Balkinization  

Tuesday, October 07, 2025

Gaming Out the Appellate Void

Andrew Coan

Last spring, I wrote about the possibility that the executive branch might defy a district court order and refuse to appeal. As the prevailing party, the plaintiffs could not appeal. The result would be an appellate void, in which lower federal courts lack effective tools for enforcing their decisions against a recalcitrant executive and higher courts lack any obvious path to intervene.

Alternatively, after the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., the executive branch might comply with court orders only as to specific plaintiffs, while continuing to enforce the challenged policies against everyone else. By refusing to appeal, the President would deny higher courts any opportunity to weigh in, without actually defying any binding judicial order. 

I have now written a full-length article gaming out these scenarios (forthcoming in Cornell Law Review).  The article first explains the jurisdictional dynamics that create the appellate void and why contempt sanctions offer little practical remedy. It then analyzes why a President might find this strategy tempting. In effect, the appellate void constitutes a reverse Marbury v. Madison. Instead of the Supreme Court asserting the power of judicial review, while leaving the President powerless to push back, the President would assert the power to defy the federal courts, while leaving the Supreme Court powerless to respond. 

This result is not inevitable. The appellate void strategy has real costs that might dissuade the President from embracing it, and courts and litigants have many potential responses. But if successful, the strategy would have large implications for judicial review, separation of powers, and the rule of law. The full article is available here


Older Posts
Newer Posts
Home