E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
I would like to thank Jack Balkin and Mark Graber
for organizing this virtual symposium. In a short response it would be
difficult to do justice to the thoughtful responses of all of the contributors.
There is a vast and rich literature on early American constitutionalism that
spans multiple disciplines. The Partisan Republic draws liberally from
this immense body of scholarship. Sandy
Levinson shrewdly notes that The Partisan Republic does not fit easily
into the most familiar models of scholarship we have become accustomed to as
academics. It is far shorter than most synthetic works, avoids extensive
quotation from primary sources, and does not expressly engage with other
scholars’ work directly in the body of the text. These stylistic choices were
deliberate. The Partisan Republic
not only offers a new interpretation of early American constitutional history,
but a new model for how serious scholarship can reach a wider audience. The Partisan Republic can be read by
those with little background in the subject matter, but still speaks to our
scholarly peers across multiple disciplines. Threading this needle was not easy
and likely it meant that it took twice as long to write a book that ended up
being half the size of a more conventional history.
Mary Bilder and Greg Ablavsky echo a point made by
Sandy Levinson about the Partisan Republic’s effort to “expand the cast
of characters” beyond the “usual suspects” in traditional works of
constitutional history. Our efforts here
build on a generation of scholarship. All
three commentators correctly note that there is still much empirical work to be
done to recover the voices of these actors.
In this sense, our effort to write a constitutional history from the
bottom up to supplement the traditional court-centered top down approach was
less fully fleshed out than we might have wished. In particular, the literature
on gender and the Constitution in the early Republic is still far less
developed than the literature on race, a fact that Mary Bilder’s new project
will doubtless remedy. Gregg Ablavsky’s most recent scholarship, published
after our book went to press, also offers a fresh reading of federalism that
complicates our account in interesting ways and I wish I had the chance to
engage with his most recent arguments about federalism in the book.
Mark Graber and Mark Killenbeck draw attention to
the problems posed by cutting our story off in the Jacksonian era. The themes
of democracy, exclusion and party are not only relevant to the constitutional
politics of the period we cover in the Partisan Republic, but arguably
only became more important in the period after our volume ends. These issues continued to shape the contours of
constitutional development until the Civil War. One might argue that ending our
story so early diminishes its analytical power. Frankly, I agree with that
critique and taking the story forward in time would have been desirable. Although the book ends in the 1830s, the story
we set out to tell did not. Indeed, in the early planning stages of the book,
there was some very brief discussion of dividing the project into two separate
volumes. The first volume would have
covered the period 1788-1819 and the second volume would have explored
constitutional politics in the period between the Missouri Crisis and the Civil
War. I hope the editors of this important series consider commissioning such a
volume to address the era of sectional conflict and the coming of the Civil
War.
I want to focus the rest of my comments on the overlapping
themes explored in the thoughtful essays of Jud Campbell and Jonathan Gienapp. Both scholars focus on the implications of the
Partisan Republic for modern debates about constitutional meaning and
interpretation. ( I also suggest readers
consult the insightful exploration of these issues on Profsblawg
in a fascinating essay by NYU’s Rick
Hills.) History has always been
important to American constitutional theory, but until recently such debates
were not cast in the terms associated with constitutional originalism. Exploring the theoretical and empirical problems
with originalism would require a book length treatment, not a short blog
post. Rather than dive into that
sprawling debate, I want to highlight one of the most troubling aspects of
originalism: the failure to recognize the power of popular constitutionalism in
the Founding era. Most originalists
simply take it as a given that the people themselves were mute bystanders in
the great constitutional debates of the early republic. If the Partisan Republic accomplishes
nothing else, I hope that it shows that this claim is demonstrably false. The
people themselves took an active role in shaping early American constitutional
development. There are many ironies in the originalist use of democracy as a
trope and theoretical construct. The
supreme irony is that many in the Founding generation looked at democracy as a
danger to be avoided at all costs, not as a theoretical foundation for a
constitution whose meaning would be frozen in time. Although the Partisan
Republic falls short of providing a comprehensive history of popular
constitutionalism in the Founding era (a point made by many of the contributors
to this symposium) the book does demonstrate that even the landmark decisions
of the Marshall Court only make sense when one acknowledges the role of the
people themselves in the constitutional politics of the period.
A number of originalists have dismissed the
relevance of the people themselves, arguing that constitutional meaning is a
legal construct and popular ideas are largely irrelevant to the lofty world
inhabited by lawyers and judges. The Partisan
Republic not only offers strong evidence that this was not the case, but
even if this dubious claim were true this would not justify the simplistic
model of consensus history that virtually all originalists accept uncritically.
Conflict, not consensus, was the
defining feature of Founding era constitutional culture and law. There was no consensus among judges and
lawyers in the Founding era about how to read constitutional texts. In fact,
lawyers and judges may well have been more divided over such matters than
ordinary Americans. Restoring voices to groups who have been marginalized in
earlier accounts and recognizing the contingency of this formative period of
our constitutional tradition ought to spur innovative new research on the
Founding era. If The Partisan Republic makes a modest contribution to this
intellectual project, it will have achieved its main goal.
Saul
Cornell is the Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History at Fordham
University. You can reach him by e-mail at scornell1@fordham.edu.