Balkinization  

Monday, January 30, 2017

The Normal Politics of Abnormal Presidents

Mark Graber

Donald Trump is an abnormal president.  Mr. Trump lacks any traditional criterion for the presidency other than being elected by the rules prescribed by Article II.  He is a sexual predator, a serial liar, proudly ignorant, a bully and a bigot, who surrounds himself with the worst characters of American constitutional politics.  Unlike any other president in American history, Mr. Trump has no particular commitment to the institutions of constitutional democracy, broadly defined.  If Ben Carson was arguably a dimension worse than any other aspirant for the presidency in 2016, Mr. Trump is dimensionally worse than Mr. Carson.  Claims that some other president or presidential aspirant are as unqualified or as bad, while perhaps true regarding an individual characteristic (Trump may be no dumber than Warren Harding), are ludicrous in the totality.  Whatever his psychological condition, Mr. Trump is constitutionally unfit for the White House or any other position in a constitutional democracy.

The Trump presidency is nevertheless the consequence of normal constitutional politics.  Trump was elected according the constitutional rules.  His candidacy was a product of changes in campaign-finance that have increasingly facilitated self-financed candidates with limited political histories as well as celebrities such as Ross Perot and Sarah Palin.  The 2016 vote largely mirrored  the 2008 and 2012 vote with differences being as much explained by secular trends in voting choice as particular details of the campaign such as the FBI's intervention.  The only major unique event was the publication of embarrassing documents by Russian hackers, which no doubt played some role in the election.  Still, evidence suggests that false news and information played a far greater role and the inability of many voters to make accurate judgments about basic facts seems a consequence of long-term trends in how Americans obtain and process facts about the political world. 

The normal politics that generated an abnormal president highlight the necessary repairs that must be made to the American constitutional order to prevent Trumpism.  If constitutional order A in the normal course of operation generates constitutional order B and constitutional order B is a terrible regime, constitutional order A has severe design flaws and cannot be restored merely by a temporary expedient that removes a particular manifestation of political outcome B.  Impeaching Trump promises only temporary relief.  If Donald Trump were to disappear today, the combination of campaign finance laws, media practices, party politics and sheer bigotry that produced Donald Trump will likely produce some variation on Donald Trump in the foreseeable future.  That is our new normal.  Trumpism can be prevented only if fundamental changes are made to the constitutional order, whether those changes be, as Sandy Levinson insists, to the constitutional text, or as I believe, to the way that constitutional politics functions.

Alas, the normal politics that generated an abnormal president also highlight why very few governing officials have an incentive to change fundamental features of the constitutional order.  The vast majority of powerholders in the United States are the beneficiaries of this dysfunctional constitutional regime.  Donald Trump is good for media profits, which means Trump or similar are good for a corporate controlled media.  Republicans are unlikely to tinker with a constitutional order in which Republicans control most levers of government.  Republican Senator Shelley Moore of West Virginia spoke for her party when commenting that most Republicans like the direction Mr. Trump is taking the country, even as they wish Mr. Trump would tone down his rhetorical excesses.  Leading Democrats are also unlikely to tinker with a constitutional order which has contributed to their control of the party.  In this constitutional order, after all, Nancy Pelosi gets to be House Minority Leader and Hillary Clinton almost wins the presidency.  Not bad.  In a constitutional order in which Democrats are the majority party, a fair probability exists that different persons play prominent leadership roles in that coalition. 

The challenge that the normal politics of abnormal presidents present is finding the resources in the existing constitutional order for upending that regime with the understanding that the means by which this order is upended will likely become the normal politics of the next era.  A military coup that overthrows Mr. Trump provides the foundation for the military coup that overthrows President Elizabeth Warren.  If the left gains power through riots in the streets and general strikes, then opposition to a leftwing government is likely to take the form of riots in the streets and general strikes.  The best solution and the most challenging one is a campaign aimed at mobilizing voters under the most difficult circumstances for mobilizing voters since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Judge Posner on Syrian Refugees

Gerard N. Magliocca

Last fall, a panel of the Seventh Circuit handed down Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, which held that the State of Indiana (led then by the current Vice-President) could not lawfully exclude Syrian refugees from the state because that was inconsistent with the federal refugee policy in place at that time. Without commenting on the legality of the President's current executive order, let me quote some excerpts from Judge Posner's opinion about the facts of the case.

