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Balkinization Symposiums: A Continuing List                                                                E-mail: Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu David Luban david.luban at gmail.com Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu Compendium of posts on Hobby Lobby and related cases The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War Powers, and OLC The Anti-Torture Memos (arranged by topic) Recent Posts The Supreme Court as running dog of the capitalist empire: Reflections on the Arbitration Act cases
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Tuesday, May 22, 2018
The Supreme Court as running dog of the capitalist empire: Reflections on the Arbitration Act cases
Sandy Levinson
A sensationalist title, to be sure. But it is important to recognize that the deepest ideological commitment of the current majority reveals itself not necessarily in constitutional law cases, where Anthony Kennedy, and even on occasion some of the other conservative justices, reveals a willingness to go off on what many of us would regard as "progressive" directions, just as some of the liberal justices, especially Breyer, can be found joining with his conservative colleagues in certain criminal procedure cases. But it should now be clear that the conservative majority has fully imbibed the notorious memo from Lewis Powell in the earlier '70s arguing that business interests had to devote themselves to capturing control of the legal culture in order to protect themselves from dangerously leftist ideas (including, for Powell, the notion that labor unions really had rights worthy of respect). The Court has made the Arbitration Act of 1925 into far, far more of a "constitutionalized" statute than it's now willing to do, say, with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, eviscerated in Shelby County by the usual five suspects. But the Arbitration Act is now given precedence over the later National Labor Relations Act, and it is clear that the majority is totally indifferent to the consequences for ordinary individuals of being effectively unable to seek meaningful legal redress.
Comments:
Nothing in the NLRA reverses the Arbitration Act and, until the radical Obama board, no NLRB for three quarters of a century attempted to rewrite the NLRA to do so.
This simple case should have been a 9-0 decision with an observation that legislation is Congress’s job.
SPAM's use of the word "simple" exemplifies his simplemindedness on what is fair and jus. The blindfold on Lady Justice serves to shield the eyes of the conservative Justices from the masses of Americans impacted by this decision, Americans lacking the bargaining power to refuse to accept such unconscionable provisions in employment and other agreements.
Regarding Sandy's title to this post, it should be recognized that a "capitalist empire" is not necessarily a democracy. Many, perhaps most, Americans lack the capital needed for sufficient bargaining power to challenge agreeing to such provisions. By the Bybee [expletives deleted, despite Gina], Lewis Powell expressed those views before he became a Justice. As a lawyer, he represented businesses. Powell put his twist on Calvin Coolidge's famous remarks on the role of business in America. Now Pres. Trump has taken Article II's "take care" clause to include his own Trump Enterprises. And I share Sandy's concerns with the Revengelicals (FKA Evangelicals) being "thrilled" by the addition of Justice Gorsuch) to the Court.
Filibustered Obama judicial nominee Victoria Nourse did argue in "A Tale of Two Lochners" that the Supreme Court in the "Lochner Era" overall used their judicial review power narrowly, excepting certain economic cases that get/got a lot of attention.
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/999/ The Bill of Rights ("so-called" might be a reference to a new book by a co-blogger here, GM?) did have a bit of bite in the 1930s (e.g., Near v. Minnesota; Scottsboro Cases). Heck, even the lower courts pre-Buck v. Bell repeatedly struck down or limited eugenics laws. The courts did expand its use of judicial review in civil liberty cases post-New Deal though. Jack Balkin has noted that the judicial nomination process provides a limited democratic check that helps develop the law. Prof. Lain on Twitter recently referenced an article she wrote that argues as well that sometimes the courts protects majority will: https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/147/upside-down-judicial-review/pdf But, the system is skewered some, including in ways Sandy Levinson has strongly criticized, to promote a certain minority control. Checks of the majority in various ways is good. Other times, less so. Anyway, the process in place [after a different approach in the FDR-LBJ days] has brought a Supreme Court that views the law in a conservative business sense in various respects. Thus, arbitration cases with 5-4 judgments. Judges are a result of a political process. There is a reason not to like its outputs these days. A lot of sand has been thrown in the works too.
I think you're giving Powell too much credit/blame here. Sure, he created the blueprint, but the proximate cause of the current majority is (a) McConnell's willingness to play constitutional hardball; and (b) the EC. Longer term, we might blame the EC for Roberts and Alito too, though that's less clear.
It's certainly clear, though, that liberals have placed less emphasis on the Court than they should have been doing for the past 25 years. And many who call themselves "leftists" treat it as unimportant. Those have to change, if we are ever to recover the Republic.
I question Mark's "certainly clear" in the closing paragraph of his comment. In any event, the Constitution does not specifically provide for judicial supremacy over the elective federal branches.
The lower courts changed over the years but it is striking that the last time a majority of justices were appointed by a Democratic President was around 50 years ago.
The center of the Court in the 1970s to 1990s was more in flux with multiple justices on various issues joining the liberals. It's more obvious now. Justice Garland would have balanced things. Bush41 appointing Souter, who reflected New England Republicanism of the early Bush sort helped temper things and Kennedy did as well. Control of the Senate matters though even if the Democrats were able to vote down Alito, somewhat unlikely a more moderate Republican pick would have been forced since it wasn't the same "perfect storm" Bork was. The courts were a strong concern of many Trump voters. (One poll had it as a 30% importance thing.) Meanwhile, some whined that Garland -- a Breyer trade-off for Scalia -- was too white-bread or something. FWIW, Senate Democrats have shown some spine on judicial nominations though they have limited power. And, no, net I think ending the filibuster was appropriate in that case, especially given the whole story at the time.
