch's references to Locke. Most readers of Primus' critique of Gorsuch on Locke I assume would accept Gorsuch's reasoning. Should readers be burdened with reading up on Locke to see if Gorsuch's reasoning makes sense? How much of Locke would a curious reader have to read to determine whether or not such reasoning is valid? Assuming Gorsuch has become aware of Primus' critique, will Gorsuch defend his reasoning or correct it if he determines that Primus' critique is valid?

Likewise, if Gorsuch is aware of Tushnet's critique, will he defend his "facts" on Schechter or concede that he was in error? Would "correction" appear in the Gorsuch's opinion?

Perhaps opinions of the Justices have to be critiqued for the kinds of missteps suggested by Tushnet and Primus. With the proliferation of opinions - and longer opinions - this would be a difficult job. Maybe a future opinion will point to the errors claimed by Tushnet and Primus. But Marbury still stands tall even after the bin-centenary articles referenced earlier.

Sandy references Trump and Boris Johnson in tandem. I would add Bibi. They have similar visages of crazy eyes.

And I'm pleased that Sandy mentioned his critique of both Scalia and Stevents histories in Heller. That can't be said enough.
 

"And I'm pleased that Sandy mentioned his critique of both Scalia and Stevens histories in Heller. That can't be said enough."

I wouldn't dispute that; Neither the majority nor the minority in Heller got things right. It's just that, where the majority set out to preserve a non-threatening remnant of the right in question, the minority set out to uproot it root and branch, to leave no bit of it remaining. So the majority didn't have to go quite as far in distorting history.

But they both falsified some significant history, (For instance, Scalia turned the decision in Miller on its head.) and I would not be surprised if it wasn't intentional on both sides. I suspect that if Scalia had been faced with the choice of either upholding Coxe's right to "every terrible implement of the soldier", or signing onto Stevens' opinion, Stevens would have triumphed.
 

Scalia's majority opinion in Heller ignored the brief of historians and ignored the brief of linguists on the history and original meaning of the 2nd A.. It has been said that Scalia included his dicta on appropriate limitations to assure getting the majority. I don't know if that's correct. Rather, I 'm of the view that Scalia wanted to avoid his opinion being alongside CJ Taney and Dred Scott. Scalia's "self-defense" of an individual was distinct from a well regulated militia. Under state law, common law, self defense via a shod foot, a knife, a rock, etc, would be available outside of the Constitution. Maybe in Scalia's own mind he was a 2nd A absolutist, as Brett seems to be. Of course such non-military weapons can't do the carnage that military grade weapons in "common use" can. And of course Scalia did not address that self-defense has evolved over centuries.
 

"Of course such non-military weapons can't do the carnage that military grade weapons in "common use" can."

That's why Coxe said every terrible implement. He wasn't sugar coating it.

"Scalia's majority opinion in Heller ignored the brief of historians"

There were, of course, multiple historians' briefs. Most of them quite favorable to my side of the argument.
 

Trained statisticians will likely appreciate the (in)significance of numerical superiority in an unrepresentative sample.
 

Such briefs must stand or fall on their own merits. I was merely pointing out that Shag's use of 'the' was inappropriate.
 

Back in the day, others referred to "the" brief of the historians and to "the" brief of the linguists. These historians and these linguists were renowned academics in their respective fields. Scalia did not follow these scholars. As Brett concedes, the history used by Scalia has been severely criticized even by originalists. According to Brett Scalia relied upon "Most of [the multiple historians] quite favorable to my side of the argument." Alas, Brett does not have his desired revolutionary 2n A absolutism, at least not yet.
 

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Anyway, as to the OP, Gorsuch is basically of a breed of second generation Federalist Society types too full of themselves about history. Judges of various types have this quality but Federalist Society types self-righteously say they are just bound by history that they all too often don't really understand. This is not a matter of them simply making things up but they are guilty of some degree of historical negligence. The way he got his current job makes me a bit more annoyed at this sort of thing.

