Balkinization  

Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Recovering Reconstruction

Gerard N. Magliocca

To build on Mark's post, I want to point out that there are significant obstacles for lawyers who are inclined to interpret Reconstruction broadly (or just correctly), let alone for those who aren't.

First, there are no detailed notes on the discussions of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which was created 150 years ago this month. While Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention are flawed (for example, they were not published until long after the fact and were revised substantially by him after 1789), at least we have some sort of record of what was said in Philadelphia.  For the Joint Committee, by contrast, we have only a journal with bare-bones minutes.  Imagine how much constitutional debate would have been enriched if we knew how John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, and the others on what amounted to the Second Constitutional Convention said behind closed doors.

Second, there is no Federalist Papers for Reconstruction.  Bingham and Stevens never had the time (or probably the motivation) to write a series of detailed essays defending and explaining their work.  Courts and lawyers, though, often need this sort of explication to understand the context of the text that they are required to apply.

Third, there is no equivalent of Farrand's Records on the Reconstruction Amendments.  Good luck trying to find a single source that nicely organizes the debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, the ratification debates in the states, or the public statements and private letters of those Founders.

There's nothing that we can do about the first two problems, short of a miraculous discovery of a lost manuscript, but we can address the last problem.  Perhaps the best way to honor Reconstruction on its sesquicentennial is to start creating a definitive collection of its primary sources.  This is not a sexy task and is probably too much to ask of one person, but we would all benefit from such an edition.

The Copperhead Court?

Mark Graber

One remarkable feature of contemporary constitutionalism is the extent to which the foundations of Roberts Court and conservative constitutionalism lie in the post-bellum Democratic opposition to the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and other exercises of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Over and over again, Chief Justice John Roberts and other conservatives almost quote verbatim statements that Democrats made in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  The Roberts Court does not share the post-bellum Democratic commitment to white supremacy.  Finding other differences between the constitutional commitments of former copperheads and doughfaces and prominent contemporary conservatives is quite difficult. 

Roberts Court justices and their allies take the post-bellum Democratic position on the master principle underlying the Constitution of the United States.  During the debates over the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Republicans repeatedly articulated a constitutional commitment to a national government strong enough to provide for the general welfare.  Democrats responded with a constitutional commitment to limiting the power of the national government.  The Roberts Court shares the constitutional vision of those who fought against national civil rights legislation.  “In our federal system,” Chief Justice Roberts declares in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, “the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”

Roberts Court justices and their allies take the post-bellum Democratic position on the nature of constitutional rights.  During the debates over the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Republicans repeatedly declared that the national government had a constitutional obligation to provide former slaves and refugees with certain goods and services.  Democrats responded that no one has a constitutional right to government provision of goods and services.  The Roberts Court shares the constitutional principles that inspired President Andrew Johnson to veto civil rights laws.  “Our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid,” the Chief Justice’s predecessor, William Rehnquist, asserted in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, “even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”  Another prominent conservative judge, Richard Posner, maintains that our "Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.  The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them."

Roberts Court justices and their allies take the post-bellum Democratic position on American federalism.  During the debates over the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Republicans insisted that Congress was free to distinguish between states that had a history of racial discrimination and those that did not.  Democrats responded that permitting the Freedmen’s Bureau to exercise authority in some states rather than others violates a constitutional commitment to equal state sovereignty.  Chief Justice John Roberts shares the structural views of those who opposed the post-Civil War Constitution.  His opinion in Shelby County v. Holder describes the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act as a “dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”

Roberts Court justices and their allies take the post-bellum Democratic position on national power under the post-Civil War Amendments.  During the debates over the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Republicans maintained that Congress was the institution responsible for determining what measures would best facilitate the transition from slavery to full citizens.  Democrats responded that Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment could do no more than forbid slavery.  Leading constitutional conservatives share the views on constitutional authority championed by those who thought Congress in 1865 powerless to strike at Black Codes.    Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Tennessee v. Lane asserts, “Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or “remedy” conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. So-called ‘prophylactic legislation” is reinforcement rather than enforcement.”

Roberts Court justices and their allies take the post-bellum Democratic position on constitutional equality.  During the debates over the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Republicans insisted that Congress could take into consideration American racial history when passing legislation that provided specific benefits to destitute freedmen.  Democrats insisted that any legislation that favored persons of color violated constitutional commitments to equality.  Chief Justice Roberts agrees with those who hoped African-Americans would remain in a state as close to slavery as constitutionally possibly.  His opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 insisted, “The way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”

For years, originalists have told us that constitutional language must be interpreted consistently with how that language was understood when constitutional provisions were ratified.  Apparently with respect to the Thirteenth Amendment, what they have meant is that constitutional language ought to be interpreted consistently with how persons who opposed constitutional provisions interpreted that language after ratification.








Wednesday, December 23, 2015

Merry Christmas, Kim Davis! [UPDATED]

Marty Lederman

Newly elected Kentucky Governor Matthew Bevin yesterday issued an executive order directing the Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives to create and promulgate a new marriage license form, to be used by County Clerk's Offices throughout the Commonwealth.  The new form would not itself make any reference to the Clerk's office, or to the Clerk, as such.  It would, however, require the "issuing official" to record his or her name and title, and the county in which the license was issued.

Which official would sign the license in a particular county?  Ordinarily, the County Clerk, because a provision of Kentucky law (KRS § 402.080) states that a license “may be issued by any county clerk,” and another provision (KRS § 402.100) provides that “[e]ach county clerk shall use the form prescribed by the Department for Libraries and Archives when issuing a marriage license.”  As I explained here, however, the latter provision also indicates that the license may, alternatively, be issued by a deputy clerk:  It specifically states that the license must contain “[t]he date and place the license is issued, and the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.”  Moreover, KRS § 61.035 states that “[a]ny duty enjoined by law . . . upon a ministerial officer, and any act permitted to be done by him, may be performed by his lawful deputy.”

