Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Constitutional theory is in need of a paradigm shift. It is obviously important to articulate an inspiring vision of what the country is and what we want the country to be, one that has the moral force and clarity to attract the kind of political support needed for meaningful policy change. I agree wholeheartedly with the contributors to the Constitution in 2020 volume that constitutional law has a crucial role to play in this regard. But in exalting constitutional law as an expression of nationhood and identity, and elevating the Constitution to the level of civic religion, we risk losing sight of a fundamental truth: constitutional law is, like any other form of law, an instrument of policy and a form of social technology. It is no small matter to engineer peace and prosperity on a national and even international scale. Yet a successful constitution is precisely such a feat of engineering. Consider the most grievous calamities of the last century. War, famine, genocide: we have not nature, but rather the failure of our methods and institutions for resolving disputes and allocating resources, to blame for these. In other words, it is our technologies of government that fail us catastrophically.
Law is a central component of the technology of government. And if law is to society as software is to a computer, then constitutional law is the operating system: it is a framework that enables, constrains, and structures human activity. From this perspective, it should be obvious that we can speak of both constitutional success and constitutional failure. And it should also be obvious that what humanity desperately needs is a body of knowledge that guides societies toward constitutional success and away from constitutional failure.
I would like to suggest that constitutional theory would be a more worthwhile endeavor, of greater value to humanity, if it were to do two things. The first is to articulate the criteria of constitutional success, or the goals that constitutional policy should aim to achieve. The second is to identify the constitutional choices that best advance those goals. The most basic criterion of constitutional success is the Hobbesian one of avoiding a state of “perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbor,” in which conflict is endemic and resolved on the basis of strength and strength alone. E. Adamson Hoebel, writing a half-century ago on “the law of primitive man,” deemed it the goal of law to avoid “ghastly explosion,” and he argued as a historical matter that those human societies that have endured have done so by expanding the scope of the law, by creating “effective instruments of procedure,” and by limiting and allocating the use of force in such a way as to enable “social authority” to prevail in the last analysis. The limitation and allocation of force; the establishment of effective procedures for the emergence and resolution of conflict; the survival of society without “ghastly explosion”: although Hoebel does not call these criteria of successful constitutionalism, that is precisely what they are.
A society such as our own that is fortunate enough to take the possibility of “ghastly explosion” for granted (or, perhaps more accurately, one that has already endured its ghastly explosion and expunged its most egregious constitutional defect by way of a bloody civil war) rightly has higher and more extensive ambitions for its constitutional law than mere survival. But it should be equally obvious that other countries are not (yet) so fortunate. Nor is the international community, which remains characterized by what Hoebel called “primitive law” on a global scale. Law exists, but vindication of the law is largely a matter of self-help; rules exist, but enforcement and observance of the rules occurs on the basis of non-legal considerations, and at the discretion of the powerful. The prospect of ghastly explosion stalks the system. The international legal order needs to be infused with principles capable of commanding allegiance, and to be backed by mechanisms and institutions that are capable of rendering those principles meaningful yet do not amount to a new, uniquely terrifying Leviathan of global government. In short, the world is in need of constitutionalization.
Can constitutional theory rise to the challenge?
Are we to have the kind of constitutional theory that is narrowly preoccupied with judicial hermeneutics? Should we spend another fifty years debating the implications of the so-called “counter-majoritarian dilemma,” on the questionable assumption that such a dilemma even exists? Is constitutional theory to be a parochial discipline that reaches no further than the country’s borders and treats the rest of humanity as largely irrelevant, except perhaps for historical purposes?
Or will we have the kind of constitutional theory that concerns itself with questions of institutional design, and on ascertaining which interests and outcomes are privileged by what kinds of rules, practices, and structures? Will constitutional theory look beyond our borders (http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org) for a better understanding of the impact of different design choices? Will constitutional theorists seek to discern in domestic practice what is worthy of global constitutionalism, and find in global constitutionalism what is worthy of domestic practice? Can constitutional theory help to foster a dialectic that advances not simply the development of American constitutional law, but rather the development of constitutionalism more generally?