The signing on of clerks with special history knowledge is appreciated though historians are of a mixed bag too so law clerks with history majors only will take us so far. They also need a bit of humility or some knowledge might be a bad thing.
 

I read a range of books and articles on the background of the 2A from a range of points of view. The most accurate accounting to me was that the understanding of its meaning developed over time and Justice Alito touched upon this in McDonald v. Chicago:

By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Government would disarm the universal militia—had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense.

A former comment said this:

I wouldn't dispute that; Neither the majority nor the minority in Heller got things right. It's just that, where the majority set out to preserve a non-threatening remnant of the right in question, the minority set out to uproot it root and branch, to leave no bit of it remaining. So the majority didn't have to go quite as far in distorting history.

The majority preserved the part that the 2A developed into (balancing the evidence, I say this). The 2A started as a concern for the federal government not to threaten state militia. State militia at that time were governmental bodies made up of average men, akin to juries. The governor was the head of the state militia and average male citizens voted for lower officers (as one might vote for a jury foreman).

The 2A in framing had an exception for conscientious objectors. But, COs didn't as a rule not have guns for self-defense or hunting. They weren't vegans or Jainists. They were dissenters from military use. As historical accounts like put forth by Saul Cornell note, self-defense was another matter. People had a fundamental right to self-defense (and hunting for subsistence). But, it wasn't the concern of the 2A generally speaking. More open-ended wording to that effect was declined.

Scalia's Heller ruling focused on what the 2A eventually became -- a concern for self-defense. By the time the 14A was ratified, that was widely an understanding of what the right meant. The state militia was seriously in the decline. The militia, however, was the focus of the argument in Heller. Stevens told that half of the story.

In McDonald v. Chicago, Stevens also talked about the right to self-defense by use of arms. He said there was a serious argument for it as a liberty right but as a judicial matter -- as a matter to overrule local democratic decision-making -- he argued the evidence wasn't compelling enough.

I wish either Kennedy or Souter wrote the opinion in Heller -- either might have wrote a more honest accounting of the right in question, Souter from the old New England where the right to own a gun for self-defense is respected (see, e.g., liberal Senator Leahy having a firing line at his home). But, as far as it goes, Alito's opinion is better than Scalia's especially the last part of Heller where instead of sending it back to apply the new rule, Scalia offered a mixture of advisory opinion and fact-finding ruling on handguns, safety locks and so forth.

Anyway, the regulations allowed in Heller/McDonald limits its scope. And, like other constitutional rights, history and practice provides various regulations are appropriate. The nature of the militia and even the language "well-regulated" also warrant this. Speech doesn't mean any verbal threat is okay (among any number of other regulations allowed) and the 2A allows them too.
 

I share Joe's views of Gorsuch and of Federalist Society judges, with the slight caveat that his family and regional background seem to provide him with an interesting voice on Indian cases, and he has the virtue of calling them as he sees them in criminal procedure cases.

As for the OP, I am all in favor of a well rounded education, but I have to say that Roscoe Pound was wrong and judges are probably better off not teyong to be amateur sociologists (or statisticians or economists or historians). Just follow the precedents and try to get the law right
 

One thing about the Second Amendment is a lot of people go around pretending the textual meaning isn't obvious. It's ridiculously clear that the idea was to have an armed populace a la Switzerland which would be trained and regulated and available to defend the Republic.

The problem is that doesn't fit into the narrative of either side of the modern gun control debate. It doesn't permit draconian restrictions on weaponry, but also doesn't support the hyper-libertarian "I can own all the guns I want and it's none of the government's business".
 

" It's ridiculously clear that the idea was to have an armed populace a la Switzerland which would be trained and regulated and available to defend the Republic."

Absolutely, this is not rationally disputable. Self defense would have been seen as a 9th amendment right; One so obvious as to not have been stated, an inevitable corollary to the right to life stated in the Declaration.