Therefore, in a county such as Rowan County, where the Clerk--Kim Davis--refuses to issue such a license, a Deputy Clerk can do so using the new form.  (The County must provide at least one clerk willing to sign it--it'd be a violation of federal constitutional law to compel couples to travel to another county to obtain  a license.)  In Rowan County, that willing Deputy Clerk has been Brian Mason.  If the Department of Libraries and Archives complies with the Governor's new Executive Order, presumably Mason will sign the new form.

Perhaps this accommodation will satisfy everyone concerned, even though (ironically?) Mason will now include on the marriage form two pieces of information that Kim Davis has insisted he not include on the licenses he has been issuing since September 14th--namely, the name of Rowan County, and his title, Deputy Clerk.  (See my earlier post here.)  [UPDATE:  Davis has informed the trial court that use of the new license form will "accommodate[] and protect[] Davis’ (and others’) sincerely-held religious beliefs, and also maintain[] a uniform marriage licensing scheme and create[] a new uniform marriage license form that is authorized by executive order and also plainly valid and indisputably recognized throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky."]

Here's hoping this saga is, finally, coming to an end.

One legal point of note:  In his executive order, Governor Bevin reasoned that this accommodation was required by the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act, KRS 446.350, because use of the previous form "substantially burdened" certain Clerks' "refus[al] to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief."  (That's a quote from Kentucky RFRA, which reads differently from--and more broadly than--the federal RFRA, which refers to substantially burdening "a person’s exercise of religion.")

Thursday, December 17, 2015

Breaking News: Political Parties Try to Enact Policies that Strengthen Their Coalition and Weaken Their Opponents'

Mark Tushnet

Sorry for the snark, but that's the burden of about 40 pages of an 80 page article in the Yale Law Journal. (Whatever happened to the initiative to slim down law review articles?) The other 40 pages are devoted to arguing that entrenching your party by adopting substantive policies isn't all that different, practically or normatively, from entrenching via constitutional amendment,via statutes that purport to entrench themselves against repeal, or via expressly or obviously partisan policies like gerrymandering or selective voter suppression. The burden of those pages is that (some) people seem to think that entrenchment via constitutional amendment is normatively OK but that the other kinds of entrenchment aren't.

Another (substantive) takeaway is that sometimes entrenchment is good, sometimes it's bad. Or: Entrenching good things is good, entrenching bad things is bad. At other times one might have said that the term "entrenchment" doesn't describe anything of normative interest but -- shudder -- is a reification. That way, though, lies critical legal studies.

Wednesday, December 16, 2015

The Status of the WPR: Savage Responds (updated)

Stephen Griffin

Charlie Savage has done me the favor of responding to my post on (essentially) the constitutional status of the War Powers Resolution in Republican administrations.  It's worth reading, although I suspect we are about to really get into the weeds.  I'll reply after I have a chance to assemble my thoughts.

So now I'm focused, but before I reply directly to what Savage said, I'll introduce a new point, just for fun.  One assumption common to recent discussion, including Savage's book, was that the WPR's 60 day limit was first exceeded only in the 1999 Kosovo operation.  I'm not so sure.  On a normative level, at least, if one uses the sorts of arguments that were made against the Obama administration in the context of the Libya operation -- well, the Reagan-era operation to reflag Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War surely qualifies.  You can check out the events of "Operation Earnest Will" on Wikipedia.  For those of us who were current-events junkies at the time, you might remember this was a large-scale naval operation lasting more than a year that involved exchanges of fire and...actual combat involving US personnel in harms way(!), something that wasn't true for Libya.  So why didn't this raise a big WPR issue?  Well, it did.  In fact, this operation was one of the reasons influential members of Congress of both parties concluded the WPR was unconstitutional, defunct or both at the end of the 1980s.  The dispute that resulted is well covered in Barry Blechman's The Politics of National Security.

My partisan-based approach helps explain why this didn't register as a WPR "precedent."  It wasn't a precedent for Democrats because they weren't in the White House.  It could have been a precedent from a Republican perspective, but it's pretty clear that Republicans already believed the WPR was unconstitutional.  This takes me back to Savage's evidence.

Read more »

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

By Undermining Unions, The Roberts Court Will Do Still More Damage to Our Democracy

Guest Blogger

Tabatha Abu El-Haj

Poll after poll reveals a bipartisan consensus that wealthy interests exert too much political influence, yet the Roberts Court is positioning itself to use the First Amendment to strike one more blow against the political power of ordinary Americans.  The case is Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, a relatively obscure labor law case.  Twenty-five states have adopted right-to-work legislation that prevents unions from compelling any individual from paying any fees as a condition of employment. California, however, permits unions to set up what are known as “agency shops” in which no one is required to join the union to maintain employment, but everyone is required to pay a “fair-share service fee” for representation in collective bargaining.  The Friedrichs petitioners have invited the Court to rule that such agency shop arrangements are unconstitutional, at least for public unions.  All indications are that the Supreme Court will accept that invitation, overruling Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1976) and providing a rationale that will easily be extended to private-sector unions.