Because of fear of terrorist infiltration--apart from the massive 9/11 terrorist attacks, Boston, New York and San Bernadino (California) have been targets of terrorist attacks since 2001 by persons not born in the United States--all persons seeking to enter the United States as refugees are required to undergo multiple layers of screening by the federal government, following screening by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, before they can be admitted to the United States. The process can take up to two years. Of course, there can be no certainty that no terrorist will ever slip through the screen, elaborate though it is; for there has been terrorist infiltration of this country since 9/11 and there is a specific concern about Syrian refugees: many of them were born elsewhere, moved at some point to Syria, became caught up in the civil war there, sought to escape from that embattled nation in which hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed, and are difficult to screen because little may be known about their life either in Syria or in their country of origin if different from Syria . . .
The governor of Indiana believes, though without evidence, that some of these persons were sent to Syria by ISIS to engage in terrorism and now wish to infiltrate the United States in order to commit terrorist acts here. No evidence of this belief has been presented; it is nightmare speculation . . .
The governor's brief asserts 'the State's compelling interest in protecting its residents from the well-documented threat of terrorists posing as refugees to gain entry into Western countries." But the brief provides no evidence that Syrian terrorists are posing as refugees or that Syrian refugees have ever committed acts of terrorism in the United States. Indeed, as far as can be determined from public sources, no Syrian refugees have been arrested or prosecuted for terrorist acts or attempts in the United States. 

More than seventy years ago, Justice Robert Jackson explained that "oversimplification, so handy in political debate, often lacks the precision necessary to postulates of judicial reasoning." The President is soon going to find that out, and he's going to get tired of all the losing.

Sunday, January 29, 2017

Trump's Refugee Order and The Initial Judicial Resistance

Jonathan Hafetz

Last night’s ruling by a federal district judge in Brooklyn, temporarily blocking enforcement of key portions of President Trump’s order on refugees and other immigrants, is important in several respects. Trump’s order seeks to suspend entry of all refugees to the United States, bar Syrian refugees indefinitely, and block entry into the U.S. of citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries (based on those countries' purported associations with terrorism). The order’s implementation produced immediate chaos and suffering—with refugees from war torn countries and legal permanent residents returning home trapped in America’s airports—and sparked protests across the country.  Judges in other jurisdictions have also issued rulings blocking parts of Trump's order. (See the E.D. Va. order here, blocking removal of legal permanent residents).  While it is too early to draw firm conclusions, here are a few preliminary thoughts on what these important developments could portend.

In entering the stay, Judge Donnelly found that the petitioners had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their procedural due process and equal protection challenges and faced irreparable harm. (Petitioners also raised statutory and international law arguments).  The order, entered after an emergency hearing on Saturday night to forestall imminent deportations, did not flesh out the court's analysis. But its issuance suggests that the judge was moved at least in part—and properly so—by the discriminatory animus underlying the order. (David Cole has argued why, for this reason, the order also violates the Establishment Clause). This animus appears not only in the order’s text (note its pledge to keep “radical Islamic terrorists” out of the U.S., while never mentioning other terrorists), but also by Trump’s repeated anti-Muslim statements both during the campaign and since taking office, including his express preference for “Christians” seeking asylum over “Muslims.”

The decision provides a few tea leaves for predicting judicial review in a Trump administration. First, Trump’s overreaching—and his refugee order is almost certainly one example of more to come—could provide an impetus for judges to curb doctrinal anomoloies.  In this case, it may embolden otherwise sympathetic judges to chip away at the plenary power doctrine, long criticized as an aberration to prevailing anti-discrimination norms in constitutional jurisprudence. (See Ruthann Robson’s post discussing recent cases where the Supreme Court has suggested it may cast a more critical eye at the doctrine). The refugee order’s combination of manifest bias and arbitrariness—note its senseless targeting of some countries to the exclusion of others (including countries from which the 9/11 attackers came) and its blatant disregard of evidence on the lack of a security risk posed by refugees (see Alex Aleinikoff's post here)—may give judges ground to strengthen those anti-discrimination norms, under whatever standard of scrutiny they ultimately apply. The same goes for the government’s continued assertion of categorical territorial limitations on the Due Process Clause to preclude its application to those stopped at the border-- should, for example, the government continue to detain refugees and others denied entry under Trump’s order without a hearing.

Second, and relatedly, ordinary doctrines of judicial deference will prove vulnerable in the face intemperate and irresponsible action by the executive. Ben Wittes has catalogued the chaos and confusion surrounding the order, which excluded lawyers and other officials in the executive branch with  relevant expertise. For a parallel, look at the trio of Supreme Court defeats suffered by the Bush administration after 9/11 on the detention and treatment of terrorism suspects, which resulted from a disregard for legal rules and which was pushed by an ideological cabal within the administration and excluded top military officials. Put simply, judges will be less likely to defer to knee-jerk extremism from a White House in which Steve Bannon is calling the shots or exercising influence. The Trump administration has already appeared to retreat from one key part of the order--the provision affecting legal permanent residents--but the damage to the administration's credibility has been done.

