E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Over the past decades, Prof.
Joanna Schwartz has written an illuminating series of law-review articles on
the litigation and financial dimensions of civil rights litigation. Drawing on
qualitative, quantitative, and doctrinal analysis, Schwartz has cast new light
on case selection, barriers to litigation, how payments are made, and what
consequence payments have to subsequent behavior. Her exemplary body of work
demonstrates the importance of a multidisciplinary approach, sustaining a single,
cohesive research agenda, and resisting the assumption that insight emerges
only from recondite econometric sophistication applied to staggeringly large
data sets. Any serious scholar grappling today with the mechanics of civil
liability for governmental torts needs to attend closely to her work. Her new book, Shielded:
How the Police Became Untouchable, does not endeavor to break new ground in
relation to these articles. Instead, it distils much of the material to be
found into her articles into a form readily digestible by lay (non-academic) readers.
Modestly, Schwartz aims less to showcase her own research as to offer those lay
readers an anatomy of the doctrinal and practical barriers hindering
constitutional tort actions for damages or for injunctions against police.
These range from the rigors of plausibility pleading to the difficulties of
translating court judgments into durable behavioral change on the part of
institutions. Shielded is hence a work of translation—taking up an
element of the policing puzzle that might be missed by law audience—and no less
valuable for it. The reason for investing into
translation is started early in Shielded, and then reiterated: Starting
in the 1960s, Schwartz observes, federal judges have made empirical claims
about the volume and negative costs (i.e., externalities) of civil-rights
litigation. Judge T. Emmet Claire, for example, complained in 1968 of an
“increasingly large volume” of Section 1983 actions (p.38). A decade later,
Chief Justice Burger complained of the “torrent” of suits against cities
(p.200).Yet the volume of Section 1983
suits has not risen, as Schwartz explains, out of step with secular trends in
federal-court case-loads (p.38). Repeatedly, Schwartz shows, judges have
tempered the force of liability out of a concern for the financial consequences
on officers—even though officers are almost always indemnified, while
information about information is selectively shared with jurors to create a
mirage of individual defendants’ exposure to liability (p.83). Shielded hence offers itself quite
consciously as an antidote to what James Baldwin (in a passage Schwartz deploys
as an epigraph) described as “[i]gnorance, allied with power” working as “the
most ferocious enemy justice can have.” Schwartz is plainly correct
that empirically erroneous representations offer a foundation for the
judicially glaciation of federal-court accountability for police violence. But
it does not follow from this that a mere correction of those errors, however
lucid, will have a material effect on the availability of remedies for the
constitutional wrongs of police. A false belief can play several different
roles in sustaining malign social arrangements. They can hence stand in quite
different relationships to the data immediately available for popular
consumption. The pseudo-scientific theories of race and gender differences can
be deployed to ‘explain’ manifest disparities (“X lives in these rundown
neighborhoods because they are lazy”) in ways that track, and hence operate as
substitutes for, depassé theological accounts
(“X are doomed as the Children of Ham …”).Or they can be threaded into the social mechanisms that create, and then
reproduce, these disparities (“We don’t extend mortgage credit to X because it
is not the most efficient deployment of resources.”).Empirical claims about the vulnerability of
certain groups, and their heightened need for protection, can even be a
foundation for policies that devastate those groups. (Claudio Sant’s history of
the 1830 Indian Removal Act comes to mind here). The point to underscore across
these examples is that false beliefs do not stand on their own; they are
interleaved into larger structures of belief, confirmation, and true evidence.
It is only once integrated into these larger epistemic networks that they can
play a sustaining role in respect to malign social stratifications. Even as Shielded
recounts the false premises of plausibility pleading, qualified immunity,
limits to municipal liability, and the like, it offers no account of how it is
that judges come to hold their beliefs, or of the larger ideological matrix in
which they rest. Nor does it explain why judges continue to hold the beliefs
that Schwartz shows to be false despite the availability of empirical
studies—including those by Schwartz herself—demonstrating their fallacy. Why,
one might hence ask, was this book necessary given that Schwartz has documented
powerfully the errors animating several key doctrines across several
well-received academic publications in prestigious journals? Why have the
Justices and judges who remain avid advocates of qualified immunity—many of
whom make ostentatious displays of learning, frequently of a historical bent,
beyond text and precedent—not updated their beliefs? And why should a popular
book change their minds? Yet for better or worse, Shielded
offers no account of what might be called the ‘political epistemology’ of
police untouchability. It offers no explanation of why fallacies come to
take hold. It does not concern itself with why it is that judges such as Claire
or Burger come to believe them firmly in the apparent absence of any
confirmatory evidence. Nor does it address the ways in which either the
partisan reflux of judicial appointments perhaps, or instead maybe the
institutional socialization of the federal bench creates an environment in
which lies about police violence can thrive. It is therefore difficult to
discern whether and how Schwarz thinks that this book will move the needle when
her own (very fine) articles have not done so. There are moments at which Schwartz
comes close to indulging in an uncharacteristically lazy assumption that change
will flow from some sudden enlightenment on the Justices’ part(p.86). Such magical thinking is so pervasive
even in the legal academy’s soi-disant peaks that Schwartz can be forgiven for
slipping into a hackneyed (and uncharacteristically unsupported) trope. Rather,
I think the project of Shielded is best understood as an effort to end-run the
Justices, and as an effort to seed change in the broader public domain on the
assumption (perhaps false) that the bench cannot cling like drowned sailors to
Gericault’s Medusa, to comfortingly paranoic fantasies in the face of public
opposition. In any event, Shielded
deserves a wide public readership given this ambition. I certainly hope it
changes the tenor of public conversation about policing. One of the lessons of
the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and its immediate effects, however, has
been the durable strength of reactive forces even in supposedly liberal, pro-reform
jurisdictions. Whether and how Shielded
can break through the enduring crust of false beliefs remains to be seen. I
hope for the best, but wonder whether Schwartz’s keen insights alone can move
the needle.
Aziz Z. Huq is the Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago School of Law. You can reach him by e-mail at huq@uchicago.edu.