Any decision by the Court that strikes a blow to unionism will further erode the political power of ordinary Americans relative to wealthy Americans, just as a decision to undermine church-going or parental involvement in school boards would.  By promoting political participation among ordinary Americans, unions, like churches, PTA, and the Rotary Club, are part of a virtuous circle of civic mindedness, political engagement and democratic accountability – one that the First Amendment was established to protect not undermine.  
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ASPLP Conference at AALS, January 6th, 2016

Guest Blogger

James Fleming

The annual conference of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, on "Privatization," is to be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, on January 6, 2016, in New York. It will take place in the Riverside Ballroom, Sheraton New York Times Square Hotel.

The link to the program on the ASPLP website is here. The conference features prominent scholars in law, political science, and philosophy. Registration is not required.

Sunday, December 13, 2015

The constitutionally critical, last-minute correction to the Paris climate change accord

Marty Lederman

Early on Saturday, in Paris, the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change released this document, which was represented to be the "final draft" of the historic climate-change agreement.  French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, who was heading the United Nations conference, called it “the best possible text,” one that resolved points of contention that had taken negotiations "into overtime."  “In this room you are going to be deciding on an historic agreement,” Fabius told the nearly 200 delegates.  “The world is holding its breath.  It counts on all of us.”

No so fast.   The final plenary meeting opened . . . but was suddenly, and mysteriously, suspended.  Everyone's breath would have to be held a bit longer.

What was the problem?

Take a look at page 21 of the purported "final draft," and Article 4.4 in particular:
Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances. 
According to that "final" version, whereas "developing" country Parties "should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances," the developed country Parties--including the United States--"shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets."

The word "shall" apparently had been added at the last minute--reportedly a mistake made by "fatigued" staffers.  It was only a tiny, one-word change . . . yet it was a scrivener's error the United States could not live with.

Why not?  Because the word "shall" would have established a legally binding obligation under international law--one that the U.S. delegates apparently thought would (as a matter of U.S. constitutional law) require the approval of either two-thirds of the Senate or majorities of both Houses of Congress.  And such legislative approval is, to say the least, not forthcoming anytime soon.  (I explained the critical constitutional difference between nonbinding and binding agreements--in the context of the recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iranian nuclear capabilities--in this post with Jack Goldsmith, in the second half of this post, and in this post.)  [UPDATE:  Actually, the determinative question is not so much whether the agreement as a whole is in some sense "binding," but instead whether any of particular provisions of the agreement impose the sorts of binding obligations that would trigger the requirement in U.S. constitutional law for Senate or congressional approval.  As Daniel Bodansky writes, in a very useful, concise paper on such questions in the context of the Paris accords:  "Treaties often contain a mix of mandatory and non-mandatory elements. . . .  [T]he Paris agreement might contain a mix of mandatory and hortatory provisions relating to parties’ nationally determined contributions and other issues. For example, it might include commitments that parties maintain, report on, and update their NDCs throughout the lifetime of the agreement, but make the achievement of NDCs only hortatory."  As one U.S. diplomat is quoted as saying, the Paris accord is not subject to Senate or congressional approval because "[t]he [emissions] targets are not binding; [and] the elements that are binding are consistent with already approved previous agreements.”]

Back in October, in fact, the State Department had explained to Senator Corker, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the "intended nationally determined contribution reflected in the U.S. 'INDC' submission [was] not intended to constitute an obligation the United States must fulfill under international law, and the United States considers that the Paris agreement should reflect that approach more broadly."  Accordingly, the State Department wrote, the United States is not “seeking an agreement in which Parties take on legally binding emissions targets.”

Accordingly, when the U.S. delegation tripped across the word "shall" on Saturday afternoon, Secretary Kerry insisted that Article 4.4 revert back to use of the word "should"--which would make the first sentence of Article 4.4 a nonbinding goal, rather than an obligation, of developed country parties such as the U.S., and thus something to which the President, acting alone, could commit the United States.

The French reportedly warned that if the United States opened up the document to further changes, the whole, delicate deal might fall apart, seeing as how other nations--India, in particular--were also seeking last-minute changes.

For Kerry and the United States delegation, however, it was understandably a nonnegotiable demand.  As the Secretary would say in his press briefing in Paris later last night:
[T]he bottom line is that when I looked at that, I said, “We cannot do this and we will not do this. And either it changes or President Obama and the United States will not be able to support this agreement.”  And we made it crystal clear that every text up until this particular one had a different wording.  So it wasn’t hard for them to realize that somebody had made a mistake, and they accepted responsibility for it. . . .  So we kept faith with our own negotiating standards and what we promised to Congress and the American people.
And so the wording of the first sentence of Article 4.4 was changed from "shall" to "should"--see the "revised" version of the "final draft," released late yesterday . . . and that would appear to make all the constitutional difference.*

__________________________
* Will it make a practical difference, in terms of parties' compliance with the agreement?  Hard to say.  As Daniel Bodansky writes:  "Thus far, it has been next to impossible to answer this question empirically.  To do so, one would need to hold all other factors constant, and vary only the legal form of an agreement. Despite significant efforts over the last two decades to determine the significance of legal bindingness internationally, we still do not have any definitive answers."

Saturday, December 12, 2015

Ted Cruz's Supreme Court Memos

Gerard N. Magliocca

If Ted Cruz becomes the Republican presidential nominee next year, then he would be the first Supreme Court clerk ever nominated for President.  (Indeed, I think he would be the first law clerk of any sort nominated for President, though I'd have to give that some more thought.)  In my view, the voters have a right to see the memos that Cruz wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist during his clerkship.