Third, federal courts will continue to provide a crucial check, not only because of their structural independence, but also because they remain insulated from Trump’s non-fact based world. Unlike in the media, where Trump continues to peddle lies (like the falsehood that millions of undocumented immigrants voted illegally during the presidential election) and muddy the water before the American public, courts still operate in a world of law and facts. That is not to say some judges will not view some issues in a manner favorable to the Trump administration.  But it does mean that, at least unless and until Trump launches a direct assault on the judiciary, there is still one place where Trump will have to provide answers to the reality based world and will be held accountable on that basis.

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Foreign Policy Chaos

Stephen Griffin

For my war powers book I reviewed the foreign policy, with special reference to decisions related to war (including covert operations) of all US presidents since FDR.  With the possible exception of Kennedy’s acquiescence to Eisenhower’s Bay of Pigs invasion and Alexander Haig’s privately expressed (in the early Reagan administration) proposal to turn Cuba into a parking lot, this is the worst start in foreign policy I can think of for any modern presidential administration.  There’s no real comparison.  Things are sliding downhill remarkably fast.  But let’s keep in mind that it’s not really because of the actions of the “US government.”  It’s just President Trump’s White House.

Although Trump provoked a needless dispute with Mexico (needless because, after all, parts of a wall already exist and we could have presumably expanded it somewhat without jeopardizing our entire relationship), the seven-nation ban on refugees is in another category altogether.  There could be severe consequences for the US, both externally and internally, from this action, which will be fairly termed a ban on Muslims.  I suppose we could discuss policy consequences like an increase in terrorism, but the more obvious and immediate dangers are legal and constitutional.  The White House just threw a cloak of legitimacy around arbitrary discrimination against Muslims and, in doing so, Trump employed an explicitly religious rationale.  This puts us in exceedingly dangerous territory.

Remember Nixon’s second-term challenge to the other branches to “epic battle?”  That was mostly posturing on Nixon’s part, because he was already deeply embroiled in the Watergate conspiracy.  But Trump’s refugee order is the equivalent in our time and poses a tremendous challenge of moral, legal and institutional response.  Of course there will be a response from outside the government, but what about inside?  I can barely believe that responsible officials in the DOJ and the State Department, in particular, will support this action.


There is an additional very troubling feature of Trump’s action that should not get lost in what I assume will be an enormous reaction to its discriminatory character.  The action is also wholly arbitrary.  There is no rational basis for this policy.  This is like policy as fantasy football, policy as vanity plate.  There is no evidence of an increased danger to the US from Syrian refugees or any other refugees.  If terrorism is the problem, I suppose we might be more concerned by people traveling from France and Belgium than Yemen and Somalia.  But however we analyze the policy, the underlying reality is that it is not the result of any rational policy process.  There was no process.  This is pure prejudice.

Friday, January 27, 2017

Sir Humphrey Appleby Lives

Gerard N. Magliocca

My favorite television series are "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister," the BBC programs that aired in the 1980s. They primarily depict the relationship between Jim Hacker, a politician, and Sir Humphrey Appleby, the head civil servant who advises Hacker.  In simple terms, some of the plots revolve around Hacker's attempts to get things done over civil service opposition, and some of them are about Appleby's attempts to block ideas that he views as bad policy.  It's very funny (in a British way) and still highly relevant.

One of Hacker's telling comments is that the opposition party in Parliament is the opposition in exile, but the civil service is the opposition in residence. I mention this because that may be an accurate description of the current political situation. The trend in administrative law scholarship, dating back to then-Professor Kagan's article on "Presidential Administration in 2001, emphasizes the degree to which presidents have successfully exerted their authority over the administrative agencies even though they also answer to Congress. Less attention, it seems to me, has been given to how civil servants can frustrate presidential policy if they choose to.

In the first week of the new Administration, I've been struck by the extraordinary number of leaks coming from the various agencies. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I think it's unusual to see draft executive orders leaked to the press, or conversations between the President and the head of the National Park Service that just occurred.  There is also the new phenomenon of agencies using social media to put out messages that are contrary to the Administration's stated goals.

Won't the President's political appointees get this under control once they are in place? Partially, but how much can they do in the face of determined opposition?  You can't just fire civil servants at will, and you can't easily replace the ones with the technical know-how necessary to carry out policy. And (as any devoted watcher of "Yes, Minister" can attest), there are a million complicated strategies that civil servants can use to delay policies if they are so inclined.

This is not to say that the civil service in America is a check-and-balance equivalent to the courts and Congress. But we may find out in the next few years just how much they can do.

Law's Abnegation: A Reply to the Symposiasts

Guest Blogger

Adrian Vermeule

For the Symposium on Adrian Vermeule, Law's Abnegation



            I'm grateful to Jack Balkin for organizing the symposium on Law's Abnegation, and to all of the symposiasts for their generous remarks and for their time. It seems to me that no single common theme emerges; their points, while interesting, do not converge on any single line of conversation. So I will mention a few disparate issues, attempting to touch on all of the symposiasts except Sandy Levinson, whose cogent and (overly) charitable entry speaks for itself and calls for no response.