They key point here is HOW they set out to safeguard the militia system: They sought to protect it against being discontinued, neglected, by a government that didn't WANT to maintain a militia system. Or wanted a select, rather than general militia, which would exhibit the same disadvantages as a standing army.

Their approach was to guarantee to us as individuals, NOT militia members, a right to be appropriately armed, and to train. So that a population armed, and familiar with those arms, would be available to raise a militia from at need, even if the people in charge of the government didn't want it to be possible to raise a militia.

If the right had been restricted to just militia members, it would still be easy to discontinue the militia, and with it the capacity to raise a militia if needed.

That's how you square the circle, Dilan: It's an individual right guaranteed to protect the ability to raise a militia from the general population. And like all rights, it protects that against the government itself.

As such, of course, it is a right to military arms, not civilian. Not that there was any such distinction at the time. THAT distinction only arose in the US in the mid 1900's, as a result of the federal government setting out to violate the 2nd amendment.

Lesser arms are only protected in the sense that, once you have a right to military arms, no law denying you lesser arms can be "necessary and proper"; It would be outlawing aspirin when people have a right to codeine.
 

Brett details his revolutionary 2nd A absolutism at 5:41 AM. But Scalia in Heller did not so provide. Nor did Alito in McDonald.

Brett may be - or not - a member of an unregulated militia in his South Carolina community, ready for a revolution if necessary, under 2nd A absolutism. Would such an unregulated militia be considered a collective or just a bunch of individuals each with his/her own views of the meaning of the 2nd A?

The militia clauses in the 1787 Constitution acted in tandem, and continued so after the 2nd A was ratified. There might have been changes in practice regarding the role of the militia as time went on to the Civil War, as Alito pointed out in McDonald in connection with the incorporation of certain of the bill of rights via the 14th A. But that applied to the states. But the 2nd A may have become obsolete because of the changes in practice regarding the militia. Forcing life - actually death - into an obsolete 2nd A was judicial activism considering that McDonald came down more than 100 years after the 14th A was ratified.

Self defense had been around with the common law and later state laws, evolving in different forms, not in one universal form.

Both Scalia in Heller and Alito in McDonald relied upon originalism in their opinions for the Court. Does that mean we look to what constituted self defense in the various states in various forms when the 14th A was ratified, but that at the federal level we look to what constituted self defense when the 2nd A was ratified? What clarity do we have on the 2nd A at the federal and state levels since these two 21st century decisions outside the home from the Court? Citizen Brett can attend - or not - his unregulated militia meetings to discuss whether the government - either at the state or federal level - is doing the right thing in their view, and if not, to rebel under the guise of the 2nd A with all kinds of military weapons. Multiply this by the number of unregulated militia throughout the nation. Are they coordinated to rebel against the government? Is Brett still mentally pulling the red radishes of his youth? Might all this lead to domestic violence? Are state and the federal governments hog-tied by the 2nd A to challenge, per militia clauses, what might be domestic violence or indeed a revolution?
 

Brett's comment at 5:41 is a paradigm example of what the OP (and previous posts) were criticizing.
 

What Brett gets wrong is that the Second Amendment didn't repeal the treason clause. Levying war against the United States is expressly made illegal by the Constitution.

So the militia was supposed to protect the Republic, not commit treason against it.

That has a couple of important implications:

1. RKBA, while an individual right, is subject to regulations that would advance the purposes of having a trained, disciplined militia at the ready. So the government can't prevent individual gun ownership but can require members to report for training, take safety classes, secure their weapons, and register them.

2. While I agree in general terms that there is some right to military weaponry, there is also room for regulations based on the need for an effective fighting force. In a military unit, especially dangerous weapons might be kept in armories, issued only on need, and issued only to those people who demonstrate proficiency and prudence.

The thing is, this is all so far from the modern gun control debate. The government would need to decide what the citizen militia would look like and how it is to be disciplined and trained.
 