The Rehnquist Papers (which are held by the Hoover Institution at Stanford) are not open after 1981, as the Chief Justice stipulated that his papers should remain closed so long as a Justice that he served with is still alive.  Nevertheless, Senator Cruz may have retained copies of the memos that he wrote to the Chief.  If not, he could request that they be made available to the public.  Ordinarily, the wishes of a Justice with respect to his or her papers should be followed, but I think when a former law clerk seeks the White House an exception is justified if the clerk/candidate consents.

Of course, I have no idea what Cruz worked on during the 1996-'97 Term, but some of the notable cases from that Term include:

Printz v. United States (the anti-commandeering principle)
Clinton v. Jones (presidential immunity from civil litigation)
Washington v. Glucksberg (the right of assisted suicide)
Boerne v. Flores (RFRA and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment)

I'm sure some Republican primary and caucus voters would be interested to see what the Senator thought about these and other important matters that came before the Court at that time.



Friday, December 11, 2015

Savage on War Powers

Stephen Griffin

I’ve worked my way through Charlie Savage’s substantial tome on Obama’s use of presidential power, Power Wars: Inside Obama’s Post-9/11 Presidency.  It’s a highly valuable account of executive lawyering on national security matters, if somewhat lengthy.  Having written on war powers in Long Wars and the Constitution, I was naturally interested in what Savage had to say on the subject.  Unfortunately I see a few problems with Savage’s rendering, even as he contends that many accounts of presidential war powers, particularly with respect to the War Powers Resolution, are mostly “myth.”

In my experience, myth is hard to get rid of when it comes to war powers.  With respect to Savage, the basic issue is not so much inaccuracy, but that he accepts an essentially liberal, post-Vietnam version of the development of presidential war powers.  Specifically, Savage argues that it is a myth that all presidents since Nixon have taken the position that the sixty day limit in the WPR is unconstitutional.  It is certainly a myth that all presidents have taken this position, but Republican presidents, starting with Reagan in 1983, have indeed taken this position consistently.  I demonstrate this at length in Long Wars.

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Thursday, December 10, 2015

Lesser Schools

Mark Graber

Is anyone else wondering whether members of the Bush family, members of the Kennedy family, and members of other prominent families (including presumably members of the Scalia family) would have been better off matriculating at lesser universities and graduate programs rather than attending a school higher than their numbers merited that admitted them on the basis of their family connections.

Wednesday, December 09, 2015

Why is Trump Polling So Well?

Gerard N. Magliocca

I once wrote an article on Huey P. Long, the legendary "Kingfish" of Louisiana politics. In response to a comment that one of his proposals was impractical, Long allegedly said:  "Yeah, but by the time they figure that out, I'll have something else for them." I think this sums up Donald Trump rather well (along with his Renfield, Ted Cruz).  I'm open to voting for a Republican for President, but not those two gentlemen.

Why, then, is Trump polling so well?  I'm going to try to answer that with an anecdote, which is admittedly a poor form of evidence, but this one has stuck with me.  One day years ago a student came to my office to ask about doing an independent study paper with me.  The paper, she explained, would be about internal groups that wanted to impose sharia law on the United States and what we should be doing to stop them. I asked her what made her think that such a thing could happen, and her response was that these groups "had a plan" that required an aggressive response. I then gently pointed out that I could have many plans with no chance of success (mind you, she wasn't talking about some terrorist attacks; she was talking about the imposition of sharia law by force).  No matter what I said, though, her answer was that I was naive or just too sanguine about the threat.  We didn't end up working together.


How could a smart person believe this, I wondered?  The answer, I've come to see, is that convincing someone that something they believe is urgent is, in fact, not urgent is exceptionally hard.  And when someone authoritative (or, at least, authoritative-sounding) says that the the threat is urgent and that extraordinary measures are necessary, the critics become even more naive or sanguine.


Of course, being a sanguine person, I believe that there is no silent majority that will endorse Trump or Cruz in a general election.  And I believe, as Jefferson said:


"If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve the Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."     


On Spiro on Trump in the NYT: No, it's unconstitutional

Richard Primus



In The New York Times yesterday, Peter Spiro suggested that Donald Trump’s proposal to bar Muslim immigration, though morally reprehensible, would likely be valid as a matter of prevailing judicial doctrine.  I read Spiro as trying to make some subtle points about the gap between judicial doctrine and constitutional meaning and also, in the end, as trying to push the law of immigration in a less racially discriminatory direction, so to a considerable extent I have sympathy for his project.  But his suggestion that Trump’s proposal is consistent with current judicial doctrine strikes me as wrong, and it’s important to say so. 

Spiro is correct that the courts give Congress and the President far more latitude in the context of immigration than they do elsewhere.  So there would be plenty of room for a lawyer defending Trump’s proposal to argue that the First and Fifth Amendment protections against religious and other discrimination that would apply in most domestic contexts would not apply, or would apply with diminished force, in the context of immigration. 

But regardless of how that part of the argument might be resolved, a flat ban on Muslim immigration would be unconstitutional under existing judicial doctrine, because it would flunk the basic doctrinal rule that every governmental action must have a legitimate purpose. 

Sure, such a law would be defended by the lawyer representing Trump’s administration as having a valid purpose—presumably, the purpose of protecting national security.  But just because a lawyer claims that a law is motivated by a certain purpose doesn’t mean that the Court will accept the claim, even in areas where the Court gives Congress and the President a lot of deference.  An outrageous claim can still be rejected as implausible. 

The standard method for assessing whether a law is plausibly motivated by the purpose that its defenders claim for it is to measure the fit between the ostensible end and the chosen means.  In this case, the fit between the law and the claimed purpose is crazily bad.  It is not rational national security polity to ban all entry into the country by any member of a billion-plus member group whose members have every possible racial, national, and political background (and a welter of different ideas about religion, too).  I’m no national-security expert, but I have no trouble making that judgment.  Neither, I suspect, would a panel of federal judges.  The real motivation for such a broad ban on Muslim entry into the United States could only be animus-based, or theological, or some combination of the two.  Under existing judicial doctrine, those are not constitutionally valid motivations.