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Thursday, January 26, 2017

The Political Construction of Administrative Law

Mark Graber

For the Symposium on Adrian Vermeule, Law's Abnegation

Judicial review and administrative law are politically constructed.  A generation of historical institutionalists (Keith Whittington, Howard Gillman, Leslie Goldstein, Scott Lemieux, Paul Frymer, Kevin McMahon, Ran Hirschl, etc.) demonstrated that the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional thrives in the United States and throughout the world because elected officials from the First Congress of the United States to the Israeli Knesset at the turn of the twenty-first century empowered courts to declare laws unconstitutional.  Adrian Vermeule in Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State brilliantly documents how both elected officials and federal judges have similar ceded substantial policy making power to the administrative agencies.

Claims that judicial review and administrative law are politically constructed do not entail that constitutional courts and administrative agencies are pawns serving higher masters.  Governing officials have reasons empower other institutions to make independent judgments.  Courts and administrative agencies can reduce the volume of decisions made by other institutions.  They often have special expertise that other governing institutions lack.  Courts and administrative agencies are sometimes the proverbial canaries in the mineshafts.  Other governing officials may prefer foisting controversial decisions off on less politically accountable decision makers to deflect blame for unpopular decisions (while reserving the right to take credit if a consensus forms that the court or agency did the right thing).

The political construction of judicial review and administrative law has normative consequences.  If the Judiciary Act of 1789 and related legislation better explain the establishment and development of judicial review in the United States than Marbury v. Madison (1803) and related judicial decisions, then the conventional countermajoritarian difficulty makes little sense.  If contemporary administrative law largely consists of courts working out the fundamental logic of a combination of past political and legal decisions, then attacks on the administrative state as lacking legal foundations make as little sense.  Claims that elected officials should take back usurped power from the courts or that courts should take back usurped power from administrative agencies ignore the mechanisms by which power was freely given rather than stolen in the middle of the night.

The political construction of judicial review and administrative law pose particular problems for originalists.  Originalists insist that constitutional decision makers should make every effort to return the constitutional order to its pristine form.  Historical institutionalists, however, point out that constitutional institutions in their pristine form provided political actors and judges with reasons and incentives to abandon originalism.  Law’s Abnegation similarly details how constitutional institutions operating in their pristine form produced the contemporary administrative state.   If Merlin by magic returned the American constitutional order to its pristine form, historical institutionalism and Vermeule’s work suggest that the same reasons and incentives that produced contemporary judicial review and contemporary administrative law will reproduce those practices in the very near future.   The problem, if a problem exists, is one of constitutional design rather than a problem of individual decision makers betraying the commitments of a constitutional order. 

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Wednesday, January 25, 2017

US to rest of world: Don't even think of having any international events in the US

Sandy Levinson

GIven the actions of the individual who currently occupies the White House, why would any international organization, ranging from scholarly groups to the International Olympics Committee or World Cut, conceivably wish to hold an event in the US.  One presumes that it will become ever harder for anyone to get a visa to enter the US.  Can anyone possibly believe, for example, that we will effectively protect ourselves against the possibility of a terorrist entering the US simply by denying entry to anyone from, say, Syria or Libya?  As we get more paranoid, don't we have to worry about anyone coming from, say, Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, as well.  Shouldn't we expect anyone and everyone from those countries (and many others as well, including, say, Israel, which has generated its share of Jewish terrorists to complement the better known Arab variety) before we let them through the literal and metaphorical "walls" the present occupant is so eager to build?  Perhaps we won't miss the foreign visitors. I'm no fan of the Olympics and was very happy when my sometime-quasi-home city of Boston rejected the opportunity to apply for the 2024 games.  But, no doubt, others disagree and wold like to see more such international events.  And, as as someone interestd in comparative constitutional law, who is planning to go to Copenhagen in July for the annual conference of such scholars, I would appreciate the 2018 conference's being held in a more convenient (for me) venue, just as the 2015 gathering was in New York.  But I suspect I should get used to traveling abroad and simply hoping that none of the countries whose nationals we're going to disrespect and mistreat in the very near future will feel like reciprocating.  (In this context, I recall paying handsome feels for visas to visit Brazil and Argentina solely as reciprocal responses to the extortion visited by the US on nationals of those countries who wish to visit the US, unlike (at least currently) visitors from, say, the UK.)