Ages of the current Justices when appointed:
Roberts 40; Kennedy 51; Thomas 43; Alito 55; Gorsuch 49. Ginsburg 60; Breyer 56; Sotomayor 55; Kagan 50. And that's not counting the fact that Ginsburg was a cancer survivor, Sotomayor has Type 1 diabetes, and Kagan is a smoker. In addition, the "liberal" justices are much less liberal than 4 of the 5 conservatives are conservative. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_U.S._Supreme_Court_justices#/media/File:Graph_of_Bailey_Scores_of_Supreme_Court_Justices_1950-2011.png
The Constitution does not provide age provisions in Article III and provides lifetime appointments subject to few challenges. People are living longer, including members of the Court. Perhaps Justices don't retire to the same extent as in the past. Were Democrats derelict in appointing older, perhaps unhealthier persons to the Court? I don't know if that case can be made. As to the less liberal, more conservative, perhaps that comes with the numbers and might reverse if liberals were in the majority. The goal is to get to 5. Justices can change over time, as with Souter and Blackmun. The past 25 years have seen accelerating political dysfunction and major changes in Senate rules on judicial confirmations. Perhaps the situation is the luck of the draw as well as longevity of some Justices.
Off specific topic but perhaps relevant to the current political environment is this NYTimes article I just read at its website: "As Population Growth Slows, Populism Surges" By Philip Auerswald and Joon Yun focusing on fertility declines not only here, but in many countries, resulting in the drift between rural and urban politically, with resulting populism. The article includes an interesting paragraph on recognition of this issue a few years back in Russia by Putin. Scary.
Roberts was 50.
Longer life spans is an additional reason why limited terms might be a good idea for at least Supreme Court justices and 18 years might be a good idea. There has been some argument made that this doesn't require a constitutional amendment since you can give life tenure to a federal judge without necessarily it being all for one position. So, e.g., David Souter resigned from SCOTUS, but still served as a court of appeals judge. A justice can also finish an eighteen year term and be active to fill in vacancies in case of recusal. "Good behavior" particularly is a guard against political interference. Independence would still exist with such limited terms. The necessity of a fully open-ended tenure on one panel is unclear. An open set of judges randomly assigned to circuits that need a vacancy, a sort of roving temp, seems constitutional.
"Independence would still exist with such limited terms. "
Only if they were either automatic, or at the choice of the judge himself. If it were discretionary on the part of anybody else, not so much.
And applying even a newly instituted automatic reassignment in the case of existing Supreme court Justices could be just a means of court packing; Such a change would have to be scheduled far enough out nobody would know the political impact.
Only if they were either automatic, or at the choice of the judge himself. If it were discretionary on the part of anybody else, not so much.
I'm not sure what "discretionary" means here. Congress would have the choice to set forth a new rule -- now there isn't such a rule, but via its power over the courts [e.g., the number of justices or how many are required for a quorum], they can choose, have discretion, to set up a new automatic rule. It wouldn't only apply to disfavored nominees, if that is the concern. applying even a newly instituted automatic reassignment in the case of existing Supreme court Justices could be just a means of court packing I think the rule would apply prospectively to new nominees. The justices were appointed with the understanding they would fit into the current system. Of course, there is a power to "court pack" -- e.g., expand the number of justices. But, that isn't the idea here. It simply is, as applied to all justices let's say, to have a fixed term of full active service on the Supreme Court. Judges still will serve by good behavior. Specifics are flexible. The original Supreme Court, e.g., rode circuit. This significantly affected things, including wear and tear that affected length of terms and who was on the job.
Reading the decision and commentaries as a layperson, not a lawyer, I can't help but feel that the pro-employer advocates have the better statutory interpretation arguments here, even though the pro-worker advocates have the better public policy arguments. Which leads me to wonder whether it's the Supreme Court that is running dog, or the U.S. Constitution itself. Isn't there a very good explanation of this decision implicit in KLarman's "The Framers Coup"?
Excluding slavery, the Constitution of 1787 (including the bill of rights) seems neutral vis-a-vis employers and workers. But perhaps some of the "principles" of slavery are reflected in decisions of the conservative wing of SCOTUS.
Back in 1787, agriculture engaged many of the populace, usually family farms, except for the slaveowners' plantations. This was pre-industrial revolution. Other than such plantations, what constituted big business as we have today back then?
Bob Richard's comment is a mix curious.
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If the Court decided things statutorily the right way, what exactly is the issue? Is it that there is an assumed problem regarding why the law hasn't been changed by Congress yet? There are various reasons why something that is "pro-worker" wouldn't pass Congress. And, since the specific thread of cases involved here are pretty recent, it is even more understandable. I don't know why it "can't be helped" that the pro-employer side is correct, but a 5-4 case makes it fairly unsurprising that people can be found for both sides of the argument. Maybe it again boils down to that there are debatable issues here and who controls the government and gets to pick the justices is the deciding factor.
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