E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
The
Vox story recommended below struck a particular nerve with me. So I will record my disagreement, at least
from a methodological perspective, with some of the views expressed by
the various eminent scholars consulted in the well-reported story about how to
tell whether we are in a constitutional crisis.
I engaged with Keith Whittington on this question long ago on the Law
courts list. That’s because Keith took
issue with the discussion of constitutional crises in my first book American Constitutionalism. I followed up by replying in Long Wars and theConstitution and in a short article taken from Long Wars which can be accessed here. So, from my perspective, here we go again.
Two
general observations. Constitutional
crises are historical events and I hope we can agree that they are best studied
as history, that is, taking into consideration the self-conscious understanding
of the participants. I think it sensibly
follows that it is best to proceed inductively, by examining widely agreed-on
instances of constitutional crises to build a theory about what they are and
why they occur. But this pretty clearly
puts me at odds methodologically with Keith, who would rather proceed from
first premises.
And
I do agree with the scholars consulted that the current situation doesn’t count
as a constitutional crisis (subject to the comments below and see this article referencing
a “governing crisis” in the Trump administration).
Nevertheless,
something is a bit off with the views expressed in the article. After reading it you might well wonder
whether there were any constitutional crises at all in the twentieth century,
at least after the 1957 Little Rock crisis.
I didn’t see a reference to the 1937 confrontation between FDR and the Court,
Watergate, and Iran-contra. They were
certainly perceived as crises at the time which from my perspective makes them
canonical. Any theory of constitutional
crises thus has to account for them. Consider
that the scholars consulted agree that if President Trump were to defy a
federal court order, that would probably qualify as a constitutional crisis. But what if the president leads a criminal
conspiracy to discredit his opposition and stay in office? That doesn’t count? For these scholars, Watergate is reduced to
whether Nixon defied the Court in the wake of the ruling in US v. Nixon (he
didn’t). But as I detail in Long Wars, Watergate was a crisis long
before July 1974.
So
let’s restart.
In American Constitutionalism, I argued
that constitutional crises in American history are typically characterized by a state of fundamental uncertainty.
Surely stability is a key goal of any constitution and it is certainly a
quality attributed to the U.S. Constitution.
In constitutional crises, however, the Constitution’s normal polarity reverses
and unexpectedly injects instability and uncertainty into daily politics. The secure framework for politics the
Constitution normally provides looks increasingly shaky. People begin to feel nervous about what
should be standard government operations.
By the way, feeling a bit queasy these days? Without question, many Americans are.
Now in
any given crisis, you might think that it is the officials running the
institutions that are the problem, not the Constitution itself. But what do you think the Constitution
is? It is this question that lies at the
heart of many conundrums in constitutional theory, including how to understand
constitutional crises. If the
Constitution is implemented or enforced through institutions, then the
operation of those institutions will tend to determine what the Constitution is
in a practical sense. In other words, I
think it is more useful to see constitutional crises as generated internally
rather than externally. To be sure, the
country might be invaded and we might only then discover that the government
lacked the power to respond because of some flaw in the Constitution. But history shows that this is unlikely.
Look
again at the current situation. One plausible path
for analysis unmentioned in the Vox article is that Trump himself,
the fact that he could get elected at this moment in American history, is the
crisis. Trump is the crisis. After
all, he is plausibly the “chaos president” so ably described by Jeb Bush. If he is, no good will come of this. But the views expressed by scholars in the
article seem to be “externalist.” They
portray Trump in a bumper car, as it were, bouncing off a black box called the
Constitution. Checks and balances save
the day. But where did Trump come from?
In American Constitutionalism I proposed
that it is appropriate to use the word “crisis” in a situation in which the
apparently normal operation of the constitutional system indicates “that
something is fundamentally wrong with the way the system is operating as a
whole.” I went on to raise the issue of
the decline in political trust, referencing Ross Perot’s surprising showing in
the 1992 election, saying “The emergence of a significant group of citizens who
are profoundly alienated from politics and government and feel powerless to
affect ostensibly democratic institutions is the most disturbing aspect of the
contemporary constitutional system.” I’m
feeling pretty good about this 20-year-old analysis in light of the populist
insurgency which is hammering both political parties today. It is noteworthy that John Judis similarly
refers to the reemergence of the “middle American radical” in his trenchant analysis
in The Populist Explosion.
We
should be alive to the possibility that a candidate like Trump could emerge only
after a period in which the Constitution was misfiring, whether you want to
call it gridlock or not. For some time,
we have been ripe for a crisis of trust.
As I argue in Broken Trust, government institutions need trust to
reproduce themselves (and their norms) effectively across time. Continual low trust in government seems to
have caught up with us. Even if some
legitimate process removes Trump before his four years are up, we are in deep
trouble. And yes, it is constitutional
trouble (although, perhaps, not quite a crisis yet!).