A Valentine to Jennifer Rubin, the most courageous commentator on our present reality

Sandy Levinson

I've suggested this before, but it's worth repeating that the two most truly admirable columnists in the country may well be Michael Gerson and Jennifer Rubin, both of them part of the ostensibly "conservative" cohort of columnists at the Washington Post.  They have been consistently and eloquently critical of our newly inaugurated president (who may or may not be a "sociopath," but is almost universally agreed to be otherwise unfit to be our president under any standard criteria, including previous experience, knowledge of relevant policy, and emotional maturality).  They have both become genuine heroes of mine, which means, among other things, that I will now read and take seriously even columns of theirs when I disagree with them (as when, say, Ms. Rubin attacks the Iran deal or expresses more support for the current Israeli position than I believe is merited).  They are both truly serious and commendable people, who are clearly willing to burn bridges to traditional friends and allies because of their own intellectual and moral integrity.  I've never met either, but it would be an honor to do so..Both deserve the award that the JFK library gives each year to those who are "profiles in courage" (an award, incidentally, that JFK would certainly never have won as a practicing politician). 

The gist of her column, provocatively titled "Maybe Trump is not lying," is that in fact he may not be "lying" in the sense of actually realizing that he is stating falsehoods.  Instead, he is truly delusionary, believing that what he is saying is "in fact" true, just in the way (my analogy, not hers) that a certain kind of schizophrenic claiming to hear voices from aliens contacting him/her from spaceships hovering above us in the ether may in fact be accurately conveying his/her perception of reality.  So who is worse, a mendacious clear-cut liar (think of Kelly Anne Conway, perhaps the single most loathesome person to emerge from the Trump entourage, even moreso than Steve Bannon, who probably does in fact believe some of his near-neo-Nazi pernicious nonsense) or a delusionary?   One might analyze this either as moral question or a policy question.  The former allows us to let the "sincere" schizophrenic off the hook for the reasons that we allow people to be acquitted on grounds of mental illness even as we immediately commit them to facilities not called "prisons" because they are in fact dangers to themselves or, more importantly, others.  The latter, on the other hand, requires us to ask which is in fact more of a truly danger as a would-be "leader."  (The answer, of course, may be that both are equal menaces.)  In any event, she concludes as follows:


We are not calling — yet — for invocation of Section 4 of the 25th Amendment. (“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.”)
 We are calling for someone, perhaps his children, to see if they can prevail upon him to stop behaving in this way, for if not, legitimate worries will mount about whether he is able to carry out his duties. We also are saying that Republicans need to be pressed to state their view: Is he lying or is he unable to separate what he wants to believe and what exists, literally, in front of his eyes? The first makes him morally unfit, and was the basis upon which many #NeverTrumpers refused to vote for him. If the latter, they — and we all — have a constitutional crisis the likes of which we have never seen. With Trump, however, we have learned the past provides no guarantees

So she is willing to suggest what others have been too tactful (or gutless) to note:  That we don't have to talk about impeachment, which requires wading into the swamp of legalistic arguments about what constitutes a "high crime and misdemeanor."  We're already beginning to be subjected to endless debate about the one true meaning of the Emoluments Clause, which, frankly, I regard as exemplifying the kind of bubble of abstracted legalism that smart and well-trained lawyers live in.  Within a seminar room, it may be worth arguing whether the Emoluments Clause does or does not apply to the President because he is not an "officer" under a certain tendentious reading of 18th century literature.  Among other things, of course, this requires putting to one side that it is almost literally bizarre to assume that those who cared enough about foreign influence to put the Emoluments Clause in the Constitution in the first place would have thought that it should be perfectly all right for foreigners in effect to try to bribe a sitting president.  But I truly digress, for what makes Donald Trump so truly scary to almost any thoughtful individual (including, I have discovered, at least one of my colleagues at the University of Texas who in fact voted for him) is his emotional volatility.  (I should note, incidentally, that another colleague of mine, a trained physician, has suggested that Mr. Trump is exhibiting some symptions of early-onset dementia--which wouldn't be all that early given that he is, after all, 70.

The 25th Amendment, if one in fact takes it seriously as part of the Constitution, does offer a way to get rid of Mr. Trump tomorrow without having to submit to Talmudic debates about the particular extent to which he has committed "high crimes or misdemeanors."  To be sure, other kinds of debates are generated by the 25th Amendment, but, blessedly, none of them require getting into the swamp of originalism and the like.  One "merely" has to figure out how to discern whether or not a President has become unfit to carry out the responsibilities of his/her office.

Even if, as a practical matter, it is unimaginable that the 25th Amendment will in fact be invoked (any more than it was invoked in Reagan's second term, when one suspects that some of the inner circle were aware that Alzheimer's has set in), we we should ask ourselves exactly why it is unimaginable.  As she suggests, there is a perfectly good argument that he lacks the emotional stability to carry out the solemn duties of his office.  Is this proof that the 25th Amendment, added to the Constitution only after John F. Kennedy's assassination and the realization that we would have been far worse off had he lived  and lingered as a severely injured President, perhaps like Woodrow Wilson, is exactly what James Madison thought was true about lots of the Constitution--that is, that the relevant clauses were simply "parchment barriers," not to be taken really seriously.

