Balkinization   |
Balkinization
Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts The "ratification" of the ERA
|
Friday, June 01, 2018
The "ratification" of the ERA
Sandy Levinson
Comments:
Okay.
I think I'll just say "altogether untenable arguments" is debatable. Given past comments, further comment is likely to be redundant or off topic, so I think I'll end there.
Sandy Unless one makes the altogether untenable arguments that a) Congress cannot impose a time limit on the consideration of proposed amendments and b) that states have no right to rescind earlier ratifications prior to the addition of a proposed amendment to the Constitution...
Would you care to explain your reasoning? Where does Article V grant Congress the power to place time or any other limit on the power granted states to hold ratification votes? Where does Article V grant states the power to rescind previous ratifications? The grant of power to hold a ratification vote does not imply the opposite power of recission. Thanks in advance.
I think the better analogies would be:
(1) The House and Senate pass a bill that says it only becomes law if the president signs it within 24 hours. The president signs it after 48 hours. The entire bill, including the 24-hour provision, thus becomes law, according to the Constitution. The 24-hour provision is plainly unconstitutional, and it seems to me that the remedy should be to sever it, not strike down the entire law. To do otherwise would effectively allow congress to shorten the president's signing period. The ERA's proponents have a tougher case because all they have is constitutional silence, rather than a constitutionally specified ratification period. And it seems reasonable that after a couple of hundred years, congress could have concluded that it's a bad idea to keep stacking up live amendments. But I'm not sure that makes their argument untenable. (2) Once the House and/or Senate passes a bill, I don't think it can change its mind, even if the other body or the president hasn't acted yet. Similarly, once Congress has proposed an amendment, can it withdraw it? I wouldn't think so. (If it can, that destroys the argument that Congress needs to be able to put time limits on ratification.) Certainly a state cannot rescind its approval once ratification is complete. On this one, I think the ERA's proponents have the better argument.
"the Senate has nothing more to commend itself than did the three-fifths clause."
My jaw dropped when I read this. You can't possibly mean it - slavery, which was required to give the three-fifths clause force, was one of the greatest moral evils that our planet has ever witnessed. To say that the relative malapportionment caused by the structure of the Senate is even in the same universe of illegitimacy and immorality - well, I'm going to have to assume you don't really mean it.
The three-fifths clause was designed to establish disproportionate representation in the House (and the Electoral College), and the Senate was designed to have disproportionate representation. In that respect they are comparable. The post did not imply that the undemocratic nature of the Senate is as great a moral evil as slavery.
online pg courses
These sort of post are continually motivating and I like to peruse quality substance so I am upbeat to discover numerous great focuses here in the post
"The three-fifths clause was designed to establish disproportionate representation in the House"
Yes, it was. It was intended to reduce the political representation of slave states. The default, remember, is that those who couldn't vote DID count, 1 for 1, for purposes of representation. Children, women, disenfranchised criminals, they all counted 1 for 1. Only slaves counted for less, reducing the political power of the states that held them. With no such clause, slaves would have counted 1 for 1, also, and the slave states would have had more power in Congress. Would a 0/5ths clause have been better? Sure, if you could have still had a united states, instead of secession occurring 70 years earlier. That's why it's called the three-fifths compromise: They reduced the representation of slave states as much as they could without prompting the slave states to reject the Constitution and go their own way. I truly hate the gross political lie that's become so common, that the 3/5ths compromise was a pro-slavery clause. It was an anti-slavery clause, and everybody knew it. It only started getting called pro-slavery a few decades ago, when the left decided that it needed to discredit the Constitution as all about protecting slavery, and lying about the 3/5ths clause would be a good start. There ARE clauses in the Constitution that are genuinely odious. Say, the fugitive slave clause. "No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due." But the three-fifths clause is not one of them.
Brett, your comment is valid only if one presumes that it would have been just to give the slave states FULL representation in Congress for their slaves, even though those states did not represent the interests of their slaves in Congress, as they represented the interests of the white children and white women in their states. (I don't mention white disenfranchised criminals because I don't know whether they were disenfranchised back then, or if disenfranchisement came about as part of Jim Crow.) To presume that it would have been just to give the slave states ANY representation in Congress for their slaves would be ridiculous.
