Balkinization  

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage

Andrew Koppelman



     The case for same-sex marriage has been politically triumphant, and its victory looks inevitable.  It nonetheless is curiously incomplete.  It has succeeded, not because the most sophisticated opposing arguments have been considered and rejected, but because those arguments have not even been understood.  Those arguments rest on complex claims, either about what sustains the stability of heterosexual marriages or about what those marriages essentially are.  The most familiar claim, that recognition of same-sex marriage jeopardizes the heterosexual family, demands an account of the transformation of family norms in the past half century.  Major social change should not be undertaken without a full awareness of what is at stake.

My new essay, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, just posted on SSRN and forthcoming in the Illinois Law Review, thus remedies a major gap in the literature.  It critically surveys and evaluates the arguments against same-sex marriage, focusing on recent writings of Amy Wax, Robert P. George, and Mary Geach.  You may not be persuaded by them.  In fact, you shouldn’t be persuaded by them.  But you need to know what they are.

Both Mary and I are right

Sandy Levinson

I appreciate Mary Dudziak's thoughtful post on the legitimate disillusion with aspects of Barack Obama's presidency.  I think it is a disgrace, for example, that he so completely capitulated to the well-off complainers about relatively modest delays in air travel while he has remained basically silent about the insane sequester cuts that are affecting those who do not regularly engage in air travel.  Far better for the "sequester" to be considered on an "all-or-nothing" basis than allow Republicans and scared Democrats to cherry-pick those relatively few aspects of the sequester that impinge on those at the relative top of the class structure (including, I must confess, well-paid law professors like me who fly a lot).  I also think that it is fair to criticize Obama (or, for that matter, to praise him) for certain foreign policy decisions given the relative autonomy that American presidents may have in that domain, or in making certain kinds of military decisions. 

That being said, I continue to think that Maureen Dowd's criticism of Obama for failing to play sufficient hardball vis-a-vis the background-check bill is mistaken.  The President has far less practical power with regard to domestic legislation.  Would it really make sense, for example, for the President to threaten Mark Begich, whose re-election to the Senate is essential if Democrats are not to be rendered irrelevant after the 2014 election, because he is cautious about putting his re-election in jeopardy by voting for a bill that a) would, at best, be only marginally helpful in helping to reduce violence attached to guns; and b) would very likely not be passed by the House.  Critics are basically asking the President in effect to place Begich's re-election in jeopardy by asking (or imposing pressure on him) to engage in a "grand gesture" that would not only risk his re-electionbut also would probably not eventuate in actual legislation.  The reason for the latter is the bicameralism that is an important part of the Constitution.  Its purpose (and function) is to make it harder to pass legislation, which means, among other things, that a member of either house of Congress must calculate the actual odds that the other house will be receptive.  Jimmy Carter many years ago successfully put pressure on Democrats in the House to support some energy reforms that then went nowhere in the Senate, which, quite understandably, angered the House members who went out on a limb. 

As it happens, I support bicameralism in a polity as large as the US (or, for that matter, even Texas, though not, e.g., any state smaller than New Zealand, which functions just fine with one House of Representatives), though I despise the principle of equal representation in the Senate.  But we should be aware that even the best bicameral systems (far better than our own) may impose costs as well as benefits.  In any event, we should be able to combine both "personal" sorts of criticisms of the kind that Mary offered with the more "structural" ones that I emphasize.  It is altogether possible that if everyone were making structural arguments, I would feel compelled to point out that individuals and other contingencies are important as well, as Mary correctly suggests.  But, to put it mildly, I don't think there's an excessive emphasis on structural argument in our contemporary discourse. Just read every single one of the Times' or Washington Post's stable of columnists, of all political persuasions.  So until one of those worthies does indeed connect the dots, I will continue to complain about the partial nature of their often otherwise helpful analyses. 