Pfft. I'm probably better read on the relevant sources than 99.999% of the population, having been an academically inclined 2nd amendment activist. You're not arguing with me, you're arguing with people like Tench Coxe and Judge Story.
 

"What Brett gets wrong is that the Second Amendment didn't repeal the treason clause. Levying war against the United States is expressly made illegal by the Constitution.

So the militia was supposed to protect the Republic, not commit treason against it."

It would have been utterly absurd to have written into the Constitution a right of revolt against unjust rulers; Such rulers would never say, "Well, ordinarily we'd crush all resistance against us, but you do have that clause stating that revolt against unjust rulers is constitutional, so I guess we'll have to let you revolt."

Franklin was given to the occasional joke, but Madison wouldn't have written one into the Constitution.

Judge Story: "The importance of this article will scarcely be doubted by any persons, who have duly reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, with which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people. The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights. "
 

It would have been utterly absurd to have written into the Constitution a right of revolt against unjust rulers

Brett, the problem is that the move you are making is exactly what you always accuse liberals of doing.

The Constitution is 100 percent clear-- no right of armed revolt against the government. It's the only crime specifically set forth in the Constitution, and it is defined as a capital crime.

Against that, you (and it isn't just you, it's most of the modern Second Amendment activist crowd) points to statements from Story and, heck, Madison as well, in which they talk about a right of revolt.

But the problem is, as you just said, they couldn't get that language into the Constitution. In fact, they didn't even try. Because they knew that authorizing a right to revolt against the government would have turned the thing into a suicide pact.

So Story's and Madison's statements, and all the others, are the equivalent of the modern legislative history that conservatives always tell us that we should reject-- members of Congress who can't get whatever they want into the bill so they go on the floor and make a self-serving statement about how the language that was passed should be interpreted.

Given that the Constitution prohibits armed revolt in clear and express terms, that's the end of the issue. No right of armed revolt can be read into the 2nd Amendment even if you pull out 400 statements from framers saying it should be in there.
 

To get back somewhere within shooting distance of the original topic of the post, can we really create a law school curriculum -- even for elite law schools -- on the assumption that our graduates will sit on the Supreme Court and decide profound questions of public policy? Most of us, and I include myself, hack around with the intellectually paltry tools in our professional toolbox trying to persuade a judge or jury that X is the fact rather than Y, and that, under tolerably well understood rules, my client should, therefore, win. When the rule in question is not tolerably well understood, I have a different toolbox of similarly unremarkable tools for trying to persuade a judge that the understanding that favors my client is correct. Every so often, a case depends on facts known to certain types of experts, but not to lawyers. In those cases, a lawyer must exercise due humility. I may have a qualitative understanding that some layperson's statistical argument is wrong, common enough in discrimination cases, which I do a lot of, but if the actual numbers matter, I hire someone to create the "gobbledegook." I hope I have enough grasp of statistical ideas not to be taken in by charlatans and to translate the goobledegook, with help from my expert, into English. But a freshman level independent knowledge of statistics, or economics, or some conceivably relevant natural or social science -- which is more than most non-professionals have and as much as we can reasonably expect law students to acquire -- is more likely to give lawyers falso confidence in their views than actual knowledge.
 

"Brett's comment at 5:41 is a paradigm example of what the OP (and previous posts) were criticizing."

Indeed. As I've often said, he's one of the least self-aware fellows I've ever seen.
 

I don't think law school can give future judges much more than a little bit of knowledge in many subjects and a little bit of knowledge can often be worse than no knowledge (because the person thinks they have enough when they should be more humble). To me the answer is that judges need to practice more restraint and give deference where it's due to experts.
 

