E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Susan Rose-Ackerman’s “Democracy and Executive Power,” is a
magisterial work about executive creation and implementation in four western
democracies, two presidential and two parliamentary, of public policy initiatives
undertaken within statutory frameworks framing these executive tasks. Thus, its
focus is on the process Americans call rulemaking (known in other systems as
secondary or subsidiary legislation), the executive development of regulations
to implement statutory directive.This process
is a universal necessity of governance in this complex and interdependent world.
Yet it is equally necessary that it be undertaken by unelected bureaucrats,
with the result, all too evident in contemporary American debates, that serious
questions can be raised about its legitimacy in the face of the public’s claims
for its participation and the actors’ accountability. That is, as her title reflects, the central
issue is answering the claims of democracy in relation to these actions.
Legislators act after generally public debate, on public votes for which the
electorate can hold them responsible.
Prof. Rose-Ackerman develops model after thoughtful and
persuasive model, reflecting her background in economics and her deep
understanding of executive policymaking. She is quite taken by the American
process of notice-and-comment rulemaking, with its significant provisions for
the public’s knowledge in advance of proposals to be acted upon, for public
input then into the agency’s deliberative processes, for explanation much
fuller than legislatures provide of agency reasoning in adopting a regulation,
and for judicial controls considerably more demanding than apply to statutes.
And she is chary, as am I, of the steady development of presidential controls tending
to render the process more opaque and more subject to political capture in ways
the electorate cannot well control.The
processes she finds in England, France and Germany generally lack our
bureaucratic processes, but have elements – in France, for example, the
training, discipline and traditions of its civil service – that tend to promote
regularity compensating for issues of transparency, participation, and
accountability.Still, her general
thrust is for the kinds of agency-level processes we enjoy.
The inclusion of France and Germany in her analyses gives
this book broader appeal to the growing audience for comparative administrative
law – a discipline for which, in the English-speaking world, Prof.
Rose-Ackerman has been a charter member – than Professor Margit Cohn’s equally
recent A Theory of the Executive Branch: Tension and Legality.(A few months ago Cohn’s book was the
subject of a series like this one, hosted by Adminlawblog.org, a Wordpress site
focused on common-law jurisdictions.)A
Theory of the Executive Branch addresses the same issues as Prof.
Rose-Ackerman in seeking to develop a general theory of executive action in a
democratic context.But she does this largely
by comparing UK and US institutions. Prof. Peter Cane’s contribution to the
series on Cohn’s book questioned whether her data set was “far too small to
accommodate her aspiration to generality,” and focused “on her more specific
claim that there is sufficient similarity between the US and UK systems to
generate a general theory.”He found
this “unconvincing” given the very different relationships between the
executive and the bureaucracy, and in the concept of judicial power, in the two
systems.[1]
By adding the German and French approaches Prof. Rose-Ackerman so well
understands, “Democracy and Executive Power” effectively meets this critique, greatly
enriching our understandings of its important themes.Perhaps one could wish that other world
democracies had been included; these issues are common to all.In particular, attention to the draft
administrative law code prepared for the European Union by the RENEUAL group of
European administrative law scholars might have strengthened the argument for
moving, generally, toward notice-and-comment processes for executive
policy-making; the RENEUAL draft’s recommended processes striking resemble the
American model.There is, then, more
work that could be done; yet this book is a remarkable, strong effort to tackle
a first-order set of governmental, democratic problems.
Problem solved? Reading
“Democracy and Executive Power” brought to mind Prof. Rose-Ackerman’s colleague
Jerry Mashaw’s remarkable analyses of social security adjudications.Prof. Mashaw identified three models by which
the propriety of those adjudications might be assessed, each stressing
particular values that would be compromised by the alternatives: first,
bureaucratic rationality, that might be styled efficiency, in which costs are
contained and errors in granting and denying claims are evenly distributed and
tightly bunched; second, reliance on the judgment and service commitments of
professionals – doctors, in that particular case -- taking care to avoid the
possible costs of disrespecting the profession’s integrity; and finally, moral
judgment, stressing fairness to the claimant and respect for her perspectives
and dignity.
"If these hypotheses are
correct,” he wrote, “then it may also follow that the best system of
administrative adjudication may be the one most open to criticism.A compromise that seeks to preserve the
values and to respond at once to the insights of all of these conceptions of
justice will, from the perspective of each separate conception, appear
incoherent and unjust.The best system
of administrative adjudication that can be devised may fall tragically short of
our inconsistent ideals."[2]
These words have long been for me, the
most powerful evocation of administrative adjudication’s dilemmas.And “Democracy and Executive Power,”,
throughout, brings similar wisdom to the issues of executive policy-making procedure,
as the needs for efficiency, transparency, participation and accountability
collide. Her models, too, collide, and I am tempted to end these comments by
remarking that
"If her hypotheses are
correct, then it may also follow that the best system of administrative
rulemaking may be the one most open to criticism.A compromise that seeks to preserve the
values and to respond at once to the insights of all of these conceptions will,
from the perspective of each separate conception, appear incoherent and unjust.The best system of administrative rulemaking
that can be devised may fall tragically short of our inconsistent ideals."
Peter L. Strauss is Betts Professor of Law Emeritus at Columbia Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at plsathome@gmail.com.