E-mail:
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Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
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Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
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David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Independence and Accountability in Investigations of High-Level Officials
Mark Tushnet
I've been working on two papers dealing with the constitutional design of permanent agencies charged with investigating high-level corruption, agencies that are common around the world. As with courts, the design issues involve achieving the appropriate combination of independence and accountability. As a shorthand: Designers need to figure out ways to avoid overzealousness by the investigators while reducing the risk of underenforcement or selective enforcement. (My current thought is that a multi-headed agency rather than a single investigator is the way to go.)
The immediate responses to the Comey firing raise interesting questions about the "design" issues when one is appointing a temporary investigator for a single inquiry. My only thought here is a snarky one about how the design issues are addressed in U.S. politics. There appear to be two principles at work. (1) Where the subject of the investigation is a Republican, only a Republican investigator will have enough credibility to conduct an investigation whose outcome will be broadly acceptable. (2) Where the subject of the investigation is a Democrat, only a Republican investigator will have enough independence to conduct an investigation whose outcome will be broadly acceptable. One senses that there's actually only one principle at work. [I put to one side the already circulating, even more snarky suggestion that the President should nominate Merrick Garland to replace Comey, or should be named as the special prosecutor/counsel.]