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Since my article on the consequences of President Trump
cancelling the November election appeared in Politico, I have been
having an interesting discussion with Howard Wasserman.Professor Wasserman previously bloggedabout
essentially this problem and came to many of the same conclusions that I
did.He has since posted two thoughtfulresponses.
Professor Wasserman dove deeper than I did into the question
of gubernatorial appointments of replacements for senators whose terms expire
in January.He finds that three states,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode Island, lack laws empowering their governors to fill
vacancies in the Senate.If those seats
remained empty, the 51-49 Democratic Senate majority that I predicted would
turn into a 49-48 Democratic edge.All
three of those, however, are solid one-party states, and with the stakes this
high one can well imagine them rapidly enacting vacancy-filling statutes, with
their governors re-appointing the incumbents.This would only tip the balance if Oklahoma enacted such a statute and
neither of the others did.
A more intriguing puzzle is posed by North Carolina, a state
with an incumbent Republican senator but a Democratic governor.I had counted that as a Democratic pick-up if
the failure to hold an election left the Senate seat vacant.Professor Wasserman points out, however, that
North Carolina law
ordinarily requires the governor to appoint replacement senators from a list
submitted by the executive committee of the former senator’s party.If this procedure were followed, the
Republican executive committee might nominate incumbent Senator Tillis plus two
people so repugnant that they could be confident that the Governor would never
choose them.
But the law in question applies “[w]henever there shall be a
vacancy in the office of United States Senator from this State, whether caused
by death, resignation, or otherwise than by expiration of term”.As Senator Tillis’s current term is, in fact,
expiring, some might argue this means that the requirement to appoint from a
partisan list disappears:no senator had
previously been elected to the term beginning January 3, 2021, and therefore no
party executive committee has the right to submit a list of names.If so, in the absence of an election North Carolina
presumably gets a Democratic senator.If, on the other hand, this means that, under these circumstances, North
Carolina lacks gubernatorial appointment authority, the new Senate could be
deadlocked 48-48.
For what it is worth, North Carolina’s attorney general is a
Democrat and the balance of power on its Supreme Court is held by justices elected
without partisan affiliation.The Senate
might claim the right to resolve this question on the basis of its
constitutional right to judge the qualifications of its members, but if it has
48 other senators of each party it may have difficulty deciding whether a
Democrat appointed by Gov. Cooper may take office.Because North Carolina’s legislature is
staunchly Republican (though not by a veto-proof margin), the state presumably
would be unable to amend its gubernatorial appointment law.Again, however, if Oregon and Rhode Island
quickly give their governors appointment power, the lack of a North Carolina
senator would not matter.This does
raise the question of whether the party in opposition to the governor in some
other states will try to argue that their governors may not fill vacancies
resulting from the failure to hold an election.
Professor Wasserman also points out that a Democratic
majority might not wish to elect Sen. Leahy president pro tem, despite his being
its most senior senator, because his assuming the presidency would create a
vacancy in the Senate that Vermont’s Republican governor could then fill.I agree, under those premises.Because the Democrats could simply shift to
another senator whose governor is Democratic, Governor Scott might conclude
that he is conceding nothing – and could put a Vermonter in the White House –
if he promised to appoint a Democrat to replace Senator Leahy should his Senate
colleagues choose him.I cannot imagine
the Senate Democratic leadership would want a divisive open contest for
president-in-waiting.If they conclude
they dare not choose Senator Leahy, the next-most-senior Democrat is Senator
Dianne Feinstein of California, whose governor is a Democrat.
More broadly, the cancellation of an election is so abhorrent,
and the chances of taking the White House are so evenly balanced, that this
situation cries out for a negotiated compromise to avert the worst
constitutional crisis since Reconstruction.Resolving this conflict without a deal, and seating a president whom
half the country regards as a putschist, would be spectacularly dangerous.And the Supreme Court could destroy its
legitimacy – and hence its ability to resist all manner of court-packing
schemes – if it were to seat a Republican on a 5-4 vote.
Whether our current leaders are capable of that, however, is
far from clear.Entering into any kind
of compromise would surely be a career-ender for a Republican; depending on the
terms, it could ruin a Democratic leader as well.
As my Politico article suggests, however, a fair
number of individuals would have the chance to bring this contest to a decisive
conclusion.As few as four strategically
placed Republican representatives could tip the balance for Joe Biden in the
House, if it still exists.A Republican
senator could vote for the Democratic vice presidential candidate or to elect a
Democrat president pro tem of the Senate.A few Republican electors could decide that their party should not be
allowed to keep the presidency after cancelling the election.A few electors from each party could agree to
vote for someone other than President Trump or former Vice President Biden,
giving the House a third option.Figuring
out who a compromise candidate could be is difficult:perhaps former Rhode Island Governor and
Senator Lincoln Chafee (who has served in both parties), current Kansas
Governor Laura Kelly (who was elected with the support of many prominent
Republicans), or former Maine Senator Olympia Snowe (arguably the last moderate
Republican senator).(Here I am assuming
defections to place a Democrat or neutral in the White House as I cannot imagine
a Democrat wanting to reward President Trump or Vice President Pence for
cancelling the election – or bringing any of the party’s rank-and-file along if
they did.
Our system is not built to resolve this sort of question
cleanly because our nation’s leaders throughout the years have been confident it
could never occur.We should all hope
that they were right.