Monday, April 29, 2013

It’s time for liberals to stop making excuses for Obama

Mary L. Dudziak

Sandy Levinson took Maureen Dowd to task for her column last week, “No Bully in the Pulpit,” which criticized President Obama for failing to pull the votes together to get the gun control bill through the Senate.  “Now it's Maureen Dowd who can't connect the dots,” he said. 
She thinks he should have played hardball with the holdout Democrats and attempted to recruit more Republican support.  In particular, he shouldn't have left the cajoling up to Joe Biden.  For her, it's always personalities, and never structures, that explain the American political system.  So she's my latest candidate among Times' columnists who simply cannot connect the dots between political outcomes and the structures established in the Constitution.
For Sandy, “the egregious outcome is best explained by our egregious Constitution and the allocation of voting power in the Senate.”

Sandy is, of course, right that structure matters.  But Dowd is also right that a president’s effectiveness in using the powers of his office also matters.  Other presidents have faced structural barriers to achieving their goals.  Some presidents have been more successful than others at moving forward in the face of opposition. Structure alone does not determine political outcomes. 

The more we explain away failures during Obama’s presidency as the inevitable consequence of political structures, the more we put off an urgent analysis of the failures of the president himself.  And the more we put off the political work that liberals and progressives need to engage in: marshaling our own efforts against a president we once supported. 

We have a liberal president who has used his powers to institutionalize and legitimize targeted killing, but who was unable to use a powerful political moment – the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shootings – to get gun control through the senate, who has escalated the rate of deportations, and who is silent as prisoners appear to try to kill themselves at Guantánamo, a prison he promised to close.  With no substantial push-back from the left, the direction of compromise is of course toward the right.  And so, if we are to focus on structure, the absence of more powerful progressive opposition becomes its own feature of the broader political structure.  As liberals remain hopeful and wait, the only meaningful political push-back is from the right.
   
In his second term, Obama won’t need to worry about electoral consequences, of course, but he should be worrying about his legacy.  It won’t be long after the 2016 election that we will turn to assessing the Obama presidency.  At that point, we will tally up the successes and the failures, of which gun control is surely one.  But the time for liberal and progressive pundits and intellectuals to voice their disappointment in this presidency is now, when a chorus of criticism from formerly loyal supporters might serve as a wake-up call before this truly becomes a lame-duck administration.  It’s time for liberals to stop making excuses for Obama, but instead to hold him accountable.

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Guantanamo as a "Political Prison"

Mark Tushnet

The Lawfare blog is a useful source for a moderately conservative spin (Steve Vladeck's posts are an exception to the spin) on developments in the law of counterterrorism -- not as useful as Marty Lederman's less frequent posts here, of course. There is, however, one real cost to reading Lawfare -- Ben Wittes's obsession with the New York Times's editorial page. His most recent post on the topic is particularly egregious. Its header is "The New York Times Declares Al Qaeda Membership Legitimate Political Activity." One clue to the difficulty is Wittes's restatement of his point: The editorial "inevitably suggests that the detainees at Guantanamo are 'political prisons,' which in turn connotes prisoners of conscience." Note how suggests and connotes turn into declares.

Substantively, Wittes's objection is that the editorial refers to Guantanamo as a "political prison," with the ensuing suggestion and connotation. But, I would have thought, the natural reading of the phrase is that Guantanamo is a prison maintained for political rather than penological (or similar) reasons, without suggesting that those detained there are prisoners of conscience. And that reading seems to me accurate enough.

Wittes's readings of the Times's editorials are not "sharp" or "astute"; they are systematically distorted by an astigmatism whose source lies in Wittes, not in the Times. (Which is not to say that the editorials are always right -- although I do observe that Wittes has taken to writing recently that the editorials he discusses do not "contain[] many factual errors in the sense of factually-false statements of the type I normally note," which is a reasonably disgraceful thing to say.) And, the effect is not only to reduce the blog's overall usefulness, but to lead this reader to distrust Wittes's readings of other documents he sometimes deals with. All in all, someone ought to take him out to the woodshed to cure him of his obsession.

Friday, April 26, 2013

Berger on Civil Religion in Boston

Andrew Koppelman



The great sociologist Peter Berger has posted a provocative reflection on the interfaith services that took place in Boston after the bombings.  Those services, he observes, were carefully tailored by the clergy who spoke there to avoid any specific religious content – even though only by reference to that content could they respond to the most pressing question of the day, “How could God have allowed this to happen?”

