E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
In the lead up to the election, Walmart removed
guns and ammunition from sales floors of its U.S. stores that sell firearms, in attempt to prevent theft of
firearms if stores are looted amid civil unrest. And then, when its assessment of the likelihood of civil unrest
ebbed, it nimbly changed course andreturned these items again to its shelves.
These sensible moves are far from the first time Walmart has shown
leadership in trying to assure that it was responsibly marketing products that
can be violently misused. Last year, it
stopped selling ammunition that can be used semiautomatic rifles and the year
before it raised the minimum
age to purchase guns or ammunition to 21.
But can a single gun retailer make
a dent in gun violence? Our new research suggests that it can.
In
1994, Walmart stopped selling handguns at all of its locations in every state
except for Alaska. Then in 2006, Walmart stopped selling firearms altogether in
more than half of its stores. But the company partially reverse course in
2011 and began increasing the number of stores selling rifles and
shotguns. We tested the impact of these policy changes on suicide and
homicide.
There are reasons to be skeptical that Walmart’s policy changes would have a
significant impact. The United States is awash with gun dealers.
There are more than 62,000
federally licensed dealers, more than the number of grocery stores or
pharmacies. But not all dealers are created equal. In any given
month, more than two-thirds
of Americans visit a Walmart store. Even with its self-imposed
restrictions, Walmart remains the nation’s largest gun dealer.
Another reason for skepticism about the possible impact of Walmart’s decisions
is that many gun suicides involve someone else’s firearm or firearms purchased years
earlier. Still, a substantial number of suicides do involve recently
acquired firearms. And making gun acquisition even marginally more
difficult could reduce gun ownership over time. Having a firearm in one’s
home substantially increases the risk
of suicide.
In fact, in
a forthcoming statistical analysis we find that Walmart’s 1994 decision to
stop selling handguns reduced firearm suicides without increasing non-firearm
suicide. From 1994 to 2005, controlling for a variety of legal, social
and demographic variables, counties with Walmart stores experienced a 3.3 to
7.5% reduction in the gun suicide rate (without an increase in non-gun
suicides). Our estimates suggest that Walmart’s decision to stop selling
handguns has saved between 425–998 lives every year. Between 1994 and
2005, this represents more than 5,000 lives saved. On the other hand,
Walmart’s 2006 and 2011 decisions to discontinue then resume the sale of rifles
and shotguns in many of its stores did not significantly impact suicide.
The greater effect of the 1994 no-handgun policy makes sense. Seventy-five
percent of firearm suicides involve handguns.
The Walmart example shows that the decisions of private businesses can
significantly reduce gun violence. This is not to say that public policy
has no role. To the contrary, many public policy interventions have been
demonstrated to reduce gun violence, especially gun suicide. Gun sales
have surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, raising concerns about increased risk
of suicide
and domestic violence homicide. But public policies have mitigated
the surge in some states. For example, states like New
York where gun shops have been closed as non-essential businesses and
states with licensing requirements have experienced a reduction in firearm
sales.
Walmart’s recent
decision to restrict firearm displays should be applauded because it reduces
the chance that firearms from its stores will be looted and fall into the hands
of individuals who would misuse them. But our estimates underscore the
possibility that corporations can play a broader role in mitigating the
country’s gun suicide crisis. Walmart has led the way over the years with
a series of self-imposed firearm sales restrictions. Its decision in 1994
to stop selling handguns likely has saved thousands of lives. Customers
and employees at other substantial retailers, such as Bass Pro Shops and
Cabela’s (which still sellhandguns) and Dick’s Sporting Goods (which has
eliminated firearm sales at some of its stores), would do well to take note. It is time for
more corporate executives to show leadership on reducing gun violence.