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Osagie K. Obasogie I am teaching a seminar this
semester on Substantive Due Process. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization compelled me to offer this class, as
the rejection of reproductive rights as fundamental rights may
very well signal the beginning of the end for the idea that unenumerated
legal entitlements are hidden in due process clauses, and that a skilled jurist
can discover and enforce them. My thinking has been that it would be good to be
able to teach these materials now, before they become part of the Legal History
curriculum. On the first day of class, I
offered students a framework that could help them think through the nuances and
complexities connected to an expansive reading of the 14th Amendment
that might acknowledge such rights. I told them that, as a relatively young person in my late 40s, I am part of the first
generation of Black Americans in this country’s nearly 250-year history who
was born entirely free. Students looked puzzled, and a bit shocked. Wasn’t freedom for Black Americans settled in 1865
with the 13th Amendment? Well, yes. But not completely. This
became an entry pointfor a discussion
about the formal equality provided by the Reconstruction Amendments and
enduring State sponsored barriers to freedom that persisted throughout much of
the late 19th and 20th centuries, such as Black Codes and
Jim Crow laws, not to mention the violence and intimidation used to maintain
racial hierarchies. These practices were
not affirmatively dispelled until various civil rights laws were legislated in
the 1960s. As Price notes, “[o]nly during and after the Civil Rights Movement’s
mid-twentieth-century successes has the federal government, including the
Supreme Court, sought to recover the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise and enforce
meaningful protections against racial subordination.” (182) We often think of this type of
infringement on rights as part of the distant past – something that perhaps our
great grandparents experienced but otherwise irrelevant to modern legal
discussions. Yet, this dynamic is not only about race. Dobbs itself
highlights the ongoing struggle for women to achieve reproductive autonomy,
while sexual minorities, poor people, and others have interests that align with
the freedoms professed by the 14th Amendment that have not been
achieved due to the belief that there is not a textual hook for their legal
recognition. This grounds a question that the
seminar explores throughout the semester: how should judicial review engage with
the documented problem of persistent substantive inequalities in light of law’s
stated commitments to equality, largely understood as neutrality? For this
conception of equality, enumeration is the touchstone; judges are thought to be
able to only enforce those rights that appear in the Constitution. Judicial
review as the possibility of discovering and enforcing unenumerated yet
fundamental rights has been controversial to say the least. Yet it has been
central to federal courts’ efforts at encouraging a more inclusive society. Zachary Price’s Constitutional
Symmetryoffers a broader theory of
judicial review to help resolve these and other important debates. By proposing
symmetry as an interpretive north star, Price suggests that judges should
“craft constitutional understandings that may be mutually beneficial and thus
(hopefully) mutually reinforcing across partisan and ideological divides,
rather than one-sided and polarizing.” (2) This is a bold and optimistic vision.
At the heart of Price’s claim is that each part of the partisanship divide represents one circle of a
Venn diagram where there might be an ever so thin overlap in partisan
sensibilities. Once identified, judges can craft rulings within this space that
satisfy the ideals of both major political groups. Price deftly argues that
this negotiated space may exist for even the most difficult political and legal
areas, such as gun rights. Constitutional symmetry is an important
concept that might allow courts to shift the focus of judicial review away from
taking sides and towards finding common ground. Few would argue against the
benefits of turning partisan temperatures down, so to speak, as part of an
effort to find a space of collective agreement. But can symmetry apply to fundamental
rights? Price believes so and says that “genuine symmetry in this area should
require maintaining some general doctrinal formulation that avoids
constitutionalizing one set of contested preferences at the expense of its
rivals.” (211) There seems to be a profound
tension between the very idea of a fundamental right and symmetry as a
normative guide to judicial review. If a right is to be framed as truly fundamental
to citizenship – whether it be access to contraception, same sex marriage, or
any other right that evokes appeals to substantive due process – must it not also
be uncompromised? Declaring something to be fundamental yet limiting its full
expression due to partisan disagreement hardly seems to respect the centrality
of said right to people’s lives. Rather, it subjects the enjoyment
and expression of rights to the limitations of then-prevailing political winds.
It might also transform the judiciary –
the branch of government that is to “say what the law is" – into a collection
of mediators in robes with lifetime tenure. Prioritizing the resolution of
political tensions might not align with a constitutional structure that
positions federal courts as a co-equal branch of government and is unlikely to meet the vision that Chief
Justice John Marshall had in mind when he established judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison. I offer these perspectives precisely
because we are currently in a political moment where partisan disputes that
affect vulnerable populations are moving into unchartered waters. If constitutional
symmetry is the goal, it is unclear how centering partisan appeals might shape
broader judicial inquiries. Take, for example, Representative
Nancy Mace’s use
of an anti-transgender slur during a House Committee hearing, and her stunning
refusal to acknowledge the harm and depravity of this speech. Such language
by a sitting Congressperson can anchor partisan divides on legal and political
issues pertaining to sexual minorities and normalize less-than respectful
treatment of vulnerable segments of the American population. Should this type
of partisan speech and its attendant beliefs be part of the judicial calculus
of symmetry in deciding cases relevant to transgender Americans? Price’s formulation of
constitutional symmetry would likely consider the use of slurs against a
minority group reprehensible and outside
the bounds of judicial consideration. But to the extent that constitutional
symmetry privileges partisan conciliation over uncompromised values such as
justice for marginalized groups, it is hard to have confidence that this
proposed approach can consistency identify which partisan ideals should not be
considered and which political sensibilities merit deference. This latent
instability embedded in pursuing the aesthetics of symmetry over the substance
of justice may expose minority groups to harms that could rollback many of the
gains in civil rights and constitutional interpretation that have been achieved
over the past few decades. At some point, certain political
positions are just wrong and incompatible with our legal commitments. Constitutional
Symmetry is an admirable attempt at deciding politically charged cases by finding
a middle ground that can allow most Americans to support our democratic institutions.
But symmetry itself as a guiding norm may
very well need guardrails to prevent insidious ideas from being mistaken as
legitimate party preferences that should be deferred to. I look forward to
future work by Price that continues this conversation and further develops his
promising idea. Osagie
K. Obasogie is the Haas Distinguished Chair and Professor of Law at the
University of California, Berkeley with a joint appointment in the Joint
Medical Program and School of Public Health.