It would be a very good thing if the press, every time it interrogated Vice President Pence and other members of the Cabinet, asked if they were aware of the Amendment and if they had any personal concerns about Mr. Trump's actual abilities carry out his office.  Do they really believe it is irrelevant what a President believes to be the case about the world, whether it's space aliens from Venus, the non-existence of global warming, the presence or electoral fraud, or whatever?  I assume that they do not share the same delusions that Mr. Trump does, which means they are, like Ms.Conway, only mendacious enablers who deserve the unalloyed contempt of the country in a way that a pathetically deluded schizophrenic does not.  Perhaps Donald Trump indeed has the excuse of being seriously mentally ill.  There is no excuse for his entourage of enablement, including people like Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell.  .  

Other uses of "emolument" in The Federalist (and the fallacy of affirming the consequent)

John Mikhail

In my last post, I drew attention to the fact that the Morgan Lewis white paper on conflicts of interest fails to supply any convincing evidence for its originalist thesis that “an emolument was widely understood at the framing of the Constitution to mean any compensation or privilege associated with an office” (emphasis original). 

On the basis of footnote 12, which reads “See, e.g., The Federalist 2, 177, 243, 268, 340, 379-80 (G. Carey & J. McClellan eds., 2001),” I identified six Federalist papers on which the white paper relies: Numbers 1, 36, 46, 51, 65, and 73.  Examining these essays, I found that their uses of “emolument” fall short of establishing the “original public meaning” to which the white paper appeals.  Yet the signal “See, e.g.” indicates that there may be other passages in The Federalist that support this originalist claim.  Are there such passages, and, if so, what do they say?

The edition of The Federalist to which Trump’s lawyers refer is the Liberty Fund reprint of the 1818 Gideon edition.  By searching the Liberty Fund’s free PDF of this volume, one can easily locate every occurrence of “emolument” in The Federalist.  This exercise yields six additional essays in which this term is used: Numbers 55, 59, 72, 76, 77, and 84.

The relevant excerpts are given below, after the jump.  Once again, none of them entails or even strongly implies that “emolument” was a precise or technical term at the founding, the meaning of which was restricted to payments or benefits associated with fulfilling the duties of an office.

To be sure, several of these passages do indicate that office-related payments or benefits were characterized as emoluments.  It is the converse of that proposition, however, which Donald Trump needs to establish for his originalist argument to succeed.  The form of that argument is not “All office-related payments or benefits are emoluments” but rather “All emoluments are office-related payments or benefits.”  To assume that these propositions are logically equivalent is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.   And to assert that the latter proposition is true as a matter of original meaning is to say something empirically false, as even a cursory look at a fraction of the pertinent evidence illustrates.

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Abnegation?

Andrew Koppelman

For the Symposium on Adrian Vermeule, Law's Abnegation.



The Supreme Court has not ordered federal marshals to break into Prof. Adrian Vermeule’s office and steal his lunch.  You wouldn’t call that abnegation.  “Abnegation” signifies denying oneself something that one is entitled to, and the Court isn’t entitled to Prof. Vermeule’s lunch.

So what is the word doing in his title?  Law’s Abnegation is a marvelous book, but its title is misleading. 

The book defends judicial deference to the administrative state, brilliantly and persuasively, and shows why such deference follows from familiar legal principles.  This matters, because so many scholars have worried that there is something legally and constitutionally questionable about the modern administrative state.

“In area after area, lawyers and judges, working out the logical implications of their principles with a view to rational consistency, have come to the view that administrators should have broad leeway to set policy, to determine facts, to interpret ambiguous statutes, and even . . . to determine the boundaries of their own jurisdiction.”  (1)  Efforts to discern a special sphere of judicial authority over administrative decisionmaking have turned out to be incoherent:  “no one has ever drawn crisp and clear distinctions among fact-finding, law-interpretation, and policy-making; the three activities bleed into one another in an integrated course of activity by which agencies set legally enforceable government policies within a certain domain.”  (28)  It is impossible to “reserve some heartland of legalism in which judges would exercise de novo, entirely independent judgment.”  (34)  When courts realized this, they became broadly deferential to any administrative decision that is not utterly indefensible.  That has had the salutary effect of shifting power within agencies away from lawyers and toward scientists, engineers, and economists, who are better qualified to make policy judgments in their areas of expertise.  “The strength of the internal legal arguments for deference become ever greater as the complexity and scale of the policy problems facing the administrative state grow.”  (213)  This all needed to be said.  Vermeule has made a major contribution.