To get back somewhere within shooting distance of the original topic of the post, can we really create a law school curriculum -- even for elite law schools -- on the assumption that our graduates will sit on the Supreme Court and decide profound questions of public policy? Most of us, and I include myself, hack around with the intellectually paltry tools in our professional toolbox trying to persuade a judge or jury that X is the fact rather than Y, and that, under tolerably well understood rules, my client should, therefore, win. When the rule in question is not tolerably well understood, I have a different toolbox of similarly unremarkable tools for trying to persuade a judge that the understanding that favors my client is correct.

I have never been treated as a bigger pariah than the day I argued, when speaking to the assembled faculty of a major law school, that law schools are trade schools and need to stop trying to teach students how to be law professors and start teaching them how to be lawyers and to pass the bar instead.

Law faculties would openly revolt at that. It's not their self-image, and it's not what they want to teach. And as a result, the bar review courses and big law firms have to fill that educational gap, which is scandalous given what people pay to go to law school.
 

To get back somewhere within shooting distance of the original topic of the post, can we really create a law school curriculum -- even for elite law schools -- on the assumption that our graduates will sit on the Supreme Court and decide profound questions of public policy?

Law schools can teach law, including how law is actually applied in real life.

As far as that goes, that would suggest a value to a range of subjects not merely law related. For instance, a study of statutory interpretation in a vacuum without a basic understanding of political science as to how laws and regulations are crafted is artificial. This might be obtained largely in education before law school. The traditional law, for instance, was supposed to be educated in a range of things (including classics, history, rhetoric, etc.) which would assist here.

At some point, a lot of what becoming a good justice entails comes after law school. Justice John Paul Stevens was a law clerk, in private practice, a counsel to a congressional committee and then a lower court judge. This all "educated" him as well as a range of other things probably regarding being a justice. Other justices were "educated" in other ways.

I think law school curriculum can be a subject of discussion here but ultimately there is also a limit. This also should provide a judge some humility when they try to write historical papers akin to the one by Gorsuch that was cited.
 

As far as that goes, that would suggest a value to a range of subjects not merely law related. For instance, a study of statutory interpretation in a vacuum without a basic understanding of political science as to how laws and regulations are crafted is artificial.

What do you mean "political science"? Certainly you need a basic knowledge of CIVICS. But I think of political science as things like rigorous studies of voting patters, polling data, and the like.

This also should provide a judge some humility when they try to write historical papers akin to the one by Gorsuch that was cited.

The reality is both lawyers and judges tend to lack this humility. As OP said, the tendency is to think you can become an expert within an hour.

The striking thing is how useless most of it is. You don't actually have to be a historian to interpret the Constitution-- indeed, you generally get a better interpretation if you ignore what Madison and Jefferson and the other slave-raping scuzzballs who founded this country thought, and just look at the iteration of caselaw over the years. Nor does tort or antitrust law have to do exactly what economists want it to do. Let the legislature decide to what extent to write expert opinion into the law. Judges are much better off applying precedent and using judgment, which are supposed to be their core competencies.
 

Does that mean we look to what constituted self defense in the various states in various forms when the 14th A was ratified, but that at the federal level we look to what constituted self defense when the 2nd A was ratified?

Shag flagged this idea before.

The understanding of specific aspects of the terms of the Bill of Rights changed over time. The understanding was not the same in 1787 and 1868. But, as a general rule, the courts today apply a one size fits all approach.

The law of self-defense developed over time and as with other matters in our common law constitutional system, a two track process is not how the 2A is now applied. In both cases, the law as developed over time is factored in.

BTW, only one judge took seriously that D.C. v. Heller was a special case in that it was not a national law interfering with state action but dealt with law in the federal district. It was just handwaved in the majority opinion and the dissents to my memory didn't even touch upon it. Given the 2A as a whole as well as strength of government interest to justify the laws in question, the matter seemed worthy of a bit more attention.
 

