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Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Timothy
Waters has written what is probably the wittiest book Yale U.P. will publish
this year, and remarkably it’s about the technical question of secession. The
front half of the book, on the breakup of colonial empires is written for the
legal historian, and as we had our own example of this in 1776 there’s no need
to revisit it. Of greater interest is his discussion of modern secession
movements in First World states, especially the example of Quebec separatism in
the 1970s and 1990s and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Reference on the Canadian Clarity
Act.[1]
The
unanimous Canadian decision is the fons et origo of the modern secession
question, at least for that country and our own. In the 1960s, Macleans
Magazine had a cover story on a Quebec separatist, René Levesque, with the
headline “Should this man be charged with sedition?” Ten years later, Levesque
was the premier of the province whose voters were being asked to decide on
secession in a referendum. That’s how fast these things can happen, and it
might well happen here. So at least I argue in American Secession, for
an overlarge country whose bitter divisions and separation of powers bid to
make it ungovernable.
American
Secession has been thought a constitutional impossibility since the Civil War
and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Texas v. White.[2]
In that case, decided after the War was good and over, the Court held that the
union was “perpetual,” as the 1781 Articles of Confederation had stipulated.
But almost none of the Framers of our Constitution, at their 1787 Convention,
thought that the Articles had survived, and if they were wrong then George
Washington was illegally elected president in 1789, since every state had to
agree before the Articles were amended and the last state to ratify the
Constitution did so only in 1790. Besides, as James Madison told the delegates,
if a state were invaded by the federal government, it would conclude that the
compact amongst the states was at an end. Yet when my Alexandria VA was invaded
in 1861, that was just what happened.
The
Canadian example puts to rest the fear that secession might lead to armed
conflict. English Quebecers were told, in the separatist government’s Bill 101,
that their language would have a second-class status in the province. The
Anglophones called it Bill 401. That’s the name of the highway between Montreal
and Toronto, and after the separatists came to power in Quebec several hundred
thousand English-speaking Quebecers simply moved to Ontario. So we’d not see a
war if a U.S. state seceded. Instead, we’d simply see the kind of sorting of
people that goes on today, for example between California and Texas.
Modernity
has led to one other great change, as Waters notes. Today, democracy is seen as
a grundnorm of constitutional government in Canada and in the U.S. That was how
the Canadian Supreme Court saw how Quebec might possibly accede to independence.
The Constitution … embraces the
entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of
constitutional authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of the
written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is
necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles
animating the whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism,
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.
A
solid vote in a clearly-worded secession referendum would reflect the
democratically expressed wishes of the voters and could not be ignored. On the
other hand, the votes of people in other states or provinces would matter too. While
Waters speaks of a “right” of secession, the Canadian court held that no such
thing exists. Instead, a successful secession referendum would simply initiate
a series of negotiations about the division of federal assets, the assumption
of the federal debt, the protection of minorities, free trade and related
matters, a bundle of interconnected relationships that the Quebec separatists
called “sovereignty-association.”
There
is one other great change, between 1861 and today, on which Waters did not
remark, and that is the expansion of the federal government. In 1861 the
federal footprint was so small that Henry Adams thought that secession could
happen easily. That’s not the case today, where so many Americans rely on the
federal government for jobs, welfare payments, or simply as the ultimate
guarantor of our security, as we discovered in the fallout from Hurricane
Katrina in 2005.
But
if that’s made the exit option more vexed, it’s also given states a greater
incentive to go their own way and leave the union. With the expansive power of
the federal government, we’ve lost much of the benefit of Tiebout sorting and
jurisdictional competition which secession might bring back, as I note in
chapter 11 of my book.
And
now I must reveal myself to be a unionist and not a secessionist, for I voted
against separatism in a Quebec referendum. I concede that people who live in
countries organized on linguistic grounds might have a greater sense of unity,
fellow-feeling and trust, but I was also happy to live in a bilingual country.
I thought that Anglo Torontonians would benefit from a bit of French-Canadian joie
de vivre and that it might do them good to be able to read Molière in the
original. I also believed that francophones might be benefited with a knowledge
of Shakespeare and even with a dose of Toronto’s dour rectitude. Civilization,
I concluded, was an Anglo-French condominium, like Egypt under the Khedives.
I also
think that clarity is overrated, that nothing is more dangerous than a sense of
justified hatred, that differences are best settled over cases of rye whisky, and that Teilhard de Chardin was not
altogether wrong when he wrote that everything that rises must converge.
F.H.
Buckley is Foundation Professor at Scalia Law School at George Mason
University. You can reach him by e-mail at fbuckley at gmu.edu.