But why is there anything puzzling about this?  Under the law, lots of people, including administrators of agencies, have lots of discretion to do lots of things.  “Law has abnegated its authority, relegating itself to the margins of governmental arrangements.”  (1)  It does that all the time. 

It isn’t abnegation for the law to stand by and let someone do what they’re entitled to do.  That’s just the ordinary operation of law.  In fact, it’s what law is for: to tell us what authority we have, what property is ours, what our rights are.  There is no “ultimate abnegation of law’s pretensions” (126), because there are no pretensions to abnegate.

One of the book’s foils is Ronald Dworkin, who, Vermeule accurately observes, never said much about administrative law.  Vermeule thinks this is a “massive blind spot”:  courts cannot uniquely be the forum of principle, as Dworkin claimed, because courts defer to agencies, and “agencies interpreting law must necessarily choose which of several competing principles to honor, how much weight to attach to principles, and what the rate of trade-off between competing principles will be.”  (4)

Dworkin certainly had his blind spots, but it’s not clear that this is one of them.  Vermeule nicely shows that deference follows from settled legal principles.  Judicial deference to the executive branch, where deference is what the law requires, is very old news.  Laurence Tribe (1 American Constitutional Law § 3-13 at 366 (3d ed. 2000)) observes that the most secure defense of the political question doctrine is the classical view that the constitution itself has committed some questions to another branch of government.  That is the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison:  “Questions, in their nature political or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court.”  That’s not abnegation.  That’s just a court saying what the law is.

Vermeule challenges a lot of conventional wisdom.  His book shows that the legitimacy of the administrative state isn’t an exciting question.  That is what is exciting about the book.


Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Administrative Law Working Itself (Im)Pure

JB

For the Symposium on Adrian Vermeule, Law's Abnegation.


Vermeuele's Law's Abnegation is written with style and verve. It is a bit repetitive at times, as if Vermeuele hopes to convince us of the correctness of his positions by asserting them over and over again. But the work as a whole is truly a marvelous introduction to the philosophy of administrative law. I would recommend it to any student who wants to look beyond the caselaw to understand the subject.

The title is misleading in one respect. It is simply not true, nor does Vermeuele argue, that *law* has abnegated its role or that it has been displaced by the administrative state.  Administrative rules and regulations are a kind of law.  If anything, law *proliferates* in the administrative state-- that is one reason why the critics of the administrative state don't like it.  Rather, Vermeuele's point is that certain professional groups we associate with law-- judges and lawyers-- become increasingly less important in the administrative state. So the book should properly be called "Judges' abnegation" or "Lawyers' abnegation." But those are far less engaging titles.

Vermeuele celebrates the rise of law-promulgating and law-enforcing agencies dominated by experts other than lawyers. He argues that Article III judges have self-consciously chosen to play only a marginal role and that lawyers generally-- both within and without the agencies-- will play an increasingly smaller and smaller role.  Once again, however, this is not a claim about law-- it is a claim about the increasing separation of law from lawyers and judges.

The book's conceit is that separation of law from lawyers and judges is an example of the law "working itself pure." Vermeule repeatedly invokes Ronald Dworkin's notion of a coherentist account of law that combines fit with justification-- and he argues that the law has been moving toward greater coherence as it increasingly separates law from the domination of lawyers and judges.

It is hard to know how seriously to take the use of Dworkin in this book.  Dworkin, after all, symbolizes the very judicial imperialism that Vermeule targets in his book. Indeed, Vermeule seems to take great delight in turning some aspects of Dworkin against Dworkin himself, and to employ Dworkinian phrases like "fit and justification" or "the law working itself pure" in ways that undermine the Dworkinian model of principled decisionmaking.

Vermeule is not really making an argument that the law has become more principled over time. Quite the contrary, Dworkin distinguished (unconvincingly, to my mind) between arguments from principle and arguments from policy. Vermuele's central claim-- which he asserts over and over again in this book-- is that lawyers and judges have performed a cost-benefit analysis on their own professional contributions to the administrative state. They have asked themselves what their contribution at the margins is. And, over time, they have concluded that the best balance of costs and benefits is for them to recede into the background, and to abnegate their traditional roles.

This is not an argument from principle. It is a hard-headed argument from costs and benefits, the very sort of argument that Dworkin might have classified as an argument from policy, and therefore *not* an example of the law working itself pure. It is not an example of Dworkinianism, that is, unless the real master principle is that all legal arrangements should be subjected to cost-benefit analysis. At that point, however, the Dworkinian distinction between principle and policy implodes.

Vermeule insists at various points that he is offering a purely internalist account of law, but if you have read any of his other books or articles, you have to take this with a very large grain of salt. Near the end of the book he admits that his internalist account tracks externalist accounts of the growth and development of the administrative state that he has offered elsewhere.  His basic temperament is externalist and realist, and admirably so; when he claims to be talking purely internally, one has to treat him as an unreliable narrator.

