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Julian
Nyarko, Eric Talley, and I have just posted a new paper
that uses computational methods to investigate the ideological and partisan
structure of constitutional discourse on the floor of Congress (and secondarily
in newspaper editorials). The headline finding is that constitutional discourse
has grown much more polarized over the past four decades. In fact, it has
polarized at least as rapidly as nonconstitutional discourse. How can computational
methods show this? Relative to the early and mid-twentieth century, it has become
substantially easier for an algorithmic classifier to predict, based solely on the semantic content of a
constitutional utterance, whether a Republican/conservative or a
Democrat/liberal is speaking.
There
are a number of other intriguing findings in the paper, which we hope will open
up a new set of research agendas for constitutional scholarship. Here, I will
mention just one.
Although
the paper focuses on aggregate trends in “constitutional polarization,” we consider
in Part V whether some especially salient terms may be doing outsized work in
differentiating the parties’ contemporary constitutional rhetorics. The figures
below display word clouds associated with the utilization of terms in the broadest
constitutional dictionary that we created (containing terms from the text of
the Constitution as well as important constitutional concepts that are at least
several decades old) for two eras: 1959 to 1976 and 1999 to 2016. The earlier
era predates the recent surge in polarization of constitutional discourse; the
later era captures the surge at its apex.
Figure
A shows the fifty most distinctive terms
regardless of party in congressional floor remarks from each era, with size
scaled to its distinctiveness. “Distinctiveness” refers to the difference in
the relative frequency with which a term is used across the two major parties.
For instance, if Republicans use a term 10 times for every 10,000 words they
speak, whereas Democrats use it 8 times, then the distinctiveness is
(10/10,000) – (8/10,000) = 0.0002. In other words, these are the fifty
constitutionally freighted terms that are most strongly “owned” by one
particular party during the years in question.
Figure
B replicates the analysis for the Obama presidency specifically, the last full
presidency for which we have data. All terms in all word clouds are color-coded
based on which party uses the term most frequently.
These
results, I submit, are stunning. In the 1959–1976
period, Figure A shows, congressional Democrats had a far more distinctive and robust constitutional vocabulary than
Republicans did. In the 1999–2016 period, the opposite was true—with the
important exceptions that the terms “civil rights” and “voting rights” remained
squarely in the Democratic fold.
Put (overly) simply, Democrats used to dominate constitutional
discourse. Now Republicans do.