I forget who, but someone said that, because the slave states consider slaves to be property, it would make as much sense to include them in determining the number of representatives as it would to include the number of cattle in those states.
It was Elbridge Gerry, who was the vice president under Madison and who gave his name to "gerrymandering."
The slave state delegates to the Convention were thrilled with the 3/5 clause (and other pro-slavery provisions) and said so. They used it as a pro-ratification argument in the Southern state conventions.
As a full-time troll at this Blog, Brett exposes himself as a student of revisionist history on the subject of slavery under the Constitution.
"Brett, your comment is valid only if one presumes that it would have been just to give the slave states FULL representation in Congress for their slaves,"
I had absolutely nothing to say about justice. I simply pointed out that the default rule was that non-voting groups were counted for representation purposes, and that the 3/5ths compromise represented a reduction in the representation of the slave states relative to that default position. The revisionist history is the history that claims that the 3/5ths compromise was purely a gift to the slave states. When a "compromise" is exactly what it was, splitting the difference between what the two sides wanted, in order that a flawed Constitution could be ratified, instead of a better one not being ratified. The abolitionists might have negotiated harder, but the perception at the time was that slavery was in a decline, and would be weakening over time. Later historical developments, such as the invention of the cotton gin, unfortunately changed that.
Brett, What "default rule" do you refer to? I don't think that a rule could have existed before the Constitution was ratified. Is the default rule just your own? If so, then my default rule is that white non-voting groups were counted for representation purposes, or that non-slave (white or black) non-voting groups were counted for representation purposes. Under my default rule, the 3/5ths compromise represented an increase in the representation of the slave states relative to that default position.
I take your points that you were not commenting on the justice of the matter, and that the 3/5 clause was a compromise.
Since a few people commented on it, I'll just state my opinion on the 3/5 Compromise.
It was an anti-slavery clause, and everybody knew it. Brett pushes the quite valid "compromise" argument but cannot leave it there. As Mark Field notes, the provision was seen as a benefit to the slave states. Slavery was a powerful interest at the time, including those who didn't own slaves but profited from it. The Constitution was going to have to -- in 1787 -- live with it somehow. Like now, we live with very bad things too. So, like Benjamin Franklin said in "1776," not being demigods, they had to compromise with evil. Slaves were not seen as members of the political community. This made them different from women, children, non-property owners and even free blacks (contra to Taney, accepted at least in some states as members). So virtual representation for them would not follow a similar "default" rule. This made counting them somewhat controversial, but again, it was a compromise. Previously, each state had one vote. Now, in one house, states broke down by population. But, slaves was a special sort of "person" (something many slaveowners basically ignored), including as economic units (one means banded about to figure out representation and appropriate requirements as to taxation). Thus, the compromise. BTW, slaves were treated as "persons" in certain ways, so were not mere property. They even sometimes had a right to counsel (e.g., Missouri freedom suits). The "odious" nature of the Fugitive Slave Clause is unclear unless you are not going to recognize slavery at all. At the time, especially if putative slaves were given due process rights in fair hearings before being seized, it was accepted practice in each state, even Massachusetts, to return putative fugitive slaves. The 3/5 Compromise was in place because it was recognized that states could have slavery and that the slaves were rightly only counted by 3/5. Once you do that, unequal laws for free blacks become reasonable, the very citizenship of blacks can be questioned. There is something "odious" about this, but in 1787, it was a practical necessity akin to letting states deny women the right to vote. And, though how exactly it will play out was unknown (some were more sure slavery was on the decline than others), the compromise did give additional power to states with a smaller political community. Free women at least had some rights to speak out and petition, even if they could not vote in the republic being crafted. And, one that in the process would benefit slave interests. So, this too was an odious component of the compromise.
Brett rarely comments on the justice of matters. One doesn't have to read between Brett's lines to understand where he stands on racial, speech, religion, guns, issues and yes, gender as demonstrated by Brett at both Gerard's post and Sandy's post on ERA. Brett obviously looks at justice for minorities and others without power as a personal zero-sum game.
