E-mail:
Jack Balkin: jackbalkin at yahoo.com
Bruce Ackerman bruce.ackerman at yale.edu
Ian Ayres ian.ayres at yale.edu
Corey Brettschneider corey_brettschneider at brown.edu
Mary Dudziak mary.l.dudziak at emory.edu
Joey Fishkin joey.fishkin at gmail.com
Heather Gerken heather.gerken at yale.edu
Abbe Gluck abbe.gluck at yale.edu
Mark Graber mgraber at law.umaryland.edu
Stephen Griffin sgriffin at tulane.edu
Jonathan Hafetz jonathan.hafetz at shu.edu
Jeremy Kessler jkessler at law.columbia.edu
Andrew Koppelman akoppelman at law.northwestern.edu
Marty Lederman msl46 at law.georgetown.edu
Sanford Levinson slevinson at law.utexas.edu
David Luban david.luban at gmail.com
Gerard Magliocca gmaglioc at iupui.edu
Jason Mazzone mazzonej at illinois.edu
Linda McClain lmcclain at bu.edu
John Mikhail mikhail at law.georgetown.edu
Frank Pasquale pasquale.frank at gmail.com
Nate Persily npersily at gmail.com
Michael Stokes Paulsen michaelstokespaulsen at gmail.com
Deborah Pearlstein dpearlst at yu.edu
Rick Pildes rick.pildes at nyu.edu
David Pozen dpozen at law.columbia.edu
Richard Primus raprimus at umich.edu
K. Sabeel Rahmansabeel.rahman at brooklaw.edu
Alice Ristroph alice.ristroph at shu.edu
Neil Siegel siegel at law.duke.edu
David Super david.super at law.georgetown.edu
Brian Tamanaha btamanaha at wulaw.wustl.edu
Nelson Tebbe nelson.tebbe at brooklaw.edu
Mark Tushnet mtushnet at law.harvard.edu
Adam Winkler winkler at ucla.edu
Americans elites in 1824 successfully prevented a demagogue from
assuming the presidency. The demagogue,
Andrew Jackson, won a clear plurality of the popular votes and a small
plurality of electoral votes.
Nevertheless, because he did not win the majority of the Electoral College
votes, the election was decided by the House of Representatives. In the subsequent politicking, Henry Clay
threw his support to John Quincy Adams, which enabled framing elites and their
biological descendants to retain control of the executive branch of the
national government.
This elite success was short-lived. Badly divided and lacking strong public
support, the second Adams Administration accomplished little. Jackson’s supporters, outraged by what they
perceived as a “corrupt bargain” between elites, took their revenge in the 1826
midterms and 1828 national election.
Jackson, who received only 41 percent of the popular vote in 1824,
received 56% of the vote in 1828. Every
elite fear was realized over the next eight years. Jackson and his allies in Congress sponsored
a genocidal removal of native Americans from the south, substantially increased
national support for human bondage, created a recession by destroying the
national banking system, put an end to internal improvements, and scuttled
plans for a national university. Jackson’s
bellicosity set in motion the events that led to the Mexican War and probably,
the events that led to the Civil War.
Elites may have won the battle in 1824, but their means of success
helped cost them the war.
American elites were right to perceive a constitutional
crisis in 1824, but they misperceived that crisis. Jefferson, Madison, the Adams clan, and other
persons associated with the framing generations loathed Andrew Jackson, a
person they correctly regarded as constitutionally unsuited for the presidency
because of his bigotry, proclivity to violence and lack of knowledge about
public affairs. The actual
constitutional crisis in 1824 was that a substantial percentage of American
voters enthusiastically cast their ballots for a person constitutionally
unsuited for the presidency because of his bigotry, proclivity to violence and
lack of knowledge about public affairs. This
obsession with the violent sociopath rather than with the political movement that spawned
and empowered the violent sociopath furthered the collapse of the elite constitutional
republic envisioned by the framers. Taking
the election away from Jackson produced four years of political gridlock which
further augmented the number of persons who cast their ballot for the person
constitutionally unfit by 1787 standards to hold the presidency.
Whether American elites (of which I am a card-carrying
member) will fare any better in 2016 should the Electoral College by some
miracle take the election away from Donald Trump than American elites fared in
1824 when they took the election away from Andrew Jackson is doubtful. Such a success will temporarily disempower
Donald Trump while almost certainly increasing the rage of his supporters. Whether justified or not, Trump voters and
some others will perceive that a corrupt bargain has taken place and redouble
their efforts to gain control of the national government. The gridlock produced by a Hillary Clinton
presidency is likely to further augment the number of enraged Trump voters who
will either elect Trump or someone as bad in 2020 (an electoral college
compromise that produces John Kasich or Paul Ryan is hardly better).
The lesson 1824 should teach 2016 is that the approximately
47% of voters who cast ballots for Donald Trump on election day is the most fundamental crisis
of our time rather the accidental outcome that a person grossly unfit for the
presidency was elected this time. A
nation in which 47% of the voters are willing to vote for a person patently
unqualified to be president of the United States (or Treasurer of the Linden Community
Civil Association for that matter) is a nation in deep constitutional trouble
regardless of whether by accidents of timing and whether that candidate wins or
loses. And, under the rules, the
candidate won. Claims that Clinton “really”
won the election because she won the majority of the popular vote are the
political equivalent of northern claims before the Civil War that Southerners
only gained control of the national government because their representation in
Congress and the Electoral College was augmented by the three-fifths
clause. True, but beside the point.
Andrew Jackson (eventually) and Donald Trump gained office
because they garnered enough support to win national elections under the rules that
then governed national elections.
Demonstrations that the rules were not democratic, even grossly
undemocratic, neither change this political fact nor change the political fact
that approximately half the American people approve of Donald Trump nor change the
political fact that to regain control of the national government, the left will
have to win by playing according to existing rules and practices (which are
likely to become even worse during the Trump presidency). Once the left gains control of the national
government, then and only then should left worry about what
constitutional rules can be changed informally and what ought to be changed
formally. In the meantime, we need to follow Abraham Lincoln, who spent almost no time during the 1850s persuading the already persuaded that the three-fifths rule was unfair and a good deal of time persuading crucial voters (by the rules of the time) that both their principles and their self-interest were better served by Republicans than Jacksonian Democrats. One hopes this lesson is learned in less than thirty years.
UPDATE: I really should read the most recent Balkinization posts before posting. Needless to say, while I share Sandy's fears about a Trump presidency, I think the lesson history teaches is that constitutional parlor tricks (which is what I perceive the "Hamiltonian" solution to be) are failures, even when they work. Perhaps, however, one reason is that I genuinely think that a Rubio presidency with the present Congress is likely to be about as bad as a Trump presidency.