Indeed, the Vermeuele who has written on civil liberties and executive power, or on decision theory and constitutional law, might well regard the very phrase "the law works itself pure," as a pious fraud, and then proceed to explode it elegantly. That Vermeuele does not show up in this book, although one suspects he is in the background, chuckling mischievously.
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Monday, January 23, 2017

Stumbling into Obamacare Federalism

Joseph Fishkin

Federalism has various functions in our constitutional system.  But the picture of which functions matter most changes during periods of intense political polarization, intense federal government dysfunction, or both (and our current political era, both pre- and post-Trump, is a cocktail with a whole lot of both).

For example: Heather Gerken has argued that one central function of federalism, and indeed sub-federalism potentially “all the way down,” is to allow people who are in the minority in national policy disagreements to have some jurisdictions where they actually decide—govern—rather than merely voicing their dissent.  This particular function of federalism takes on greater significance at times of intense polarization, even as that same polarization tends to tax the willingness of those in power at the national level to countenance dissent from the states below.

I’ve blogged here before about another, less laudable item in the list of functions of federalism (and especially of “cooperative federalism”): to obscure the role of the federal government in major national policy measures, disguising federal policy as state policy and federal dollars as state dollars.  This is one of the reasons why you so often see polling results that show, for example, that state insurance exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act (such as KYNECT, the Kentucky-branded exchange), as well as the state-administered Medicaid programs the ACA dramatically expanded, are far more popular than the ACA itself.  To be sure, even the ACA itself—the unambiguously national brand—is more popular than Beltway Republicans think.   But its state-branded components are often considerably more popular.  As is often the case, states get undue credit for the good stuff.  The individual mandate—collected by the IRS via your 1040—looks like the federal policy it is, while KYNECT looks like the state of Kentucky.  Here as elsewhere, citizens have every reason not to understand that the bulk of the money for many popular state programs comes from the federal government.  We have deliberately fuzzed it up.

The current debacle unfolding in Congress and the Executive Branch, as Republicans flounder to formulate a plan to “replace” the ACA, amid radical disagreement within their own ranks over exactly what the goals and scope of any such replacement ought to be, has me thinking about a third and much simpler function of federalism.  Federalism can be a way to punt.  Sometimes, the federal government simply has reason to decide not to decide an issue.  Maybe the tradeoffs are too hard.  Maybe there is no solution that can garner a majority in Congress.  So, the federal government punts, leaving it to the states.

There is plenty of overlap among the functions of federalism I’ve just mentioned (and others I have not).  For instance, sometimes people advocate what sounds like a punt to the states of a hard issue, but really what they have in mind is more Gerkenian: One side is nationally in the minority, and they argue that something should be “left to the states” precisely because that way they’ll win somewhere rather than losing everywhere; and perhaps by winning somewhere, they’ll advance their overall argument in the national public sphere in the long run.  This is why “leave [same-sex] marriage to the states” was at one time, briefly, the liberal position (when liberals were nationally in the minority on the issue) and then later became the conservative position (when conservatives found themselves in the minority).

So that brings us to our current political moment.  Republicans have a problem.  Their general problem is that now they have to govern.  Their specific problem is that they have pledged to “repeal and replace” the ACA and they have no idea how to translate this into national policy that can (a) garner 60 votes in the Senate and a majority in the House, (b) not mangle the national health insurance system so badly that it creates political blowback on an epic scale (I am deliberately setting the bar very low), and (c) satisfy their core supporters that they have followed through on their promise to slay their white whale, Obamacare.  Indeed it would be a challenge to satisfy any two of these!  And they do need all three.

Many but not all Republicans would set the bar higher, with a stronger version of (b) that we could call the “nonretrogression” principle in health insurance: The millions of people who now have coverage through either expanded-Medicaid or the exchanges should not be made substantially, visibly worse off (such as by losing health insurance outright, or seeing their current insurance replaced with something that is obviously flimsy in comparison).  President Trump, for his part, has repeatedly and forcefully endorsed this stronger version of (b).

The result is a moment of serious peril for the new Republican governing majority, and I’m not sure they yet appreciate the scope of the peril.  Any major, high-profile changes to Obamacare will begin to trigger the Pottery Barn rule: the chaos and broken mess of the health insurance system will begin to be blamed on Republicans.  Even without such major, high-profile changes, after a while people will tend to blame the President for national policies that are going badly.

So, what to do?  The answer is Obamacare federalism.

That should be where this debate ends up.  And—each of the major sides in that debate in Washington should endorse some version of it, for different reasons that track the functions of federalism outlined at the start of this post.  This afternoon I saw an early indication that a few key Republican Senators are thinking along these very lines.*

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