Henry's point about the lack of any pre-existing rule is a good one. It's important to remember that the 3/5 rule was originally adopted in 1783 as a compromise on *taxes*. It had nothing to do with slavery per se (all states other than MA had slaves at that time), nor with voting (all states voted as units in the Confederation Congress). The 3/5 scheme was adopted in the Constitution in order to allocate *votes*, which is a very different thing, particularly when one is claiming to institute a republic.
Joe's point about compromise is also well-taken. The 3/5 rule was not adopted in a vacuum. It was part of a wide-ranging compromise, parts of which we can reconstruct (equal representation in the Senate; Congressional power to regulate commerce) and parts of which we can infer (abolition of slavery in the Northwest Territory). Plus some other clauses related to them. Because it was part of a compromise, it's impossible to describe the 3/5 clause as any sort of "defeat" for the South. As I said above, their representatives were very happy with the result; SC, for example, ratified the Constitution quickly and by a margin of more than 2-1.
Is there a breakdown somewhere on how states handled apportionment of state legislators at that time? How did a Northern state with a significant slave population, e.g., apportion its state legislature including heavy slave areas?
I don't know enough of state rules at that time to give a definitive answer. In VA, they mostly drew lines to protect slaveholding interests. The coastal areas (lots of slaves) were disproportionately represented compared to the Piedmont and areas west (few slaves). That continued until the Civil War, and it's one reason WV was so ready to break away.
AFAIK, they didn't try to draw lines based on population, but to cover, say, counties. This may not have mattered much, since voting was restricted to property owners.
Ok, so I found this paper which discusses state apportionment from 1776-1920: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/Apportionment%20of%20State%20Legislatures%201776-1920.pdf
For the period we're discussing here's the bottom line (be sure to read fn. 1, because older charters would be much less representative): "For the first three decades after 1776, a majority of state constitutions adopted apportioned legislative districts using geography as a basis - fixing in the constitution the number of legislators that each county or other subdivision would receive.1 Even this approach, however, appears at least in part to have taken population into account because these geography-based apportionment schemes often gave additional representation to counties or cities with greater population. Moreover, population was more evenly spread across rural and urban counties prior to the rapid urban population growth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so apportionment by county did not create the disparities it would today. Of the original thirteen states, only two expressly apportioned by population in their first postindependence constitutions – Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. 1 We analyzed only constitutions enacted from 1776 forward; we did not study colonial charters which remained active during the early years of statehood in some states." The whole thing is only 9 pages, so it's worth reading.
Appreciated.
Certain delegates argued that counting slaves would be absurd so it seems rather logical to then ask how they specifically handled things. But, basic discussions do not appear to talk about such things. Confusion about "default rules" there is understandable. The Constitution is in respect to apportionment and other things (such as eligibility to office) somewhat ahead of its time.* I will take my own state -- NY -- particularly since it had a sizable slave population (Sojourner Truth is perhaps the most famous). Reference is made to a census of "electors and inhabitants" but the preset numbers set by the state constitution are only to be updated as necessary if they are not proportional to the electors. Cf. Art. I of the Federal Constitution Let's go to South Carolina. The Constitution of 1790 allots by region. Not clear how they figured out the numbers. The 1808 version counted "white inhabitants" and the Senate by region. There is a rather convoluted description of exactly how this is done. But, even free blacks are not counted for this purpose. === * There is not always a match there -- e.g., some anti-federalists were called out for caring so much about rights or structural restraints being absent in the proposed federal constitution when their own states did not protect such or such.
President Trump's claimed, via his lawyers, power to obstruct justice is the power to destruct justice: absolute power. A constitutionally claimed exception to no one being above the law. Shades of Nixon's "When the President does it, that means it is not illegal"
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/rural-electrification-administration/ To The Federalist Papers! Trump is the Anti-Federalist.