Berger observes:

“This is a very distinctive American version of the separation of church and state, a quite strict legal separation, yet with diverse religious groups noisily present in public life. I think that, by and large, this has been a very successful arrangement. It presupposes that a religious group, when it enters public space, must translate its commentaries into terms that can be understood and debated by all citizens, most of whom will not be members of the particular group. Put differently, if one wants to persuade fellow-citizens in public space, one must employ a secular discourse. That discourse does have a moral foundation, the value system of the “American Creed”. Adherents of this or that specific faith may find these values more vague, even superficial, than the ones derived directly from faith, and they themselves may understand their allegiance to the Creed in terms specific to their faith. Thus the secular discourse of the public space coexists with the plurality of specific (if you will, “sectarian”) religious discourses.”


What’s fascinating about this particular variety of secularism is that the religious groups participated precisely because they were religious:  the service avoids matters of theological disagreement, but nonetheless the churches function as official mourners for the nation.  They were invited; the Harvard Philosophy Department was not, and neither were any of the many other institutions of civil society.


Marc DiGirolami worries about Berger’s formulation, “which reminds me a little bit of Rawls's proviso.  It may be more accurate to say that the specific religious discourses not only coexist with the civil religion, but themselves also somehow constitute it.”  DiGirolami doesn’t want to purge those specific discourses from the public sphere.  But what’s peculiar about the American practice is that they are simultaneously in and out of it:  their specific theological differences are integral to their identities, but they are expected not to discuss them in this context. What happened in Boston wasn’t Rawlsian, because the operative category isn’t “comprehensive view,” but “religion.” The clergy avoided discussing theological niceties, but their function was specifically religious.


All of this I take to be further confirmation of my description of American law in action in my new book, Defending American Religious Neutrality.  American law treats religion as a good thing, but insists that the state take no position on any controversial theological question.  What Berger shows is that religious speakers understand and respect that constraint when they are acting in a quasi-official capacity.  We can and doubtless will continue to argue about whether American norms about public religion are appropriate.  Those arguments should be based on an accurate description of those norms – in this case, of the peculiarly religion-friendly character of American secularism.  We keep bumping into evidence of that character, so it is puzzling that it is so little understood.








Thursday, April 25, 2013

Did the Law Professors Blow It in the Health Care Case?

Andrew Koppelman



David Hyman’s newly posted paper, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against the PPACA?, reflects on what he calls “the epic failure of law professors to accurately predict how Article III judges would handle the case.”  The culprit, he concludes, was the experts’ insularity and arrogance.  (I’m one of his named targets.)

The following facts are undisputed:  (1) many law professors, myself included, declared that the constitutional objections to the ACA were frivolous, and (2) the Court in the end accepted many of those objections and struck down the law in part (the requirement that states accept the Medicaid expansion or lose all their funds).  These facts should be deeply embarrassing to the professors if and only if their jobs consist entirely of making predictions about what the Supreme Court will do.

Hyman allows for only one other possibility:  Law professors weren’t actually making predictions. Instead, they were just behaving like law professors – i.e., they were pontificating about the state of constitutional law precedent, and/or providing their personal views on what the Constitution authorizes and prohibits.” 

Well, that sounds like pointless navel-gazing.  If there are just two options, prediction and pontification, then only the first is worth doing.  “With all due respect to those quoted, no one (apart from other law professors who do constitutional law, the articles editors at the law reviews that publish their articles, and perhaps the mothers of those law professors, and I’m not so sure about the last category) has the slightest interest whatsoever in the personal views of constitutional law professors on what the Constitution authorizes and prohibits.”

Now, as it happens, not all of us confidently predicted that the Court would uphold the ACA.  Here’s the first sentence of my first article on the topic:  “The Supreme Court may be headed for its most dramatic intervention in American politics—and most flagrant abuse of its power—since Bush v. Gore.”  That sentence presumes that there is a criterion by which one can intelligibly call a decision an abuse of power. 

In Hyman’s world, that notion is unintelligible.  It is impossible for a case to be wrongly decided, because law is simply whatever courts say it is.  (If you complain, you’re just pontificating.)

In fairness to Hyman, a lot of law professors did confidently make predictions about the case, predictions very different from mine.  How can that be accounted for?  I have my own hypothesis.