One might say that the point I am making should have doomed the Japanese exclusion upheld in Korematsu, such that the fact that the Court ruled for the government in Korematsu shows the limits of relying on the rule requiring the government to act only for valid purposes.  But even leaving aside the fact that permissible-purpose doctrine is formally different in 2015 from what it was in 1944, that argument imagines that attitudes among federal judges toward Muslims in 2015 are relevantly similar to the attitudes among federal judges toward persons of Japanese descent that prevailed in 1944, and that’s not a tenable assumption.  Of course a judiciary with virulent prejudices against Muslims could cite Korematsu and various other cases and produce an opinion that would uphold a Trump-style ban on Muslim entry.  But a court with sufficiently powerful prejudices can do lots of things that shouldn’t be characterized as the present state of doctrine, especially if the relevantly necessary prejudices aren’t actually the judicial prejudices of the day.  And one need not be naïve about the state of current judicial prejudices to think that there’s a world of difference between the way that mainstream elite Americans think about Muslims today and the way that their predecessors thought about persons of Japanese descent seventy-plus years ago.  (Imagining that the two cases are similar probably requires vastly underestimating the anti-Japanese prejudice of the past.)

Here’s a final point arising from that last one.  My confidence that judges would deem a flat ban on Muslim entry into the country to be unconstitutional is partly rooted in an understanding of how courts, at this point in history, apply the doctrines under which animus and theology are not valid bases for government action.  And in the world where I’m confident that the federal judiciary would recognize a flat ban on Muslim entry into the United States as having an invalid motivation, I’m also confident that Congress would not enact such a ban.  In the alternative universe where Congress would enact such a ban, it’s harder to say what the courts would do with it.  But I don’t get very far, in assessing what present doctrine permits, by hypothesizing a counterfactual judiciary and asking what it might do.  Or rather, I could get very far indeed, in any direction, which makes the inquiry a bit devoid of practical payoff, except as an illustration of the dependence of law upon the intuitions of the decisionmakers. 

Tuesday, December 08, 2015

The only relevant question at the next debate

Sandy Levinson

The only relevant question at the next Republican debate is 'Would you really  be willing to campaign and vote for Donald Trump to be President of the United States if he received the Republican nomination?"  Anyone who answers "yes" is a scoundrel who should be disqualified from further consideration.  It is as if, say, Hubert Humphrey pledged to support George Wallace if Wallace received the Democratic nomination.  At some point, one has to say no, and that point has certainly been achieved with Donald Trump.  For Paul Ryan to bleat that Donald Trump would be a better president than Hillary Clinton is all you need to know about the gravitas of the Janesville Speaker.

After all, the very first question asked Donald Trump in the first debate was whether he would accept the verdict of the Republican primaries, and after some hesitation he seemed to say yes.  But, of course, everybody treated that as simply a way to assure that he wouldn't run a third-party (which he probably will if he feels treated "unfairly" by Republicans like Karl Rove and Dick Cheney who are actually blowing the whistle on him.

Washington Post columnist Dana Milbank has a strong column comparing Trump to Mussolini.  The most relevant passages, especially relevant for those who have chastised me for calling Trump a fascist, are as follows:

A couple of weeks ago, after Trump said he would consider forcing Muslims in the United States to register in a database, the conservative military historian Max Boot tweeted: “Trump is a fascist. And that’s not a term I use loosely or often. But he’s earned it.”
Trump uses many of the fascist’s tools: a contempt for facts, spreading a pervasive sense of fear and overwhelming crisis, portraying his backers as victims, assigning blame to foreign or alien actors and suggesting only his powerful personality can transcend the crisis. He endorsed the violence done to a dissenter at one of his rallies, and he now floats the idea of making entry to the United States contingent on religion.
Are Republican "leaders" really willing to profess that they would blithely support such a man to be President of the United States?  Recall that Alexander Hamilton helped to engineer the election of Thomas Jefferson, whose politics he despised, because he believed that Aaron Burr was totally unscrupulous and without the republican character necessary to be President.  

On BDS

Mark Graber

Judaism occupies a special place in many religions and in the Western cultural conscious.  Jews killed Christ.  Jews must be treated differently because they are People of the Book.  The return of Jews to Israel is of special eschatological significance.  Persons have special obligations to convert the Jews. Both philo-semitism and anti-Semitism are rooted in this western tradition of regarding Jews as meriting distinctive treatment.  Other religious faiths, by comparison, have no special status in Judaism.

The academic infatuation with the BDS (Boycott, Divest, Sanction) movement is the latest manifestation of the historical tendency for non-Jews (and alienated Jews) to hold world views in which Jews have a special status.  The National Women’s Studies Association and the American Anthropological Association are the latest scholarly organizations to institute and call for a complete boycott of Israel and Israeli scholars.  Academics affiliated with the BDS have been known not to answer letters from Israeli children on subjects of mutual interest on the theory that all Israeli Jews ought to be treated as contemporary untouchables.  There is, of course, much to criticize about Israeli politics from a general perspective.  More reasons exist to criticize Israeli politics from the Jewish perspective championed by movements associated with the Jewish religious left, most notably the Hartman Institute.  The willingness of non-Jews to single out Israel as unique among the malefactors of the world, and even among the plausibly democratic malefactors of the world, nevertheless replays the historical special status of Jews, Judaism and Israel in Western thought that most BDS supporters would treat as a prime example of unconscious bias in almost any other circumstance.