Aside: the 3/5ths clause explicitly excluded "Indians not taxed" from the count. Should we conclude that Congresspeople did not (and perhaps still do not) represent the interests of the Native Americans resident in their constituencies? In antebellum America, they represented the interests of their slaves the way they represented the interests of their dogs and cattle.
“Indians not taxed” weren’t counted because the Indian tribes were independent, sovereign states in their own right, and so most Indians weren’t Americans. Except for those who had left their tribes and joined American society, thus becoming subject to taxation by that society.
President Trump, via his lawyers, abrogates America's longstanding "the rule of law, not of men" governance with "the law of the rule of the President." It's time to rain on, rein in and reign over Trump's "parade of horrors."
Post a Comment
|
Books by Balkinization Bloggers Linda C. McClain and Aziza Ahmed, The Routledge Companion to Gender and COVID-19 (Routledge, 2024) David Pozen, The Constitution of the War on Drugs (Oxford University Press, 2024) Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation (Yale University Press, 2024) Mark A. Graber, Punish Treason, Reward Loyalty: The Forgotten Goals of Constitutional Reform after the Civil War (University of Kansas Press, 2023) Jack M. Balkin, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision - Revised Edition (NYU Press, 2023) Andrew Koppelman, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed (St. Martin’s Press, 2022) Gerard N. Magliocca, Washington's Heir: The Life of Justice Bushrod Washington (Oxford University Press, 2022) Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2022) Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism (Oxford University Press 2021). Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak, eds., Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond (University of Massachusetts Press, 2021). Jack M. Balkin, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Same-Sex Marriage Decision (Yale University Press, 2020) Frank Pasquale, New Laws of Robotics: Defending Human Expertise in the Age of AI (Belknap Press, 2020) Jack M. Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time (Oxford University Press, 2020) Mark Tushnet, Taking Back the Constitution: Activist Judges and the Next Age of American Law (Yale University Press 2020). Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?: The Unnecessary Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2020) Ezekiel J Emanuel and Abbe R. Gluck, The Trillion Dollar Revolution: How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Politics, Law, and Health Care in America (PublicAffairs, 2020) Linda C. McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction (University of Chicago Press, 2019) Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke University Press 2018) Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, eds., Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018) Gerard Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights became the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018) Cynthia Levinson and Sanford Levinson, Fault Lines in the Constitution: The Framers, Their Fights, and the Flaws that Affect Us Today (Peachtree Publishers, 2017) Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) Sanford Levinson, Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought (University Press of Kansas 2016) Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in the 21st Century (Yale University Press 2015) Stephen M. Griffin, Broken Trust: Dysfunctional Government and Constitutional Reform (University Press of Kansas, 2015) Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015) Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014) Balkinization Symposium on We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2014) Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2013) John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2013) Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment (New York University Press, 2013) Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013) Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform (Oxford University Press, 2013) James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (Harvard University Press, 2013) Balkinization Symposium on Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University Press, 2013) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012) Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) Linda C. McClain and Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012) Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2012) Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011) Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, First Amendment Stories, (Foundation Press 2011) Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011) Gerard Magliocca, The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash (Yale University Press, 2011) Bernard Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2010) Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 2010) Balkinization Symposium on The Decline and Fall of the American Republic Ian Ayres. Carrots and Sticks: Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done (Bantam Books, 2010) Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters (Yale University Press 2010) Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff: Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010) Jack M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (2d Edition, Sybil Creek Press 2009) Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2009) Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate?: How the Case of Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (Yale University Press 2009) Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The Constitution in 2020 (Oxford University Press 2009) Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press 2009) Mary Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (Oxford University Press 2008) David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) Ian Ayres, Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-By-Numbers is the New Way to be Smart (Bantam 2007) Jack M. Balkin, James Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman and Tal Zarsky, eds., Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (N.Y.U. Press 2007) Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play: Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds (N.Y.U. Press 2006) Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale University Press 2006) Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge University Press 2006) Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford University Press 2006) Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge University Press 2006) Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (N.Y.U. Press 2005) Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press 2004) Balkin.com homepage Bibliography Conlaw.net Cultural Software Writings Opeds The Information Society Project BrownvBoard.com Useful Links Syllabi and Exams |