There are two ways of predicting what the Supreme Court will do. One is legal analysis. You read the Court’s decisions, see what broad principles the judges have endorsed, and then apply those principles to the case before you. But there is a second approach, which I’ll call Kremlinology, after the old practice of analysts trying to guess what the Central Committee of the Soviet Union was up to. This attempts to piece together any evidence one can find of the whims of those in power, in order to intelligently guess how that power will be used.

Law professors aren’t Kremlinologists.  They tend to presume, and are usually right to presume, that the courts are interested in legal analysis.  From that standpoint, the case against the ACA was and remains preposterous.  But sometimes the presumption turns out to be false.  Perhaps the professors should have taken more account of that (though I’m sure that some of them weren’t as confident as they sounded, and were trying to shame the Court into doing the right thing).  But then, the reproach against them is like the line from the movie Animal House:  “You can’t spend your whole life worrying about your mistakes.  You fucked up.  You trusted us.”



Wednesday, April 24, 2013

New Books Network Interview on The Tough Luck Constitution

Andrew Koppelman



I discuss my new book, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform, with the New Books Network website, here.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Warrantless Searches of Homes and the Fourth Amendment

Guest Blogger

Albert Wong

Last week, in a determined quest to capture the lone remaining suspect in the Boston Marathon bombing, law enforcement officers defined a 20-block perimeter in the middle of densely populated Watertown, Massachusetts and conducted a thorough, door-to-door search of all residences within those 20 blocks. There is no question that the suspect was dangerous. And it is probably true that many, if not most, of the residents in those 20 blocks were willing to consent to a search of their property to ensure that the suspect had not broken in and secreted himself in some nook or cranny. But absent consent, did heavily armed SWAT teams have a legal right to conduct warrantless searches of every house located within said 20 blocks?

A recent article by Diane Burch Beckham, Senior Staff Counsel for the Texas District and County Attorneys Association, makes clear that according to existing case law, the answer is no. “Four circumstances,” she writes, “must be present when officers enter a home, without consent or warrant, to search under [exigent] circumstances: the offender might escape if police do not make an immediate entry; the offender has demonstrated that he poses a danger to the community (for instance, the crime just committed is a crime of violence); the offender has been pursued into the house continuously from the crime scene; and the warrantless arrest would be lawful if accomplished in a public place but that cannot be done because of the suspect’s decision to retreat into a private place.”

Several of these prongs are clearly satisfied in the instant case. There was ample justification for the arrest of the suspect, there was little question that he posed a danger to the community, and there was a credible flight risk. Importantly, however, the suspect was not “pursued into the house continuously from the crime scene.” He was pursued into a large, general region of a city. Even in cases involving a single house, “[t]he information must be fairly specific … merely investigating a potential danger may not justify warrantless entry.” The lack of specificity here is only more pronounced; officers had no specific or articulable reason to believe that the suspect was present in any given house in the 20-block perimeter. In fact, the suspect was ultimately found by accident, and not by police but by a civilian, safely outside the 20-block area.

Nor do the Fourth Amendment’s requirements evaporate due to the serious nature of the crime being investigated. “There is no precedent” for such a proposition, as Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, reaffirmed just last Term. And accepting such a “novelty” would lead to a cornucopia of “vexing problems”: in investigations involving “extraordinary offenses,” if it’s okay to conduct nonconsensual warrantless searches of every house in a 20-block area, what of searching every house in a 30-block area? Or a 100-block area? What exactly constitutes an “extraordinary offense”?

As Aaron Zelinsky recently reflected on Concurring Opinions, “[i]n moments like this, it often feels that the process we’re engaged in - the study of law - is a waste of time. After all, one of our country’s greatest cities has come under attack. Over 100 people are injured. SWAT teams are deployed up and down the Eastern Seaboard.” But ultimately, “what separates us from [criminals and terrorists]” is a “belief in human rights and the rule of law.” That “we always try to meet our noblest ideals … [is] what makes our country so special - as we [each] do our tiny bit in moving forward the ‘full weight of Justice’.”

Albert Wong is a Student Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at albert.wong at yale.edu

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