The Middle East often resembles the world’s most difficult international law and international human rights class examination.  No shortage of victims exist.  These victims represent all nationalities, religions and ethnicities.  No national, religion, ethnicity or political movement has anything that resembles clean hands.  Any political solution or scholarly analysis inevitably privileges some contestable claims at the expense of others, satisfies some demands for justice at the expense of others, and puts some people rather than others in jeopardy of severe harm.  Were Israel a Buddhist state or a state committed to one version of Islam rather than another, no scholarly organization would consider standing as a discipline only with one party in the dispute. 

The BDS claim that Israel is an “apartheid state” drains “apartheid” of meaning (we can't call Jews "Nazis" so we call them "Boers").  The condition of non-Jews and even of Muslims in Israel does not approach the condition of native Africans in South Africa for most of the twentieth century or, for that matter, Jews throughout most of history.  One might insist that no state ought to have an established religion or provide special benefits to the faithful, but Israel is hardly unique in that endeavor.  The status of ethnic minorities in Israel resembles the status of ethnic minorities in most moderately decent democracies, which is to say clearly imperfect from the perspective of ideal theory.  Certainly, no basis exists for singling Israel out if one measures equality by examining the political rights, economic rights, education rights, or actual outcomes of ethnic minorities within a polity.

Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is more complex.  I suspect every progressive and every progressive Jew wishes Israel was far more scrupulous in ensuring that civilians are not harmed in military attacks on suspected terrorist groups.  On the other hand, one might also wish that the terrorist groups that enjoy considerable popular support in the Middle East and in Palestine had any scruples about attacking civilians.  Perhaps the leaders of the BDS movement in Palestine are sincere when they claim that they are entirely independent of any movement that intends to drive Israel into the sea, even if that means exterminating (the word consciously chosen) every Israeli man, woman and child, though how members of various academic associations can be sure of this is beyond me.  And no one can give any guarantees to Israel that a Palestinian state will not be a site for frequent terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.  Properly understood, the Palestinian problem is deeply problematic from almost any plausible theory and is recognized as such whenever a non-Jewish nation deals with terrorist threats.  Jews, Judaism and Israelis are, apparently, supposed to be better for reasons that appear largely sub-conscious.

In 1 Samuel 8:20, the original Israelis ask for a king so “that we also may be like all the nations.”  For better or, in my judgment, worse, Israel has become “like all the nations.”  The way in which Israel reacts to terrorist attacks seems no more exaggerated than the way in which Americans and the French have recently reacted, although my sense is fewer Israelis than Americans support Donald Trumpish responses.  This is cause for dismay among those of us who hoped a Jewish state would be more “a light unto other nations.”  We are entitled to demand Israel be special because, if Israelis are going to ask for our support as Jews, then we may insist that nation live up to the best Jewish standards.  An Israel that is like other nations cannot provide reasons for young Jews abroad to identify as Jews and be proud of their Jewish heritage.  But the non-Jewish world has no more right to impose higher Jewish standards on Israel than Jews have to call on the Pope to live up to what we believe are the best Catholic standards.  Perhaps faculty supporting BDS may need mandated cultural competence after all.

Clearing the Brush in Today’s One-Person, One-Vote Case

Nate Persily

The oral argument today in Evenwel v. Abbott was revealing in many respects, as such arguments often are, in highlighting which points in the briefs command the most attention from the Justices.  However, as is also often the case, the oral argument can serve to obscure certain points, as advocates attempt to use their time to complicate issues that really are quite simple.  Such is the case, I believe, with the debate in Evenwel over whether redistricting on some basis other than total population is possible.  On this question, I should note I am hardly a disinterested observer, having filed an amicus brief based on my experience as a Special Master and court-appointed redistricting expert, and having written about the issue in PoliticoScotusblog, and the Washington Post.
To be clear, the issue is not whether one is physically able to draw districts on the basis on some data source other than the census population numbers.  Of course, one could.  The question is whether the available data are consistent with the theory of one person, one vote – even according to the Appellants’ novel interpretation of that rule.   There is a fundamental incongruity between the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause proposed by the Appellants and the data they use to demonstrate a constitutional violation and suggest as a remedy.
First, no dataset of eligible voters exists.  All of the debate about the American Community Survey’s (ACS) citizen voting age population (CVAP) data is somewhat beside the point.  Even that dataset does not pretend to capture the relevant statistic — eligible voters —  that the Appellants contend is necessary for compliance with one person, one vote.  The ACS data do not account for 168,000 people in Texas prisons or the roughly 350,000 others who are disfranchised because of a felony conviction.  Nor do they account for the roughly half million eligible voters who live abroad but can vote in Texas elections.  These large  categories of persons do not amount to rounding errors or statistical nit-picks – even if the ACS were accurate, it does not satisfy Appellants own constitutional standard for one person, one vote compliance.
Second, the problem with the ACS CVAP data is not that you are unable to put it into a computer and use it for redistricting.  You could do that with any dataset.  Rather, what you would be putting into the computer at the time of redistricting are old estimates of what the population was, not what it is.  Everyone, including Appellants, agrees that the yearly ACS surveys are not usable for redistricting because they only sample 2.5% of households and are released only for communities in excess of 65,000 people.  Therefore, they say, you should use the averages of the ACS surveys from the previous five years – that is, use five-year old data to redistrict for a ten-year redistricting cycle!  At the time of the 2011 redistricting, for example, you would have had to use data averaged from the 2006 to 2010 surveys.  Some of the 17 year olds not counted in the 2006 CVAP numbers, for example, would be 23 years old by the time of the first elections held under the new lines.
Third, the granularity of the data and the presence of error margins introduce novel questions regarding one person, one vote.  Again, the point here is not whether one is able to redistrict on the basis of survey results: You could draw lines to equalize between districts the number of Donald Trump supporters according to presidential preference surveys.  Rather, the idea of a survey – as compared to a census – is in tension with the notion of one-person, one-vote.  The linedrawer who draws a district using the ACS survey data is, in effect, saying that he or she is 90 percent certain (the ACS’s reported confidence intervals)  that the population in that district is within the margin of error as reported by the survey.  As explained in my amicus brief, these error margins are sometimes quite large, especially at the local level.  Such errors will increase further in size, if one needs to break up the block groups into blocks, as one often would do, in order to accommodate any number of other redistricting considerations. (Even the five-year averages of ACS data are not released below the block group level.)  When it comes to ACS citizenship data, moreover, some of the data are imputed by the Census Bureau, itself:  For five percent of respondents in the 2013 ACS, the Bureau “allocated” (i.e., filled in) the answer to the citizenship question.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the ACS can be eliminated at any time.  This is not a theoretical possibility:  the House of Representatives voted to eliminate it in 2012.  Further, because of the government shutdown in 2013 and a reduction in funding in 2004, ACS surveys in those years suffered from a high margin of error.
I hope the ACS stays around, as it is an invaluable tool to inform public policy, including the redistricting process.  But the possibility that it might disappear highlights the irony in the EvenwelAppellants’ argument.   They maintain that the only constitutionally required population dataset – namely, the census enumeration of persons – is actually forbidden by the Constitution for use in redistricting.  That just cannot be right.

