E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
If,
as I argued earlier this week, the 2001 AUMF passed by Congress cannot be read
to authorize the growing set of U.S. military actions against Syrian and
Iranian forces in Syria, does the President’s Article II power standing alone
support these strikes? The best articulated argument I’ve seen that the
President has the Article II power to attack Syrian aircraft (or Iranian drones
or any non-ISIS force in Syria) in the interest of defending U.S.-allied Syrian
government rebels goes something like this.The President surely has Article II authority to act in defense of U.S.
facilities and troops overseas without first waiting for congressional
authorization, a necessary extension of the President’s power (on which there
is near uniform agreement) to “repel sudden attacks.”As relevant here, this authority should be understood
to extend to the defense of certain organized third parties (whether a state
like Britain or our allied non-state Syrian Democratic Forces) operating (as
Bobby Chesney puts it) “in close coordination with the U.S. military in a
combat setting.”In such a situation, I
take the idea to be, our interests are closely enough aligned and our military
forces closely enough entangled, that an attack (or threatened attack) on a
third party ally is effectively the same as an attack on us.
This
‘third party self-defense’ theory of the scope of Article II power is in one
sense quite a bit narrower the currently prevailing position of the Justice
Department Office of Legal Counsel – which, under President Obama, took the view that the President has constitutional authority to use military force on his
own so long as an important U.S. interest was at stake, and so long as the quantum
or nature of contemplated force didn’t actually amount to “war” within the
meaning of the Constitution’s “declare war” clause. Under this OLC view – based in part on OLC’s
assessment of post-World War II presidential practice – one need not develop
any specialized theory of third party self-defense to justify the use of
executive power here; the current President could surely assert one of several
U.S. concerns in Syria as the important interest at stake (say, protecting
the interest of regional stability), and
so long as the strikes were limited in scope and duration (i.e. less than
“war”), all of these actions could be said to fall within the scope of Article
II, whether defense of battlefield allies was among the expressly named
interests or not.
Yet
there are at least three ways in which this ‘third party defense’ notion may be
said to go beyond even the broad 2011 OLC conception of presidential power: (1)
I am not aware of any previous practice in which the President has asserted the
particular national interest of defending battlefield allies as such as a
justification for authorizing the use of force abroad. Now it is surely one of the difficulties with
the 2011 OLC opinion that it leaves so open-ended the question of what counts
as an national interest sufficiently important for the President to use force,
but if we are to take seriously the notion that past practice matters here, it
would seem important to identify some at least analogous illustration on which
to rely. (2) To the extent past examples of “important” national interests
matter, the case for using force to protect a zone in a foreign country within
which our own military might train opposition forces strikes me as vastly less
impressive than the interest in, say, ridding the world of the scourge of
chemical weapons. Indeed, the “de-confliction”
zone we are now using force to protect is just over the border
from a country (Iraq) in which we have every right (thanks to that nation’s
consent) to be operating militarily and, presumably, training anti-ISIL forces
all we like.
Above all, (3) in the 2011
Libya strike (and almost all previous post-World War II executive operations), unilateral
executive uses of force abroad were taken in
concert with UN authorities. For
reasons I alluded to briefly in my previous post, both our downing of the
Syrian jet and the recent U.S. strikes to preserve its non-state allies’ right
to operate in the “de-confliction” zone appear to be in violation of the UN Charter (a treaty we are obligated to
observe as supreme law of the land under our own Constitution’s Article VI). Whether one considers that an Article II
problem, an Article VI problem, or simply a violation of international law – the
United States’ legal position here is as precarious as it gets.