Just to be clear, I don't deny the value of broad intellectual culture, even for hacks. And if anyone has a practical proposal for integrating what specialized disciplines know into instruction on legal topics where that knowledge is relevant, I'm all for it. But I think the best plausible result of such instruction is an ability to "issue spot," and to bring to the forefront of the students' minds how much they don't know. That is far from nothing.
 

I agree with CJColucci and Joe about the need to recognize what you don't know. One sad fact about the legal system is that it rewards lawyers who can spout bullshit confidently. That's not just true for matters outside the law, but I've seen plenty of it inside the law as well. We can hope judges will spot the latter, but these days too many of them are overloaded with cases and underloaded with clerks, so bullshit prevails more than it should. Overconfidence in the judges, a la Gorsuch or Roberts, is only part of the problem.
 

What do you mean "political science"? Certainly you need a basic knowledge of CIVICS. But I think of political science as things like rigorous studies of voting patters, polling data, and the like.

The dictionary definition that came up: "a social science concerned chiefly with the description and analysis of political and especially governmental institutions and processes." I'm using it basically as generally but if you think of it in some narrow sense, my apologies.

History and other things can help interpret the meaning of the Constitution though should be used carefully with "judgment" with the best amount of humility as a judge (or lawyer) can provide. This includes the "scumballs" and non-scumballs involved in the process. It doesn't mean we have to follow "exactly" what any expert (there no one position anyway on any given matter of dispute here) but they factor into decision-making. This is seen from constitutional analysis from the 1790s on.
 

I think 99.9 percebt of history in constitutional interpretation is window dressing. It isn't a rule of decision and really never has been.
 

And just to gild the lily a little, way too many lawyers underrate precedent. Precedent isn't as sexy as history, or original understanding, or policy, or economic efficiency. And obviously people go back to the instances where a precedent like Plessy simply had to be overturned.

But we have a common law system for a good reason. Precedent reflects the wisdom and learning of all the brilliant jurists that came before. It gives you the wisdom of crowds. And it allows the legal system to learn over time.

One of the very best things about the American system is our precedent-based common law legal system, which we got from the British. It doesn't get nearly enough love from lawyers and legal theorists, But I think it's the best possible way to run the railroad-- far better than having judge play amateur historian or amateur economist.
 

I think that both history and precedent are important. In fact, I'd argue that precedent contains within it the need to understand the history of the law. We need to understand the development of legal doctrine historically in order to understand why precedent takes the form it does.

I also think that the term "precedent" is overused. It shouldn't mean "some judge made a dumb ruling in the past, and I can cite that dumb ruling to justify the dumb thing I want to do now". A true precedent needs to be more robust than that. It should not be a single court, it should be many courts over many years. It should be approved, or at least acquiesced in by the other branches of government and by the public at large.
 

This is a not bad quote on a finding of precedent: "my judgment by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation."

But a slave owning scumball wrote it, so I won't rest on it alone.

Precedent will involve history as noted. People, each one, here and elsewhere reference history repeatedly when talking about constitutional meaning. It is an aspect of applying the law, including history over time (the history of marriage, e.g., developed over the years, and understanding that helps settle various questions in this context).

So, that leaves the "historian" or "expert" part. Where do people learn about history and so on? From others, including experts in the field. As with an expert witness (let's say a blood expert) in a trial, they are not gods. The people making the judgment have the final say. Some, however, might not have enough humility to give credit where credit is due regarding how they make their judgment.

And, in the end, people often go where they want to go regardless but as a whole that is not ALL that happens especially in multimember institutions.
 

A number of the comments, following the post, focus on what law schools do, which is to train lawyers--and as CJ Colucci says, this is about being able to make, one way or the other, a plausible argument for your client in court--or to provide legal advice, as an expert on the law, to your client. But the topic being discussed is not what lawyers need to know, but what judges need to know, particularly when their decisions are not reviewed by anyone else. I'd say judges need to know what lawyers know, plus a lot more, most especially the limits of their knowledge. Unfortunately there isn't any way, in the US legal system, to require judges to learn anything.