Be careful what you wish for in Evenwel, Justice Kennedy

Joseph Fishkin

In another major Texas redistricting case, eight years ago, the Court faced the question of what to do about Congressional District 23.  It was an odd wrinkle in an odd case, and frankly one that no one thought would be the major storyline emerging from LULAC v. Perry—but that is what it turned out to be.  What happened was this.  State legislators wanted to protect then-incumbent Henry Bonilla, a Republican, in a sprawling rural district in West Texas that was closely divided along both racial and partisan lines.  Bonilla (although Latino himself) was not the choice of most Latino voters in his district, and those voters were becoming more and more active.  So what did the state do?  They moved heavily-Latino areas with growing numbers of voters out of the district, and moved other heavily-Latino areas into the district that contained the same number of people, but fewer voters.  The result: same total population, same(ish) Latino population, but fewer actual Latino voters to worry about.  It was a very clever-seeming move, one which preserved the appearance of a Latino-majority district, but one in which minority political power was nothing more than a desert mirage.

Justice Kennedy cried foul.  Writing for himself at the fulcrum of a divided court, aided by some expert lawyering by Nina Perales of MALDEF, Justice Kennedy saw that it was wrong—and held that it was a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—to deliberately pair the white areas of the district that had relatively high numbers of actual voters with a distant Latino area that had relatively low numbers of actual voters.  Such a move would predictably block the emerging Latino majority in the district just as effectively as more familiar gerrymandering techniques such as packing and cracking.

Today’s oral argument in Evenwel seems miles away from LULAC v. Perry.  The Evenwel argument took place on the high and arid terrain of abstract theories of voting and representation, not the factually rich, close-to-the-ground inquiries of a Voting Rights Act case.

But make no mistake about it: if the Court decides Evenwel incorrectly, it could inadvertently end up requiring—everywhere, under the Equal Protection Clause—what it correctly prohibited under the Voting Rights Act in LULAC.

The issue in Evenwel is this.  What should be equalized under one-person-one-vote?   Should every district have the same number of people?  Or should they have the same number of eligible voters?

The United States basically says, people.  The plaintiffs say, eligible voters.  The State of Texas says, whichever we want—federalism leaves it up to us.  Justice Kennedy, at oral argument, seemed to be considering yet a fourth answer: “But why is one option exclusive of the other? Why can't you have both? . . . . Why can't you use both?” (p.34)

Mathematically, this is possible.  (Justice Kennedy asked if there were “any studies on this” and indeed there is one, although nobody at oral argument seemed aware of it.)  But here’s what you have to do to make it happen.  If each district is going to have the same total population and the same eligible voter population, then you’re necessarily going to need to pair every area that has a relatively high proportion of eligible voters with another area that has a relatively low proportion of eligible voters.  That’s where you run into trouble.

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Cato Institute debate on "constitutional crises"

Sandy Levinson

The Cato Institute web site today published a piece of mine on "constitutional crises" within the American system, which will be followed in the next week or so by responses from Jacob Levy, Tom Ginsburg, and Richard Albert.  I am obviously grateful to the folks at Cato for giving me this opportunity, and I look forward to reading the response (and then replying to them). 

Monday, December 07, 2015

America's coming exceptional self-isolation

Sandy Levinson

Put to one side the fascistic suggestion by Donald Trump with regard to barring Moslems from entering the United States and presumably monitoring all Moslem-Americans who are ostensiblly equal citizens entitled to full protections of the Constitution..  And one can even put to one side the obvious legal questions, in terms both of domestic constitutional law and international law, about such proposals with regard to immigrants and visitors.  It is an embarrassing fact, after all, that so long as the Chinese Exclusion Cases remain on the books, it may be the case that the US, as a "sovereign state," has the absolute right to deny entrance on any grounds it sees fit, including religious.  Indeed, it is not unthinkable that Antonin Scalia believes that "sovereign states" within the US have such a right, as the US Supreme Court suggested in the 1837 case Mayor of New York v. Miln, overruled in 1941, but it's not clear that Scalia--or Texas Gov. Greg Abbott--has received the message.


