E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
It’s
commonplace to observe that major civil rights organizations from the 1910s to
the 1960s received significant financial support from Black professionals and
businesspeople who provided services to the Black community. Often that
observation is coupled with comments about the ways in which that source of
funding gave the organizations’ programs a middle-class tilt. And it is also
sometimes coupled with the explanation: These contributors were insulated from
retaliation by the white community in ways that, for example, schoolteachers,
sharecroppers, and tenant farmers were not.
Though he
doesn’t focus much on the phenomenon just described, Dylan Penningroth
foregrounds a deep explanation for it. Black professionals and businesspeople
had the resources they did because they had ordinary contract and property
rights, the same rights that whites had. And, indeed, a perhaps stronger point:
The professionals among them—the barbers, dentists, and insurance agents—were
often able to build their businesses because they had licenses from the
white-dominated state.
And things
could have been different. Penningroth mentions an abortive effort to impose
licensing requirements for washer-women in Atlanta. Professional licensing
could have been administered as literacy requirements for voting were:
nominally neutral as to race but in practice racially discriminatory. As I’ll
argue, we can see hints of this sort of difference at several points in
Penningroth’s narrative.
I think that
those hints can usefully be interrogated with the concept of legal pluralism
and—what might be a subcategory of legal pluralism—Ernst Fraenkel’s account of
the dual state.
(Michael McCann and Feliz Kahraman offer
a view similar to mine.) Penningroth powerfully contends that the
common-law rights available to Blacks were pretty much the same—both formally
and mostly in practice—as those available to white. I suggest a tweak to his
account in which we can see those rights on a continuum from true legal
pluralism through what Penningroth, quoting W.E.B. Du Bois, calls “Negro law,”
to the unitary law Penningroth portrays.
For present
purposes, true legal pluralism occurs where we can see both state law and
non-state law, each with a full panoply of norms and institutions. The
possibility of legal pluralism arises early in the book and crops up recurrently.
It is also available for the analysis of a group of cases that Penningroth
discusses in some detail, dealing with the internal law of religious
associations, protected to some degree against displacement by state law by the
Constitution’s religion clauses. “Church law” is often cited as an example of
legal pluralism.
Early in the
book Penningroth notes that Blacks developed ideas about their property rights as
slaves with reference to community practice and custom, and that they
effectively enforced those ideas through their community institutions. He sees
something similar in state law, which, for example, interpreted contracts with
reference to trade practice and had rules about prescriptive property rights. Similar,
yes, but not the same: State institutions enforced trade practice and the like
but didn’t enforce community practice and customs of the Black community.
These
components of Penningroth’s narrative seem to me to describe a domain of legal
pluralism. But, to revert to the metaphor of a continuum, the Black community’s
ideas about custom and like provided the foundation for their conceptualization
of property and contract rights once Blacks won their campaign to gain access
to state law—that is, once they became free and full citizens.
Further along
the continuum are Black-specific legal concepts—Du Bois’s Negro law. Here too,
I suggest, we see hints but not fully congealed doctrine. Penningroth suggests
that state law sometimes applied traditional ideas about coercion and capacity
to contract with an eye to the special circumstances of Blacks in a racist
society. He discusses what appears to be something approaching a doctrine about
fraud with respect to what his sources call the “ignorant negro.”
Had these
hints become formal doctrine within state law we might see a version of
Fraenkel’s dual state in which there is one normative state, as Fraenkel calls
it, for whites and another normative state for Blacks. (This differs from
Fraenkel’s theory, in which there is a single normative state and a domain of
completely arbitrary rule.) Some aspects of “lynch law” might fit into this
category as well. Lynchings sometimes occurred when Blacks violated ill-defined
“rules” about the ways in which Blacks were required to manifest respect for
whites. And “legal lynchings” occurred when the state’s criminal processes
administered procedural rules that were nominally race-neutral in
race-conscious ways. (See this
for my first tentative thoughts along these lines.)
Why didn’t a
Fraenkel-like dual normative state develop in the United States? Perhaps
because of a combination of a conceptual point that Penningroth emphasizes and
an institutional one that he regularly adverts to without bringing it directly
into his analysis. The conceptual point is that for centuries (until some point
in the early twentieth century) the common law of contracts, torts, and
property was understood to be what Holmes called a brooding omnipresence in the
sky—a set of principles valid and binding everywhere.
In itself
that might not have prevented the emergence of the kind of dual normative state
I’ve sketched: The two normativities could (conceptually) exist everywhere and
their “union” (to use a term from set theory) would be the law everywhere. The
institutional point is that the United States is a federal system in which
state courts articulated their own versions of the universal common law. And,
importantly, racism was unevenly distributed among the states—some highly
racist, others less so, and others even less so. Mississippi might have
developed a separate body of “Negro law” with contract rules predicated on the
“ignorant negro” assumption, but Michigan might not. The geographically
differentiated distribution of racism was, as Penningroth notes, was one common
reason for the great Black migrations. Without dual normativities everywhere it
would have been extremely difficult to create a universally applicable
dual-like state.
Bringing
legal pluralism into Penningroth’s narrative would do little more than tinker
with it around its edges. His central point is that that our starting place
should be with the proposition that Blacks had the same common-law rights that
whites did. And that seems to me entirely correct.