Rather, one might actually raise a pragmatic and amoral  point that one would think a self-professed business genius, who has, by his own assertion, made millions in resorts like Atlantic City, would be sensitive to.  Adoption of such wicked policies would, in addition to everything else, assure that the US would simply for a very long time never again be able to host any international gathering, whether one thinks of the World Cup, the Olympics, or a trade fair.  All of them depend on relative freedom of movement across borders.  Already the US makes it more difficult for foreigners to enter the country, and many countries have retaliated by making it equally inconvenient for Americans to travel abroad.  Thus Brazil and Argentina, to name only two, extract hefty visa charges that are acknowledged quite openly to be a response to the charges the US places on their own nationals when they try to visit the US. 


So why in the world would any international organization pick the US as the venue for its events when other countries would be more welcoming?  Perhaps we will become more like China and North Korea in our hesitation to welcome those about whom we've become hysterical.  Mr. Trump and his allies apparently think that their suggestions would be cost free (except to foreign Others) if adopted.  But not only is there no reason at all to believe that Trump's "policies" would make us safer; it is the also the case, in addition to their betraying what is most admirable about the United States, at least in its self-conception as set out on the Statue of Liberty, that the economic costs would be enormous.  One awaits the next polls, to see what limits there are on acceptance of his idiocy.  If not, then we should be very, very afraid, for all sorts of reasons.  The only silver lining of his continued prominence as a candidate would be the almost certain destruction of the Republican Party as they pay the price for the cynically racist Southern Strategy adopted long ago by Richard Nixon with such effectiveness. 


[UPDATE:  I am chastised in one of the comments for my intemperance in calling Donald Trump a "fascist."  Is he any less "fascistic" that the vaunted "Islamic-fascists" who are the object of vituperation from the Right?  Perhaps neither is "really" fascist if we require, say, commitment to a corporatist organization of society, etc.  So, to be sure, it would be valuable to have serious discussions of what makes one a "fascist," "communist," "socialist," "democrat," "libertarian," and so on.  But there is really no reason to continue treating Donald Trump or his acolytes as mere entertainment (the Huffington Post initial strategy).  He is as dangerous to the stability of the United States as, say, Huey Long or Father Coughlin were during the '30s in the United States or, for that matter, Marie Le Pen in contemporary France.  Does one want to settle for calling him a "dangerous narcissistic authoritarian"?  I would regard this as a friendly amendment.  But it is shameful that some Republican "leaders" continue to treat him with respect.  Lindsay Graham, with whom I agree on very little, is behaving as a truly responsible leader in his own comments about Trump.  He should be commended. 

Wednesday, December 02, 2015

A Fourth Path in Evenwel: What Campaign Finance Jurisprudence Tells Us About Legislative Redistricting

Guest Blogger


Michael T. Morley


            On December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. 2015), in which the Petitioners, a pair of Texas voters, seek to dramatically change the constitutional requirements for redistricting state legislatures.  The case presents an interesting and important three-way dispute between the voters, the State of Texas, and the Government, which was granted leave to participate and argue as amicus curiae.  The voters contend that the “one man, one vote” principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires states to draw state legislative districts in a way that equalizes, to the greatest extent possible, the number of eligible voters in each district.  They have challenged the constitutionality of Texas’ legislative districts, which were drawn to equalize the total number of people in each district, regardless of their eligibility to vote.  Petitioners have shouldered the unenviable burden of establishing that the manner in which virtually every jurisdiction in the nation chooses to draw state legislative districts is unconstitutional. 

The State of Texas, in contrast, contends that the Equal Protection Clause gives states discretion to choose whether to equalize the number of eligible voters, or instead the total number of people, in each district.  The Government, borrowing from Alexander Bickel, invites the Court to issue a more minimal ruling.  Pointing out that Texas has drawn its legislative districts based on total population, it asks the Court to affirm the constitutionality of that approach without ruling on whether the Petitioners’ proposed alternative—equalizing the number of eligible voters in each district—would be permissible, as well. 

The Government goes on to strongly imply, however, that Petitioners’ proposed method for drawing legislative districts is unconstitutional.  Allocating state representatives based solely on the number of eligible voters in each district, the Government argues, “risks rendering residents of this country who are ineligible, unwilling, or unable to vote as invisible or irrelevant to our system of representative democracy. . . .  A redistricting plan based on voters alone risks sending the distinct message that the political system is responsive to no one else.”  The Government later elaborates, “Viewing people who do not vote as irrelevant to our system of representation would be especially inappropriate given that distribution of public resources tends to correlate with the distribution of political representation.” 

The Solicitor General’s concern about rendering certain people “invisible” sounds less like traditional legal argument than the political rhetoric of the Obama Administration.  More importantly, the Government’s arguments about the people to whom the Government itself should be accountable ignores a rich and fertile body of precedent that addresses this very issue:  campaign finance law.  Indeed, it appears that none of the more than two dozen briefs filed in Evenwel seek guidance from the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. 

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Tuesday, December 01, 2015

Supreme Court paves the way to hear the DAPA immigration case this Term . . .

Marty Lederman

. . . assuming it decides to hear the case, that is.  Lyle Denniston has the details:  The Court will likely consider the petition at its January 15 Conference, so that the case could be argued in April if the Court decides to grant cert.

For more on the case, see my posts here and here -- and the Balkinization blog symposium from last year.

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